Is it possible to begin a book with a confession of failure? Yes, it is possible and, in this instance, essential, even though the irony implicit in the question is unmistakable, since the question contains its own answer. Nor is it an expression of arrogance (as some readers may perhaps surmise); it is not a frivolous game with one's own limitations and blind spots. No doubt, a certain metaphysical ingenuousness is needed to coin the glib phrase a ‘God of one's own’ and to ‘expound’ it (whatever that might mean). In principle, however, the sphere of religion relates to that of sociology like fire to the water that puts it out.
As a sociologist with a firm belief in the redemptive power of sociological enlightenment, I have the idiom of secularism in my blood. The premise of secularism – more specifically, the idea that with the advance of modernization, religion will automatically disappear – cannot simply be expunged from sociological thinking, not even if that prognosis were to be refuted by history. It is for this reason that the contents of religious beliefs, with their – relatively – autonomous force and reality, their visions of a different humanity and their power to make whole worlds tremble, are so rarely exposed in their full ambivalence to the gaze of sociology. Sociologists are more concerned to demonstrate that even though rain-dancing Indians produce no rain with their dance, they successfully ‘interact’, because their dance has the ‘function’ of contributing towards the ‘integration’ of the group. However, such an approach tells us absolutely nothing about the whys and the wherefores of the cultural productivity and destructiveness of religious belief.
In sociology such lacunae are regarded not as defects, but as proof of scientific integrity. The discipline concerns itself with only one half of such basic religious distinctions as that between creator and creation, eternity and time, the next world and this one. Even if sociologists do not deny the depth and power of religious feelings, they refuse to accept that religious phenomena must be understood and explained in religious terms. Instead, they establish a ‘methodological secularism’, according to which religious phenomena are primarily seen as having social causes and functions. And that is as it should be: it satisfies the sceptical scientific mind.
However, such a view is in conformity with the process of secularization. It makes visible its own leading idea: the de-mystification of the religious sphere. And it renders invisible and incomprehensible something that increasingly determines reality, namely the re-mystification of reality by religion. Hence it is not necessary to be religious but merely to think consistently in sociological terms to be subject to doubts about whether the a-religious or anti-religious tendency of sociological scepticism is best suited to decoding not just the religious significance of a ‘God of one's own’, but its social and political power as well. Thus the present book sets out on what is doubtless a vain quest for an alliance of fire and water – in the service of both: that is to say, of sociology's claims to knowledge and perhaps also of religion's own self-understanding.
Etty Hillesum
In her diary Etty Hillesum, a Jewish woman from the Netherlands, left a record of the ‘God of her own’ she had sought and found. Her handwritten diary entries start in March 1941 and end in October 1943. At the beginning of her diary the young woman leads the life of an ordinary citizen, although her very existence is threatened by the racist delusions of National Socialism. As her outward life became increasingly confined, Etty Hillesum progressively turned her gaze inwards. She read Rilke, Dostoevsky, Pushkin, St Augustine and, again and again, the Bible. Slowly and almost imperceptibly, the conversation with herself turned into a conversation with God. Etty Hillesum even developed a special style for speaking to God. She talks to God as if talking to herself. She speaks to Him directly without a trace of self-consciousness. Self-discovery and the discovery of God, finding herself and finding God, inventing herself and inventing God – all merge naturally into one. Her ‘own’ God is not the God of the synagogues or the churches or the ‘believers’, as distinct from the ‘unbelievers’. ‘Her’ God knows nothing of heresy, the Crusades, and the unspeakable cruelties of the Inquisition, Reformation and Counter-Reformation, or of the mass murders of religiously motivated terrorism. Her God is free from theology and dogma; He is blind to history and, perhaps for that very reason, merciful and helpless. She says, ‘When I pray, I never pray for myself, but always for others, or else I carry on a crazy or childlike or deadly serious dialogue with whatever is profoundest in me and which for simplicity's sake I call God’ (Hillesum 1981: 165).
What is needed is the viewpoint of a sociology of religion that does justice to this subjective dimension of the religious – even if establishing such a yardstick makes failure unavoidable. Historians have discovered religious biographies and autobiographies and other works of testimony that have proved to be documents of extraordinary revelatory power, and so it may well be meaningful to allow one such work of testimony to speak for itself and then to interpret it.
Perhaps we are moved by the utter childlike earnestness of this individual, intimate, dialogical voice because Etty Hillesum expresses and embodies things that appear entirely incompatible. Instead of hatred for the persecutors, trust in her own God. She, even she, faces destruction, she suspects it; we know it. Nevertheless, she writes, ‘And if we survive this age intact, intact in body and soul, above all in soul, without bitterness, without hatred, then, once the war is over, we shall have the right to have our say. Perhaps I am an ambitious woman. I should like to have my say, however small.’
Completely helpless in the face of catastrophe, she notes with the victim's lack of guile, but repudiating her role as victim, ‘One would like to be a plaster on many wounds.’ Caught up in an utterly hopeless situation, she denies that the victims' situation is hopeless and restores their dignity of action. ‘… we shall have to produce a small portion of love and kindness from within ourselves to counter every new crime and every new act of cruelty. We may indeed suffer, but we must not crack up’ (ibid.: 224).
Etty Hillesum was Jewish but she grew up in a family in which Jewishness played no role at all. It was as a Jewess that she was deported to a concentration camp and killed, but she did not accept Jewish identity. Nor, however, did she convert to Christianity. Etty Hillesum experienced and practised a radical version of a God of her own choosing. No synagogue, no church, no religious community. Was Etty Hillesum a non-Jew in her lifetime and a Jew in her death?
Even when imprisoned in the camp, Etty was present without belonging. The metaphor she uses to describe her situation is ‘shipwreck’. Drowning people jostle each other to grab hold of a piece of driftwood in the endless expanse of the ocean.