Secular World Order
The myth of a secular world order for IR theorists begins with the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which marks an agreement between Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and the Schmalkaldic League. The treaty established the principle of cuius regio, eius religio ā āwhose region, his religionā, which enabled princes within the Holy Roman Empire to choose whether their region would follow Catholicism or Lutheranism, effectively ceding sovereignty to individual principalities. For subjects dissenting from their ruler's adoption of a particular version of Christianity, there was the option of converting or transferring to another region. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), bringing the Thirty Years War to an end, built on the Peace of Augsburg, reinforcing the idea of sovereignty. The principle of religious toleration and non-interference in the domestic religious affairs of other states laid the groundwork for a realist international order based on pluralism, with religion subordinate to raison d'Ć©tat and states being the key actors in international relations (Shah and Philpott 2011; Thomas 2005: 54ā5).
For mainstream IR theory, the death and destruction caused by religious conflict across Europe necessitated removing religion from politics and establishing principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states as a means of reducing the prevalence of war. The privatization of religion was an essential component of modernization and the bringing about of an international system, order or society in an anarchical world. The allegiance of citizens or subjects to a transnational and transcendent religion could be transferred to the state instead, strengthening power and assuring rulers of the loyalty of their subjects. And yet such a narrow reading fails to acknowledge that Westphalia recognized religion's role within the state as its raison d'ĆŖtre. Westphalia produced a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain how religion was relegated in the West from being the central component in the life of the individual, community and state to being a privatized affair.
William Cavanaugh dismisses the idea that the liberal state, privatization of religion and secularization saves us from the excesses of religion's propensity for domestic disputes and international warfare as a myth (Cavanaugh 2002). Scott Thomas suggests that modernization theory is able to supply the missing dimension to account for international relationsā neglect of religion. Modernization theory has three components, beginning with the concept that a āmodernā society can be distinguished from a ātraditionalā society, the former being characterized by rapid change, flexibility and economic progress, while the latter is regarded as inflexible, āstatic or monolithicā. Clearly, both portrayals are stereotypes and overlook change within traditional society. However, the stereotypes serve to restrict the public role of religion to traditional rather than modern society (Thomas 2005: 51).
The second concept of modernization theory is one of universalism ā that the process of modernization is linear, from primitive, through traditional to modern society. This progression is an inevitable product of economic and scientific development, which will affect all parts of the world. The Age of Reason and the Enlightenment emerge from the religious foundations of traditional society in the West but these are outgrown, enabling society to continue to develop and progress. The superiority of Western liberal society in this second concept would inevitably extend to the rest of the world with differences between the modern and traditional eventually disappearing, including the public role of religion (Thomas 2005: 51ā2).
As part of the belief in the inevitability of universal modernization the third aspect of modernization theory is critically important for attitudes towards religion within policy making and academic theorization. Secularization theory can be traced back to the eighteenth century and is implicit in the seminal works of two of sociology's founding fathers, Weber and Durkheim. As society becomes increasingly educated and modernized a cultural pluralism develops in which religion is no longer preeminent and withdraws, or is withdrawn, from the public square. Social, political and economic institutions will dominate modern society with religion becoming increasingly a private matter. Religion and religious institutions are portrayed as pre-modern, backward, based on irrationality and superstition, which increasingly only has relevance to individuals at the private level. As society becomes more modern the influence of religion and religious observance will decline (Berger 1990; Bruce 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2011; Thomas 2005: 52).
Secularization Theory has paved the way for secularism to dominate Western polity, with its most pronounced expressions evident in the first amendment of the American constitution and the French constitution's introduction of laïcité with walls of separation between Church and State. Restricting religion to the private sphere and minimizing its influence released political, cultural and economic institutions to become utility maximizers operating on the basis of rational decision making. Religion is socially constructed as absolutist, irrational, divisive and backward with a propensity towards violence. While the Treaty of Westphalia was drawn up to put an end to religious violence, modernization was the key to reducing violence and warfare with religion demonized as being the leading cause of wars and violence throughout history (Cavanaugh 2009:17).
Secularization theory has dominated social scientific enquiry and the significance of religion in the public sphere of the liberal nation-state and yet is based on certain myths. It constructs a social world in which modernization and rationality are prerequisites and religion is seen as an impediment to progress. A world where religion and spirituality are no longer forces within th...