The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637-1739

Kenneth Clatterbaugh

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9780415914765
• eBook ISBN: 9781317828105
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy examines the debate that began as modern science separated itself from natural philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The book specifically explores the two dominant approaches to causation as a metaphysical problem and as a scientific problem.

1.
The Debate

There is no question, which on account of its importance, as well as difficulty, has caus’d more disputes both among ancient and modem philosophers, than this concerning the efficacy of causes, or that quality which made them be followed by their effects. (T, 156)

Treatments of causality in seventeenth-century philosophy present the interpreter with a peculiar problem. On the one hand, the notion of causality is central to the period’s major positions and disputes in metaphysics and epistemology. On the other hand, few of the most prominent figures of the period enter into detailed or precise accounts of the relation of causal dependence or causal connection. (Wilson 1991, 133)

The Project

In our contemporary world, scientists seek causes; philosophers talk about causation. Scientists use causes to explain phenomena, whereas philosophers try to understand the nature of causation. At the same time contemporary philosophers, too, use causation to answer a variety of questions in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of language, and ethics. For example, many philosophers understand scientific explanations as causal accounts of why changes occur, and they interpret natural laws as expressing causal relationships. The meaning of names, descriptions, and even the possibility of knowledge may depend upon how the world is causally structured. What things can do causally is sometimes treated as an indispensable part of collecting them into categories or natural kinds. And, finally, contemporary philosophers of ethics hold that knowing what is causally possible is crucial to deciding what we ought to do since we are not bound to do what we cannot (causally) do.

As Wilson notes in the above passage, the concept of causation is also central to the writings of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers (the modern period). Yet the emphasis in modern philosophy courses tends to be epistemological: beginning with the Meditations, the question that unfolds is how the rationalists and empiricists respond to the skeptical challenge. However, the nature of causation immediately intrudes itself into these epistemological discussions. Descartes, in the Meditations, begins his quest for knowledge beyond himself with a causal proof for the existence of God, a proof that makes key assumptions about the nature of causation. And Spinoza, in one of the first axioms of the Ethics, makes knowledge of something dependent on knowledge of its cause (EMC, 410). Beyond these immediate epistemological concerns, modern philosophers continue to worry about the nature of causation and to use the causal connection to solve a variety of philosophical puzzles.

Perhaps, in appreciation of the philosophical centrality of causation in this period, there is now a growing body of secondary literature about causation in the modern period. This literature, however, remains atomized, and attention to shared concerns about causation among the major thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is often overlooked in favor of articulating a particular philosopher’s understanding of causation.¹

There are a couple of obvious reasons for scholars’ delay in turning to the causation debate in modem philosophy. First, Descartes, who plays such an important role as a founder of this debate, is notoriously obscure in his remarks about the nature of causation, and this obscurity tends to infect the entire debate. Second, there are so many distinct threads in this debate that any effort to gather them into a continuous account of the debate is difficult and frustrating. But just as we gain a certain perspective on the philosophies of this period by looking at their struggle with skepticism or their transformation of the concept of substance, so we gain a unique perspective if we focus on their general concern with causation.

This book is an introductory overview of the modern debate about causation. The dates selected for this debate span the years 1637, when Descartes published his Discourse on the Method, with Optics, Meteorology and Geometry, to 1739, when Hume published A Treatise on Human Nature. Descartes represents the beginnings of the modern concern about causation, and he makes a conscious effort to transform philosophical thinking about causation. Hume, on the other hand, represents the culmination of several tendencies in the debate, especially the simplification, secularization, and epistemological treatment of causation. Although this book offers an introduction to the debate, it includes several of my own observations about crucial issues within the debate; these observations may be of interest to more advanced scholars of this period.

Throughout this book my treatment of the debate is built around two grand problems.

The first is the metaphysical problem of causation. Sleigh describes this problem as an attempt “to state what conditions obtain at the level of ultimate metaphysical reality when causal statements are employed” (1990b, 163). Suppose, for example, that a modern philosopher thought that when an oven (a substance) bakes bread (a substance), it warms the bread through the transfer or communication of heat (an accident) to the bread—that would be one example of how causation works at the metaphysical level. Such an account of causation obviously makes numerous assumptions about the kinds of entities that exist and how they relate to one another.

The second grand problem is the epistemology of causation. This grand problem has two subproblems. The first is obviously how we can know what goes on at the metaphysical level. And a failure to show that the metaphysics of causation can be known may translate into an abandonment of that metaphysical view. Thus, the early modems, for example, reject Scholastic accounts of causation in part because the explanatory principles—substantial forms—are not knowable. But a second epistemological problem of causation is how we know that an apparent causal interaction is a genuine causal interaction. Obviously, unless we can correctly identify causal connections, we do not know where to apply the metaphysical analysis. Furthermore, since modem philosophers generally hold that causes explain effects, until there are ways to recognize genuine causal interactions, there is no way to distinguish genuine explanations from pseudoexplanations. For modem philosophers, who seek to understand the material and mental worlds, identifying true or proper causes is necessary in order to make the universe intelligible.

Not all modern philosophers discussed in this essay are concerned with giving what Sleigh calls the “metaphysically correct” account of what happens when two things are related as cause and effect (Sleigh 1990b, 163). But if they do not offer a positive account of their own, they, at least, are clear about which accounts they consider to be incorrect. And they often try to formulate epistemological criteria by which true or proper causal processes can be demarcated from pseudocausal processes. Their examples of purported causal processes are often mundane ones, such as the baking of bread, the sun melting wax, a person voluntarily raising her arm, or one body pushing or pulling another. However, as modern science becomes more successful, the examples become more complex and the importance of making one’s account of causation agree with scientific examples increases.

Throughout the approximately one hundred years of the debate three great transformations occur in the thinking about the nature of causation. First, the concept is greatly simplified; second, it is secularized; and third the problem of identifying true or proper causal connections replaces philosophical concern about the metaphysical problem of causation. In the simplification process, many complexities and ambiguities are abandoned. The moderns discard talk about the four causes in favor of explanations in terms of efficient causation only. Hume takes it as a corollary of his definition of cause that “all causes are of the same kind” (EHU, 156). Furthermore, causes are no longer seen as logically or metaphysically necessary to their effects, and, accordingly, effects do not have to preexist in their causes. The ambiguity between cause-as-thing and cause-as-premise in a scientific explanation lessens as modern philosophers sharpen the distinction between language and the world. The secularization of the concept of cause is complete by 1739; in Hume’s philosophy, God ceases to be the paradigm of a true cause and becomes irrelevant to proper causal explanations. Third, and finally, interest in the metaphysical problem of causation wanes because it is increasingly seen as an insoluble problem of little importance. At the same time, science prevails over metaphysics; the paramount philosophical conception of cause becomes that which is so identified in an accepted scientific explanation.

In part, these changes in thinking about causation are motivated by a growing success in understanding and controlling nature. Francis Bacon realized in 1620 that “human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be reproduced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause, is in operation as the rule” (Bacon 1620, 3). If God is the real cause of natural changes, then understanding nature becomes more difficult and controlling nature becomes impossible; even the early modem Hobbes cites such concerns for removing the “doctrine of God” from knowledge of cause and effect (MO I, 10). Further, if cause and effect are metaphysically or logically linked, then given that the initial state of the universe is already set, control of natural processes again becomes impossible. Both understanding and control of nature, however, depend directly upon the correct identification of causal processes as does the all-important experimental philosophy that emerges with Boyle and Newton. Thus, the focus on identification of genuine causal processes fits tightly with the search for understanding and control over diseases, bodies in motion, and other critical problems that are the ultimate goals of natural philosophy.

Metaphors that contribute to the belief that causal processes can be identified and controlled become increasingly common; nature is a machine, often like a clock (Freudenthal 1986, 53-55; Laudan 1966). Clocks are understood, their causal workings, whether by springs or pendulums, are known, and they can be repaired and adjusted. (Some theistic philosophers even hope to gain insight into the nature of the creator by understanding his clock.) “Mechanism” or “the mechanical philosophy” is often used to describe the seventeenth-century view of nature as a machine. But “mechanism” is only a direction in thinking about causation that appears at this time; as we shall see, there are many seventeenth-century “mechanical philosophies.” They all share an anti-Scholastic metaphysics, but in other respects they differ metaphysically and epistemologically. Metaphysically, some (classical mechanists) hold strictly to a push-pull model of causation at least in the physical world. Some mechanist metaphysics are wholly materialistic, others are only partially materialistic. Some admit forces of repulsion and attraction as basic forces of nature. Some believe that causation in the microworld, the world below sense perception, is precisely the same as that in the macro world of ordinary perceptual objects, while others posit special processes below the threshold of the senses. Ultimately, in order to determine the extent to which the one hundred years of this period may be identified as mechanistic, there must be a philosophically satisfactory explication of the various mechanical philosophies. And as McGuire notes, “no adequate analysis of the various meanings of ‘the mechanical philosophy’ has yet been given” (McGuire 1972, 523). That task lies beyond the scope of this book, although it is hoped that a better understanding of the causation debate will contribute toward that end.

Three arenas of discussion dominate the modern debate about causation, although they are not all equally important to every participant in the debate:

The first is how to explain metaphysically the apparent interaction between bodies. Physics is the science of the day, and the laws of motion dominate much of that science. Early modern philosophers quickly came to agree on a generalized understanding of inertia, that is, they agree that a body at rest will remain at rest unless acted upon and a body in motion will continue in motion in a straight line (or, in some cases, in a circle) unless acted upon (Dijksterhuis 1961, 366; Gabbey 1980; Woolhouse 1993, 102-103). But while this concept of inertia ended certain of the most pressing issues as to why bodies continue in motion or at rest, it immediately suggests that there are causes (external forces) that explain why bodies change direction and accelerate or decelerate. In Gabbey’s words several modern philosophers and scientists came to view the dynamic world as one in which “interactions between bodies were seen as contests between opposing forces, the larger forces being the winners, the smaller forces being the losers…. Furthermore, it was held that the resultant forces continue indefinitely in the absence of further collisions …” (1980, 243).

Once the arena of physical dynamics is identified as one of forces that change or alter rest or direction, philosophers and scientists debate on two levels. At one level they disagree about the laws of motion, how to formulate them, and what is conserved in motion (Dijksterhuis 1961; Woolhouse 1993, 102-33). At another level, the metaphysical level, they disagree about what the motive force (vis movens) is and through what processes that force is distributed throughout the world of dynamic bodies (Gueroult 1980, Hatfield 1990). The first level of disagreement, the scientific debate, is relevant to our project only to the extent that it throws light upon the second, which is where the two great problems of causation are most apparent.

The second arena is the debate about how to explain the correlations between mind and body. None of the modern philosophers deny that there is a “connection” between mind and body. They do question the nature of that connection, that is, whether it is a causal interaction or some other kind of relation. The mind-body connection, itself, divides into two subissues: (1) the relationship of minds to bodies and (2) the relationship of bodies to minds. Some moderns treat the former, but not the latter, as a causal connection; some deny that either is a genuine causal interaction; and some hold that both are causal interactions. Mind-body interaction is a particular problem if mind and body are very different kinds of things; thus, some philosophers embrace a monism that posits only one kind of substance, and in that way try to dissolve the problem. Later modern scientist-philosophers such as Boyle and Newton tend to move the whole issue of mind-body interaction outside of scientific discourse. Their focus then is on the causal connections and scientific explanations of the physical or material world.

The third arena is a set of questions as to how to divide up the causal network between God and God’s creations. For the most part modern philosophers do not doubt that it makes sense to speak of God as the creator and at least a partial cause of everything, although they do not claim to understand fully the nature of God’s causal powers, and they describe God’s role in different ways. But since God is a cause of everything and since they, for the most part, also believe that created things are causes, some determination of the relationship between God and these finite causes is needed. Does God enjoy a prolonged retirement after creation while his creatures do the work? Do God and created things collaborate in producing change in the world? Does God do it all, while created things only serve as epistemic guides to what happens next? Each of these questions was answered in the affirmative by some modern philosopher. Furthermore, if God is a causal factor in producing various changes, how much about God must be understood or included in a proper explanation of these changes? Since there are sharp disagreements about the epistemological accessibility of God, the inclusion of God in any explanations brings with it controversy about just how intelligible the universe really is. At the same time, there is a major shift in the debate in this arena. The early moderns, with the exception of Hobbes, hold that some knowledge of God is critical to understanding nature and natural laws. The later moderns generally dismiss God as a part of scientific understanding but hold, at the same time, that understanding nature is a good way to gain an understanding of God.

Lying behind their efforts to solve the issues in these arenas is a multiple legacy derived from Aristotle and the Scholastics. From Aristotle comes the idea that proper explanations are in terms of the actual causes of things and that there are four kinds of causation. In Aristotle these causes appear in the scientific syllogisms that are used to explain phenomena. The Scholastics reinforced these Aristotelian ideas and add the theological thesis that God is the true author (creator) of everything (see Wallace 1972 I).

While many of the early modern philosophers accept the division of causation into four types, they abandon the metaphysics of substance, essence, and accident that underlies that division. At the same time they must abandon the Aristotelian/Scholastic model of a proper causal explanation. Having the Aristotelian/Scholastic legacy without its ontology makes the labor of reconstructing a theory of causation even more herculean. From Aristotelian/Scholastic philosophy moderns inherited the idea that God is an active cause in His creation; modern philosophers, who would keep God as a cause, must explain how they can retain their new-found, scientific explanations of phenomena, explanations that often do not refer to God. Their dilemma is obvious. On the one hand, if God is a true cause of everything; then the new scientific explanations are not proper explanations. On the other hand, if the new scientific explanations are proper, then God is not a true cause of everything. Most of the debate from Descartes through Hume centers around how modern philosophers can free themselves of this legacy and whether one philosopher is more successful than another in that task. Ultimately, the legacy of Aristotelian/Scholasticism is jettisoned in favor of explanations without God, substantial forms, or even substances.

A great many ph...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Editions and Abbreviations
• 1. The Debate
• 2. Descartes: The Metaphysics of Causation
• 3. Descartes: The Epistemology of Causation
• 4. Classical Mechanism: Hobbes and Gassendi
• 5. The Temptation of Occasionalism: Le Grand and Malebranche
• 6. Causes and Sufficient Reason: Spinoza and Leibniz
• 7. The Limits of Classical Mechanism: Boyle, Rohault, and Newton
• 8. The Attempted Alignment of Philosophy and Physics: Locke, Berkeley, and Hume
• 9. Summation and Final Ironies
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index