What is Power?

Byung-Chul Han

• Publisher: Polity
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781509516131
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Filosofía
• Subtopic: Filosofía política

Power is a pervasive phenomenon yet there is little consensus on what it is and how it should be understood. In this book the cultural theorist Byung-Chul Han develops a fresh and original perspective on the nature of power, shedding new light on this key feature of social and political life. Power is commonly defined as a causal relation: an individual's power is the cause that produces a change of behaviour in someone else against the latter's will. Han rejects this view, arguing that power is better understood as a mediation between ego and alter which creates a complex array of reciprocal interdependencies. Power can also be exercised not only against the other but also within and through the other, and this involves a much higher degree of mediation. This perspective enables us to see that power and freedom are not opposed to one another but are manifestations of the same power, differing only in the degree of mediation. This highly original account of power will be of great interest to students and scholars of philosophy and of social, political and cultural theory, as well as to anyone seeking to understand the many ways in which power shapes our lives today.

1
The Logic of Power

Power is usually defined as a causal relation: the power of the ego is the cause which effects a particular behaviour in an alter against the latter’s will. It enables the ego to impose his or her decisions without having to show any consideration for the alter. Thus, the ego’s power limits the alter’s freedom. The alter suffers the will of the ego as something alien. This common idea of power does not do justice to its complexity. Processes of power are not exhausted by attempts to break resistance or to compel obedience. Power does not have to take the form of coercion. The fact that there is a will forming that opposes the holder of power actually bears witness to the weakness of that power. The more powerful power is, the more silent is its efficacy. Where it needs to draw special attention to itself, it is already weakened.¹

Neither does power consist in ‘neutralizing the will’.² The claim here is that the existing power imbalance impedes the formation of a will on the side of the subordinated party, for this party will in any case have to succumb to the will of the holder of power. Hence, the holder of power directs the subordinated party regarding the latter’s choices of action. But there are forms of power that exceed such a ‘neutralization of the will’. It is the sign of a superior power that those subjected to it explicitly want what the holder of power wants, that those subjected to power follow the will of its holder as if it were their own, or even anticipate that will. The one who is subjected to power may glorify what he or she would have, in any event, wanted to do, by declaring it to be in accordance with the will of the superior power, and executing it with a ‘Yes!’, an emphatic affirmation of that power. Thus, one and the same action takes on a different form in the medium of power because the action of the holder of power is affirmed or internalized by the one subjected to power as his or her own action. Power is thus a phenomenon pertaining to form. How an action is motivated is crucial. Not ‘I have to anyhow’ but ‘I want to’ expresses the presence of a superior power. Not the inner ‘No’, but the emphatic ‘Yes!’ is the response to a superior power.³ Causality does not allow for an adequate description of it, because in this case power does not operate like a mechanical push that simply moves a body out of its original trajectory. Rather, its effect is like that of a field in which the body moves out of its own accord, so to speak.

The model of coercion does not do justice to the complexity of power. Power as coercion consists in enforcing one’s own decisions against the will of the other. It therefore displays only a very low degree of mediation between ego and alter, which relate antagonistically to each other. The ego is not received in the soul of the alter. The form of power which does not exercise its effects against the intended actions of the other but from within these contains more mediation. For a superior power is one that forms the future of the other, not one that blocks it. Instead of proceeding against a particular action of the alter, it influences or works on the environment of the alter’s actions even before they take place, so that the alter voluntarily decides in favour of the ego’s will, even without the threat of any sanctions. Without the use of any violence [Gewaltausübung],⁴ the holder of power takes his place in the soul of the other.

The causal model is incapable of describing complex relations. Even organic life as such cannot be understood in terms of causal relations. As opposed to a lifeless and passive thing, an organism does not allow an external cause to have an effect on it without the organism contributing to it. Rather, it reacts independently to the cause. This capacity to give an independent response to an external trigger is characteristic of the organic. A lifeless thing, by contrast, does not respond. The specificity of life is that it cuts short the external cause, transforms it and lets it begin something new in itself. Life may be dependent on food, but food is not the cause of life. If we can talk of a cause at all in this context, then it is life itself which has the power to turn what is external to it into a cause of specific organic processes.⁵ These processes are therefore not simple repetitions of the external cause on the inside. Rather, they are independent achievements, independent decisions of life. It reacts independently to the outside. An external cause is but one of many possible triggers that life itself turns into a cause. Life never just passively suffers such causes. An external cause never achieves an effect without a contribution or decision of the inner. There is no immediate continuation of the outer into the inner, as in the case of the transmission of kinetic energy from one body to another. The category of causality is even less suitable for a description of mental life. The complexity of mental life determines the complexity of power processes which cannot be translated into linear relations between cause and effect. This complexity distinguishes power from physical violence, where a simple causality between force, or strength, and effect can be given. This reduction in complexity probably constitutes the advantage of physical violence.

The complex processes of power cannot be adequately described with simple arithmetic. A slight countervailing power may inflict severe damage on a power of superior strength. This affords even a weak opponent great importance, and thus power. Specific political constellations may also give a lot of power to weak parties or nations. And complex interdependencies mean that there is reciprocity of power. If the ego needs the cooperation of the alter, a dependence of ego on alter is the result. The ego can no longer formulate and enforce his or her demands without taking the alter into consideration, because the alter has the option of reacting to the ego’s attempts at compelling him or her by ending his or her cooperation, which would also put the ego into a difficult situation. Thus, the ego’s dependence on the alter can be perceived and used by the latter as a source of power. Even the very weakest can turn their powerlessness into power by making skilful use of cultural norms.

Furthermore, there is the multifarious dialectic of power to consider. The hierarchical model of power, according to which power simply moves from top to bottom, is undialectical. The more power someone holds, the more he or she is dependent on the advice and cooperation of subordinates. The holder of power may be able to give orders across a vast range of matters. But due to the increasing complexity of such operations, the power in fact passes on to the advisors who tell the holder of power what orders to give. The numerous dependencies of the holder of power become a source of power for the subordinates. They lead to a structural dispersal of power.

There is an obstinate belief that power excludes freedom. But this is not the case. The power of the ego reaches its peak precisely at the point at which the alter voluntarily follows the will of the ego. The ego does not impose him- or herself on the alter. Free power is not an oxymoron. It says: the alter follows the ego out of freedom. Whoever wants to achieve absolute power will have to make use not of violence but of the freedom of the other. Absolute power is achieved at the point at which freedom and submission coincide completely.

However, power based on giving orders and power based on freedom and what is taken for granted are not two opposed models. They differ only in appearance. Raised to an abstract level, they reveal their common structure. Power allows the ...