From Gaza to Jerusalem

The Campaign for Southern Palestine 1917

Stuart Hadaway

• Publisher: The History Press
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780752499017
• eBook ISBN: 9780750966610
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

The Palestine campaign of 1917 saw Britain's armed forces rise from defeat to achieve stunning victory. After two failed attempts in the spring, at the end of the year they broke through the Ottoman line with an innovative mixture of old and new technology and tactics, and managed to advance over 50 miles, from Gaza to Jerusalem, in only two months. As well as discussions of military strategy, Stuart Hadaway's gripping narrative of the campaign gives a broad account of the men on both sides who lived and fought in the harsh desert conditions of Palestine, facing not only brave and determined enemies, but also the environment itself: heat, disease and an ever-present thirst. Involving Ottoman, ANZAC, British and Arab forces, the campaign saw great empires manoeuvring for the coveted Holy Land. It was Britain's victory in 1917, however, that redrew the maps of the Middle East and shaped the political climate for the century to come.

1

TO THE BORDERS OF
PALESTINE, 1882–1916

AT THE OPENING of 1917, the British Army in Egypt was geographically more or less exactly where it had been at the start of the war: on the far eastern edge of the Sinai Desert, on the border between Egypt and Ottoman-held Palestine. On the outbreak of war in 1914 the British had withdrawn from the border, back to a defensive line based on the Suez Canal, and had spent most of 1916 regaining that lost ground. But if the army was now back in the same physical position, their material and political positions were radically different.

Britain had been sporadically involved in the internal affairs of Egypt for over a hundred years, protecting what was the quickest and most direct route between the home country and India. However, they did not take up permanent residence until the 1870s when Egypt, crippled by international debt, was declared bankrupt. The European Great Powers, including Britain, stepped in and took control of the country’s finances. Resentment over this grew in Egypt until a military-led revolt seized control of Egypt in 1881. An Anglo-French fleet assembled to restore control, but the French element subsequently pulled out at the last moment. It was left to Britain to effectively invade Egypt and, by the autumn of 1882, take control of the country.

It was not quite as clear cut as that, however. Although a British Agency, under a Consul-General, controlled all finances, and slowly British procedures and staff crept into most government departments, Egypt technically remained under the rule of the Khedive, and a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans, facing their own internal and external threats and wars over the next thirty years, paid little attention to the problem, although attempts were made to decrease Egypt’s boundaries (ones which the British led the way in deflecting, even to the extent of threatening war with Constantinople). Within Egypt opinion was divided about the British presence, and the effects that they had on public and private life at different levels of society.

In 1912 a new British Consul General was appointed, Field Marshal The Right Honourable The Viscount Kitchener, who had served extensively in the country in the 1880s and 1890s, leading campaigns to secure Egyptian control over the Sudan. Kitchener was on leave in England when the crisis of July 1914 broke. Although he attempted to return to Egypt, he was instead appointed Secretary of State for War, and authority in Egypt fell to his senior subordinate, Sir Milne Cheetham.

The outbreak of war in Europe led to two major and interconnected concerns about Egypt. Firstly, how would the Ottomans react, and secondly, how would the Egyptians?

It looked very likely that the Ottoman Empire would ally itself to Germany (and indeed the two had signed a secret treaty on 2 August 1914), and the possibility was that the Ottomans would take action to regain Egypt. This could take the form of a conventional attack, but the most feared option was the use of a religious uprising. The nominal head of the Ottoman Empire was also the Caliph, the symbolic head of Islam. Britain was deeply concerned that the Caliph would use his position to call for a jihad, a holy war, against them and the French. This could not only lead to uprisings in Egypt and the Sudan, but across numerous other African and Asian colonies, and, worst of all, perhaps even India. An equal possibility, although not as feared, would be that the nationalists in Egypt would take advantage of the international crisis to start their own rebellion, with or without outside support. These two fears meant that the Egyptians had to be handled very carefully.

After all Egypt, or at least the canal that ran through it, was a crucial strategic asset for the British and their French partners in the Entente Cordiale. Even in peacetime massive amounts of the raw materials that fed the British economy came through the Suez Canal. In wartime these imports would be absolutely vital, and would likely increase dramatically. While cargoes from the Far East could go via South Africa instead (as, indeed, many would from late 1916 due to the submarine threat in the Mediterranean) this would add time delays to each voyage. With shipping tonnage at a premium, the faster a ship could deliver a cargo and steam off to collect another, the better. And of course the cargoes were not just raw materials for the British war machine, but also men for her armies. Particularly in the early months of the war, the tens of thousands of trained troops despatched from India and the recalled British garrisons from around the world would prove crucial in stemming the German advance in France. Later, India, New Zealand and Australia would provide a steady stream of invaluable reinforcements for the Western Front.

Protecting the canal from local or outside threats was paramount, but there was little idea on how to do so. The Foreign Office had considered the issue as recently as 1913, and then effectively given up due to the complexities involved. An outright annexation of the country could spark the feared internal revolt, possibly spreading elsewhere, tying down valuable troops and threatening the canal. On the other hand, the status quo was also unacceptable. Officially, the Khedive controlled all matters to do with law and order, and also commerce. The British would not be able to legally do anything to round up spies or saboteurs, or stop the Egyptians trading with Britain’s enemies. Technically, although it was unlikely, they would not even be able to stop German or Ottoman shipping, even warships, using the canal. The final conclusion was that the ‘man on the spot’ would have to make a judgement call when the time came.

When that time did come, the ‘men on the spot’ were Sir Milne Cheetham and the Egyptian President of the Council of Ministers, Hussein Rushdi Pasha. Thankfully for them the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, who was notoriously anti-British and lost few opportunities to cause them difficulties, was out of the country at the time and staying in Constantinople. Cheetham and Pasha were both able to keep a level head and calm control of the situation. Their final decision was to issue on 5 August 1914, the day after Britain declared war on Germany, a ‘document which committed Egypt virtually to a declaration of war against the [British] King’s enemies.’9 In it, several war-time measures were detailed, such as forbidding Egyptian citizens from trading with Britain’s enemies or giving them loans. These would realistically have only limited impact on the country while at the same time making it publically clear that they were supporting Britain.

There was a general lack of response to the document. Apart from the usual market fluctuations to be expected when a major war breaks out, there was little response in Egypt. The British held their breath, waiting for the nationalist or Islamic backlash, but it did not come. The Ottomans did not immediately attack, declare a jihad or indeed take any action at all, and it was not until three months later that the hiatus was broken. The Ottomans resisted German pressure to join the war for as long as possible, but finally had to relent. On 2 November 1914 Ottoman warships, crewed and commanded by German sailors, and acting under pressure from Germany, bombarded Russian military targets in the Black Sea, and brought the Ottoman Empire into the war.

In Egypt, the open state of war led to a declaration of Martial Law. The British military commander in the country, Lieutenant General Sir John Maxwell, took charge of all matters pertaining to the defence of Egypt. The immediate results of this included the abandoning of the Sinai Desert as being indefensible with the resources available, and the use of the Royal Navy to sweep German, Austrian and other enemy shipping out of the Suez Canal, in contravention of international law. Indeed, the Royal and French Navies began to impose their control on the whole of the eastern Mediterranean, snapping up enemy merchant vessels, and patrolling (including the innovative use of seaplanes) and raiding the Syrian and Palestinian coasts. On 18 December 1914 the de facto British control of Egypt was formalised by the declaration that the country was now a Protectorate. Again, internal Egyptian response was muted; even the declaration of jihad by the Caliph in November had failed to cause any mass stirrings. Despite this, the spectre of an Islamic uprising would remain a serious concern for the British authorities throughout the war.

The regular British Army contingent in Egypt was badly needed in France, so alternative arrangements were made. The Egyptian Army was not entirely trusted, and besides was largely tied up in garrisons in the Sudan, so outside assistance was needed. Several divisions of Indian troops passed through the Suez Canal in early September on their own way to France, and the 9th (Sihind) Brigade and 3rd Mountain Artillery Brigade were landed in Egypt to bolster the garrison. By the end of the month British troops began arriving in the form of East Lancashire Division (Territorial Forces), soon to be renumbered as the 42nd (East Lancs) Division. These were part-time soldiers, whose training was not good enough to allow them to face the Germans in Europe. Instead, they came to Egypt to complete their training while also guarding the canal. As they arrived, British regular units departed, leaving just one brigade of fully trained troops to guard the whole of Egypt.

In November more Indian troops arrived, although many were Imperial Service Troops; raised, trained and equipped by local Indian rulers, and below par compared to their regular Indian Army comrades. More reinforcements arrived in early December in the form of the volunteers of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC). Although great in number and enthusiasm, their training had hardly begun before they had been put on the ships to Egypt. However, although almost all of the forces in Egypt needed significant amounts of training, there were now at least sufficient numbers to create an illusion of safety.

The illusion was tested in early February 1915, when the Ottoman forces in Palestine crossed the Sinai Desert and attacked the Suez Canal defences. Led by the military governor of Greater Syria (the Ottoman province that included Palestine), Djemal Pasha, the Ottoman troops left the garrison town of Beersheba in mid January. Despite taking precautions, such as travelling by routes far inland, they were quickly spotted by British and French seaplanes launched from warships off-shore, and later by Royal Flying Corps aeroplanes operating from Egypt. The first wave of the attack, drawn mostly from the 25th (OT) Infantry Division, with cavalry, artillery and Arab cameliers in support, struck at several points along the canal on the night of 2/3 February. The main attacks fell around Tussum, at the southern end of Lake Timsah, while smaller diversionary attacks were made in the north and south.

The defences of the canal had been built mostly on the western bank, using the canal itself as a physical barrier. The wisdom of this had been questioned, but during this first attack the strategy paid off. Indian troops entrenched behind the canal were able to rake the Ottoman troops as they attempted to cross, while Entente warships on the canal provided heavy artillery support. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Ottomans persevered until the early afternoon of 3 February before Djemal Pasha called a retreat. His second wave, the 10th (OT) Infantry Division was still fresh and unused, but most of the Ottoman boats had been destroyed and the element of surprise was lost. Leaving small rearguard units behind, the Ottomans withdrew to Beersheba.

It had been a valiant attempt, especially given the chaotic state of Ottoman Army logistics. To bring a force of over 20,000 men across the Sinai Desert had been a creditable feat, and the British were loath to make any kind of pursuit. The Indian troops, bolstered by Egyptian artillery, had held the line well, but they were still the only fully combat ready troops in the country. The Australians, New Zealanders and British Territorials were making great progress in their training, but to commit them against unknown numbers in a desert environment would not have been wise. Equally, not enough pack-animals were available to carry the supplies needed for any sizable force to operate in the desert. Although the decision not to pursue the defeated Ottomans would be questioned by many, it was undoubtedly the correct one.

For the rest of 1915, British attention in the eastern Mediterranean was focused on the ill-fated campaign in the Dardanelles. Egypt was stripped of most of its British and ANZAC troops to fight in the campaign as part of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF). It also became the base of operations for the MEF, with supplies (including fresh water) being gathered in and despatched from Egypt, along with reinforcement troops. The country also mobilised a massive effort to supply medical care to the wounded and sick pouring out of Gallipoli, of whom the latter were the majority. Apart from army hospitals, state and private hospitals were fully or partly turned over for military use, while others were set up by well-meaning civilians or the Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies. By the end of 1915, there were 18,000 hospital beds being used by the army in Egypt, as well as 17,000 spaces in convalescent homes.

The operations of the MEF left the defences of the Suez Canal once again perilously thin. Thankfully, the campaign in the Dardanelles had a similarly draining effect on the Ottoman forces in the eastern Mediterranean, and no troops could be spared to take advantage of the British weakness on the Sinai front. It was another matter on the other, western border of Egypt, though. Ottoman and German agents encouraged an invasion of the Western Desert by the Senussi, a religious sect based in Libya. For a relatively small outlay in equipment, gold and instructors, the Ottomans and Germans provoked increasing hostility between the Senussi and the Anglo-Egyptian authorities, neither of whom were keen to fight each other. In November 1915 the actions of a German submarine forced the Senussi’s hand by passing over to them captured British sailors, and then bombarding the Egyptian Coast Guard station at Sollum. A Senussi invasion of the Western Desert along the Mediterranean coast followed.

The initial British response was to pull back into Egypt while suitable forces were gathered. Few troops could be spared from outside the country, while only a few small garrisons and depots remained in Egypt. A scratch force was thrown together, but fared badly in the first few engagements against the Senussi, who were born and bred desert fighters. Only in late December did the British manage to stop the Senussi advance, and it was not until mid February that they were able to begin recapturing lost ground. By then the campaign in the Dardanelles had been declared a lost cause, and the troops withdrawn to Egypt. The returning troops began to retrain and be re-equipped. They were designated the Imperial Strategic Reserve, and marked as being available for sending anywhere in the world where they may be needed. Some of them were immediately sent against the Senussi, fighting back along the coast to Sollum, and also beginning to evict Senussi garrisons from several of the oases far in land and deep inside the Western Desert. By the end of March 1916 the coastal campaign was over, although minor operations continued in conjunction with Italian forces in Libya. Further south, most of the oases were cleared by the end of 1916, although a large garrison remained at Siwa.

With the drain of the Gallipoli campaign removed, and the threat to the western half of the country dealt with, thoughts again turned to the Sinai Desert. In fact, General Maxwell had been making what preparations he could even while the fighting in the Dardanelles continued. He had updated much of the road and rail network in Egypt, significantly expanding both in the Canal Zone. Should the army wish to advance in any numbers into the Sinai, logistics would be a crucial consideration and the new infrastructure would be invaluable. Likewise a start, albeit a small one, was made in gathering camels as well as herders and Egyptian labourers to support the army. It was not until the spring of 1916 that any serious efforts could be made, though, and first a certain amount of work was needed to get the army’s house in order.

During the Dardanelles campaign, the organisation of the army in Egypt had become increasingly fractured and confused, with different organisations having responsibility for different areas of the country, or different functions regardless of area. The situation had reached the state where many senior officers were themselves unclear as to who they answered to, and an effort was made to simplify the command structure. The final upshot of the reorganisations was Maxwell’s replacement in March 1916 by Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray, former commander of the MEF, and now commander of the newly created Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF). Not that the army was in any fit state to go on any expeditions.

Although limited patrols and sweeps were made into the Sinai Desert, where an Ottoman force under the command of the German Colonel Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein was active in monitoring and probing the Suez Canal defences, large-scal...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Note on Names, Quotes, Terminology and Foot/End Notes
• Acknowledgements
• Maps
• Prologue: Jerusalem, 9 December 1917
• 1 To the Borders of Palestine, 1882–1916
• 2 First Battle of Gaza: Opening Moves
• 3 First Battle of Gaza: Disaster
• 4 Second Battle of Gaza
• 5 Ottoman Palestine
• 6 Egypt 1917
• 7 Arab Revolt
• 8 Trench Warfare
• 9 Allenby
• 10 Plans
• 11 Beersheba
• 12 Breakthrough
• 13 Pursuit
• 14 Into the Judean Mountains
• 15 Jerusalem
• Epilogue
• Glossary
• Appendix A: Orders of Battle, 1st Battle of Gaza
• Appendix B: Note on the structure and equipment of British and Imperial forces
• Appendix C: Orders of Battle, 1/5th King’s Own Scottish Borderers’ raid on Sea Post, 11 June 1917
• Appendix D: Note on the structure and equipment of Ottoman forces
• Appendix E: Orders of Battle, 3rd Battle of Gaza
• Select Bibliography
• End Notes
• Picture Section