Timothy W. Crawford's The Power to Divide examines the use of wedge strategies, a form of divisive statecraft designed to isolate adversaries from allies and potential supporters to gain key advantages. With a multidimensional argument about the power of accommodation in competition, and a survey of alliance diplomacy around both World Wars, The Power to Divide artfully analyzes the past and future performance of wedge strategy in great power politics.
Crawford argues that nations attempting to use wedge strategy do best when they credibly accommodate likely or established allies of their enemies. He also argues that a divider's own alliances can pose obstacles to success and explains the conditions that help dividers overcome them. He advances these claims in eight focused studies of alliance diplomacy surrounding the World Wars, derived from published official documents and secondary histories. Through those narratives, Crawford adeptly assesses the record of countries that tried an accommodative wedge strategy, and why ultimately, they succeeded or failed. These calculated actions often became turning points, desired or not, in a nation's established power.
For policymakers today facing threats to power from great power competitors, Crawford argues that a deeper historical and theoretical grasp of the role of these wedge strategies in alliance politics and grand strategy is necessary. Crawford drives home the contemporary relevance of the analysis with a survey of China's potential to use such strategies to divide India from the US, and the United States' potential to use them to forestall a China-Russia alliance, and closes with a review of key theoretical insights for policy.
Frequently asked questions
How do I cancel my subscription?
Simply head over to the account section in settings and click on âCancel Subscriptionâ - itâs as simple as that. After you cancel, your membership will stay active for the remainder of the time youâve paid for. Learn more here.
Can/how do I download books?
At the moment all of our mobile-responsive ePub books are available to download via the app. Most of our PDFs are also available to download and we're working on making the final remaining ones downloadable now. Learn more here.
What is the difference between the pricing plans?
Both plans give you full access to the library and all of Perlegoâs features. The only differences are the price and subscription period: With the annual plan youâll save around 30% compared to 12 months on the monthly plan.
What is Perlego?
We are an online textbook subscription service, where you can get access to an entire online library for less than the price of a single book per month. With over 1 million books across 1000+ topics, weâve got you covered! Learn more here.
Do you support text-to-speech?
Look out for the read-aloud symbol on your next book to see if you can listen to it. The read-aloud tool reads text aloud for you, highlighting the text as it is being read. You can pause it, speed it up and slow it down. Learn more here.
Is The Power to Divide an online PDF/ePUB?
Yes, you can access The Power to Divide by Timothy W. Crawford in PDF and/or ePUB format, as well as other popular books in Politik & Internationale Beziehungen & Diplomatie & Abkommen. We have over one million books available in our catalogue for you to explore.
The theoretical framework comprises two elements. The first, the âcoreâ theory, is an âabstract conceptual modelâ that identifies the âcritical variablesâ of the strategy and the âgeneral logic associated with [its] successful use.â1 It describes how selective accommodation works (when it works) and suggests conditions under which states are likely to attempt it (what I call âinitiationâ conditions).2 The second consists of propositions about contingent conditions, and associated mechanisms, conducive to the success or failure of attempts. Like the initiation conditions, these are probabilistic. Combined, these elements offer an overarching framework to explain selective accommodation attempts and outcomes, one that is geared to the priorities of policy-applicable theory. It thus furnishes two kinds of âusableâ theoretical insight: (1) a general conceptual model of the strategy of selective accommodation, and (2) generic knowledge about the conditions that favor its success.3
Because this framework does not cover all of the potential causes, actors, and interactions that may produce outcomes, and because its propositions are probabilistic, the theoryâs limits are worth noting. It cannot offer a parsimonious âcovering lawâ explanation of outcomes across the range of cases. Nor can it identify, in the linkages between attempts and their outcomes, a master intervening variable that consistently determines success and failure. In different cases, different contingent conditions will weigh more heavily in shaping developments.4 The framework thus anticipates âequifinalityââthe possibility that âdifferent causal pathways ⊠lead to similar outcomes.â5 Moreover, even when the values of all of the elements of the theoretical framework are strongly congruent with the outcome of a case, this can only yield a âpartial equilibriumâ account. That is because the theory covers only a subset of the strategic interactions (involving the divider, target, and dividerâs allies) that combine to produce outcomes. Thus, in each case, actors and factors outside the theoryâs scopeâsuch as the reactions of the targetâs alignment alternatives, or the quality of domestic politics within key actorsâmay augment the explanation.6
Given those limitations, one can expect from the theory the following: first, to direct attention in each case to initial conditions and patterns of calculation, observable through process tracing that elucidates the dividerâs decision to initiate selective accommodation; second, that the contingent conditions implicated in each case correspond to features of the policy and strategic context that are salient to decision-makers operating within it; and third, that those contingent conditions specified in each case, and the mechanisms they entail, have leverageâthat is, they help explain decisions, moves, and interactions that are central to the chain of events leading to the outcome (i.e., success or failure) in each case.7
The Core Theory
The core theory contains the general conceptual model of selective accommodation and its basic influence formulaâthe use of positive incentives (e.g., promises, rewards, and concessions) to create divergent pressures on members or potential members of an opposing alliance. More specifically, the divider uses such inducements to accommodate a target âsingled out for preferential treatmentâ in order to lure or keep it away from a more dangerous main enemy.8
This definition implies, indeed presumes, a broader theoretical domainâa bargaining arena in which the divider competes against others in a âbidding warâ over the targetâs alignment.9 Although rooted in that image of alliance competition, the core theory abstracts away from certain aspects of it. It does not specify the alignment goals the other bidders will seek, or which of them will bid higher, or why they will do so, or whether they can do so credibly. But it does stipulate that the targetâs alignment will be determined by its assessment of the relative attractiveness of the benefits offered, which will reflect both the content and credibility of the alternative bids.10
The techniques that dividers can use to accommodate vary in their costs and utility. The costliest is appeasement (by which I mean the sacrifice of a primary interest), which is rarely used to divide. Less costly and more often used are concessions and compensation (which entail sacrifices of secondary values) and endorsement (which means extending diplomatic support for a targetâs position that conflicts with that of other potential adversaries).11 Whatever the form, the primary mechanism of influence is exchange: inducements are given or promised to a target in return for a desired change (or preservation) of its alignment. These accommodations will influence the targetâs choices by directly shaping its leadersâ view of the relative attractiveness of compliance versus other alignment options, and/or by âcatalyzingâ domestic political shifts in favor of a decision to comply.12 Either way, in the first instance, their relative value to the target is the driver.13
Though they can have these advantageous effects, accommodative bids are not generally cheap optionsâinstead, they are costly and risky. Like all influence attempts involving positive incentives, when they work, the logic of exchange makes them costly.14 That is, to win (or sustain) compliance, one has to give up something, either immediately or at a promised future point, or both. Along with that cost comes the risk that oneâs flexibility will convey weakness and invite more danger and demands.15 Such downsides raise the question, when are states likely to try selective accommodation? The propositions discussed next answer it.
Initiation Conditions
That selective accommodation entails costly exchange suggests two important things about when states will tend to try it. These are the deductive bases for the initiation propositions. First, there is a motive calculus: the state must face a situation pressing or threatening enough to prompt its leaders to consider giving up some things to someone who wants them, in order to get a less dangerous pattern of hostile alignment. Second, there is a means calculus: the state must believe it possesses reward power relative to the target. Beliefs that such reward power is very limited depress the motivation to try selective accommodation. Thus, for a state to initiate a serious attempt, its leaders must think they haveâor can controlâsome things that they can manipulate and dispense which are valuable to the target. These basic ideas are fleshed out next.
MOTIVE: BELIEFS ABOUT THE TARGETâS STRATEGIC WEIGHT
A dividerâs willingness to pay costs to influence the target is related to how much advantage it expects to gain by doing so.16 The concept of strategic weight captures this. The dividerâs assessment of a targetâs strategic weight boils down to beliefs about the potential impact of the targetâs alignment on war and peace outcomes vital to the divider.17 When it believes the targetâs alignment has high strategic weight, its motivation to influence the target successfully will be stronger, and so should be its willingness to make concessions to that end.
The determinants of strategic weight are varied and context-specific. They may figure in the dividerâs larger deterrence or coercive strategy. If its larger goal is to deter the main enemy, then it will rank the target as a strategic heavyweight if the enemy will be (1) likely to aggress if it has the target as an ally and (2) unlikely to if it does not. If the dividerâs goal is to coerce the main enemy on some issue, then it will rate the targetâs strategic weight highly if the enemy will be (1) likely to stand firm if the target is its ally and (2) likely to capitulate if the target is not.18 Similarly, perceptions of a targetâs strategic weight may reflect beliefs about the extent to which its alignment will delay or hasten the outbreak of war. Thus, for countries looking to âbuy timeâ before they have to fight, keeping the target neutral or detaching it from the main enemy may be seen as a way to slow the latter down.19 A targetâs strategic weight may also be reckoned in terms of how much its alignment will enable or impair the dividerâs plan to fight a war. If the divider has invested heavily in a war-fighting strategy that either depends on the targetâs neutrality for success or, much the same, becomes unworkable if the target joins the main adversary, then the divider will place high strategic weight on the targetâs alignment.
Especially in wartime, beliefs about strategic weight will focus on the targetâs âwar-tippingâ potential. These judgments may home in on the threats or opportunities posed by the targetâs capabilities per seâand the desire to deny them to the enemy or deploy them against it. They may also reflect a positional calculus, if the target is located in a place that will enable or obstruct operations with serious consequences for prosecution of the war effort. Finally, assessments of war-tipping potential may also turn on beliefs about the knock-on political effects of neutralizing or realigning the target. Thus, the divider may perceive the target to be a war tipper because it expects that a change in the targetâs alignment will trigger a series of alignment shifts that cumulatively will decide the war.20
For case analysis, I condense these variations into a simple categorical variable with two values. If evidence shows that the dividerâs leaders expect the targetâs alignment can swing their prospects against the main enemy in any of the ways just described, then the target has âHighâ strategic weight. If evidence shows that the dividerâs leaders do not believe that the targetâs alignment will have such effects, then the target has âLowâ strategic weight. Table 1 summarizes the logic.