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European Social Policy 1950â1969
[The Commission] cannot conceive that the Community has not got a social purpose.
EEC, Second General Report, 19581
This then is the sum total of social policy measures in the Treaty of Rome: a whiff of society-creating measures in Articles 2, 117 and 118; a gesture towards harmonisation in Articles 119 and 120; and a strong element of functional social policy to encourage the mobility of labour, and the retraining of workers through the ESF.
Hoskyns, Integrating Gender
How is it that such divergent views could be held over the role of social policy in the early years of the EU? Was social policy at the heart of the early treaties of Paris and Rome that laid the foundation for the ECSC and the EEC? Or was social policy an afterthought used to placate the threatened in the integration process? Moreover, what role did social policy play in early integration theory? This chapter attempts to explore these questions. It starts with a review of the key social policy developments at the international level and within the ECSC and EEC member states in the years immediately after the Second World War. I then examine three early integration theories, federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism as well as their interpretation of EU social policy, succeeded by an analysis of the role of social policy in the treaties of Paris and Rome, and a brief overview of major social policy developments. In conclusion I argue that EU social policy has been an uncertain and controversial policy since its creation. It has generally had a secondary role in relation to the larger goal of economic integration, but was expected to become increasingly important as integration progressed.
West European social policy in the early postwar years
The foundations of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Economic Community (EEC) were based on fundamental military and economic bargains between the major member states. These bargains revolved around the answers to such questions as how to rebuild the broken economies of Western Europe, how to deal with the growing threat from the USSR, and what should be done with Germany. Social policy, or concerns over its development, played only a limited role in early integration strategies. The early unimportance of European-level social policy (in marked contrast to national developments) greatly limited its scope, but did not completely eliminate it from the European agenda.
West European social policy has a long and detailed history (Ashford, 1986; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Flora, 1986; Gough, 1979; Marshall, 1975; Pierson, 1991; Titmuss, 1974). Its modern roots easily reach back into the second half of the nineteenth century, when demands for state provisioning of education, health care, unemployment insurance, pensions, labour rights and family support all began to be heard. The variety of these demands was staggering and their various institutional manifestations often reflected the general orientation of early national welfare state structures. For example, early German âconservativeâ social policies aimed at co-opting and integrating the working class into a conservative Bismarckian social order. Early French social policies were used to promote a Catholic family structure. Meanwhile, early British social policies, such as the reforming of the Poor Laws in the mid-nineteenth century, reflected the more liberal, market-oriented approach of the British system.
Social policies grew throughout the twentieth century, and expanded rapidly after the Second World War. This postwar expansion was triggered by a number of demands from soldiers who had made tremendous sacrifices during the war, families who had suffered because of the war, and the general population that felt that the state had a growing responsibility to do something about the basic condition of society. In some cases, these policies were undertaken by left-wing governments, particularly in Britain and Scandinavia. In others, they developed under conservative or Christian-democratic regimes such as in Germany and France. Moreover, as the economies of Western Europe began to revive in the late 1940s, the expanding economic capacity and fiscal resources allowed the state to expand social policies and social rights. Despite a great deal of variation between the European social policy regimes, European welfare states and social policy seemed to be following a similar developmental path.
As T.H. Marshall argued in his seminal work, Citizenship and Social Class (1950), West European societies seemed to be going through a similar developmental process in regard to the nature of citizenship and individual and social rights. Marshall saw this as a three-step process involving the creation, expansion and universalization of fundamental civil rights (eighteenth century), the formation of universal political rights (nineteenth century) and the foundation of fundamental social rights (twentieth century). Social rights were the zenith of citizenship rights and had become increasingly universalized, within the various nation-states, in the early postwar period. In the early 1950s social expenditure by West European nation-states varied between 10â20 per cent of GNP. By the mid-1970s it had grown to 25â33 per cent of GNP (Flora, 1986: xxii). Marshallâs book was a clear reflection of the public expectations for the development of social rights and policies in the early postwar period. The particular type and level of social policy varied from country to country, but for Marshall (and many others) the trend was towards expansion and universalization of these rights and policies.
At the supranational level, were social policies being discussed and implemented? The answer is: yes, they were discussed; and no, they were not implemented. By 1948 three major international institutions had a substantial social policy component to their work. The oldest was the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO was founded in 1919 in the aftermath of the First World War and was oriented towards improving the living standards and rights of working persons. After the Second World War the reputation and influence of the ILO was greatly boosted by a supportive US government and its linkage to the United Nations. Its job was to provide information on labour and working conditions, and promote the creation of full employment, increasing living standards, and basic social and economic rights within the member countries. The ILO did produce a number of documents on basic working, labour and social rights; its power to inform, encourage or embarrass gave it some influence, particularly among smaller nations, but it never had the ability to directly intervene in or substantially influence a national situation (Galenson, 1981). Likewise the UN, founded in 1944, did create a substantial body of basic economic and social rights in its original charter which member states were supposed to fulfil. However, most Western European nations far exceeded the level of these basic rights and the UN lacked the political will and policy capabilities to rigorously implement them. Finally, the Council of Europe, founded in 1948, created a European Charter of Human Rights in 1953 that included some social rights. Moreover, in 1961 the Council presented its European Social Charter (Gomien et al., 1996). Similar to the principles of the UN and the ILO, this charter was a list of basic social rights which most of the West European countries easily surpassed. Council of Europe members who signed the charter were expected to maintain and improve upon these basic provisions. However, policing and implementing these policies was left up to the member states. The Council of Europe had no money or powers to implement the rights, leaving the charter with little impact on particular social rights other than through its moral force.
Early European integration theory
Before turning to the earliest elements of EU social policy, it is necessary to step back and examine the role of social policy in early European integration theory. During the 1940s and 1950s there were three main theories which attempted to explain and direct the development of European integration: federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism (Harrison, 1974; Pentland, 1973; Heater, 1992).
Federalism
The theory of federalism has a long and distinguished history both as a type of government and as a theory of governing (Riker, 1964; Wheare, 1953; Heater, 1992). The ancient Greeks established early federalist leagues. Other examples include the Hanseatic League (gradually formed in various north German cities, c. 1250â1350), the Swiss federation (founded in the fifteenth to sixteenth century), Dutch federal republic (sixteenth century), United States (eighteenth century) and Germany (nineteenth century). As a theory of uniting different regions/states into a diverse yet unified unit, federalism received a substantial boost in Western Europe following the two world wars. These left a desperate desire within many people for the creation of a more unified society that would contain or eliminate such conflicts, at least within Western Europe (Heater, 1992: chapters 6â7). In 1946 the European Union of Federalists (EUF) was established, building on earlier federalist organizations and including a number of former resistance fighters and leading intellectuals (mostly prominently Altiero Spinelli, the future EEC Commissioner).
At its most basic level, postwar European federalism relied upon three main assumptions (Harrison, 1974: chapter 3). First, human society was complex and heterogeneous. Such issues as language, race and culture could not be reduced to one clear and homogeneous social model. Second, society was pluralistic. Different interests had their legitimate place within various cultures and groups and the right to autonomy, protection and influence within general society. Third, since society was diverse and pluralistic (and would continue to be so for the foreseeable future), institutions must be devised to grant not only autonomy and protection, but a voice to these various elements of society while unifying them within a larger framework. The envisioned framework generally included a state structure divided both vertically, between central, regional and local institutions, and horizontally, between distinct central institutions and resting upon a constitutional edifice that balanced the rights and responsibilities of both the central and regional bodies and interests. In theory, the benefits of the federal system included: a barrier against central despotism; the protection of minority interests; the peaceful integration of conflicting interests; and the ability to solve societal problems at the level of government (local, regional, national, supranational) that was most suited to the particular problem.
For the postwar Euro-federalists, their system could resolve the previously irreconcilable differences that had twice torn Western Europe apart. With its combination of local, regional, national and federal governmental structures allowing for a maximum amount of diversity and protection of minority and regional rights within a unifying framework, European federalism would provide the necessary freedom and autonomy for the different European societies at the same time as it would provide for and encourage co-operation and conflict resolution. Pluralistic autonomy would be wedded to a co-operative and integrated federal structure to produce a productive and peaceful West European society that would be a model not only for the rest of Europe, but for the world as well.
The key problem for the federalists was how to go from the existing European structure of antagonistic and competitive nation-states to the formation of a European federation. For moderate federalists, such as Spinelli, the federalist goal could be obtained only through slow moderate reforms that increasingly integrated the differing nation-states into a growing federal structure. For radical federalists, the late 1940s represented a revolutionary moment in West European history. The legacy of two world wars had weakened the traditional hold of nationalism. West European society was sick of war and desperate for a new peaceful political system. Radical federalists hoped to channel this discontent into a political force that would demand the immediate creation of a European federal system.
The role of social policy in both the moderate and radical federal visions was secondary and obscure. The ideas and plans of the federalists were much more grandiose than the petty concerns of social policy. The federalists were trying to establish a new, prosperous and peaceful European order. Their expectation was that if European federalism could be created, then peace would be assured, the economy and society would prosper, and social problems would be alleviated by these broader developments. The creation of European level social rights and social policies would obviously play a role in this development.
What happened to federalist thinking in the 1950s? The radical federalists were doomed to disappointment. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, there was a brief upsurge in public opinion against the nation-state and towards some vision of Euro-federalism. However, as war memories faded, the economies of Western Europe revived, and the Cold War heated up, public support for the various nation-states returned and the hopes of creating a political force for federalism turned out to be a mirage. Without the European democratic force, radical federalists were little more than âvoices crying in the wildernessâ (Harrison, 1974: 44). Moreover, with the failure of the Council of Europe, the ECSC and EEC to adopt a federal structure and the collapse of the proposed European Defence Community and European Political Community in 1954 (Willis, 1968; Grosser, 1982), the movement lost its internal organization and drive and ceased to play a major role in EU affairs.
On the other hand, the moderate or evolutionary federalists saw the limited successes of the Council of Europe, the ECSC and EEC as laying the basis for some form of future federal structure. As already noted, several of the moderate federalists (Spinelli) moved into prominent positions within the new Euro-institutions. Despite disagreements about the pace of federal transformation, the moderate federalist vision has played a role in the strategies and plans of the EU from its earliest days to the present.
Functionalism
It is rather ironic that the second main theory of early European integration, functionalism, was originally opposed to the creation of regional or continental supranational federations. As David Mitrany argued in the seminal work of the functionalists, A Working Peace System: âThere is little promise of peace in the mere change from the rivalry of Powers and alliances to the rivalry of whole continents.⌠Continental unions would have a more real chance than individual states to practise the autarky that makes for divisionâ (Mitrany, 1966: 45). Like early realists in international relations theory, Mitrany and the early functionalists saw the largest threat to peace in Western Europe and elsewhere as the anarchical international system and the self-interested actions of individual states within that anarchical order. Building regional blocs or super-states within that basic order would not change the prospects for peace. For Mitrany, individuals were generally rational, economistic, utilitarian, self-interested and welfare-oriented. Society, mirroring the thinking of classical economics, was little more than a collection of these individuals. In many ways, states were reflections of individuals. They were generally rational and self-interested. However, nation-states, caught in an anarchical world order, continually had to justify their existence to their constituent societies and at the same time defend themselves against attacks from other states. This aggressive-defensive relationship was fundamentally opposed to the basic utilitarian and welfare-oriented nature of individuals. As long as nation-states existed within an anarchical international system, this contradiction would continue, and the basically co-operative and economistic tendencies of society would be suppressed under the potentially violent struggles caused by nation-state competition.
To escape from this trap and to create real peace and prosperity, society had to subvert and eventually eliminate the nation-state. As opposed to international-relations realists, functionalists thought this could be done through a slow, steady process of functional transformation. Individuals and interest groups needed to shift their national orientation and strategies towards the opportunities and benefits of international co-operation. This would not be done at the state level, but on the relatively low level of basic social and economic interactions. Economic groups demanding greater market opportunities, academic groups desiring increased exchange of knowledge, tourist groups yearning to explore different areas, could maximize their own distinctive interests much more effectively outside the constraints of the nation-state. These groups were predominantly ânon-politicalâ for Mitrany in that they were merely pursuing their self-interest rather than the particularist political demands of a given nation-state. Moreover, as these interactions or transactions2 increased two major transformations would occur. One, individuals and groups would begin to demand the creation of international authorities that would maintain and support these functional links. Sovereignty would begin to transfer away from competing nation-states to non-political co-operative international institutions that would fulfil the functional needs of society. Two, as nation-states became increasingly caught within the growing mesh of functional social relations they would become increasingly constrained and incapable of pursuing their former violent and destructive activities.
The functionalist strategy was relatively straightforward. Ignore the activities of state actors, since state level promises of peace and friendship will come and go. Instead, spend time promoting the low level functional linkages between different societies. As these linkages grow and develop, these individuals and groups will increasingly demand that international institutions ânon-politicallyâ support and enhance these activities. As Mitrany stated, international peace is âmore likely to grow through doing things together in the workshop and market place than by signing pacts in chancelleriesâ (Mitrany, 1966: 25). Over time, national sovereignty and control would erode in a sea of functionally oriented international institutions.
Following this logic, social policy played an important role for the functionalist. Social policy, like economic policy, was the realm of low politics (as opposed to the high politics of defence and foreign relations). Dealing with unemployment, promoting workersâ rights, encouraging labour mobility, taking advantage of larger economies of scale, co-ordinating family, education and health policy and combating poverty were all issues and policy areas that were seen as primarily ânon-politicalâ and best addressed through technically efficient bureaucratic organizations that could promote the fundamental commonality of these issues. Economic factors were clearly at the heart of functionalist thinking, but social factors and policies were important as well.
What happened to functionalist thinking in the 1950s? As mentioned earlier, Mitrany opposed the formation of regional European organizations such as the ECSC and EEC since they would merely form larger units of the same national problem. He and other functionalists strongly supported the creation of the UN and the ILO. For these organizations to be created and to have some impact was a major achievement. However, by no stretch of the imagination could it be argued that they were fulfilling the functionalist dreams of enmeshing nation-states into peaceful co-operation. Ironically, functionalist thinking was central to the creation of the ECSC and EEC. It did not take much of an intellectual leap to take the grandiose global plans of the functionalists and apply them in a constrained yet successful manner at the European level. The ECSC and EEC were designed to promote functional linkages between the various member states. Authority and sovereignty were transferred to an international, functionally oriented, bureaucratic institution that was supposed to maintain and develop these functional linkages. Moreover, the hope was that these growing functional linkages would increase the interdependence and co-operation between the member states; if not end, they would at least reduce the likelihood of violent conflict between them. Unlike federalism, which provided the EU with a proposed goal or vision, functionalism helped to give the ECSC and EEC their actual strategies, concomitantly providing the basis for neo-functionalism.
Neo-functionalism
Ernst Haasâs history of the ECSC, The Uniting of Europe, published in 1958, remains one of the pre-eminent works of neo-functionalism. It examined in detail the policies of the ECSC and, more importantly, the ECSC-related policies of the major political parties and interest group actors in all six of the member states. For Haas, a marvellous thing had occurred in the early 1950s...
