Grasping Gallipoli

Terrain, Maps and Failure at the Dardanelles, 1915

Peter Chasseaud, Peter Doyle

• Publisher: Spellmount
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780750962261
• eBook ISBN: 9780750963572
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

The failure of the Gallipoli campaign was instantly blamed on a great untruth – that the War Office was unprepared for Dardanelles operations and gave Sir Ian Hamilton little in the way of maps and terrain intelligence. This myth is repeated by current historians. The Dardanelles Commission became a battleground of accusation and counter-accusation. This book, incorporating much previously unpublished material, demonstrates that geographical intelligence preparations had indeed been made by the War Office and the Admiralty for decades. They had collected a huge amount of terrain information, maps and charts covering the topography and defences, and knew a great deal about Greek plans to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula. At least one plan was Anglo-Greek!

Much of this material, which is here identified and evaluated, was handed over to Hamilton's Staff. Additional material was obtained in theatre before the landings, T. E. Lawrence playing a part. Grasping Gallipolli, which is the first book to examine the intelligence and mapping side of the Dardanelles campaign, looks closely at its terrain, and describes the production and development of new operations maps, and clarifies whether the intelligence was properly processed and efficiently used. It also examines the use of aerial photos taken by the Royal Naval Air Service during the campaign, and charting, hydrographic and other intelligence work by the Royal Navy.

CHAPTER 1

The Gallipoli Peninsula

The Gallipoli Peninsula is a small slither of land jutting defiantly out into the Aegean Sea. Adjacent to mainland Greece – Thrace – the region has seen conflict for centuries, part of the European legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Geologically, the Balkans and the Aegean Sea are complex, a function of major earth movements when, resulting from continental drift, the subcontinent of India impacted into the continent of Asia some 60 million years ago. The creation of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara (so called because of the proximity of reserves of pure white marble) and the Bosphorus, waterways which have seen much intrigue and conflict, date from this continental collision, but continue to be modified today by movement along an active fault zone – the North Anatolian Fault – that periodically brings with it earthquakes, and resulting human tragedy.1 This fault system has also created the offsets and constrictions that are such a feature of the Dardanelles, and have been influential in the formation of the Gallipoli Peninsula itself, which like most of the landscape, is still being shaped today.

The landscape of Gallipoli is hauntingly beautiful – a fact not lost on the young men who fought there, and the poets who followed.2 Fragrant, green, teeming with wildlife and with the blue waters of the Aegean lapping its shores, it is no wonder that today tourists from Istanbul come to bathe in the quiet waters and take in the grandeur of the landscape. One hundred years ago it was somewhat different. The same landscape had a key role in the outcome of the battles there, in 1915. This is recorded in numerous histories and personal reminiscences of the Gallipoli Campaign which detail the local inadequacy of water supplies, the steepness of slopes, the incision of ravines, the precipitous nature of the cliffs, and the density of vegetation.3

With the benefit of today’s memorialised, protected and revered landscape it is possible to do what was impossible for the Allies in 1915. Walking the landscape, examining its intricacies and points of detail, one may see how difficult it was to assault the beaches and climb the slopes – of varying angles – that characterise the Gallipoli Peninsula and its associated coastlines. It is also possible, not least from well-logs taken by the British after the war,4 to examine the potential for ground water supply for the invading troops, and to examine geological and botanical details of the valleys, ravines, hills and slopes, all of which could play a significant factor in any military campaign, if it were carried out in the region today. But was it not possible to collect this data from the field when the campaign was committed? It can be demonstrated that terrain materially affected the prosecution of the campaign from landings to evacuation,5 and as such it can be argued that it was incumbent upon the General Staff to at least go some way in accumulating information on all these factors, prior to landing.

In this chapter we set the scene for the Gallipoli Campaign by examining the ground from first principles. Although couched in modern language, the techniques used are no different from those available to the men on the ground, on the sea, or in the air in 1915. It is an exercise on what might have been possible from ship, aircraft and small-scale landings, and in this way, sets the scene for our understanding of the level of terrain intelligence needed in planning an operation like that of Gallipoli in 1915.

Terrain evaluation for military purposes

Many modern writers have discussed the importance of terrain in determining the outcome of military campaigns, demonstrating that most successful campaigns draw upon the discriminating use of terrain by commanders.6 Most successful commanders can see the advantage of the wise use of terrain, using it as an additional munition of war to magnify the efforts of the defender; as a force multiplier, terrain is of paramount importance, and perhaps nowhere so well demonstrated as at the Dardanelles. The informed gathering of terrain intelligence, and its use in the prosecution of battle is of paramount importance. We must judge the Gallipoli Campaign from this perspective. Aspects of terrain are considered at two scales: in strategic planning, usually reflecting the gross spatial distribution of major elements such as seas and mountains, and at the tactical (and operational) level during action, making the best use of ground in the furtherance of the strategic aims of the campaign. Not surprisingly, strategic aspects are of greatest importance at the inception of a campaign, and involve specific decisions about the deployment of troops and the provision of resources. Tactical considerations are made in order to fulfil the strategic aims on the ground.

Typically, there are five types of problem in tactical assessments of terrain:7

1. Position, that is in the provision of vantage points, and of refuge from those vantage points held by the enemy;

2. Mobility, most especially with respect to the existence of natural terrain barriers such as rivers and impassable slopes, and the ability of surfaces – the ‘going’ surfaces – to sustain the movement of troops, machinery and animals;

3. Ground conditions, and particularly their impact on the construction of entrenchments, permanent emplacements, tunnels and defensive positions;

4. Resource provision, particularly potable water supplies and building materials for roads, and defensive works; and

5. Hazard mitigation, particularly in the prevention of prevailing winds for chemical weapons, and the prevention of floods and mass movements which could threaten the lives and infrastructure of the troops.

Today, military assessments of terrain have attained a high degree of sophistication thanks to an ability to fingerprint the characteristics of certain terrain types across the world in order to predict the resource needs and to direct the tactical aspects of a battle.8 Most conflicts are highly mobile, simply because of the increase in the efficacy of military vehicles and air power. However, the strategists of the First World War were hampered by poor communications, limited knowledge of terrain, outdated combat techniques, and a defensive ethos hard learnt on the Western Front. All these factors, it can be argued, militated against the favourable outcome of a campaign such as that fought in Gallipoli, where the terrain is complex. Some of this could, at the very least, have been mitigated with adequate intelligence, again the subject matter of this book.

This chapter outlines the role of gross terrain characteristics of the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to provide an appropriate context for the battleground of 1915. To express this, a simple system of compartmenting the terrain into specific areas with similar attributes – called ‘land systems’ by today’s military analysts – is used. Although complex-sounding, this does not demand something of the order of ‘rocket science’ to understand, as it represents a simple comparison of pieces of ground, like-for-like. In fact, it is a geographical tool that was developed for the British military in planning for another war – the expected onslaught from the east across the battlefields of Germany during the Cold War.9 Typical terrain units, the land systems, are characterised in terms of their geology, geomorphology, surface ‘going’ characteristics, vegetation and hydrogeology – all of which influenced the tactical use of ground. An overview of the terrain characteristics of the Gallipoli Peninsula is given below, an essential component of any understanding of the prosecution of the battles in 1915,10 and a precursor to our discussion of the adequacy of terrain intelligence in preparation for these battles.

Climate and vegetation of the Peninsula

The climate of the region is typically Mediterranean, with mild winters, the mean January air temperature being normally between 7 and 9°C, and hot summers, with average air temperatures exceeding 25°C in July and August. Despite this norm, winter on the Peninsula can be hard, with dramatic fluctuation in temperature which means that it can be very cold indeed. There is a marked summer drought, although annual precipitation is normally between 600 and 700mm at sea level, rising to in excess of 1000 mm in mountain regions.11 Heavy rainfall can lead to flash floods, with the otherwise dry valleys filled with raging torrents. In winter months it is not unheard of for the Peninsula to be blanketed with snow. Offshore, the weather conditions affecting the Mediterranean and Aegean were a material consideration in planning the campaign, as for just five months out of twelve the sea is calm, the rest of the time, from May to October, there is the likelihood of storms and strong winds.12

The vegetation on the Peninsula reflects the Mediterranean climate, developed by human clearance from the original mixed woodland, and comprises low herbaceous and aromatic shrubs of garrigue type, often dense and hostile to the passage of people.13 Periodic fires, now often created by human activity, but a natural process nonetheless, mean that the level of vegetation can vary on the dry upland slopes. There are few naturally wooded areas, and trees of evergreen oak and pine are usually isolated and scattered, particularly where exposed. Elsewhere, active cultivation has tamed the landscape, particularly in the southern Peninsula and within the sheltered confines of Suvla Bay.

Geology

The Gallipoli Peninsula forms part of the Alpine Pontide range, formed during the great interval of earth movements that created the Alps, Himalayas, Karakoram and Atlas mountains. The Pontides have a strong east-west orientation – what geologists call their ‘structural grain’ – and are made up of more ancient crystalline rocks developed in Anatolia, and younger, softer but still folded sedimentary rocks in Thrace and the margins of Anatolia. This grain defines the shape and form of the Gallipoli Peninsula and its associated waterways, and is a significant feature of the ‘bigger picture’. The oldest and hardest rocks seen on the Peninsula are crystalline rocks north-east of Bulair, at the point where it is at its narrowest. The geologically youngest rocks are the sediments found infilling the valleys and bays of the Peninsula; these are still soft and, in some cases, water-saturated.

A dominant feature in the Dardanelles is the North Anatolian Fault Zone, an important geological fracture that separates the European and Anatolian tectonic plates, and an actual and symbolic separation of Europe from Asia. The fault zone itself runs under the Sea of Marmara and crosses the Peninsula to the Gulf of Saros (Xeros), forming the strongly rectilinear northern margin of the Peninsula and separating it from the rest of Thrace.14 This fracture is complex, as it branches; its tributaries have formed the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara. It is still active today.15 Movement of the fault produced the Sea of Marmara between 15 and 20 million years ago, with a maximum depth of 1000 metres, and led to the deposition of the thick sedimentary rocks on either side of the Dardanelles.16

The Gallipoli Peninsula is therefore mostly composed of relatively simple strata of sedimentary rocks, mostly limestones and sandstones.17 On top of these are still younger sedimentary rocks formed as rivers spread out over the surface of the Peninsula, and at the foot of the older Anatolian uplands on what was called in 1915 the ‘Asiatic Shore.’ These comprise rocks formed some 4 million years ago, simple sands and silts, and these too have been subjected to earth movements along the fault zone, creating the plateaux and escarpments that are such a dominant feature of the topography of the Peninsula.

Relief

The relief of the Gallipoli Peninsula is relatively subdued, the dominant topographic elements being a series of ridges in the north and north-east–south-west trending plateaux, especially dominant in the south.18 The northern ridges, narrow ‘hog’s backs’ that border the northern margin of the Peninsula, are composed of mostly coarse-grained, folded sandstones and limestones. These hard rocks are steeply tilted from the horizontal, which creates prominent east–west trending headlands such as Nibrunesi Point, which continue to the coast at Bulair. The hardest of these rocks define a series of small, sheltered, but steep bays at the northern margin of the great expanse of Suvla Bay.

The hard ridges forming the northern coast contrast with the plateaux that characterise the upland areas of the rest of the Peninsula, which are formed from much softer rocks, with some notable exceptions. These exceptions were to be of great significance in the battles ahead in 1915. The plateaux ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Acknowledgements
• Contents
• List of Maps
• Glossary
• Foreword
• Introduction: The Issues
• Chapter 1 The Gallipoli Peninsula
• Chapter 2 Genesis of the Gallipoli Campaign
• Chapter 3 Pre-War Geographical Intelligence
• Chapter 4 Terrain Intelligence at the Outbreak of War
• Chapter 5 Intelligence from March 1915
• Chapter 6 The First Operations Maps
• Chapter 7 Gallipoli from the Air
• Chapter 8 Admiralty Hydrographic Surveys
• Chapter 9 Captured Maps and New Maps
• Chapter 10 Repeating the Mistakes: the Suvla Landings
• Chapter 11 Retrospect
• Appendix I Military Report on Eastern Turkey in Europe, 1905
• Appendix II NID 838 May, 1908, Turkey, Coast Defences
• Appendix III WO Report on the Defences of Constantinople, 1909
• Appendix IV Samson’s Report on Landing Places at Kaba Tepe, 1910
• Appendix V Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, 1913
• Appendix VI Dowson’s Notes on Mapping from Aeroplane photographs in the Gallipoli Peninsula, 1915
• Appendix VII Dowson’s Report on Visit to Gallipoli, July 1915
• Bibliography
• Authors’ Note
• Copyright