Foundations of Political Sociology

Irving Horowitz, Irving Louis Horowitz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351310864
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

When initially published in 1972, Foundations of Political Sociology was acknowledged to be the first unified study of the field. It still provides a cross-fertilization of knowledge concerning the interrelation of social class and political power. Taking into account new specializations in social theory, the book covers all major social systems on a comparative international basis. The opening remarks prepared for this new printing provide an estimate of how the field has changed during the past quarter century, and what unexpected challenges have arisen in areas of public trust and personal privacy.

This book examines fascism, communism, anarchism, conservatism, and liberalism as systems of rule as well as domains of theory. It is thus a unique effort at linking problems of history with problems of policy. The six sections of the book detail the historical and theoretical antecedents of this relatively new hybrid area in social research: policy coordinates of political sociology, types of social systems, forms of political ideologies, polarities of revolution and counter-revolution, civil-military relations, mass vs. elite contradictions, and threads of consensus and conflict running through these themes.

"Horowitz presents as his central thesis that in today's world no economic determinism can do justice to social reality. Foundations is the work of a politically sensitive and knowledgeable scholar." Louis Schneider, Social Forces

"Foundations of Political Sociology reflects extensive teaching and research in the area of political sociology. The book combines analytical insight with a provocative cutting edge and represents the best of Professor Horowitz." Thomas R. McFaul, The Annals

"Horowitz's political stance is interesting. Though he knows the radical literature, he distances himself from it. He sympathizes with everyone and strives to be provocative and yet elusive a personal voice in a dogmatic discipline." W.J.M. Mackenzie, Political Studies

CHANGES

Chapter 12

The Morphology of Modern Revolution

The term revolution can mean almost anything, and definitions have ranged all the way from “simple change” to “international holocaust.” Nonetheless, a body of literature has emerged that attempts to formulate some working models for how changes called revolutionary take place, and under what conditions (Hopper, 1950; Horowitz, 1964, pp. 313–330, Gross and Hopper, 1959, pp. 21–86). If this same literature does not deal seriously with why revolutions occur, this is because social scientists have focused too exclusively on consensual and functional patterns of interaction, and not nearly enough on conflictual and dysfunctional patterns. But our concern will be to understand what a revolution is in its morphological sense, rather than to explicate why a revolution takes place in its more abstract sense.

Types of Revolutions

It is best to begin with the basic available models. It is preferable to see them as models rather than theories, for what is offered has little, if any, predictive value and is useful, rather, in getting at the structural components of revolution. The work of Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, p. 252) provides a categorization: (1) palace revolutions, (2) political revolutions, and (3) social revolutions. More recently, this trichotomy was reintroduced by Rosenau (1964, pp. 45–91), who described internal wars as being fought over changes in personnel, changes in the systems of authority and, finally, changes in the structures of economy, education and political direction.

This typology was elaborated and extended by other political scientists to include more limited types of revolutionary activity. Thus, scholars like Huntington (1962, pp. 17–50) have operationalized their models into the following: mass revolutions having high participation, of long duration, with high violence, seeking fundamental changes in the socioeconomic system; revolutionary coups having low participation, of short to moderate duration, with little violence, oriented more to changes in political directorates than in social systems; reform coups, much like revolutionary coups, only revealing less ambitious changes in the political order; and finally, palace revolutions, with hardly any participation, that change leaderships rather than social structures. There are many variations on the typology, but its essential theme is the recognition that revolution implies selective participation—and that definitions are feasible precisely in terms of how many people are actually involved in revolution making rather than in the rhetoric of revolutionary goals.

If this typology helps us appreciate different types of revolutionary efforts, we must arrive at a comparable understanding of forms of revolutionary activity. The work of Chalmers Johnson (1964) is significant at this level. He defines revolution and types of revolution in terms of four variables: “(1) targets of revolutionary activity; (2) identity of the revolutionaries (masses, elites leading masses, and elites); (3) revolutionary goals or ‘ideology'; and (4) whether or not the revolution is spontaneous or calculated” (Johnson, 1964, pp. 27–28). On this basis he distinguishes six types of “revolutions”: the jacquerie (government-oriented, masses, status quo oriented, and spontaneous); the millennarian rebellion (effectively— that is, in practice—regime-oriented, elites leading masses, otherworldly, and spontaneous); the anarchistic rebellion (government- or regime-oriented, flexible participation, Utopian-reactionary, and spontaneous); the Jacobin communist revolution (community oriented, elites leading masses, nationalist-new integrative myth, and calculated); the conspiratorial coup d'état (unclear—either regime or community, elites, elitist or tutelary, and calculated); and the militarized mass insurrection (elites leading masses, nationalistic, and calculated).

The first three of Johnson’s types of “revolutions” are not revolutions at all. None of these types are aimed at the “community” and thus, even if successful, would leave untouched much, if not most, of the essential features of the “prerevolutionary” society. They do not represent truly fundamental change. Further, none of these types has an ideology or integrative myth significantly different from that already in existence. The millennarian rebellion is an ambiguous case, but by rendering unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s and unto God that which is God's, Caesar’s realm ought to undergo only slight change. Given this line of reasoning, it is possible to eliminate the criteria of calculation-spontaneity from consideration, since all of the remaining types represent planned actions. Similarly, the elimination of the first three categories leaves all revolutions with the characteristic of being either elite or elite-dominated movements. This is in accord with the idea of calculation.

There are further similarities. All revolutions are aimed at the community level. Even if the community has changed nonviolently, the revolution itself has a community orientation because it seeks to overthrow political arrangements designed to support and sanction a now-outmoded conception of community and to introduce and to institutionalize a political structure (that is, regime) synchronous with the realities of the political community. But more basically, there is an implication throughout Johnson’s discussion that the community is defined by how much the population is socially and politically mobilized— that is, who are no longer essentially parochial. This carries with it, by implication, the assumption that those who do not have a parochial political orientation must have at least a subject orientation to the political system—and are, therefore, a part of the political community.

A more pragmatic notion, in this context, is that of Karl Deutsch (1954, pp. 98–103) to the effect that social mobilization involves two distinct phases: mobilization out of traditional patterns; and integration into new roles, structures and values. The first does not by any means imply the second. Given this, it is quite possible that revolutionaries may attempt to alter the nature of the political community in order to incorporate groups who were formerly excluded—but mobilized. According to the somewhat formalistic conception presented by Johnson, this would not constitute a change in the community (because such groups must have been “subjects” beforehand and thus were already included). Furthermore, and equally telling, a significant alteration in the relative positions of groups in the community ought to constitute as much a change in the nature of that community as does the incorporation of new members. What constitutes a “significant alteration” is ambiguous, but this is directly analogous to— indeed, is the occurence of—reform shading off into revolution.

A characteristic of the mass militarized insurrection (that is, a revolutionary strategy of guerrilla war) is, in fact, an attempted alteration of the nature of the community. A defining characteristic of revolution is an attack upon and an attempted major alteration of the nature of the political network. This has a necessary corollary: A conspiratorial coup d'état can be considered revolutionary only if the conspirators intend to institute changes throughout the social and political system, including the level of the political community. All revolutions involve the creation and attempted institutionalization of a new integrating social myth. The alteration of the community must have some rationale, some justification. It is through the spread of the revolutionary ideology (which may be ad hoc and/or ex post facto, as is the glorification of ethnic minorities or outcast groups in the Third World that the changes instituted by the new elite are legitimized.

There are three essential features of revolution: (1) It is elite dominated; whatever the role of the masses may be, it can be stated with certainty that they will never be in control of the revolutionary movement— they may provide support, cannon fodder and a cause, but they will never provide the direction for and leadership of the movement, (2) it is aimed at the radical alteration of the political community; and, directly related to this, (3) it presents a new integrating mythology, a revolutionary ideology. As a consequence of these features, it is also possible to state that revolutions will not occur spontaneously; although tactical maneuvers, including even the actual outbreak of fighting, may be heavily influenced by chance occurrences, no revolution will achieve power without achieving organization.

This is not a matter of excluding the possibility of spontaneity by arbitrary definition. Rather, it is based upon the consideration that a revolution is a concerted attack upon an ongoing, even if weak, political system. Resistance must be expected, both in the form of the organized enforcement arm of the state while the old regime is in power and in the form of ad hoc counterrevolutionary efforts by the displaced elite and its allies after the old regime has fallen. The revolutionaries must be capable of (1) protecting themselves from the coercive power of the state before the revolution; (2) overcoming in some way the state’s initial monopoly over the means of organized violence; and (3) maintaining control once the old regime has been overthrown. For all of these tasks organization is necessary. Thus, another characteristic of revolution: Revolution consists, in part, of a struggle for domination of control over the system-wide monopoly of coercion and, hence, necessarily involves violence and organization.

Conditions for Revolution

Rather than deal with what might be labeled basic dysfunctional aspects of the political system—such as a lack of circulation of elites, exploitation of various classes and changes in class structure and/or technology—this analysis will be limited to précipitants of revolution. A thorough understanding of the nature of revolutionary situations will be possible only after regional variations have been systematically taken into account and after the integration of political development with theorizing on revolution. Any society that has undergone a revolution had, previous to that revolution, either a revolutionary situation or conditions that insurgents could utilize in order to create a revolutionary situation. This does not imply that societies that have not undergone revolution cannot “suffer” from revolutionary conditions; indeed, one advantage of focusing initially upon “precipitants” is that by establishing when revolutionary conditions are present—even if no revolution ultimately occurs—the number of cases appropriate for the study of “ultimate causes” may be appreciably increased. Accordingly, this assumption by no means should be taken as a value judgment to the effect that societies where revolutions have not occurred are, ipso facto, societies in which revoltuion ought not to occur.

The discussion based upon a model of revolution predates the tactic of systematic guerrilla warfare, of revolutionary wars of attrition. There is likely to be a very significant difference in the abilities, determination, sophistication and class makeup of about-to-be-overthrown governments, and the problems faced by each type of regime in preventing the revolution are quite different. While this position has considerable force, a discussion of the preconditions is relevant to pointing out conditions that indicate that the collapse of the regime is imminent.

The time period of revolution extends roughly from the initiation of significant and widespread antiregime activities (indicated by the beginning of an insurgency—in the Eastern or Asian context; of politically motivated antigovernment violence; of radical resistance to governmental policies and/or laws; and of presentation of demands for major reform and basic policy changes—all in the Western case), and lasts until the collapse or overthrow of the regime. Brinton (1957) finds a number of similarities among his four European and American case studies during this period. These may be listed as follows: (1) governmental financial difficulties; (2) ineffective governmental reform efforts; (3) desertion of the intellectuals; and, concomitantly, (4) the development of a revolutionary (integrating) myth; (5) division within the ranks of an inept ruling class; (6) an increase in class antagonisms; (7) an increase, throughout the period, of antigovernment activity; (8) an accelerator, such as resistance to increased tax levies and collection; and (9) revolutionaries. Chalmers Johnson (1966), in Revolutionary Change, presents three essential characteristics: (1) the occurrence of a “power deflation”—that is, increased reliance upon force as the means of maintaining the coherence of and order in the society; (2) the “loss of authority” by the system elite—that is, the popular withdrawal of legitimacy from the elite’s use of force and also the popular loss of confidence in the ability of the elite (and, perhaps, of the system) to survive the present crisis; (3) an accelerator; that is, an event or phenomenon that either deprives the elite of its ability to use the coercive apparatus of the state and/or convinces the revolutionaries that such force will no longer be effective against them. A fourth characteristic, elite intransigence, he considers to be an indirect cause of revolution.

It is possible to synthesize from these works four major operational categories of revolutionary précipitants (see Stone, 1966). Although other conditions may well be important and frequently present, it would seem that the following features are essential for the overthrow of the old regime: (1) loss of effective coercive power by the government; (2) disintegration of ruling elite unity; (3) rise of a new integrative myth; and (4) the widespread loss of legitimacy by the regime.

There are a number of ways in which a government may lose its coercive capability. Defeat by a superior armed force is frequently cited. Usually this refers to defeat in a foreign war, which may cause a significant reduction in armed strength, in organizational efficiency and in morale. Disorganization and loss of morale would likely be unimportant only in the case of an unusually effective guerrilla war. Otherwise, even this revolutionary strategy is likely to work only after the psychological and organizational effects of a long war of attrition have reduced the combat capabilities of governmental forces. Therefore, it is generally argued, the cause of a decline in effective military power is most often due to internal decay within either the ranks of the officer corps or of the political elite proper. The issue becomes one not so much of the relative strength of the would-be revolutionaries, but more of the ability and determination of the government to use effectively the force that it possesses.

A large part of the explanation for this loss of coercive potential must be sought in the disintegration of the unity of the ruling elite (which may well include members of the armed services). Although it is difficult to establish general rules to account for this lack of cohesiveness, a number of factors can be suggested: (1) fear of eventual governmental collapse combined with a desire to “make the best of a bad situation”; (2) policy differences stemming from the adoption of either a reformist attitude or, even, acceptance of the revolutionary ideology—as well as the maintenance of conservative or reactionary policies (elite intransigence); (3) conflicting interests within the elite; and (4) general disaffection due to the government’s inability to control the situation. Whatever the reasons, the important item is that such disintegration does occur and that it significantly reduces the government’s ability to resist the revolutionaries.

Another factor is the rise of a new integrative myth, a revolutionary ideology. It is not necessary that these goals be widely accepted. What is important, however, is that they be accepted by a politically active segment of the population—by a group that has the capabilities to organize in order to press for the institutionalization of such goals, to spread and to popularize their position and to act rapidly with a high degree of political sophistication and coherence, especially in a time of confusion and disorder. There are, commonly, only three “segments” of the population that meet these criteria: the officer corps of the military, a Leninist political party and, at a more general level, the intelligentsia. If in a revolutionary situation the military, or important segments of it, adopts the revolutionary ideology, then a revolutionary—or Nasserisi—coup is quite likely. But, more frequently, the armed forces represent an obstacle to the revolution. The party, properly speaking, ought not to be considered here. It represents an organizational structure rather than a social group. I have mentioned it simply to indicate that any group, if properly organized and sufficiently astute—and powerful —can play an important role in forcing the enactment of the new goals. However, even if workers or, in some contexts, peasants make up the bulk of the party, the leadership is still likely to be drawn from among the intellectuals (Kautsky, 1962). Thus, it is most likely to be the intellectuals who push for the “radicalization of the revolution.” For this reason, the widespread “desertion of the intellectuals” may be taken as an important condition for revolution and, more importantly, as a sign of the growth of a new integrating myth.

The final necessary ingredient is a widesprea...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Dedication
• Introduction to the Transaction Edition
• Acknowledgments
• Preface
• Histories
• Systems
• Changes
• Interests
• Outcomes
• Name Index
• Subject Index