Eyes Only

The Secret Correspondence Between Eisenhower and Marshall

Andrew Rawson

• Publisher: The History Press
• Year: 2011
• Print ISBN: 9780752462905
• eBook ISBN: 9780752477749
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

When you arrived at work today, what was on your to-do list? On 6 February 1944, this landed on the desk of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, a request from General Dwight D Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe: 'Count up all the divisions that will be in the Mediterranean, including two newly arrived U.S. divisions, consider the requirements in Italy in view of the mountain masses north of Rome, and then consider what influence on your problem a sizable number of divisions, heavily engaged or advancing rapidly in southern France, will have on OVERLORD.' It puts that late delivery or forgotten invoice into perspective. Eyes Only is not a history of the campaigns that swept across Europe between June 1944 and May 1945 – it is military command at its rawest, in real time and with no benefit of hindsight. It follows the planning, execution and aftermath of the campaigns through the highest security level day-to-day correspondence between the two Generals; the ' Eyes Only ' cables. These candid words passed over their desks between December 1943 and December 1945, here fully annotated with background information. The cables start with the fraught six-month planning period for D-Day, followed by the establishment of the beachhead and the exhilarating advance across France. A difficult winter followed, culminating in attack and counterattack in the Ardennes. As Germany's collapse became imminent, attention focused on how to conclude the war without coming into conflict with the Soviet Army. After V-E Day, the problems of occupying Germany, de-Nazification, redeployment and humanitarian efforts are all on the agenda. Messages from the key politicians – Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin – are included. The two Generals have to deal with differences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, the effect of the Mediterranean battles on the Western Front campaign — and of course 'man management' of figures such as Patton, Montgomery and de Gaulle. Judge for yourself how two of the United States' greatest military leaders dealt with the burden of command in the eye of the storm of history.

1

DECEMBER 1943
AND JANUARY 1944

Establishing SHAEF Headquarters

Smith to Eisenhower

30 December

Ref: Algiers 21147

I have just received your 21147 and have given your message to General Wilson.¹ He will await your return to take over command, and may go on to Cairo to pack during the interim.

Have yet had no time to go into living accommodation. Am sure the house offered by the Ambassador will not be satisfactory to you. He wants you to occupy one floor. I also believe that this Headquarters should get out of London at the earliest possible moment. Aside from the threat of bombing, I do not think we shall ever get shaken down until we get away from Norfolk House² as the situation is the same as it was at the beginning of TORCH.³ I will talk over possible locations with Morgan.⁴

There are two things which you must discuss with utmost urgency while you are in the United States:

First is the Air Command setup covered by my message this morning. We all believe that the appointment of Tedder⁵ as Deputy Allied Commander without portfolio and Mallory⁶ as Air Commander-in-Chief will make a difficult situation. I personally believe that Tedder should be the real Air Commander and your advisor on air matters, which Mallory now considers himself. I don’t think there is a place for both of them.

There is also a question about Tactical Air Forces. These are now organized on a joint basis. Other than Mallory, who is Air Commander-in-Chief, there is no single Commander of the Tactical Air Forces as we had in the Mediterranean.

Both the above consistencies must be corrected and no formal directive should be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until you and Tedder are both here and you make your own recommendations. The present organization of COSSAC Headquarters⁷ can be made to conform to the setup you want with the change of a few names and the substitution of a few individuals. However, the organization is very top heavy. I talked with the Deputy C.I.G.S.⁸ this morning on personnel and made some progress. Will see General Brooke⁹ this evening and Ismay¹⁰ tomorrow. Devers¹¹ returns to Algiers with me and I will put him into the picture as rapidly as possible.

Suggest you leave the written memorandum authorizing Wilson and Devers to command to be delivered to me on my arrival, to be used if necessary.

Smith to Eisenhower

30 December

Ref: 6792

I have just had a talk with Wigglesworth¹² and a preview of the command set-up proposed here. The thing which disturbs me the most is the proposed air command, which either leaves Tedder without any direct air function, with Mallory the Commander and principal advisor of the C-in-C, or, as an alternative, if you decide to make Tedder your air advisor, would leave Mallory without any function.¹³

I am also concerned about the plans here for the establishment of two Tactical Air Forces. Wigglesworth and I are convinced this is most unsound at the moment. Apparently this proposal is incorporated in a British Chiefs of Staff paper which has been, or is about to be, sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval and the issuance of a directive to the Allied C-in-C. Strongly urge that you send a message to General Marshall requesting that no action be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on further command directives until you and Tedder are here and can be in the picture, and until you have had a chance to submit your recommendations.

Smith to Eisenhower

31 December

Ref: 6824

If C-in-C has already left, Gilmer forward to Galey in Washington.¹⁴ I find that the matter of air command of which I spoke has already been covered by Combined Chiefs of Staff directive issued some time ago. There is a difficult command situation from the air point of view, and I am meeting with Spaatz¹⁵ and Eaker¹⁶ tomorrow after which I will send you a long message to Washington.

I think accommodation provided will please you thoroughly. Very nice house in London, with all the facilities you like, including lots of fire-places. Either telegraph cottage or another one, very close for the country. Everything else in the way of accommodation is taken care of perfectly by Jimmy Gault’s¹⁷ arrangements. Telegraph cottage much improved since your occupancy, particularly from a heating stand point.

Have just had a long talk with C.I.G.S. Will probably get Gale,¹⁸ but not Strong¹⁹ except for a short time, to get things going in G-2. Other personnel requested will be available.

Making tentative arrangements for a very early move of this Headquarters to Aldershot. C.I.G.S. has been most helpful and only question now is of communications. Gault will immediately survey living accommodation in that area, and he thinks prospects are good.

General Wilson’s plans are now to go on to Cairo returning to Algiers shortly before your return. Spaatz’s plane will be available. Will not have to use the two documents I suggested.

Handing Over Command of the Mediterranean

Eisenhower to Smith

6 January 1944

Ref: 6490

Your telegram announcing arrival received. This morning I saw a telegram from AGENT²¹ to CARGO²² asking that Allied Command in the Mediterranean be transferred as of the 8th. I recommended to CARGO that he not only accept this, but to inform AGENT that you and I had foreseen this possibility and that I had left with you a written note authorizing General Wilson to take Command when he considered it necessary. In view of this development and the need for my going to the new station at the earliest possible date, I believe it would be best for me to go there directly from here. In this event Devers should also assume command of the American Theater on the date you and he may agree. Unless you find this plan completely unworkable I will tentatively plan to carry it out. However, I would like you to inform both Commanders that it would be my intention to come back to FREEDOM²² purely as a visitor within a week or ten days after I reach my new station merely to say goodbye to the many officers to whom I am indebted for fine service. I wou...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Contents
• Introduction
• 1 December 1943—January 1944, Setting Up SHAEF and Choosing Commanders
• 2 February 1944, Landing Craft Shortages; Can Southern France be Invaded?
• 3 March 1944, Concerns over the Italian Campaign while Organizing Support
• 4 April 1944, Discussions over Operation ANVIL and Patton Speaks Out
• 5 May 1944, Dealing with French Issues and Last Minute Problems
• 6 June 1944, Operation OVERLORD and Securing the Normandy Beachhead
• 7 July 1944, The Battle of the Bocage and Changes in Command
• 8 August 1944, The Breakout Begins and the Invasion in Southern France
• 9 September 1944, The Race Across France and Operation MARKET GARDEN
• 10 October 1944, Logistics Problems and Supply Shortages
• 11 November 1944, Grinding along the Siegfried Line and Rear Area Dilemmas
• 12 December 1944, The Lull Before the Storm and the Battle of the Bulge
• 13 January 1945, Erasing the Bulge and Plans for Defeat of Germany
• 14 February 1945, Slow Progress toward the Rhine in Atrocious Weather
• 15 March 1945, Crossing the Rhine and Plans for the Final Battle for Germany
• 16 April 1945, The Collapse of Nazi Germany and Meeting the Soviet Army
• 17 May 1945, VE-Day and Tense Times with the Russians and the Czechs
• 18 June, July and August 1945, Occupying Germany
• 19 October 1945, De-Nazification and a Looming Humanitarian Crisis
• Epilogue
• Plate Section
• Copyright