In 1977, ânew philosophyâ took French intellectual and political life by storm. In their runaway best-selling books, ânew philosophers,â the most notable of whom were AndrĂ© Glucksmann and Bernard Henri LĂ©vy, offered a radical critique of Marxism and revolutionary politics by linking them both to the Gulag. Further, they argued that transformative politics in general and, at the limit, reason and science were dangerously affiliated with totalitarianism. The only safe politics, they suggested, was the defense of human rights. This was a crucial moment in French intellectual and political life that marked the end of the revolutionary upsurge begun by 1968 and the transition to more moderate liberal and republican political options. Making sense of it is crucial for understanding both recent French history and, more specifically, the trajectories of the intellectuals engaged in it. This is notably the case for Michel Foucault, a central figure in the ideologicalâpolitical debates of the 1970s.
Foucault intervened in the debate over new philosophy with a laudatory review of Glucksmann's The Master Thinkers in the May 9â15, 1977 issue of the mass-circulation weekly Le Nouvel Observateur. Foucault's intervention was important for himself, for Glucksmann, and for ânew philosophyâ in general. For Foucault, it was not a minor matter. His support for Glucksmann resulted in irreparable breaks with old friends, such as Claude Mauriac and, most notably, Gilles Deleuze, who had broadly shared Foucault's Nietzchean inspiration and post-1968 philosophical and political trajectory, but was sharply critical of new philosophy and remained, unlike Foucault, more generally supportive of post-1968 radicalism.1 For Glucksmann and new philosophy, Foucault's endorsement was even more important because, as I have argued elsewhere,2 new philosophy, although a mass-media phenomenon, would have been much less successful if it had not received support from leading intellectuals.
Foucault's praise for The Master Thinkers has presented something of a mystery to scholars of Foucault because Glucksmann arguably simplified and twisted Foucault's ideas beyond recognition. Evaluations of it have consequently differed greatly. Didier Eribon, Foucault's first biographer, downplays its importance by holding that Foucault's support for The Master Thinkers was âdictated more by political than by philosophical considerations.â3 By contrast, Michael C. Behrent argues in his contribution to this volume that âthe extent to which this shift [the anti-totalitarian one in new philosophy] impacted his own thinking has been underestimatedâ (p. 26). Here I will address the problem of Foucault's support for Glucksmann as a point of departure for understanding Foucault's politics and conception of power in the early to mid-1970s. While complicating Eribon's picture of Foucault taking a primarily political position, I also seek to demonstrate that Foucault's endorsement of Glucksmann was hardly accidental, but rather a reflection of Foucault's philosophical practice, its relationship with politics and the mass media, and shortcomings in his conception of power that limited its effectiveness for thinking about the twentieth century. It may be from Behrent's downstream perspective that the moment of new philosophy was a turning point for Foucault, but looking upstream toward 1977 Foucault's endorsement of Glucksmann was less of a break with Foucault's past than it may seem.
AndrĂ© Glucksmann's The Master Thinkers was the culmination of Glucksmann's disaffection with post-1968 revolutionary politics and his effort to turn a broader public away from it and other efforts at radical political transformation such as that represented by the Union of the Left, which seemed likely to win the March 1978 legislative elections when Glucksmann's book was published in 1977. Glucksmann, who had been a member of the Maoist Gauche prolĂ©tarienne in the early 1970s, had already tried to justify and explain his disillusionment with the revolutionary Left in his 1975 book La cuisiniĂšre et le mangeur d'hommes: essai sur l'Ătat, le marxisme, et les camps de concentration [The Cook and the Cannibal: Essay on the State, Marxism, and the Concentration Camps]. Taking as his point of departure Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago and the French response to it, Glucksmann argues that the Gulag is a culminating point of Western historical development, the great moments of which are âPlatonism (and its slaves), classical Reason (and its inmates), Marxism (and its camps).â4 The Gulag and its Marxist theoretical foundation are but the latest effort by elites to build up state structures and ideologies to dominate the masses, which Glucksmann calls âthe pleb.â This link between the Gulag and the West explains, Glucksmann argues, why French intellectuals have not been more indignant in the face of the Gulag. Considering theory and the state to be instruments of domination, Glucksmann calls for a politics of resistance by the pleb in both East and West. These populist and anarchist conclusions find sustenance in Foucault's work. Foucault's Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1961) is used by Glucksmann to establish the link between Western historical development and the Gulag, as it was in his view âthe general hospital,â âcrowning achievement of the new Reason,â that âprefigures the concentration camp.â5 For Glucksmann, the twentieth century âinnovates littleâ in relation to this earlier precedent, âeven the idea of deporting is not its own; the general hospital already served as the warehouse for the unfortunate that one rounded up [raflait] to send them âto the Islandsâ.â6 Foucault was central not only to Glucksmann's historical analysis, but also to his political response to it. Politics, Glucksmann stated in 1975, should take a Foucauldian turn, focusing its aim on micropowers, the disciplines that are at âthe root of the state power.â7
Glucksmann's The Master Thinkers of 1977 follows the same line of argumentation as his earlier The Cook and the Cannibal. Joining Marx in infamy are Hegel, Fichte, and Nietzsche, also presented by Glucksmann as philosophers of a coercive and normalizing state. Glucksmann argues that these âmaster thinkersâ systematized and justified the modern state's project of domination, itself put on the âorder of the dayâ by the French Revolution. They promoted an interiorization of the law that smothers the pleb's protest at its inception. While not directly responsible for the Gulag and Auschwitz, they âsystematized and rendered strategically malleable ideas and tactics largely diffused before them in societies in the process of becoming rationally disciplinary.â They are guilty for having âunder the cover of knowledgeâŠput together the mental apparatus indispensable to the launching of the great final solutions of the twentieth century.â8
Glucksmann's book is constructed around a number of homologous oppositions: the state versus the pleb, anti-Semitism versus Judaism, revolution and power versus resistance, and reason and science versus ignorance. The state seeks to dominate the pleb, submit it to its will and force it to internalize its subordination. This project leads directly to anti-Semitism, the camps, and genocide:
Although the project of domination is that of the state, intellectuals, science, and reason are all essentially complicit in it. Science and the texts of the master thinkers are simply strategies of domination, and âto think is to dominate.â Conversely, behind Nazism and Stalinism lie texts and science. Neither of...