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We Must Live Within Our Means
The Myth Itself
Perhaps the most difficult of all the austerity myths to pin down is the injunction that âwe must live within our means.â The message deeply embodied in this phrase has little relationship to the words. Rather, it serves as the apparently definitive answer to the question âCan our government spend more?â We can imagine a politician speaking at a meeting of constituents, and a concerned citizen asks, âWhy is it necessary to reduce spending on school meals?â And the elected representative answers, âThe overall government budget is in deficit and we must live within our means.â
If the constituent retorted with, âWhy must we live within our means?,â the assembled group might break into laughter, because every sensible person knows âwe must live within our means.â If the constituent instead went to the heart of the matter and asked, âWhat do you mean by âmeansâ?,â the politician, if a patient person, might say, âI mean that the government obtains its money from taxation and we cannot spend money we do not have.â That would probably induce affirmative nods from the audience.
What are our âmeansâ and what or who determines them? What does âlive withinâ convey? A dictionary provides no enlightenment. Equally vacuous is the closely related phrase, often applied to household budgets, that âfamilies struggle to make ends meet.â These clichĂ©s serve as emotional entreaties rather than practical guidelines, like âemojisâ at the end of an email.
When in the 1980s the UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made her famous assertion that government budgets are like household budgets, she was half right for the wrong reason. She was wrong in that, unlike her mythical households, real households do not operate with balanced budgets. They borrow long-term to invest (mortgages) and short-term to bridge temporary financial difficulties (such as when changing jobs and when faced with emergency expenditures). Governments do the same: they borrow to invest (e.g., in schools and hospitals) and to cover short-term emergencies (recessions).
To understand how this happens and its full implications, we must specify some concrete circumstances. The clearest way to begin the discussion is to analyze central governments in countries that have their own national currencies â the US dollar, British pound, Japanese yen and Chinese renminbi are the most important ones by size of the transactions they facilitate. Central governments with national currencies have âcentral banksâ (e.g., the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve System), public institutions that manage the national currency within the constraints of the legal mandate set by the central government itself.
To be even more concrete, we begin with governments in high-income countries that have their own currencies. This specification is necessary because financial markets in low-income countries and in many middleincome countries (sometimes identified as âemerging economiesâ) have unsophisticated financial sectors of relatively low development. Many central banks operate through financial markets, but small or undeveloped financial markets in which a few banks or corporations have disproportionate power severely limit the ability of central banks to conduct policy.
The discussion that follows applies to North America (Canada and the United States), the Western European countries with national currencies (the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), Japan and some of the middle income countries of Asia, but almost no African country except South Africa. An important caveat is necessary. The rules on central government borrowing and central bank operations vary across countries. Our discussion and analysis apply most closely to the UK and the US, whose government institutions are quite similar when considering the relationship between the central government and the central bank.
The fundamental difference is that a government of a country with its own currency can borrow from itself, which households cannot. To use a clichĂ©, the ability of a government to borrow from itself is a âgame changer.â Governments with their own currencies can always âmake ends meet,â though they must be wise in managing their âmeans.â It is not a simple task. Explaining how governments and central banks pull off this apparent trick â making ends meet that are unmeetable for households â takes center place in our first myth-busting.
What Are Our Means?
Central to the austerity narrative is the apparently innocuous advice that we should âlive within our means,â a rule for sound household money management. For households, by âliving within our means,â we âmake ends meet.â For governments, this bit of common sense means not spending âwhat isnât thereâ and always being sure âwhere the money will come from.â We find the same semi-moral entreaty applied to entire countries. If what we import and consume from other countries exceeds our exports, then we go into debt with other countries to cover the difference. As a country, we âlive beyond our meansâ and âneed to tighten our belts.â
Moving from clichĂ©s to real-world practice, households, businesses, governments and countries need not and frequently do not live within their means. When they do not, they incur âdebt.â Further along we analyze the nature of debt and the forms it takes. In anticipation of that analytical discussion, I define debt tautologically as the result of not living within our means, not making ends meet.
âLiving within our meansâ has a superficial validity that brings to mind George Joyeâs definition in 1535 of common sense as âthe plain wisdom that everyone possesses.â About 400 years later the American social theorist Stuart Chase commented, âcommon sense tells us the world is flat.â Treating the world as flat is not necessarily absurd. It can be both rational and necessary. For many tasks, such as driving an automobile from one city to another, the flat-earth hypothesis works. Itâs just common sense that a straight road is the shortest distance between home and the supermarket. But no airline pilot or shipâs navigator should adopt it. The common-sense flat-earth hypothesis applies as far as the horizon (myopically), but not much beyond. For substantial distances navigators use what is known as the âGreat Circle Route,â the shortest distance between two points on a globe (the orthodromic route). By analogy, the common-sense understanding of âmeansâ as a flow of income has limited relevance beyond the horizon of the household.
In practice a household funds its expenditures in three ways â the incomes received by its members (from work, income-generating assets such as stocks and bonds, or social support payments from governments), the sale of assets, or borrowing. Most people in Europe and North America work for someone else. The regularly employed receive incomes determined by a contract with the employer. This contractual arrangement provides the greatest part of their âmeans.â Rational budgeting for the regularly employed treats income, the means, as fixed by the employer, household asset values and government support programs.
In these circumstances, âliving within our meansâ has a clear interpretation. The sum of household expenditures over the budget period should be equal to or less than the fixed and predictable income flow during that time period. The household manager has little control over the determinants of income but can purchase less or more. Introductory economics textbooks describe âmaking ends meetâ as the household operating âwithin a budget constraint.â The phrases are equivalent.
If variable expenditures exceed fixed income, the household must either sell assets or borrow. Sale of assets means a fall in household wealth. Only a few households, the very rich, can continue this indefinitely (which provides support for Hemingwayâs famous retort to F. Scott Fitzgerald when he said: âErnest, the rich are different from usâ; Hemingway replied, âYes, they have more moneyâ). The other option, we âlive beyond our meansâ funded by borrowing, results in a debt that the household must finance out of its fixed income flow.
From the household point of view, failing to cover expenditure with the flow of income results in what are clearly undesirable outcomes. Household wealth declines either directly, by sales of assets, or indirectly, by going into debt that reduces net wealth (household assets minus liabilities). In addition, the running cost of not living within your means increases by the interest on the accumulating debt. Borrowing provides a temporary solution, but the cost of servicing the accumulating debt increases the difficulty of âmaking ends meet.â
In practice the cost of borrowing tends to vary inversely with income. The lower a household is on the income pyramid, the higher is the interest rate to borrow because lenders consider the poor risky clients. This empirical generalization, âthe poor pay more,â in part explains the infamous âsub-primeâ mortgage market in the United States, whose collapse provided the trigger (but not the cause) for the global financial crisis of the late 2000s.
Some household borrowing creates assets, such as mortgages for a home and loans to purchase an automobile. If properly evaluated, these debts should prove expenditure-reducing rather than expenditureincreasing for households. This type of borrowing creates an asset to balance against the debt. The interest payments on the asset-creating loan become part of the expenditure that household income must cover. The asset âpays for itselfâ because it generates a service that replaces part of household spending (e.g., mortgage cost replaces rent).
These one-off borrowings do not contradict the myopic generalization that a household should live within its means. The perspective of the precariously employed and the rich will be quite different. But the middle-class perspective, that of Margaret Thatcher, holds tightly to the sound budgeting parable, that households must constrain their variable expenditures within the fixed income flow, in order to keep âliving within their means.â
The flat-earth approach to budgeting does not apply to governments, local or national, whose incomes (their âmeansâ) are not fixed. âMeansâ are a political choice. The power to tax gives the power to determine the âmeansâ within which a government operates. For that reason alone we can dismiss the simple myth that âgovernments have only so much income and must live within it.â Governments determine their means by establishing and modifying the tax structure and rates, subject to accountability to the electorate. The more sophisticated version of the parable is that, whatever income governments choose to generate by tax, they must live within it â i.e., they must balance their budgets.
How Governments Borrow
Before deconstructing the government balancing act (the second myth), we must complete the analysis of what determines the means within which governments should operate. âMeansâ of a government are not the same as tax revenue. As for households, governments can borrow. The outcome of government borrowing is different than it is for households. The first step to analyze public-sector borrowing is to be explicit about the process. Bonds â promises to pay â provide the mechanism for public borrowing at all levels of government.
A bond is a piece of paper (even in this digital age) that commits the borrower both to pay the purchaser (lender) a specific amount by a stated future date and to pay interest on the specified amount. For example, a local or national government might offer for sale a $100 (or ÂŁ100 or âŹ100) bond that promises full repayment a year later (the âmaturity dateâ), and during that year to pay 5 percent of the sale price to the buyer for the privilege of having the buyerâs money for that twelve months.
Buyers of government bonds may be businesses, commercial banks, households, public institutions, or other governments. For all buyers, public bonds function as an extremely important, irreplaceable asset. Except under unusual circumstances (treated in Myth 2), public bonds represent an extremely safe asset. In 2018 the private companies that rate corporate and public bonds assigned the âdebt paperâ of Britain, France, Germany and the United States to their safest category (âAAAâ). The bonds of the British government are frequently known as âgilts,â because in the past the paper on which they were printed was literally gilt-edged.
Public bonds themselves are a âliquidâ (vendible) asset. Should the holder of a public bond want cash before the end of the bondâs life, the owner can sell that bond to anyone willing to purchase it. By convention these resales are said to occur in a âsecondary market.â In secondary markets public bonds may encounter speculation, a possibility considered later in the discussion of the function of public debts. At this point we focus on the dual nature of public bonds, a liability for the issuing government (a debt to be repaid) and a safe asset for the purchaser.
The next step is to consider borrowing for different levels and types of governments. In many countries, local and state (or provincial) governments can and do borrow, usually to finance investment projects such as public transport. In 2010 the outstanding stock of bonds issued by US municipal governments reached almost $4 trillion, almost all of which held AAA investment rating. Analogously to household borrowing, sub-national governments cover the interest and repayment (the âdebt serviceâ) by tax revenue (âgeneral obligationâ bonds) or the income generated by the investment project itself (e.g., public transport charges). All over the world, and especially in North America and Europe, sub-national governments âlive within their meansâ by taxing and borrowing.
The myopic common-sense view that governments, like households, âshould not spend money that isnât thereâ turns out to be more nuanced that it first appears. By selling bonds, sub-national governments transfer money from the private sector to themselves. As a result, governments have more money âthereâ to spend. For the economy as a whole this money transfer involves a shift of private saving to public spending.
Sub-national governments can extend the horizon of their âmeans.â National governments can completely discard the flat-earth approach to budgets. When considering the budgeting of national governments we must go straight to the Great Circle approach and leave the common-sense funding horizon behind. Separating national governments into two categories is the next step to understand the meaning of how they âlive within their means.â The two categories are governments of countries with a national currency (US dollar, British pound, Japanese yen) and those countries that share a common currency. The eurozone is the most important shared currency group, distantly followed by the fourteen-member common currency zone in Frenchspeaking sub-Saharan Africa (all using the so-called CFA franc). Because of the extremely low development of the financial sectors of CFA countries, they are not relevant to our discussion.
For public budgets, the most important consequence o...