The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century

J.R. Jones

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781317899471
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

This study of the Anglo--Dutch Wars (1652-54, 1665-67, 1672-74) sets them in their naval, political and economic contexts. Competing essentially over trade, both governments were crucially influenced by mercantile interests and by the representative institutions that were central to England and the Dutch Republic. Professor Jones compares the effectiveness of the governments under pressure - English with Dutch, Commonwealth with restored monarchy, Republican with Orangist - and the effects on their economies; and examines the importance of the wars in accelerating the formation of a professional officer corps and establishing battle tactics that would endure throughout the age of sail.

The Course of the Anglo-Dutch Wars

6 The First War, 1652–54

In March 1651 the Rump Parliament sent an extraordinary embassy, headed by St John and Strickland, to the Hague with the offer of a 'close union' or 'strict coalition' to the States General. The governmental forms that this would take were not spelled out in advance, but it was intended to be more comprehensive and permanent than an alliance so as to ensure that the religion and liberties of the two nations would be conserved. The offer reflected the sentiment of most English people outside the Stuart Court during the first half of the century, the belief that the Dutch were their natural and best friends in an otherwise largely hostile or indifferent Europe. A demand for a strict alliance had been included in the Nineteen Propositions of June 1642, and in November the Long Parliament sent Strickland to negotiate one. The refusal of the States General to recognize him, the supply of arms to the royalists, the pro-royalist bias of an embassy sent to mediate in 1643, the harbouring of the ships that defected to the royalists in 1648, were all blamed on the malicious hostility of the House of Orange with its Stuart connections. When William II died in November 1650, after attempting a coup against Amsterdam, the States of Holland decided explicitly against appointing a new Stadtholder, and a special Great Assembly was convened to discuss the constitutional position that this created. To English councillors and MPs these developments were seen as paralleling those in England: a ruler had tried but failed to overthrow constitutional liberties, his removal and the abolition of his office temporarily relieved the danger but his partisans still posed a threat. The time seemed opportune for the only two major republics in Europe to unite against those who threatened their constitutions. Yet within a year of the return of the St John embassy to England the two republics were at war, and the failure of this embassy, by producing a profound change of attitude towards the Dutch among England's rulers, contributed significantly to the abrupt collapse of goodwill between the two nations.¹

The security of the Commonwealth regime was the chief objective of the English embassy — and of the war that followed its failure. In reality there was no parallel between the dangers facing the two republics. The Dutch now had no foreign enemies, the Orangists were demoralized by William's death, and the economy was booming. In contrast the Commonwealth was ringed by active enemies: Charles II held Scotland north of the Forth, parts of Ireland were still in royalist hands, royalist privateers harried trading vessels, an unofficial war closed France to trade and led to heavy mercantile losses in the Mediterranean. Only Spain recognized the Commonwealth for purely opportunistic reasons. Everywhere else rulers and clergy denounced the regicide republic, among them the ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church who incited violent demonstrations against the embassy. Orangist in their sympathies they were incensed by the exclusion of the presbyterians from Parliament in 1648, and by Cromwell's invasion of Scotland. Besides being wary of concluding even an alliance with such an isolated and outlawed regime, the Dutch could have no confidence in its durability. These negotiations preceded Charles IPs invasion of England and defeat at Worcester. The failure of the Rump to make progress on drafting a new constitution and the continued activity of political and religious radicals threatened a new period of instability. The Dutch consistently exaggerated the possibility that what they regarded as religious licence and the proliferation of the sects would lead to moral collapse and social disintegration.²

The States General was not prepared to go further than offering a treaty 'on the common interest', fearing that a union for a 'more intrinsical and mutual interest of each in other than hath hitherto been' would mean subordination to, or even incorporation in, a much larger state and one which was currently conquering and assimilating Scotland and Ireland. Moreover any degree of union with England would entail a fundamental change in the essential basis of the Union of Utrecht, in the location of sovereignty. This rested in the individual provinces and their States (the representative bodies), and was symbolized by their sending deputies to the States General who were delegates limited by binding instructions: on any new subjects they had to refer back to their 'principals', the States, for new instructions. Consequently the Dutch members of the States General who negotiated with St John could not behave as plenipotentiaries, they could not give him authoritative answers and counter-proposals. This created the extremely damaging impression that although they professed friendship they would agree to nothing unless it was certain to work to their advantage.³

St John, the nominal head of the embassy, had little experience in foreign affairs, but Strickland had spent seven years at the Hague, and in September 1649 had warned the States of Holland of the danger of antagonizing the Commonwealth. Pointing out that Parliament had taken care to maintain 'the ancient friendship and correspondence' which had been so useful (the key word to use to persuade the Dutch) to the two countries, he warned that continued lack of reciprocal affection would make it impossible to 'maintain trade and friendship to our mutual satisfaction'. Strickland added that 'your dear and very considerable interests' would then be endangered. In 1649 this very explicit and direct warning made an impact, causing Holland to tell the States General that some Commonwealth leaders wanted a breach so that they could attack Dutch trade, which 'glitters as golden mountains' in their eyes, and that the sea would be turned into 'deadly poison'. But by 1651 this threat had seemingly receded, with the Commonwealth occupied in Scotland and Ireland.⁴

Consequently the Dutch negotiators adopted a wary and procrastinating attitude during the negotiations. They tabled thirty-six Articles whose main emphasis was on the renewal of the ancient union, or rather links, connected with the Magnus Intercursus of 1495. St John replied that this was insufficient and insisted on 'a nearer union than formerly hath been', demanding that the States General should declare itself on this main issue, 'and with all speed'. The failure of the Dutch negotiators to address the issue of a union led not just to the failure of the negotiations but to a sharp deterioration in Anglo-Dutch relations. The Dutch accused the ambassadors of intimidation, of setting arbitrary time-limits, and of breaking off the negotiations and returning to England when progress could still have been made. The English charged the Dutch with deliberately delaying their responses, falsifying the text of articles which had been accepted as part of the Magnus Intercursus, and misrepresenting the record of discussions. This failure left both parties with the impression that the other had been acting in bad faith. When the Dutch attempted to revive the negotiations at the end of 1651 the English attitude was determined by the experiences of their ambassadors. Thurloe, who had acted as their secretary, described Dutch negotiating tactics as making 'huge professions and in such manner that men are almost necessitated to believe them', but with the intention of performing only those parts that they knew would be to their advantage. The English counter to their tactics was to insist that specific replies must be made even on the most contentious issues within a short time-limit, and that the demands to be put to them must be carefully and fully prepared. The extraordinary ambassadors who arrived in England early in 1652 found themselves in an impossible negotiating position. They had instructions to seek the repeal of the Navigation Act, passed the previous October, and a renunciation of the right to search neutral ships, without offering anything in return. These preposterous and impossible demands contrasted with the itemized list of claims which the English presented, accompanied by the peremptory demand that early replies must be made. The brutally direct English attitude and the continued procrastination and evasiveness of the Dutch deepened mutual distrust: had the negotiations been conducted with a genuine intention of reaching agreement war might have been averted. They were still technically in progress when the first naval clashes occurred in May 1652, but the mistimed Dutch ploy of saying that they were now ready to discuss English proposals for a union merely confirmed the impression which was now fixed and to colour all transactions with Dutch governments over the next century — a distrust of 'good' or 'fair' words and 'huge professions', a belief that settlements would be obtained onlv by exerting pressure and eliminating time-wasting.⁵

Inevitably the Dutch came to believe in 1651—52 that the economic policies of the Rump and the Council of State were deliberately aimed against their interests, hence their ill-conceived intention to demand repeal of the Navigation Act. Certainly English opinion was becoming hostile. For example when the Merchant Adventurers proposed moving their Staple from Holland to Flanders they justified their request to the Rump by saying that this would 'totally dissolve the clothing of Holland', that is ruin the Leiden textile industry that had captured former English markets in Europe.⁶ But it would be wrong to see the measures taken by the Rump as being primarily motivated by anti-Dutch feeling; they were absolutely essential if the English economy was to recover quickly (or at all) from the deep depression caused by the second civil war, harvest failure, plague and the disruption of foreign trade. No government in England has ever had to operate under such pressure as the Rump in 1649—51, something that has been ignored or downplayed by historians, and especially those influenced by Marxism, who have contended that it should have undertaken radical social and political reforms. The pragmatism of the Rump and its Council, which they condemn, reflected a rational and relevant order of priorities. The first concern was to encourage a revival of manufactures and exports. Demand in the home market had contracted because of high food prices, high taxes (particularly the excise), high poor rates and irregular employment. The basis of the Rump's economic policy was to ensure 'that government and order in trade may be preserved and confusion avoided', and this required the rejection for example of Leveller demands for the dissolution of the chartered companies as monopolies. It should be added that this served the interests of the group of merchants who sat in the Rump, and their associates who served in the Council of Trade, men whose mentality and outlook found expression in Thomas Violet's pamphlet, The Advocate, and whose cohesiveness contributed to the influence they wielded at Westminster and in the City. At the end of 1650 they helped enact an ordinance restricting trade with the colonies (many of which were still in royalist hands) to vessels specially licensed. This was used to seize and condemn Dutch vessels and it served as a model for the wider Navigation Act of October 1651 which was primarily aimed at the elimination of the Dutch entrepôt trade: all imports must be brought directly to England from their country of origin in either English vessels or those of that country.⁷ This Act (technically an ordinance) has been grandly described as a major piece of 'state-building' and as the major cause of the first Anglo-Dutch War. Their earlier experiences meant that both the English and the Dutch were fully aware of the profound consequences of such legislative restrictions of trade. Spain imposed a trade embargo on Dutch vessels and freight in 1621, when war resumed after the twelve-year truce, and on England between 1625 and 1630, which the enforcement agency, the Almirantazgo, made increasingly effective. But after 1630 Charles realigned his foreign policy to favour Spain with considerable benefits for English trade, especially with the Mediterranean from which the Dutch found themselves virtually excluded. They had to rely on an entrepôt trade through Dover for commodities from Spain which they had formerly imported direct, and silver from America was routed via the London mint for Spain's armies and allies in northern Europe. But once negotiations for peace between Spain and the Dutch Republic made progress, and the embargo was lifted in 1647, this artificial English commercial ascendancy collapsed abruptly and completely. Now in 1651 the Dutch faced the prospect that the near monopoly they had established in trade with the English colonies (and with Scotland) would be eliminated, and the difficulties caused to the W1C by a Portuguese rising in Brazil made these losses more damaging. But there was nothing that the Dutch could do once the English disregarded their demands for repeal of the Navigation Act.⁸

However, the States General was determined to resist the English claims (and practice) of searching vessels, and they had the power to do so effectively. Dutch vessels already enjoyed favoured treatment from both France and Spain, whose war continued until 1659. In 1646 France agreed that Dutch vessels could carry enemy goods, except for contraband defined narrowly as arms, powder, horses and other military equipment, and renewed this concession in 1651 although the Dutch had made a separate peace with Spain in 1648. In 1650 Spain agreed that Dutch vessels should not be subject to interference by their admiralty authorities, so consequently they could carry French goods. The explanation of course was that both combatant states depended on Dutch carriers for the export of commodities on which their economies generally, and their war finances largely, depended. These agreements reflected their dependence on the Amsterdam entrepot, and as the Dutch exploited the advantages of neutrality their relative superiority over their English rivals would increase.⁹ The English searches of Dutch vessels for French commodities, often conducted in brutal fashion, their seizure and condemnation by the admiralty court, were becoming so numerous that they seemed to constitute a deliberate policy aimed at wrecking the vital trade with the Biscay coast of France. Only 12 vessels had been taken in 1648. This rose to 22 intercepted in 1649, 50 in 1650 and this soared to 126 in 1651 (almost equalling the worst year's losses 1628 — to the Dunkirkers), and 106 in the first half of 1652.¹⁰ The weak embassy sent to London, headed by the geriatric Jacob Cats, the popular demotic poet who delivere...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Figures
• Abbreviations
• Chronological Table
• Preface
• The Context of the Anglo-Dutch Wars
• The Course of the Anglo-Dutch Wars
• Select Bibliography
• Maps
• Index