Ecomodernism: Technology, Politics and The Climate Crisis

Jonathan Symons

• Publisher: Polity
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781509531202, 9781509531196
• eBook ISBN: 9781509531226
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Environment & Energy Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Is climate catastrophe inevitable? In a world of extreme inequality, rising nationalism and mounting carbon emissions, the future looks gloomy. Yet one group of environmentalists, the 'ecomodernists', are optimistic. They argue that technological innovation and universal human development hold the keys to an ecologically vibrant future. However, this perspective, which advocates fighting climate change with all available technologies – including nuclear power, synthetic biology and others not yet invented – is deeply controversial because it rejects the Green movement's calls for greater harmony with nature.

In this book, Jonathan Symons offers a qualified defence of the ecomodernist vision. Ecomodernism, he explains, is neither as radical or reactionary as its critics claim, but belongs in the social democratic tradition, promoting a third way between laissez-faire and anti-capitalism. Critiquing and extending ecomodernist ideas, Symons argues that states should defend against climate threats through transformative investments in technological innovation. A good Anthropocene is still possible – but only if we double down on science and humanism to push beyond the limits to growth.

1
The Thirty Years’ Crisis

Ecomodernists are often called techno-optimists. The term puzzles me. Most ecomodernists are pessimistic about the likely trajectory of climate change – they think warming far above 2°C is now inevitable. Most are pessimistic about the potential for existing technologies to achieve decarbonization – they argue that we lack mature technologies to eliminate emissions from industry, transport and agriculture. They are pessimistic about proposals for intermittent renewable energy such as wind and solar to supply all our power, as they think a stable grid requires sources of dispatchable firm capacity. They worry that the proven sources of zero-carbon dispatchable electricity – nuclear and hydroelectric power – lack public support and so are unlikely to be constructed at scale. They think it improbable that whole communities will give up aviation, meat, dairy, cars, steel, concrete or choice over family size in order to avert climate harms. Finally, ecomodernists are pessimistic about the prospects for international cooperation – they doubt that states will agree to high carbon prices, to binding emissions pledges, or to overcoming the limitations of local intermittent generation by constructing a planet-straddling hyper-grid.

So why are ecomodernists called optimists? I think it's because, despite the real risk that climate change will prove catastrophic, they argue that through the wise use of science a ‘good Anthropocene’ could be possible. Whereas many Greens offer narratives of decline and promote a return to more humble technologies, ecomodernists point to continuing advances in human welfare and urge us to keep faith with technology and science. Given the tendency for scientific advances to bring unintended consequences, ecomodernism's position does involve an optimistic leap of faith. However, some ecomodernists have described this optimism as strategic; they believe positivity enables progressive change. Moreover, ecomodernists’ promotion of technological innovation reflects a comparative judgement. Far from believing that technology will unlock a utopian future, they propose that a climate response that draws on scientific ingenuity alongside social change is likely to achieve more than strategies that reject ‘hubristic’ technologies and interventions in nature out of hand. Finally, ecomodernists can seem optimistic because, although they recognize the deep inequalities of the contemporary world, they insist that human welfare is advancing steadily. Here, ecomodernists ‘hold two ideas at the same time: that bad things are going on in the world, but that many things are getting better’ (Rosling et al. 2018, p. 248). Some people are critical of this ‘celebration’ of progress. Given the depth of international equality they believe it is premature and self-serving for Western elites to express optimism. I am sympathetic to this critique. However, I think the more important debate concerns how we might accelerate advances in human welfare while also preserving a habitable planet. Ecomodernists offer some important insights into reconciling these desirable yet potentially contradictory goals.

Before we consider ecomodernism's response to these challenges, I first want to set the scene by outlining some of the key trends shaping global climate politics, some of the systematic ways in which we might misperceive these trends, and some of the prior commitments that have shaped the Green movement's climate response. This chapter will then conclude by arguing that Green scepticism concerning innovation, large-scale technology and the state, has created a barrier to effective climate action. This is not to deny that the Green cultural critique has real value. Where Green movements have been influential they have often created more inclusive, safe and resilient communities. However, Green thinking has proven more valuable for achieving qualitative improvements in wellbeing, than for guiding climate responses. Effective climate action must enable a massive expansion in the third world's access to modern energy alongside an unprecedent technological transformation of the global economy. Despite the slogan ‘think globally, act locally’, the Green response to climate change has rarely seemed commensurate with the scale of this challenge.

A Temperature Check

It's now been three decades since climate change gained a central place on the global political agenda. In 1988 world leaders met at the Toronto International Conference on the Changing Atmosphere and pledged to cut GHG emissions by 20% by 2005. That same year, 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established and Professor James Hansen, head of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, testified to a US Congressional committee that climate change was already occurring. World leaders were thus fully briefed on climate risks. How much progress have we made in the ensuing three decades? Indulge me by taking a pen and noting your answers to the following questions:

1. 1. In order to halt continuing human-induced climate change, global GHG emissions will eventually need to be brought to zero. Between 1988 and 2017, annual global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels:
   1. (a) decreased by about 60%; (b) remained stable; (c) increased by about 60%.
2. 2. In 2017, what proportion of global final energy consumption (for electricity, heating, transport, industry etc.) was sourced from fossil fuels?²
   1. (a) roughly 40%; (b) roughly 66%; (c) roughly 80%.
3. 3. About one quarter of global GHG emissions come from electricity production. In 2017, which of the following near zero-carbon sources generated the most electricity:
   1. (a) hydroelectricity; (b) nuclear; (c) wind; (d) solar photovoltaic.
4. 4. At the end of 2017, solar provided what percentage of global electricity production?
   1. (a) less than 2%; (b) less than 10%; (c) about 20%.
5. 5. In 2017, non-OECD (developing) countries accounted for what proportion of global CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels:
   1. (a) less than 10%; (b) about 33%; (c) over 60%.
6. 6. In 2017 coal accounted for 27.6% of global final energy consumption. In 1988 coal's share was:
   1. (a) about 50% higher; (b) roughly the same; (c) about 50% lower.
7. 7. Between 1988 and 2018, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty worldwide has:
   1. (a) increased by about two thirds; (b) stayed about the same; (c) decreased by about two thirds.
8. 8. After adjusting for price differences, the majority of the world's population have incomes of:
   1. (a) less than $2 per day; (b) less than US $10 per day; (c) more than $10 per day?³

When I ask my students at Macquarie University, Sydney, they answer these questions according to a fairly consistent pattern. Although deeply pessimistic about climate inaction generally, they think renewable energy is making better progress than is actually the case, and they underestimate progress towards eliminating extreme poverty, although most students guess correctly that a majority of people earn less than $10 per day. I helpfully order the sources of low-carbon energy from highest (hydroelectricity) to lowest (solar PV). However, my students typically identify solar (or sometimes nuclear) as the largest source. In fact, hydroelectricity's 16.4% share of global electricity supply is more than double that of wind (5.6%) and solar (1.9%) combined. I suspect my students’ exaggerated perceptions of renewable energy's progress partly reflect the Green movement's enthusiasms. While it is true that wind and solar are being deployed at record rates, their success has not yet halted the growth of fossil fuels. Meanwhile, significant advances in human welfare are connected to the fact that nearly all of the increases in emissions are occurring outside the OECD. Consequently, most countries and most people are now much better placed to withstand climate harms. Thus, the three decades since 1988 have seen both rapidly increasing emissions and unprecedented advances in human material welfare. Arguably these trends define our era.

Growing emissions, declining poverty and rising national inequality are not simply emergent properties that have arisen unintentionally through the aggregation of individual self-interested behaviour. They reflect deliberate political choices. On the one hand, affluent communities have been reluctant to price carbon or invest in low-carbon innovation; on the other hand, third-world communities are intensely motivated to achieve greater energy access. In 2014 the world's second and fourth most populous countries both saw dramatic elections. International media have portrayed Narendra Modi as a right-wing Hindu nationalist with a chequered human rights record, and Joko Widodo (Jokowi) as a comparatively liberal reformer who, having been born in a slum, was challenging the Indonesian elite's stranglehold on power. However, these two leaders’ electoral platforms had one thing in common – they both promised a dramatic expansion of electricity generation and grid connections. To be sure, both leaders advocated a growing role for renewable energy. Prime Minister Modi has gained a reputation as a solar enthusiast, while President Widodo's achievements include reforming regressive fuel subsidies that at times have consumed as much as one quarter of the national budget. However, fossil fuels remain central to each country's development. For example, in 2017, coal consumption increased by 4.8% in India and 7.4% in Indonesia (BP 2018). With per capita electricity consumption well under one tenth of that in affluent countries like the United States, Australia or Singapore, no one should be surprised if ordinary Indians and Indonesians prioritize accessing modern energy over climate mitigation.⁴ Unfortunately, the consequence is increasing GHG emissions. Although India and Indonesia are both what the World Bank terms ‘lower-middle-income’ countries, they are also much too powerful to have their energy choices determined by outsiders.

Any effective global climate response needs to reflect an understanding that the era of Western dominance is over, and that the formerly impoverished communities of the Third World Coalition are demanding their time in the sun. Perhaps the most promising present-day development is that the global middle-class is swelling rapidly as manufacturing and service industries expand outside the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1: The Thirty Years’ Crisis
• 2: Ecomodernism and its Critics
• 3: Assessing the Technological Challenge
• 4: The Politics of Low-Carbon Innovation
• 5: Human Flourishing amid Climate Harms
• 6: Global Social Democracy and Geoengineering Justice
• Conclusion
• References
• Index
• End User License Agreement