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CHAPTER ONE
Major Characteristics of Fragile States
As stated above, the world of states is full of diversity, and so naturally it follows that this is also the case when it comes to fragile states. It is true that every single state is unique in terms of historical development and precise characteristics. Against this background, some observers are critical of any overall concept of fragile or failed state. Their claim is that conceptual stretching is taken too far; these general labels include cases that are enormously diverse. For example, Somalia was a collapsed state for almost a decade in the sense that the state apparatus ceased to exist; but Sudan, Iraq and North Korea are not collapsed states, even if they are considered fragile. Some states are weak in terms of formal institutional capacity (e.g. Chad), but Colombia is not a weak state in this sense, though it certainly is with regard to its ability to control domestic conflict. Some states, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, are war-torn for long periods, but fragile states such as Bangladesh and North Korea are not at war (examples from Call, 2008).
All this is true, but the insight that every state is unique does not preclude their having common characteristics which allow us to pool them in a group. Surrendering to arguments of historical specificity will not permit us to address the principal ways in which fragile statehood differs from successful modern statehood. In this latter category, there are also vastly different entities: consider Canada, Iceland, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Denmark. In order to discover principal differences, we need summarizing concepts. Such concepts should always be followed by empirical differentiation and concrete nuances, but the necessity of the latter is no argument for giving up on the former. Without more general concepts, any overall consideration about what is going on in the world of states will have a hard time indeed. Giving up on summarizing concepts is the first step towards giving up on theory altogether.
If one accepts the need for such concepts, the next question is whether âfragile statesâ is the best label for the problem we want to talk about. We are inspired by the fact that many international organizations and observers now use that term (Engberg-Petersen et al., 2008). Competing terms suffer from various drawbacks. The notion of âfailedâ or âfailingâ state indicates the emergence of an acute problem that can be quickly remedied, but fragile states have a long history and in most cases quick remedy is not possible. Failure should sooner be seen as an aggravation of the governance problems pertaining to fragile states. âQuasi-statesâ was suggested by Robert Jackson (1990). He connects the term closely to the special process of decolonization after the Second World War, but fragile states can also emerge in the absence of colonization and decolonization, as we will see in the next chapter. Finally, âweak statesâ has been a much-used term; but since âstrong statesâ are often thought of as militarily strong entities and/ or authoritarian states, âweakâ may send the wrong message. Yet the question of labelling is not crucial here; as long as we accept that summarizing concepts are needed, who wins the terminological beauty contest is less important.
The summarizing concept of âfragile stateâ is best formulated as a Weberian ideal type. The ideal type is an attempt to capture core characteristics of a given phenomenon in its pure form. In so doing it focuses on what is more important and disregards what is less important. Marxâs analysis of capitalism, for example, constructs an ideal type of the capitalist mode of production. The empirical basis is capitalism in England, but the concept centres on what Marx sees as the most important characteristics of capitalism rather than on a summary of concrete English reality. Weberâs concept of âProtestant Ethicâ is another example of an ideal type.
In our case, we are looking for the core characteristics of fragile statehood. Let us begin with the state in the narrow sense: the government and the state apparatus. Institutional and administrative structures in fragile states are inefficient and corrupt. Rule is based on selective coercion rather than legitimacy and the rule of law. There are no effective mechanisms for holding leaders accountable to the populations. Weber famously defined the state as âa human community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territoryâ (Weber, 1946:78). In this regard, the essence of statehood is enforcement: the capacity to make people comply with the stateâs laws (Fukuyama, 2004: 21). But note that, according to Weber, enforcement cannot be based only on coercion understood as the stateâs power over society; it is also based on legitimacy: that is, power through society. Michael Mann (1984) calls this infrastrucrural power; it entails a cooperative relationship between citizens and their government (Migdal, 2001).
So, fragile states are ineffective in terms of ability to plan and execute state-defined policies and they lack legitimacy in terms of being considered lawful and just by the population. But fragile states are also characterized by particular conditions in society. The economy is the material or physical basis of the state. Fragile states lack coherent national economies which are capable of sustaining a basic level of welfare for the population and of providing resources for running an effective state. Defective economies often depend crucially on the world market because they are mono-economies based on the export of one or a few primary goods. The economy is often highly heterogeneous, containing not only elements of a modern sector but also pre-capitalist structures in agriculture. In both urban and rural sectors, large parts of the population are outside of the formal economic sector, living in localized subsistence economies at very low standards.
Finally, there is a more abstract but no less important aspect: the idea of the state itself (Buzan, 1991: 69). This concerns the extent to which the people within the physical stateâs territory make up a community. There are two major facets of community. One concerns citizenship, meaning relations between citizens and the state. In well-functioning countries, the state provides political, legal and socio-economic rights for citizens, who in return have a number of obligations, such as paying taxes. The other facet can be called âcommunity of sentimentâ. It concerns the extent to which citizens consider themselves part of a community with a common language and common cultural and historical identities. Benedict Anderson (1991) refers to communities of sentiment as âimagined communitiesâ.
In fragile states, the sovereign stateâs physical boundaries do not correspond to the boundaries of the imagined communities with which the people who reside within them most identify. In these states, ethnic identities connected to tribal, religious and similar characteristics continue to dominate over the national identity. The national community of sentiment has not grown strong, partly because the state has not been able to create effective citizenship. The substance of citizenship â legal, political and social rights â has not been provided. When the state does not deliver, people turn elsewhere for the satisfaction of material and non-material needs, predominantly towards ethnic communities. Loyalties are then projected in that direction and ethnic identities are reinforced. In sum, fragile states are characterized by a situation where neither the âcommunity of citizensâ, nor the âcommunity of sentimentâ has developed to become the primary bond for people at the national level.
Table 1.1 summarizes the major characteristics of fragile states.
Many definitions of fragile statehood share our focus on the stateâs ineffectiveness and illegitimacy (e.g. Goldstone, 2009: 5). But then they also move in other directions. A brief comparison with the definition offered by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) may help clarify the choices we have made. DAC suggests the following definition: âStates are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development, and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populationsâ (OECD, 2007).
Table 1.1. The fragile state
Government | Inefficient and corrupt administrative and institutional structures. Rule based on selective coercion rather than on the rule of law. Monopoly on the legitimate use of violence not established. Low level of state legitimacy. |
Economy | Lack of coherent national economies, capable of sustaining a basic level of welfare for the population and of providing resources for running an effective state. Amalgamations of traditional agriculture, an informal, petty urban sector and some fragments of modern industry. Significant dependence on the world market and on external economic interests. |
Nationhood | Citizenship rights not provided; a divided population with predominance of local/ethnic community. Neither the âcommunity of citizensâ nor the âcommunity of sentimentâ has developed to become the primary bond among people at the national level. |
First, the OECD definition helpfully underlines that state fragility is a matter of both structures and actors. Actors within fragile states may be willing to do good things (e.g. Julius Nyerere when he was head of state in Tanzania), but they can be impeded by structures or by other actors. Both structures and actors must therefore be part of the analysis; in our ideal-type definition, the problem with fragility concerns both structures and actors, so we donât need the âand/orâ element. Second, the definition is focused on the state in the narrow sense of the government and the state apparatus. We argue that fragile statehood also concerns conditions in the surrounding society, especially as regards the situation of the economy and of the relationship between people. This helps emphasize that a movement towards less fragile statehood concerns not merely the state in the narrow sense, but also basic conditions in society. Third, the definition indicates that the problems with fragile states are of national origin, situated within the borders of the state. But we argue that international actors also bear responsibility for the emergence and persistence of fragile states and that element needs to enter the analysis. Fourth, the DAC definition tends to ask too much of fragile states; they are required to provide development, security, poverty reduction and human rights. This is a big menu. It can be argued that even several of the advanced, consolidated democracies in the Western world are unable to provide all this. Very poor states are often unable to supply all the material needs of their population even if they are highly disposed to do so.
Fifth, and most importantly, the DAC definition is ensnared by modernization thinking in its indication that all fragile states can get their act together and shed fragility by quickly becoming effective states that will provide for the good life for their citizens. This view of fragile states is further enhanced by developments in, and the aspirations of, international society. The Millennium Declaration (UN, 2000), adopted by 189 states at the UN General Assembly in 2000, makes a commitment towards realizing âthe good lifeâ for every human being on the planet. It promises to promote peace, security, development, human rights and environmental protection for all. These are respectable and desirable goals, of course, but as we have indicated, many fragile states will not be able to meet them. They are, for reasons we will explain below, more likely to be caught in a situation of âblocked developmentâ.
Some critics argue that the notion of fragile or failed states amounts to âan ideology of the imperialism of our timeâ (Jones, 2005). The charges are several: first, the term is purely descriptive, modelled on an ahistorical and ideal notion of what the âperfectâ state should look like and, therefore, it does not explain the historical emergence of fragile states. Second, âthe defining flawâ according to this critique is that state fragility is being identified as primarily âlocal, indigenousâ in origin. In effect, the âhistorically specific, international and local social relationsâ that have given rise to states caught in social, political and economic crisis are not identified (quotes from Jones, 2005: 4â6).
We find this particular critique misleading. The term is not purely descriptive, provided it is followed by an identification of the core characteristics of fragile statehood. Furthermore, this need not lead to ahistorical analysis. The next chapter is devoted to analysing different historical pathways to fragile statehood. We wholeheartedly agree that indexes of fragile states cannot stand alone; they need to be accompanied by concrete analysis of specific cases. The analysis will make clear that there are both international and domestic causes of, and pathways to, fragile statehood. In sum, we find the concept useful and the potentially âimperialistâ overtones avoidable. This approach does not preclude a closer look at non-Weberian types of governance which until now may have escaped the attention of those involved in the analysis of fragile statehood (Hagman and PĂ©clard, 2010).
Which Are the Fragile States?
We have identified the core features of fragile statehood. Given this background, which are the fragile states? Answering that question requires additional conceptual work and a substantial amount of measurement. The general characteristics set forth above need to be connected to operational indicators which are then used to estimate the fragility of individual countries. It is fortunate that there are a number of existing âconceptualizersâ and âquantifiersâ of fragile states (for an instructive overview of these, see Rice and Stew...
