The Russian Army and the First World War

Nik Cornish

• Publisher: Spellmount
• Year: 2006
• Print ISBN: 9781862272880
• eBook ISBN: 9780750962490
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This book covers not only the three major events on the Eastern Front, the battle of Tannenburg and the March and October Revolutions, it also dispels some of the myths that have grown up around the Tsar's army: their often-cited inability to adapt to 'modern' warfare being one. The nationalist formations and the Revolutionary units of the Provisional Goverment are also described, something difficult if not impossible to find in other publications. 140 photographs and six maps bring the Eastern Front into sharp focus.

CHAPTER 1

Russia to 1914

Background

During the century leading up to 1914 Russia’s military experience had been mixed. Having effectively destroyed Napoleon’s Grand Army during the winter of 1812–13, the army of Tsar Alexander I emerged as the most powerful in Europe. However, during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I (1825–55) the fear of a revolution led by army officers tainted with western-style liberalism created an atmosphere that discouraged innovation and initiative. This stifling of independent, creative thought produced an army that was plagued by a determination to perform well on the parade ground and translate this precision onto the battlefield. Consequently the army that faced the Turkish-British-French alliance during the Crimean War was defeated by generals whose performance was only marginally less inept than their Russian opponents.

Alexander II, who succeeded his father in 1855, recognised that military reform was vital when informed by his War Minister that it would take up to six months to assemble four army corps on the border with Austria. Yet things moved slowly in imperial Russia and it was only with the appointment of General D. A. Miliutin as War Minister in 1862 that things began to improve.

Throughout the 1860s and 1870s the army was engaged in a series of campaigns in the Caucasus and Central Asia which impeded the reform process and consumed the military budget. Furthermore in 1861 Alexander II had emancipated the serfs and this colossal piece of social engineering, involving over ninety per cent of the population, was more than enough to deal with, certainly in economic terms. Nevertheless, by 1865 the empire was divided into fifteen military districts. Each of these areas was, in effect, a small state answerable to the Tsar and the War Ministry in St Petersburg. The War Minister was chief military adviser to the Tsar and controlled the Imperial Headquarters, the Military Council, the High Military Council, the War Ministry Staff and the Main Staff. Despite this profusion of bureaucrats there was no General Staff and all decisions remained the prerogative of the Tsar. In 1868 a new Field Regulations Manual was issued. It noted that the army (in this was included the navy) was to be led by a Supreme Commander in Chief who, “represented the person of the Tsar and was invested with Imperial authority”. It was assumed that, in time of war, the War Minister would lead the armies in the field regardless of his command experience. This situation was to remain unchanged until the fall of the Romanov dynasty in 1917.

Following the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) General N. N. Obruchev reported that Austria and the newly united Germany would be the most likely enemies of Russia in any future conflict. And due to the excellent railway networks at their disposal they could mobilise their forces in half the time it took the Russians and that they would outnumber the Russian army by a considerable margin. The area under immediate threat was Poland jutting peninsula-like between German East Prussia and Austrian Galicia. Poland west of the Vistula River was virtually indefensible, but a system of fortresses covered Warsaw and the shoulders of the Polish salient. Obruchev suggested investing £4,000,000, twenty-five per cent of the annual military budget, in upgrading the fortresses and extending the railways in that region as well as doubling the number of available troops within easy reach of Poland. At that time, 1873, Russia’s army of theoretically 1,400,000 men was 500,000 understrength and could barely cope with its current responsibilities, let alone expand.

A conference chaired by the Tsar was convened and following a series of stormy meetings, it was agreed to introduce conscription but that the strengthening of the Polish railways and fortresses and, “other items [would have to] wait upon the financial means at hand” because the Finance Minister declared that any further military expenditure would bankrupt the empire. The basic idea of conscription was to create a body of time-served, trained men who at mobilisation would swell the ranks of the active or standing army and provide replacements.

With the introduction of universal military service on 1 January 1874 all males over the age of twenty-one were required to spend six years in the active army and nine in the reserve. Men who did not serve with the active army were to register for the Imperial Militia (Opolchenie) that could only be called to the colours by Imperial Decree (Ukase). In practice there was a multitude of exemptions that excused almost half of those reaching military age from peacetime service and a quarter from wartime service. Nevertheless Miliutin now had the manpower to expand the army.

The infantry grew to three Guards, four Grenadier and forty-one line divisions, each of four, four-battalion regiments. Distributed along the borders were twenty-nine rifle battalions. A battalion numbered one thousand officers and men. Each division was allotted an artillery brigade with sixty-four guns grouped in eight gun batteries.

The Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich, pictured here in the uniform of a hussar regiment, shortly before becoming Supreme Commander in Chief of Russia’s armed forces. The Grand Duke was an imposing figure, well over six feet tall, who reputedly enjoyed the confidence of the rank and file. Born in 1856 the Grand Duke retired to his estates in the Crimea in 1917 and took no further part in Russian politics. He died in exile in the south of France in 1929 where he was given a state funeral.

The cavalry, artillery and other branches of service expanded proportionately. The cavalry now consisted of two Guards, fifteen line and two Cossack divisions. A cavalry division comprised two brigades each of two regiments. The first brigade having a lancer and dragoon regiment, the second a hussar and a Cossack regiment. A regiment numbered almost 800 officers and men. However, Guards regiments were frequently home to more officers than their establishment due to the social cachet of such regiments and the selection procedure, including the candidate’s capacity to hold his liquor like a gentleman, was scrupulous in the extreme.

The Cossacks perceived themselves as a military caste and were treated as irregulars enjoying different terms of service established decades before. They were divided into two groups; hosts, those of the steppe, the Stepnoy, and those of the Caucasus, the Kavkas. In 1914 there were nine Stepnoy hosts and two Kavkas. The largest Stepnoy host was that of the Don, the Kuban the largest of the Kavkas, between them they provided over fifty per cent of the Cossack manpower. Other than a small number of Kuban Cossack infantry battalions, the plastuni, Cossacks were cavalry with their own horse artillery formations. Each Cossack regiment was backed by two more composed of older men: these second and third line regiments would, in time of war, be attached to army corps for escort, reconnaissance and other duties. This structure would remain the basis on which the Russian Army went to war in 1914. Finns and native Caucasions were exempt from conscription as were all the Tsars Moslem and Asiatic subjects.

In 1874 it was announced that the Polish fortresses, particularly the major ones at Novo Georgievsk, Ivangorod, Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk would undergo a rolling programme of modernisation over the next thirty years at a cost of £6,500,000. The value of the changes was tested during the Russo-Turkish War, the first serious challenge Russia’s reforming army would face.

The Russo-Turkish War, 1877–78

On 24 April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. The causes and course have no place here but the effect on the Russian Army does.

Russia’s mobilisation and deployment to the main theatre of operations (modern day Bulgaria) was carried out efficiently. But the region lacked roads and railways and those through Romanian territory were primitive. The supply route was long and tortuous as Russia lacked a significant naval presence on the Black Sea and was thus confined to the land. The Turks had adopted a defensive strategy based around the town of Plevna that was defended by hastily thrown up earthworks. The Russian plan of campaign had anticipated that the fighting would be over before Christmas. However, Plevna’s stout defence prolonged the war into the next year. The entrenched Turkish infantry were presented with the opportunity to use their excellent Peabody-Martini rifles against Russian and Romanian infantry who advanced in neat formations across almost open ground with inadequate artillery support. Inevitably the attackers were mown down, but Plevna eventually fell. The victory was regarded as clear proof of the value of fortresses and the Russian belief that bravery and the bayonet would always triumph over the rifleman. What their analysis would have been had the Turks deployed machine guns in their trenches is unknown. As it was Russia had suffered over 100,000 casualties and the losses amongst officers had been particularly high as they had to expose themselves to retain control over a battlefield that lacked communications and cover and where they were expected to lead very clearly from the front.

A Cossack outpost on Manchurian front during the Russo-Japanese War enjoys a tea break. The small size of their ponies is evident but deceptive as they were hardy, strong and capable of finding forage in the most inhospitable of conditions. The casual pose of the men is rare in photos of this period, as the camera was not common in the front line.

Miliutin established a commission to compile an accurate history of the war. However, the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 and Miliutin’s resignation led to the commission’s report being delayed for twenty years by which time its conclusions were almost redundant.

The new Tsar, Alexander III was a parsimonious reactionary as was his War Minister General P. S. Vannovski. The officer corps and the men were discouraged from study as in the time of Nicholas I and the heroes of Russia’s Napoleonic campaigns were chosen as more appropriate role models than contemporaries such as Germany’s von Moltke or the Confederacy’s Lee or Jackson.

Despite the economic retrenchment of Alexander’s reign, he did allow for the introduction of a new rifle, the Mosin-Nagant M1891 7.62mm, that was to remain in service for over 50 years. Alexander disliked the growing western influence that was creeping into Russian life and undertook a wholesale “Russification” of the army’s uniforms which led to the adoption of a very simple style of dress; a loose tunic, trousers and knee boots which reflected traditional peasant attire. All regular cavalry regiments were converted into dragoons reflecting their new role as mounted infantry. Unpopular as these changes were, the Tsar had spoken and therefore the decisions were beyond question. Diplomatically the picture was gloomy; Russia stood alone until, in 1894, the Tsar signed a defensive treaty with France that was to draw republic and autocracy closer and closer during the next 20 years.

The empire now reached from the Pacific Ocean to the middle of Europe and from the Arctic to the deserts of central Asia and it was this vast expanse, one sixth of the Earth’s landmass, which Alexander bequeathed to his son Nicholas II on his death in 1894.

Nicholas II

Nicholas II was, for a variety of reasons, ill-prepared for the role he was to play. Nevertheless he was committed to the idea of preserving the monarchy as it was at the time of his father’s death so he married a woman, Alexandra of Hesse-Darmstadt, who was equally if not more committed to this ambition. Both Nicholas and Alexandra disliked court life and withdrew from the capital city of St Petersburg to live at Tsarskoe Selo some 24kms (15 miles) away. However, despite their belief in the common people’s devotion to the dynasty, the imperial couple’s unpopularity began with the aristocracy and seeped downwards through society over the course of the next twenty years.

To those of a liberal persuasion Nicholas was a tyrant, indifferent to the lives of his people and devoted to the maintenance of his family’s position. To those of the right he was the living symbol of the state wherein the characteristics of warlord, spiritual leader and political patronage were manifest. To the mass of his subjects he was simply the Tsar, the all-powerful, all-seeing ruler in whose name policies were formulated, laws passed and wars fought. The Tsar was the embodiment of the state and his word brooked no opposition. Simplistic as these perceptions may appear they were the essence of imperial Russia, which during the early years of the twentieth century was viewed by foreigners as being a snowbound enigma: on the one hand cruel, unpredictable and threateningly xenophobic, while on the other mystical, immensely wealthy, ripe for economic exploitation and a potentially unconquerable ally. Tsarist Russia could provide evidence for any label an observer chose to hang on her, depending on need or political standpoint. Nicholas inherited from his father a multi-ethnic, multi-faith land-based empire. But although over eighty per cent of the people were peasant farmers there was a growing urban population, a tiny but rising mercantile and entrepreneurial class and the beginnings of an industrial revolution. However, many of the recently conquered lands in the Caucasus and Asia were not assimilated into the empire. Similarly, despite intensive Russification programmes, Poland, the Baltic provinces and Finland had nationalist – often socialist – underground movements. In the words of Count Sergei Witte, President of the Tsar’s Council of Ministers, Russia was, “essentially a military empire.” Indeed civil servants wore uniforms and were, to the untutored eye, virtually indistinguishable from the military on gala occasions. The Council of Ministers was the body that advised the Tsar on all matters of policy and below them a vast bureaucracy carried out the decisions thus made. But there was no elected body to represent the interests of society at large. A degree of local government had been established some years before but these bodies, the Zemstvos, had limited powers and were elected by a very exclusive group of voters.

Nicholas’ first military test was to come in 1904 with a war against people he described as, “long-tailed monkeys” – the Japanese.

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904–05

Again the causes and course are out of place here but the effects on Russia and its army are not. In 1903 the army numbered over 750,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry with 5,500 guns. When fully mobilised some 70,000 Cossacks would swell the ranks to almost 1,000,000 without calling on the reserves or the Opolchenie. As a British commentator remarked, “The Russian army must always be a very formidable foe from its great numerical strength.” But the majority of these troops were quartered within European Russia, west of the Ural Mountains; the war with Japan was to be fought thousands of miles to the east in Manchuria.

The war began on 8 February 1904 with a surprise Japanese naval attack on the Russian Pacific squadron in their base at Port Arthur. The Russians initially relied on units of the Pri Amur and Siberian military districts, which amounted to just over 140,000 men with 120 guns operating from Mukden. Reinforcements, drawn from the Kiev, Moscow and Kazan military districts, would be sent via the incomplete, single track Trans-Siberian Railway along which everything from bullets to bandages would also travel. Separated f...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Dedication
• Acknowledgements
• Contents
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 Russia to 1914
• Chapter 2 1914: The Shock of War
• Chapter 3 1915: A Time of Mixed Fortunes
• Chapter 4 Winter 1915–16
• Chapter 5 The Caucasian Front
• Chapter 6 1916, Brusilov’s Summer
• Chapter 7 Romanian Winter 1916-17
• Chapter 8 1917: The Hopeful Revolution
• Chapter 9 1917, Kerensky’s Offensive: The Last Gamble
• Chapter 10 Epilogue: September-November 1917, Russia’s Exit
• Appendix 1 The Russian Navy
• Appendix 2 The Russian Military Air Fleet
• Appendix 3 Taon: The Heavy Artillery of Special Duty
• Appendix 4 Conscription and Casualties
• Appendix 5 Chemical Warfare
• Bibliography
• Copyright