Chapter 1
The Functional Anatomy of Consciousness
Man is a structure-making, problem-solving animal.
This is a chapter about the relationship between the brainâs structure and its problem-solving function. Human survival skills reside in the prefrontal systemâs evolved capacity to create structures that solve problems. This capacity has two dimensions. The brain talks to itself, and it talks to others. The brainâs structure determines how it talks to itself, and its function determines how it talks to others. Because the brain is an interactive structure that eschews chaos, the question we have to ask ourselves is, how does the brain coordinate its inner speech with its outer speech to resolve problems?1
A NEURAL SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE BRAINâS INNER LANGUAGE
When we start thinking about this question, we face a problem right away. The infant brain does not work exactly as the childâs brain does, and the childâs brain does not process data as an adultâs does. Mature brains and old brains also have their own neurobiological systems. A cognitive neuroscience model will have to create a developmental portrait of the brain as it elaborates human and individual identities. Thus, our model will have to employ a neural systems top down approach that focuses on relevant identity changes that demarcate the stages of life.
But there is more to the brainâs internal communication than infant brain talking to infant brain, adult brain talking to adult brain, and so forth. The infant brain talks to the adult brain, and as it is de rigueur to say, the adult talks to the child within. The brainâs capacity to access our lifeâs experience is more than impressive. The way we solve problems recapitulates the development of our intrapsychic identities.
To understand and use this neural systems approach, we will follow the principles elaborated in the introduction:
Solving Problems, the Brain Talks to Itself
Using language as a coding system, the problem solver keeps track of activated prefrontal modules. These activated associations are the products of parallel-processing, prefrontal networks.
Each Hemisphere Thinks and Behaves Differently
Cognition organizes language to formulate behavior. Each hemisphere employs its own form of cognition. Left prefrontal dorsolateral cortex (the agentâs inner speech zone) organizes planned behavior. Right prefrontal dorsolateral cortex (the procedural selfâs social speech zone) organizes responsive behavior. The executive unifies the two forms of cognition as a simple sentence before we act or speak (articulatory rehearsal).
Each Module has a Life of Its Own
A module is the basic structural unit of cortex. Modules are links in associational networks. Each prefrontal hemisphere has three kinds of data inflow networks: cognitive (lateral cortex), social (intermediate cortex), and emotional (medial cortex). In addition to its participation in one of these six possible data inflow networks, each prefrontal module also participates in the prefrontal systemâs behavioral outflow.
Consciousness Develops Cyclically
Functional distributed systems develop in three cyclical spirals. The spiraling begins in the left hemisphere and moves to the right. Within each hemisphere, the movement is from lateral to medial cortex. These spirals induce characteristic paths of integration in the two hemispheres. Each cycle triggers new paths of integration, and these paths are hierarchically superior to the earlier ones. Prefrontal networks consequently develop hierarchically organized modular fields. The closer a module is to the top of a pyramid, the more abstract the data it codes.
We have to deduce these principles, because we experience system consciousness (reflection on experience organized by identity) in a unified way. Having deduced them, we can see that to solve problems, we filter data through parallely distributed networks of prefrontal structures (agent, social subject, subject, procedural self social self, and self). These structures are intrinsic to our personal identities. When we have a problem, we use them to assess whether processed data can trigger behavior compatible with our identities.
Let us summarize the types of assessments that the prefrontal cortex makes. The lateral zones code cognitive formulations of ongoing significant and salient experience. When present experience evokes them, the intermediate zones code signals derived from previously conditioned social experience. The medial zones code feedback from our emotional responses. Since every sentence solves a problem, every sentence includes contributions from our cognitive, social, and emotional life.
Here is an example of how our prefrontal identity system works to coordinate its component zones. In order to use anxiety as a signal system, we have to first sample the feedback from a minor anxiety discharge. Then we code the signal anxiety in language. Only then can we modify our behavior. If warranted by intermediate and medial signals, the executive can also evoke long-term, emotionally organized source memory. These are masses of explicit associations available to cognition.
HOW DOES THE BRAIN MANAGE CONSCIOUSNESS?
In his Project for a Scientific Psychology, Freud saw system consciousness as an indwelling sense organ that perceives the activity of those neural systems that make the most direct and simultaneous contact with the sensory world and our biochemical milieu (1895). System consciousness is the sixth sense. This executive, observing sense uses language to code how the brain is working. Thus, as a prefrontal assessment system, system consciousness makes data suitable for entering the executive structures of our personal identity.
Freudâs system consciousness also manifests a motor qualityâattention. Together, the thalamus and cerebellum create quick motor shifts in attention that focus perception. The thalamus evokes consciousness of sensory stimuli by passing signals from the ascending reticular activating system to the frontal and prefrontal areas. If, like general lighting on a theaterâs stage, the thalamus sets the stage for consciousness, then the cerebellum spotlights the data we attend. The cerebellum is a
computational system for providing the optimal context for the smooth interdigitated, coordinated neural action of whatever systems are needed from moment to moment to achieve a specified goal within the context of continuously fluctuating internal and external contexts. (Courchesne et al., 1994, p. 861)
Once aroused and attending, executive metafunctions regulate a hierarchy of activated perceptual and motor networks required to solve problems. First, an executive sense of unified identity brings our higher cortical functions into selected and simultaneous use. Higher cortical functions are the ego functions; they are not the ego, which will be defined later. Each higher cortical functionâthought, initiation, apperception, synthesis, defense, adaptation, etc.âderives from a different reference point in identity.
HOW DO METAFUNCTIONS REGULATE INTRAPSYCHIC IDENTITY?
The brainâs two hemispheres are not identical twins. The dominant left hemisphere organizes our initiatives, while the nondominant right hemisphere organizes our responses. The division of labor shows up at the highest level of prefrontal organization. Hereafter I will use the following anthropomorphisms:
âexecutive to refer to the executive metafunction that transcallosally synthesizes speech and identity
âsupervisor to refer to the left prefrontal, supervisory metafunction that integrates what we mean to do or say
âobserver to refer to the right prefrontal metafunction that represents the reality of the self in the world
In later chapters, I will show that these anthropomorphisms are justified, for metafunctions embody intrapsychic identity.
Using our functional model, we can say that while solving problems prefrontally:
⢠the left hemisphere supervises inner speech,
⢠the right hemisphere observes social speech, and
⢠the executive function synthesizes inner with social speech as articulatory rehearsal.
Without the mediation of language, the brain cannot embody its left hemisphereâs volition, its right hemisphereâs observation of reality, or its reflection on its intrapsychic identity states. The advantage that language confers on us as problem solvers is that it codes both sensory representations and motor schema.
WHAT IS ARTICULATORY REHEARSAL?
When the brain uses articulatory rehearsal to talk to itself, it fuses subjective and objective identity into das ich, the ego, by which Freud meant âIâ/âme.â At the twin centers of behavioral preparation, the simple use of the subject, I, summons supervisory volition, while the object, me, prepares observational reaction. Equipped with dual consciousness, the executive enables us to act upon the world and react to it.
Protosentences, of which âAh wa daâI want thatââ is an example, occur at eighteen months, when the infant brain synthesizes a transcallosal identity. A legacy of early hemispheric linkage, protosentences underlie later intrapsychic communications. A simple example of the brainâs talking to itself occurs in the protosentence âI need me to open the window.â Of course, one never hears such sentences because a Chomskian transformation translates them into âI need to open the window.â The full purposes of the ego are nevertheless served by the untransformed base sentence, in which the subject initiates and the object reacts.
Inner speech is mainly a sequence of action verbs that the left brain encodes for volitional discharge. We are all familiar with what the left brain has to say. For example, while watching the 1994 Winter Olympics, I heard one of the miked figure skaters vocalizing as she went through her routine. The inner speech with which she instructed her actions was, âback, back, back, through.â This is familiar enough, and to be sure, anyone who has watched professional golf on television will recognize the playersâ inner speech. Almost all men or women golfers âfollow throughâ verbally with instructions to the ball such as: âleft, left, roll, sit!â Inner speech joins action, and extends volition into the arena of effects as âbody English.â
As we fall asleep and lose the point of intention, we relapse into the social speech of young childhood. Perhaps this is why, for some of us, the dissolution of identity that accompanies the entrance to sleep feels dangerous and leads to insomnia. As we fall asleep, we need to feel that our identity is simple and coherent and that we will awaken revitalized.
At sleepâs portal, however, we begin to fuse with language and sensory images. As we fall asleep, we notice phrases floating and joining without meaning. Meaning dissolves without intention, and our only intention is to fall asleep. In other words, jetsam from the sea of wordsâideas, idioms, phrases, and imagesâfuses with our entrance into sleep, as our sense of unified identity melts.
This sea is the stuff of social speech, detached from thought. On several occasions, I was treated to displays of social speech by each of my daughters when each was two and falling asleep. Whole phrases I had used during the day must have gone streaming into their mental seas, and now, they articulated whole phrases that had to have been beyond their complete comprehension.
In waking life, the executive actively selects ideas, idioms, and phrases that we absorb from social speech and combines them with the inner speech that derives from our voluntary expression. This articulatory rehearsal, the legacy of the brainâs later childhood, is the thought that constitutes trial action. In problem solving, the executiveâs articulatory rehearsal organizes metafunctions by linking our behavioral repertoire of inner speech with the verbally encoded data of observation.
Legacies of the brainâs development of inner speech, social speech, and articulatory rehearsal are vulnerable to organic damage as well as to dynamic conflicts. Particular areas of damaged prefrontal cortex produce characteristic disruptions in speech functions. In the prefrontal cortex, damage to:
⢠the left dorsolateral zone results in the utterance of simple sentences, much like inner speech;
⢠the left orbital frontal zone causes unfocussed, impulsive utterance;
⢠the right orbital frontal zone globally disorganizes syntax (Kaczmarek, 1984); and
⢠either medial cortex gives rise to a tendency to initiate vocalization in monkeys and humans (Klin...