Battle Story: Goose Green 1982

Gregory Fremont-Barnes

• Publisher: The History Press
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780752488028
• eBook ISBN: 9780752492568
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

The Battle of Goose Green was the first and longest land conflict of the Falklands War, which was fought between British and Argentine forces in 1982. The British forces, attacking over featureless, wind-swept and boggy ground, were heavily outnumbered and lacked fire support, but brilliantly defeated the Argentine garrison in a fourteen-hour struggle. If you want to understand what happened and why – read Battle Story. Detailed profiles examine the personalities of the British and Argentine commanders, including that of Victoria Cross winner Lt Col 'H' Jones. First-hand accounts offer an insight into this remarkable fourteen-hour struggle against the odds. Detailed maps explore the area of Darwin Hill and Goose Green, and the advance of the British forces. Photographs place you at the centre of this pivotal battle. Orders of battle show the composition of the opposing forces' armies. Packed with fact boxes, this short introduction is the perfect way to explore this crucial battle.

THE BATTLEFIELD:
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED?

The Assault Begins

27 May
2200 hrs	Rifle Companies move off towards their respective start lines; Capt. Arnold, Naval Gunfire Officer (NGFO), begins calling down fire on pre-determined targets
28 May
0145 hrs	NGFO begins registering HMS Arrow’s fire on to A Company’s first objective: Burntside House
0200 hrs	Intended time for A Company (Farrar-Hockley) to advance on Burntside House; after firing a few rounds and a star shell, the main armament of HMS Arrow jams; 2 Para’s support now confined to 3 x 105mm guns of 8 (Alma) Commando Battery, 3 x 81mm mortars, GPMGs and Milans
0235 hrs	A Company begins advance, 35 minutes late, via bridge crossing over Ceritos Arroyo Stream, with Burntside House its first objective
0250 hrs	British artillery opens fire on Burntside House as A Company approaches
0252 hrs	A Company makes first contact with Argentines at Burntside House
0300 hrs	B Company (Crosland) leaves its start line and begins its advance down the west side of the isthmus towards its first objective, Boca House; D Company (Neame) remains in reserve
0315 hrs	105mm shells from three guns of 8 Battery begin to fall on Burntside Hill
0400 hrs	B Company reports successful taking of Burntside Hill; Arrow’s main armament resumes firing – some illuminating rounds and high explosive – onto Goose Green airfield
0414 hrs	A Company in occupation of Burntside House
0421 hrs	A Company resumes movement after reorganising in darkness
0427 hrs	A Company reports no casualties and no enemy in contact
0430 hrs	B Company crests Middle Hill. After an hour idle west of Burntside House, A Company resumes its advance by Jones’ order
0445 hrs	HMS Arrow leaves waters off Goose Green isthmus

Responsibility for ensuring that A Company reached its start line rested with Lt Colin Connor, the Recce Platoon commander. A Company was to advance on Burntside House at 0200 hrs from a line of fences running north–south, approximately 500m east of the house. Difficulty lay in finding the correct fence in the pitch black, marking out the position and sending guides to the battalion rendezvous (RV), which stood on a bridge over the Ceritos Arroyo stream. The guides would then lead A Company to the start line – a distance of about 2,000m across small streams and boggy ground. Connor managed the navigation correctly, but he was running behind schedule. Maj. Farrar-Hockley’s A Company reached the start line and would begin its advance thirty-five minutes late. Support Company was next to move off, leaving Camilla Creek House at 1900 hrs on the 27th and establishing itself in its desired position overlooking Camilla Creek by 2200 hrs. There it waited until 0300 hrs on the 28th before it stood in a position to engage the Argentines. Finally, A Company left Camilla Creek House at 2220 hrs. All movement took place over sodden ground, which soaked the men’s feet in icy water, the discomfort exacerbated by bitterly cold temperatures and rainfall beginning in the early hours of the morning. The night was completely black and no one could see the objectives.

A modern aerial view of the settlement at Goose Green, looking southwest towards Choiseul Sound. In theory the isthmus offered numerous opportunities for an attacker to strike from the sea, but rocks along the coast and mines laid just behind many of the beaches precluded this option. (Author)

Farrar-Hockley’s A Company was first into the attack – in complete darkness, but not throughout, as the fighting was destined to last a staggering fourteen hours – realising afterwards his mistake in leaving behind the platoon 2in mortars. Still, his FOO had registered two targets: Burntside House and tents thought to be 500m to the right, near Burntside Pond. Accordingly, as A Company prepared to advance, the guns at Camilla Creek House began to fire, instantly shifting from a ‘silent’ to a ‘noisy’ attack. Since Capt. Watson, the FOO, could not see anything, he directed fire on the basis of the original grid references, with the hope that the flashes produced by exploding shells would enable him to adjust subsequent fire as required. As A Company reached Burntside House the gun crews lifted their fire – which, in the event, had failed to hit the house – and redirected it on the second target area. HMS Arrow, on whose heavy weight of fire so many in 2 Para depended, began her mission by firing star shells to help illuminate the battlefield. Although no light emerged from Burntside House and no fire originated from within, 3 Platoon took no chances and fired two 84mm Carl Gustav anti-armour missiles at the structure. The first round missed, while two further attempts ended in frustrating misfires, whereupon 2 Platoon sought the same result with rifle, machine-gun, and 66mm-rocket fire. Four civilians were inside but, lying on the floor, miraculously remained unscathed, despite a grenade exploding in one of the bedrooms. An Argentine platoon had indeed been present in the area, but had left either during or immediately prior to the assault. The position near the pond thought to contain tents nevertheless proved an error, although after the fighting two dead Argentines were found between the house and the pond.

With A Company’s objective secure – and without casualties – Jones now ordered B Company to begin its advance. Maj. Crosland’s men did not find it difficult to reach their start line, which required only that they follow a track leading south down a narrow section of land between Camilla Creek and Burntside Pond. Their start line stood only 100m from the Argentine position, a point chosen by the Patrols Platoon around midnight. B Company had arrived on time – no mean feat in darkness – but had to wait for A Company’s attack first. In order to take advantage of the massive firepower available from Arrow – a 4.5in gun capable of firing twenty-five to thirty shells a minute – the Company FOO had to identify the desired target and then order its illumination, before HE rounds could be called in. But while the plan appeared simple enough, its execution failed on the basis of no visibility, the result of a combination of darkness and rain (not to mention the fact that radio communication initially failed) causing Arrow to fire star shells without a clear indication of the target’s location, apart from the original grid reference. Once back on the net the NGFO announced that Arrow could no longer fire, the result of a mechanical failure in her turret – thus very prematurely ending the naval supporting fire upon which B Company expected to rely to aid its attack. Crosland had to press the attack nonetheless, with illumination only now theoretically available from the battalion’s two mortars. The shortage of artillery would soon manifest itself when the FOO called for the 105mm guns to switch their targets from those forward of A Company to those facing B Company, a process which took some time since A Company had now achieved its objective. Nevertheless, without illuminating rounds available, no light could be provided to B Company.

MIXED QUALITY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE

The assessment of the SAS that the troops on the isthmus were demoralised, hungry and numerically weak proved false. Fortunately, the two Recce Platoon patrols Jones dispatched on 27 May provided him with enough intelligence to appreciate this, though the patrols could not see as far as Darwin, much less Goose Green itself. At the colonel’s commanding officer’s ‘O’ group, Jones indicated that an Argentine infantry company was reported occupying Coronation Point; this was in fact not the case. Jones was aware that sixteen trenches were identified on the northern slope of the ridge about 650m west of Darwin inlet, but he surprisingly issued no orders to bombard this position, to deploy a smoke screen to mask A Company’s advance or to assign a sub-unit to capture this point.

In the absence of this particular form of ordnance, the 105s fired on the best available grid reference, adjusting the fall of their shells according to the resulting flash and sound. Employing this unscientific but not altogether ineffective method, the guns continuously fired as B Company advanced; the shells dropping ahead of the troops in the manner of a ‘creeping barrage’, a tactic developed during the First World War. The men began their move at 0300 hrs, en route to their objective, Boca House, 5,000m distant. Crosland had devised a simple plan:

My orders were clear – advance straight down the west side destroying all in the way … The company was tight and prickly, with two machine-guns or an M79 per section. We contained a lot of firepower. This was going to be a violent gutter fight, trench by trench – he who hit hardest won.

(Adkin, Goose Green, pp. 188–9)

THE PITFALLS OF NIGHT-FIGHTING

When, before daylight, Major Crosland, B Company commander, was asked over the radio to identify his position, he admitted to having no idea: ‘Four hundred yards west of the moon for all I knew’. The difficulties associated with making progress in the dark, and systematically clearing trenches, led to inevitable delay in executing the CO’s complex plan, which required that B Company establish itself much closer to Boca House than it actually had by 0500 hrs, when Crosland began to organise the scattered elements of his company.

Employing machine-guns against the trenches, followed by grenades, Crosland’s men maintained the momentum of the attack throughout, making early contact with their opponents. Three minutes after leaving their start line, the leading sections destroyed a machine-gun post as the whole company continued to move forward, clearing trenches as they advanced. Inevitably, B Company came under mortar and artillery fire and amidst the gloom it took forty-five minutes alone to clear an Argentine position containing mortars and anti-aircraft missiles, which B Company had bypassed on its flank. Thus, notwithstanding the problems inherent in trying to maintain their cohesion in darkness, with Argentine resistance relatively light B Company had made significant progress during this opening phase of the attack – and all without loss to themselves. The company carried forward, although the CO had no idea where he actually was. Around 0500 hrs he began the lengthy process so characteristic of night actions, of reorganising and reassembling his men in preparation for their continued advance toward Boca House.

Nevertheless, Jones’ plan had fallen considerably behind schedule. Maj. Neame’s D Company, to be discussed shortly, was meant by this time to have reached the knoll near Camilla Creek, while Farrar-Hockley’s A Company, to be discussed later, was supposed to have reached Coronation Point and gone into reserve. A Company had in fac...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Contents
• Introduction
• Timeline
• Historical Background: What were they Fighting for?
• The Armies
• The Days Before Battle: Opposing Plans and Dispositions
• The Battlefield: What Actually Happened?
• After the Battle: Strategic Postscript
• The Legacy: Lessons Learned from Goose Green
• Orders of Battle
• Bibliography and Further Reading
• Author and Publisher’s Note
• Copyright