The War of American Independence

1775-1783

Richard Middleton

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781138472525
• eBook ISBN: 9781317892786
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Early American History
• Index: History

Wars rarely turn out as expected. This book shows how Britain entered a conflict that it believed could not be lost. The American Patriots were similarly optimistic about their martial prospects. Although they eventually secured independence, it was only with the assistance of France and indirectly Spain, who diverted British resources from the conflict in America, allowing France eventually to deliver a knockout blow at Yorktown.

This extensive yet accessible exploration into the War of American Independence provides aclear analysis of why this complex conflict occurred and why it ended as it did, revealing the fragile nature of the American Patriot cause. An essential guide for any history student, including those specializing in war/peace studies and the study of international relations, as well the general reader with an interest in the study of war.

CHAPTER 1

Britain and America come to blows, 1763–75

John Bull and his empire

The signing of the peace of Paris in early 1763, which ended the Seven Years War, seemingly witnessed Britain at the zenith of its power. France and Spain had been checked in Europe while Britain’s naval superiority allowed her to make important gains in North America, the Caribbean, Africa, and India. To many English-speaking commentators it seemed that Britain’s empire was now comparable to that of Ancient Rome. The only downside was the widespread resentment in Europe at Britain’s success, especially in France where Choiseul, the King’s leading minister, was already strengthening the French navy in preparation for another war.¹

However, none of this worried the victorious British. A glorious prospect seemingly awaited an empire based on trade and manufacturing. Orthodox mercantilism, still the accepted economic theory of the day, asserted that there was a fixed amount of wealth in the world. Hence the more one nation possessed, the less remained for others. The recent victories meant that Britain not only had supplies of raw materials from her colonies, but growing markets for her manufactures too. The Navigation Acts, which underpinned this system, also ensured that this trade was carried in British ships, creating a pool of seamen with which to man the Royal Navy.

Unfortunately there was just one downside to this happy prospect: the cost. The war had been carried on at great expense to the British exchequer, resulting in a doubling of the national debt to £128,000,000. This was considered highly undesirable. Until the capital was repaid, interest on the debt would have to be met by taxation, accounting for half the annual budget. The British taxpayer hence faced the anomaly that the peace of 1763 was going to be almost as costly as the war that preceded it.

The quest began therefore for new sources of revenue. One that had not been tried before was taxation of the colonies in North America. During the war, British officers and officials had noticed how prosperous the Colonists were. As one officer acerbically noted, “everybody has property and everybody knows it.”² Among the white population there was almost no poverty since all enjoyed a decent income. Taxes on the other hand were low, since the provincial governments had no debts to service. The colonies had contributed to the war, but most of the burden had fallen on the British Treasury.

The ending of the conflict in 1763 accordingly led many Britons to conclude that the Colonists should now make a contribution to the cost of defending the empire. Much of the war had been fought to protect the frontiers of New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, resulting in the deployment of 30,000 British soldiers for the conquest of Canada and a frontier stretching to the Mississippi. These developments were hugely advantageous for the mainland colonies, offering them security from Indian and French attack as well as exciting prospects for expansion. Prior to 1755 each colony had provided its own internal security. However, such localism would no longer suffice, since troops were required in Canada where the French-speaking population was resentful of the British presence. Troops were also needed to contain the many additional Indian nations who were now in the British orbit. Finally, further forces were necessary to secure Florida and its residual Indian and Spanish population. British ministers calculated that an army of 10,000 men would be necessary to protect the gains made at the Peace of Paris.³

One person who accepted the need for a colonial financial contribution was George Grenville, who became first Lord of the Treasury in April 1763. Grenville had been overshadowed during the war by his brother-in-law, William Pitt, later Earl of Chatham, but was ambitious to make his mark by meeting the challenges of the peace. He saw two ways of getting America to pay a fairer contribution to the nation’s expenses: firstly by improving the efficiency of the bureaucracy; and secondly by raising money through new taxes. The political classes in any case believed it was time to tighten British control over the colonies. The mercantilist system had clearly become lax in its enforcement, especially in New England, where royal authority was being seemingly undermined by undesirable democratic currents.

A start was accordingly made by ordering customs officers and other officials to return to America, since many of them were living in London, leaving their duties to be performed by ill-paid deputies. Greater powers were also given to the navy to suppress smuggling. After this Grenville introduced two new measures to raise taxes. The first of these, the 1764 Sugar or Revenue Act, imposed duties on the importation of molasses and other sugar products. This was followed in early 1765 with a Stamp Act, requiring all legal documents and printed materials, such as newspapers, to bear the cost of a stamp. However, both acts included additional regulations for making the collection of the revenue more effective. Customs officers were given powers to enter private premises to search for smuggled goods, while the Vice Admiralty courts were strengthened to ensure the more effective prosecution of offenders. Infractions of the Navigation Acts in America had previously been heard in the provincial common law courts, where sympathetic juries usually acquitted the defendants, whatever the evidence. The Vice Admiralty courts in contrast had only a judge to determine both the facts and verdict of a case without reference to a jury. This had long been the practice in Britain because ordinary subjects were not trusted to give impartial verdicts in revenue cases. Both measures accordingly caused little debate in Parliament.

The Grenville ministry was also responsible for one other measure in the restructuring of Britain’s North American empire. This was the Proclamation of 1763 prohibiting further settlement west of the Allegheny Mountains. Most Indian nations had allied with France during the recent conflict and refused to accept the change in sovereignty. Under the leadership of the Ottawa Chief, Pontiac, they launched a series of surprise attacks on the British forts north of the Ohio and west of Allegheny Mountains, capturing every post except those of Niagara, Detroit, and Pittsburgh. To the British, Pontiac’s War was yet another example of the Colonists’ inability to defend themselves. Apart from abuses in the Indian trade, the uprising also underlined the desirability of more orderly settlement. On the fall of Canada in 1760, settlers had pushed westward against the wishes of the native peoples. Hence to calm Indian fears, a line was to be drawn along the crest of the mountains, forbidding settlement on the other side. Those wishing to acquire new lands should go to the maritime provinces of Canada or the recently acquired Spanish colony of Florida. Apart from quieting the Indians and reducing frontier costs, such settlement would have the additional advantage of buttressing the flanks of Britain’s North American empire. It seemed a sensible measure, at least from London.⁴

The rights of British America

The actions of the British ministry came as a shock to the American Colonists, who like the inhabitants in Britain, had taken great pride in the triumph of the English-speaking peoples. They too could see a glorious future as partners in empire. The Reverend Samuel Cooper of Boston spoke for most Colonists when he exclaimed: “What scenes of happiness are we ready to figure to ourselves from the hope of enjoying, in this good land, all the blessings of an undisturbed and lasting peace.” A glorious prospect beckoned through “our settlements extending themselves with security on every side, and changing a wilderness into a fruitful field.”⁵ Some even speculated that the center of the empire would eventually move from London across the Atlantic. However, the contentment was not just economic. The inhabitants felt pride in being part of a nation which since the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89 had protected their rights through constitutional government. This was in stark contrast to the absolute monarchies of Europe. Americans were proud to be Britons.

Now these assumptions were being undermined. The Colonists believed they had paid their fair share in money and manpower for the conquest of Canada. Furthermore, the expulsion of the French and defeat of their Indian allies meant that they no longer saw any reason for a large standing army. The Colonists had taken care of themselves before 1755 and could do so again. Accordingly, if Britain wanted to maintain a permanent military presence, it must be for more sinister reasons. The colonies, like Britain, had a long tradition of hostility to standing armies since the time of James II, believing them to be “absolutely inconsistent with civil liberty.” Hence the continued deployment of troops must be “designed as a rod and a check.”⁶ Far from being partners, the Americans were to be slaves.

These suspicions about British intentions were supported by the administrative arrangements for enforcing the new taxes. The Colonists cherished their right to trial by jury and saw no reason for its curtailment in revenue cases, whatever the practice in Britain. It was a fundamental undermining of their liberty. Equally dangerous was the threat to their property posed by taxation, for without that, liberty was of little use. Finally the Proclamation of 1763 denied the right of the Colonists to cheap land. Though some New Englanders looked to Nova Scotia, the vast majority of those seeking land wanted to travel westward. Seemingly the Indian “savages” were being placated at the expense of the Colonists’ birthright.

Initially the Colonists’ reaction to these measures was muted. The frontier was still a minor consideration for most Colonists while the 1764 Sugar Act was presented by the ministers as a traditional mercantilist measure, regulating the trade of the empire by means of customs duties. The only provincial assembly to protest was New York. However, the Stamp Act was another matter. Here was an open attempt by Parliament to impose direct taxation on the daily lives of the Colonists. The first protests were made in May 1765 in the Virginia House of Burgesses where a fiery young lawyer, Patrick Henry, argued that the impositions were not only unconstitutional but against the rights of Englishmen. Anyone obeying them was a traitor. With such provocative language, colonial anger was not limited to words. Within weeks the people of Boston had taken to the streets, demolishing several properties, including the residence of the Lieutenant Governor, Thomas Hutchinson. Simultaneously, a call went forth for a joint protest by all the colonies. In response nine provinces sent delegates to New York, where they reaffirmed “the undoubted right of Englishmen, that no taxes should be imposed on them, but with their own consent.” This led in turn to a general refusal to use the stamps on their arrival in November 1765, resulting in the closure of the law courts and ports. The powerlessness of royal government was apparent for all to see.

The reaction of the Colonists caught the British by surprise. The Stamp Act had caused little debate in Parliament, where Grenville had introduced it to an almost empty House of Commons. Only one speaker, Isaac Barré, had seriously questioned its equity and advisability. When ministers stressed the benign role of Britain in the founding of the colonies, he exploded: “They planted by your care? No your oppressions planted them in America,” referring to the Puritan exodus to New England and departure of other migrant groups. His oratory, however, had been lost on the Commons where the bill was passed by 245 votes to 49.⁷

Fortunately for the Colonists, a change of ministry had occurred by the time that news of the Stamp Act protests reached London. The new government of the Marquis of Rockingham had strong links with the merchant classes, who bewailed the damage to their trade at a time of post-war recession. The new ministers accordingly opted for a repeal of the Stamp Act. However, all the parties in London agreed on the constitutionality of the Act, whatever the Colonists might say. Parliamentary sovereignty was the principle that underpinned the constitutional settlement of 1688–89 when King William III had saved England from the tyranny of James II. Consequently before Grenville’s measure was repealed, a Declaratory Act was passed, reaffirming the sovereignty of Parliament over the colonies “in all cases whatsoever.”

A tea party in Boston: Congress versus Parliament

Across the Atlantic, most Americans believed the repeal of the Stamp Act had restored the old benign relationship. They assumed that the Declaratory Act was mere face-saving. But as already noted, this was not the case. Consequently another clash was not long in coming. The ministry still needed revenue to pay the costs of defending and governing America while most Britons believed that a more positive assertion of Parliamentary sovereignty was required. One of those holding these views was Charles Townshend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had taken office in 1766 following the collapse of the Rockingham ministry. He had noticed that most Americans were ready to accept the Sugar Act because it had the appearance of regulating trade rather than raising revenue. It was also an external rather than an internal tax, giving consumers the option to buy locally produced articles which did not carry the duty. Townsend accordingly proposed a new series of taxes on the importation of tea, glass, lead paints and paper. But he took advantage of the new act to tighten further the administrative machinery for enforcing the mercantilist system, by giving additional powers to the customs service and Vice Admiralty courts. Lastly he announced that the revenues so raised would be used to pay royal officials, notably the governors and judges, who had previously been dependent on the provincial assemblies for their salaries.

If Townshend believed he had neatly circumvented the difficulties of Grenville’s previous measures, he was quickly disabused. Disguising the duties as a mercantilist measure cut no ice with the “Patriots,” as opponents of the measures were beginning to be called. The act was clearly intended to raise revenue, not regulate trade, and was therefore as objectionable as the Stamp Act. The strengthening of the Vice Admiralty courts also raised anew the issue of trial by jury. Finally the paym...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of maps
• Abbreviations
• Preface
• Maps
• 1 Britain and America come to blows, 1763–75
• 2 The fighting begins, 1775
• 3 Britain reasserts her authority, 1776
• 4 The unpredictable fortunes of war, 1777
• 5 France comes to America’s help, 1778
• 6 Spain enters the conflict, 1779
• 7 Changing strategies, 1780
• 8 The North American frontier, 1775–82
• 9 No daylight at the tunnel’s end, 1781
• 10 Resolution at Yorktown, 1781
• 11 End game, 1782
• Conclusions and consequences
• Appendix: Washington on the art of command
• Bibliography
• Index