Party and State in Post-Mao China

Teresa Wright

• Publisher: Polity
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9780745691497
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica asiatica

In recent decades, China has become a quasi-capitalist economic powerhouse. Yet it continues to be ruled by the same Communist Party-dominated government that has been in power since 1949. But how has China's political system achieved such longevity? And what does its stability tell us about the future of authoritarian versus liberal democratic governance? In this detailed analysis of the deeply intertwined relationship between the ruling Communist Party and governing state, noted China expert Teresa Wright provides insightful answers to these important questions. Though many believe that the Chinese party-state has maintained its power despite its communist and authoritarian features, Wright argues that the key to its sustained success lies in its careful safeguarding of some key communist and authoritarian characteristics, while simultaneously becoming more open and responsive to public participation. She contends that China's post-Mao party-state compares well to different forms of political rule, including liberal democratic government. It has fulfilled the necessary functions of a stable governing regime: satisfying key demographic groups and responding to public grievances; maintaining economic stability and growth; and delivering public services - without any real reduction in CCP power and influence. Questioning current understandings of the nature, strengths, and weaknesses of democracy and authoritarianism, this thought-provoking book will be essential reading for all students and scholars of Chinese politics and international relations.

1
Sources of Stable Governance in China

For more than a century, the Chinese people have experienced dramatic social, political, and economic changes. In 1911, the upheavals that resulted from the intrusion of industrializing Western powers and Japan on Chinese soil culminated in the fall of the imperial system that had governed China for millennia – a system that in its general form was longer-lasting than any political system in the world, before or since. From 1911–49, political turmoil, foreign invasion, and civil war continually upturned the Chinese people's daily lives. Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949, fundamental economic and social transformations have continued. However, over the long course of CCP rule, China's political system has in many ways become more stable.

Since 1949, this political system has been composed of a deeply intertwined, yet in some ways differentiated, ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and governing state. From 1949–76, Mao Zedong led China's political system, fomenting continuous change in the lives of the Chinese people. Though officials within the political system were not infrequently attacked as a result of Mao's determination to avoid ossification within the political system, the CCP-led political system itself remained stable. Since Mao's death in 1976, China's social and economic structures have again been dramatically altered. The totalitarian social and economic controls of the Mao era largely have gone by the wayside, as has the continual inculcation of Maoist ideology. China has moved toward a free-wheeling, convoluted, and sometimes contradictory blend of capitalist and socialist economic features, and great social freedom in some areas, but strict controls in others.

Since the death of Mao in 1976, Chinese citizens at times have engaged in public protests. Especially since the early 1990s, mass demonstrations have been commonplace. However, simultaneously, the Chinese public has demonstrated little interest in systemic political change, including liberal democratic transformation. In fact, from the early 1990s through the present, China's CCP-led regime has enjoyed greater popular support than it did in the earlier part of the post-Mao period (the late 1970s through the 1980s).

The stability of China's political system has been puzzling to many, particularly those who believe that authoritarian regimes are inherently unstable. Those who refuse to accept public opinion polls and other evidence indicating widespread public acceptance of China's post-Mao government typically argue that the CCP has maintained its power mainly through repression, and that the Chinese public is too fearful to challenge its control. Others maintain that it is just a matter of time before the CCP-controlled system falls, as its communist and authoritarian features increasingly will inhibit its ability to effectively govern.

In contrast, many specialists in Chinese politics emphasize that China's post-Mao political system has remained stable because it has been adaptable. This book agrees. At the same time, it makes a more specific argument – that the stability of the CCP-led government in China – particularly since the early 1990s – has derived both from its greater openness and responsiveness to the public, and from some of its still communist and authoritarian features.

To explain how this can be so, this book dives deep into the workings of China's political system, uncovering how the system is set up (including its major institutions and structures); how people come to occupy positions of power within the system; and how these people formulate and implement public policies. In addition, it examines how well the institutions, structures, and processes that comprise China's political system fulfill the functions that are required in order for any governing regime to be stable. Without a doubt, there are many important governmental functions. But among these, this book focuses on three that are particularly essential: (i) ameliorating public grievances and satisfying key demographic groups; (ii) ensuring economic growth and stability; and (iii) enabling access to necessary goods and services.

In Western countries, most citizens believe that only a liberal democratic political system (i.e., one with competitive elections at all levels and with guarantees of civil liberties such as freedom of expression and assembly) can adequately satisfy these requirements. In terms of the first function listed above (ameliorating public grievances and satisfying key demographic groups), governments that lack competitive elections and do not protect civil liberties are seen as uninterested in listening to and acting on the public's input. With regard to the second function (managing the economy), many Westerners argue that economic growth and stability require a free flow of information, and that this can occur only in a liberal democratic political context. When it comes to the third function (ensuring access to necessary goods and services), it is believed that unless a government is subject to popular election, it will have no incentive to guarantee the provision of the goods and services that citizens need. For these reasons, many assume that authoritarian political regimes are inherently unstable. If they do not fulfill the basic functions of government, the public will lose patience with their rule, and will force liberal democratic political change (or at least will attempt to do so). At that point, the leaders of the authoritarian regime will have to choose between democratization and repression.

These Western assumptions are challenged by the case of China. Despite dramatic economic and social change in the post-Mao period, the political system has in many basic ways remained authoritarian: opposition parties are not permitted, the public has no right to vote for top political leaders, the media is censored, and political dissent is repressed. But at the same time, Chinese citizens have evidenced remarkable toleration of – and even support for – China's CCP-controlled political system.

The political attitudes of China's citizens – however shocking and disconcerting they may be to Westerners – have been documented in a range of studies. These include numerous surveys conducted by highly respected international organizations that are led by accomplished scholars. One such organization is the World Values Survey Association, which since 1981 has conducted once-a-decade surveys in nearly 100 countries. The population samples are rigorously chosen so as to be nationally representative of the various demographic groups found among citizens aged eighteen and older, and respondents are surveyed via face-to-face interviews overseen by trained social scientists working in academic institutions.¹ In the 2012 World Values Survey (WVS), nearly 85 percent of Chinese respondents expressed “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of confidence in the national government. In addition, approximately 78 percent expressed “a great deal” (29 percent) or “quite a lot” (49 percent) of confidence in China's national legislative body, the National People's Congress.² Another well-known international survey organization, World Public Opinion (WPO) [run by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland], has conducted public opinion surveys via polls, focus groups, and face-to-face interviews in most countries since 1992. In the most recent WPO survey of China, in 2008, respondents were supportive of the political system, with 83 percent reporting that they could trust the national government to do the right thing “most of the time” (60 percent) or “just about always” (23 percent). Even stronger results were found in a nationally representative study conducted in 2008 by the East Asia Barometer (EAB), another internationally recognized survey organization that queries respondents via face-to-face interviews.³ In the EAB poll, more than 93 percent of Chinese respondents expressed “a great deal” (69 percent) or “quite a lot” (24 percent) of trust in the national government.⁴

Further, in surveys such as these, Chinese respondents' stated trust in and support for their political system is higher than is the case in almost every other country in the world, including liberal democracies such as the US, Great Britain, France, South Korea, and India. In the 2012 WPO survey, these countries were among the nineteen that were polled. Among all nineteen, Chinese citizens reported the highest levels of trust in their government. In response to a question asking for whom one's government is run, 65 of percent of Chinese selected “for the benefit of the people.” In Britain and France, in contrast, roughly 60 percent selected “by a few big interests looking out for themselves,” and in the US a whopping 80 percent chose this answer. Perhaps even more surprising, WPO respondents from China evidenced less dissatisfaction with their government's level of “democratic responsiveness” than did respondents from the US, Britain, France, and South Korea.⁵

In addition, surveys indicate that the Chinese public believes that the existing political system is fairly democratic. In the 2012 WVS, respondents were asked to evaluate “how democratically” China is “being governed today,” with a score of 1 indicating “not at all democratic” and 10 signifying “completely democratic.” The vast majority of respondents (61 percent) chose a positive score of 6–10. Only about 24 percent chose a negative score of 1–5, and most of these selected a ranking of 5. [14.6 percent did not respond or selected “I don't know”.] Similarly, in the 2008 EAB, more than 87 percent of Chinese respondents reported being “fairly satisfied” (70 percent) or “very satisfied” (17 percent) with the “way democracy works” in China. Relatedly, in the 2012 WVS nearly 70 percent of respondents stated that there is a “great deal of” or “fairly much” respect for individual rights at present in China. Overall, in the 2008 EAB, over 89 of respondents rated China's “present political situation” as “very good” (30 percent) or “good” (59 percent). Among the remainder of respondents, about 8 percent rated it as “average,” while less than 3 percent considered it to be “bad” or “very bad.”⁶

Survey results such as these must be taken with a grain of salt. As critics point out, respondents may not have been entirely honest in their answers, due to their concern that a negative response might have dangerous political consequences. Given the Chinese regime's proclivity to arrest and jail those who are deemed subversive – as well as its enormous budget for maintaining domestic “stability” (at the time of this writing this budget exceeds that of China's formal military budget) – this is an important question. To assess this possibility, various scholars have included in their surveys of Chinese citizens questions about respondents' level of fear of political persecution. They have found no correlation between a respondent's stated level of support for China's political system and his or her fear of the governing regime.⁷ Relatedly, critics of survey results such as those found in the WVS, WPO, and EAB argue that respondents' views simply reflect the ignorance or brain-washing of Chinese citizens that result from the government's censorship of the media. However, this argument also is problematic. For, researchers have found that Chinese citizens with greater exposure to China's domestic media actually express less confidence in the government.⁸ And, Chinese who regularly skirt China's Internet restrictions and access international news media reports are among the population's most vocal critics of Western governments and media outlets.⁹

A more persuasive criticism of WVS, WPO, EAB, and other mass survey results concerns their comparability across countries. For “democracy” can mean different things in different countries, and can be judged by varied standards and comparative reference-points. The veracity of this point is not in doubt. At the same time, however, questions about the comparability of national survey results do not invalidate the findings of individual country surveys; such questions simply remind us to consider each country's survey results within that country's particular context.

Additional evidence of popular acceptance of, and even support for, China's government – particularly at the national level – is found in more focused scholarly studies. These include on-the-ground interviews with and observations of a wide range of demographic groups – including private entrepreneurs, “blue collar” public and private sector workers, farmers, environmental activists, and participants in mass protests. This research con...