Chapter 1
Power: Past, Present, and Future
As the twenty-first century opens with women assuming positions of social leadership, the dynamics of the social construction of power need to be examined. Connell (1987) notes that many social scientists viewed power as a socially mediated construct in which particular transactions involving power are easy enough to observe. However, he suggests that it is often difficult to see beyond individual acts of force or oppression to a structure of power, a set of social relations with some scope and permanence. Social science theorists, though, usually present power in ways that can be characterized as patriarchal, a situation typically problematic for women. Feminist writers have tackled the complex problems inherent in configuring a feminist framework for power that does not replicate the problems of a masculinist approach, and two alternatives to traditional power have been presented: an early conception of empowerment constructed as a culturally feminine paradigm, and more recently a perspective variously called personal authority (Rampage, 1991; Miller and Cummins, 1992), self-definition (Collins, 1990), or personal agency (Yoder, 1999). Our review of the literature reveals that scholars such as Collins (1990), Ferree and Martin (1995), Josefowitz (1980), and Reid-Merritt (1996) noted the limitations of the traditional power and empowerment models; however, little has been done in a systematic way to offer alternatives.
We believe that none of these perspectives of power, taken alone, is adequate to address the changing roles of women or the social and political challenges we face in the twenty-first century. We argue that a new model of power is needed, one that in part combines aspects of the existing models, but one that also transcends these previous notions, comprising a whole greater than its component parts.
In this book we propose and describe a new model of power that we call reciprocal empowerment. We also offer an initial investigation of how reciprocal empowerment and other socially constructed concepts of power are viewed by women of various ethnicities. This chapter introduces and discusses this model and its relationship to discursive and behavioral practices. First, we define reciprocal empowerment and note its attributes. Second, from a feminist perspective, we examine the traditional power construct as a socially mediated, patriarchal model that focuses on the ideas of self versus other. We also examine the early conceptions of empowerment and more recent discussions of personal authority. Third, we propose our reciprocal empowerment model, arguing that, for some feminists, this model may present an alternative preferable to existing constructs of power. In the subsequent chapters, we present results of a qualitative study that illustrate how reciprocal empowerment, as well as other concepts of power, are perceived and experienced by women of various ethnicities.
We define reciprocal empowerment as a discursive and behavioral style of interaction grounded in reciprocity initiated by people who feel a sense of personal authority. The personal authority aspect of reciprocal empowerment provides an individual with a level of knowledge necessary to develop a heightened self-confidence that can then lead to action. This action can, in turn, facilitate movement from the private to the public sphere. Reciprocal empowerment enables people with mutual self-interests to rise above obstacles based on social and political structures and to use personal authority to discuss and act on issues openly and honestly in order to effect change. The process of engaging in reciprocal empowerment requires that the participants have enough self-confidence and respect for others to assist them without sacrificing self. The process also requires that participants be skilled in active listening to be sufficiently knowledgeable to mediate reasoned discussions that can create mutually beneficial outcomes. Although the process facilitates reasoned discussion, it does not entail abandoning oneâs own stance to avoid antagonism. The fact that reciprocal empowerment focuses on mutuality works to provide a process that eliminates the potential for interactions to degenerate into traditional power-over exchanges.
This process transcends existing notions of power that contain tensions embodied in gendered discourse. Typically, power has been masculinized by the public discourse of patriarchy. Reciprocal empowerment offers a degendered form of interaction that transcends both the masculinized models of power as well as the feminized empowerment model popular during the first wave of feminism.
Reciprocal empowerment combines the attributes of self-determination, independence, knowledge, choice, and action embodied in the personal authority model with the early empowerment modelâs attributes of compassion, companionship, collectivity, consensus, and competence to enhance oneself and others, thereby creating an egalitarian environment that fosters mutual attention, mutual empathy, mutual engagement, and mutual responsiveness. Reciprocal empowerment, therefore, combines the personal authority construct with the early empowerment conception to form a nongendered, nonhierarchical model. The paradigm includes the internal and external, involving both the process of gaining power and the results that are produced by having power, albeit a power that differs from the traditional perspective.
Before beginning our discussion, we feel it necessary to respond to a charge put forth by Dow (1995), who suggests that because feminist approaches and womenâs experiences cannot be viewed as monolithic, feminist scholars should âdiscuss the feminist assumptions that fuel their scholarshipâ and âengage with the implications of those assumptionsâ (p. 112). Various scholars (Alcoff, 1988; Jaggar, 1983; Jaggar and Rothenberg, 1984; Weedon, 1987) describe different feminist perspectives and discuss their theoretical implications at length. Among these perspectives are liberal, radical, socialist, cultural, and Marxist feminism, as well as feminist poststructuralism, and women-of-color feminism. Jaggar and Rothenberg (1984) note that women-of-color feminist theorists do not utilize any single theoretical framework, and we, too, do not adhere to a particular perspective. We do, however, share assumptions associated with some of these feminist approaches. These assumptions direct the character of our reciprocal empowerment model. For example, we embrace the values of individual dignity, equality, and autonomy postulated by the liberal theory of human nature (Jaggar, 1983). This view accepts the potential for personal agency which we realize has been questioned extensively by poststructuralist feminists and which we discuss later. However, we do not subscribe to the separation of the public and private spheres historically fostered by liberal theory. In addition, we agree with black feminists (among others) who note the ethnocentricity of liberal feminism, a perspective that historically ignored the interrelations between racism and sexism.
We also share the concern of women-of-color feminists whose writings âreflect a concern that the complexities of race and gender (and often class as well) be explored simultaneously. They caution us against hasty over-generalizations about womenâs situation, generalizations that have often reflected only the experience of white, middle-class womenâ (Jaggar and Rothenberg, 1984, p. 89). We acknowledge that the different experiences of women are significant. For example, Humm (1992) states that âa black womanâs family and labor market experience might shape her economic inequality but also, and often, the family might be a source of succor and collective support. Therefore, the strident feminist calls in the 1970s for abortion on demand could not adequately address these black understandings of the family and of sexualityâ (p. 122); furthermore, it must be recognized that race, class, and gender are âinterlocking systems of oppression not additive systems ⌠[and that] most [black and Asian feminists] take feminism to involve a recognition of âmultiple identitiesââ (p. 122).
Although women-of-color feminists highlight the influence of culture and ethnicity, they should not be confused with cultural feminists, some of whom, Alcoff (1988) suggests, advocate essentialism. We, too, wish to avoid the essentialist perspective, which, according to Foss, Foss, and Griffin (1999) is âthe view that women and men are biologically determinedâ (p. 171), and instead suggest that previous models of power, early empowerment, and personal authority arose out of or developed in response to patriarchy, a set of structural relations existing in âthe institutions and social practices of our society ⌠in which womenâs interests are subordinated to the interests of menâ (Weedon, 1987, pp. 2-3). Weedon defines patriarchy as a structure embedded in social institutions and practices, and suggests that it should not be confused with any so-called inherent qualities of individual men and women.
We also wish to avoid charges of relativism that may be raised about the concept of reciprocal empowerment by stating that its practice does not necessarily or always involve questions of moral or epistemological relativism. The attributes or characteristics inherent to the process of reciprocal empowerment do reflect certain values, such as equality and respect; hence, reciprocal empowerment can be used fully only by participants willing to abide by such values. As such, we take a stance in developing our model that lies between absolutism and unbridled relativism. Alcoff (1996) describes this position in her discussion of Putnam:
We have reason to doubt specific claims and to take issue with other culturesâ beliefs on specific issues, but because these doubts are based on specific reasons (such as lack of evidence, failure to cohere with our other beliefs on the subject, and so on), they do not lead to the all-encompassing suspension of belief that a total relativism implies. (p. 180)
Similarly, we agree with the rational relativistic view articulated by LaFollette (1991):
Thus, we should instruct each other in the basic principles inherited from the past (respect for persons, reverence for human life, etc.) and act upon those as circumstances warrant. Then, we must listen and talk. We must non-defensively hear otherâs evaluations of our actions and non-condemnatorily offer reactions to theirsâall the while acknowledging our and their fallibility. (pp. 152-153)
This discussion, then, defines our position as feminists who embrace the potential for personal agency, are sensitive to the differences in womenâs experiences, do not subscribe to the separation of the public and private spheres, are mindful of patriarchy as a set of structural relationships enacted via discourse, and are unconvinced by arguments espousing essential differences between women and men.
Power: Its Various Forms
To address issues related to power, empowerment, and personal authority, it is important to discuss the historical and social use of the terms as they relate to men and women.
Traditional Power
Power as a construct has been around since the emergence of humans in society. Numerous writers and researchers have examined the term and detailed its various uses, meanings, and implications. Merriam-Websterâs Collegiate Dictionary (1993) offers as some of its definitions of the term power the following: (1) possession of control, authority, or influence over others, (2) physical might, (3) political control or influence, and (4) the ability or capacity to exercise control. The dictionary gives the following words as synonyms: authority, control, sway, command, and dominion. These synonyms indicate that the concept of power has historically not been intended to connote a femaleâs position in many aspects of society except, perhaps, within the family structure.
Social Science Perspectives of Power
Merriam-Websterâs popular definition of power as âthe ability or capacity to exercise controlâ differs little from social science definitions and conceptions. A review of the social science literature shows that, until recently, very little usage of the term related to women, with most discussions using men as referents and emphasizing influence and control. Furthermore, definitions of power are based on wealth, resources, influence, control, and physical strength. They characterize power as the ability to get someone to do what you want despite initial resistance, and they discuss power as a form of control over resources. Lips (1991) suggests that these definitions view power as a commodity, but she argues that âPower is the process of bargaining and compromise in which priorities are set and decisions made in relationshipsâ (p. 4). Similarly, Janeway (1980) sees power not as a commodity, but as something we do. Power, then, is not a thing available only to the elite, but rather a process we all engage in.
Connell (1987) posits that power may be a balance of advantage or inequality of resources in a workplace, a household, or a larger institution. According to Goodrich (1991), âthose who dominate have much more power-to than do their subordinates, and thereby they have the means to increase their domination. Key for that purpose is the power to name and define thingsâ (p. 8). This ability to impose a definition of the situation, to set the terms in which events are understood and issues discussed, to formulate ideas and define moralityâ in short, to assert hegemonyâis an essential part of traditional concepts of social power.
According to Miller and Cummins (1992), in the past, power has been theorized in terms of menâs experiences. For example, in psychology, power is discussed as a picture of struggle, and power is measured by the ability to dominate another, to win a conflict, and to exert power over another person. Similarly, in social exchange theory, human interaction is said to involve âexertion of influence mediated through control of both tangible and intangible resourcesâ (Miller and Cummins, 1992, p. 416). In sociology, Max Weber (1969) describes power as the âchance of man or a number of men to realize their will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are not participating in the actionâ (p. 24). In fact, Duffy (1986) notes that in patriarchal conceptions of power, recurrent themes include resistance, conflict, force, domination, and control. The conceptual basis of these definitions rests in a win-lose or power-over paradigm. In short, these definitions of power focus on structural hierarchies and interpersonal terms.
Foucault also focused on structures of power. He offered a theory of power in relation to the body that has helped feminists explain the oppression of women. McNay (1992) writes that Foucault believed âsystems of power bring forth different types of knowledge which, in turn, produce effects in the bodies of social agents that serve to reinforce the original power formationâ (p. 148). Foucaultâs conception of power as it relates to the body and to sexuality has been used by feminists to combat essentialist perspectives. However, the post-structuralist denial of individual intentions and Foucaultâs early dialogue regarding personal agency creates significant problems for feminism. So, although Foucaultâs theory of power neatly allows feminists to argue the social construction of gender, we standâwith theorists such as Alcoff (1988), Giddens (1979), and McNay (1992)â in opposition to his denial of personal agency.
McNay (1992) notes that âFoucaultâs lack of a rounded theory of subjectivity or agency conflicts with a fundamental aim of the feminist project: to rediscover and re-evaluate the experiences of womenâ (p. 3). Numerous theorists have grappled with this problem in postmodern theories in ways that redeem individual intention and action. For example, Alcoff (1988) rejects the total denial of personal agen...