The Prediction and Control of Organized Crime

The Experience of Post-Soviet Ukraine

Jennifer Schrock

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138537736
• eBook ISBN: 9781351303187
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

Like most former Soviet republics, Ukraine has experienced a formidable proliferation of crime and corruption as it struggles with economic reform and the establishment of democracy.During the early 90s, Ukraine became one of the primary recipients of foreign assistance from the United States and its crime and corruption situation was increasingly seen as an impediment to economic transition and achieving a more democratic way of life. Thus in 1998, as part of a larger U.S. law enforcement assistance effort in Ukraine, the idea for a research partnership between criminologists and legal scholars in the two countries was born in this volume.The original research papers contained are the products of this ambitious research project. The realities of crime in post-Soviet Ukraine, as well as divergent methodological approaches and communication problems, presented the research partners with enormous challenges. This volume represents the culmination of that collaborative effort, and provides a singular look into the current crime situation in Ukraine, and into the potential global threat presented by Ukrainian organized crime.Contributions include analyses of the prediction and control of organized crime, trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation, international money laundering, the transnational political criminal nexus of trafficking in women, countermeasures against economic crime and corruption, heroin trafficking, business victimization by organized crime, and understanding and combating organized crime. The Prediction and Control of Organized Crime will be critical reading for security planners, policymakers, and criminal justice officials, as well as comparative criminologists, legal scholars, and political scientists interested in organized crime and political corruption.

1
Introduction: A U.S.-Ukrainian Research Partnership against Crime

James O. Finckenauer and Jennifer L. Schrock

On the main thoroughfare in Kiev stands an impressive monument to commemorate Ukraine’s tenth year of independence from the Soviet Union. Today, the Ukrainian capital is beginning to resemble many cities in Western Europe; scattered throughout the city are emerging signs of its integration into a global economy. The burgeoning of capitalism includes upscale clothing stores, Internet cafes, and that most recognized symbol of economic connection with the West—McDonalds.

Remnants of Ukraine’s recent totalitarian past, however, remain. One tangible testament to this is a statue of Lenin still standing in the center of the city of Kharkiv—a symbolic reminder of the Soviet legacy that continues to haunt Ukraine’s struggle toward economic reform and democracy. This legacy will no doubt continue to color Ukraine’s path and influence its progress for many years to come.

Background

Like most former Soviet republics, since 1991 Ukraine has experienced a formidable proliferation of crime and corruption, along with its independence. Failed reform efforts, worsened by weaknesses in the Ukrainian infrastructure, have resulted in an environment that has created numerous lucrative opportunities for criminals. The economic restructuring taking place during Ukraine’s attempts to transition from a centralized state economy to a privatized economy have unleashed a multitude of problems. In fact, it can be argued that the explosion of crime and corruption in Ukraine’s postSoviet years was a kind of manifest destiny—a foregone conclusion given the peculiar character of the insulated system that was being opened to the outside world.

Ukraine’s reforms have been mostly based on Western models of democracy and on ideas for a market-based economy. One critical impediment to the reform process has been the fact that many of the Ukrainian “reformers” belonged to the power base of the former communist era. Predictably, very few of these old nomenklatura have been much interested in playing an active role in implementing the political and economic changes that are truly needed. These retrogrades have been largely successful in retaining power and influence, and as a consequence, have helped to establish a powerful and entrenched opposition to democratic reform (Foglesong and Solomon 2001).

One reaction of ordinary Ukrainians to this reality is a feeling of disillusionment. For example, one member of our U.S. delegation visiting Ukraine in 1998 to begin to lay the groundwork for the U.S.-Ukrainian research partnership was a relatively young Ukrainian, now living and working in Washington. A former prosecutor, he had been instrumental in convincing U.S. officials to support and fund the partnership. His hopes and enthusiasm were, however, practically dashed in our meetings in Kiev and Kharkiv. He observed that the officials with whom we were meeting were the same “old Soviet types” with whom he had been all too familiar in the past. He feared that they would only be interested in what they could get for themselves and their cronies, and that a power grab and control by them would effectively squelch attempts to achieve the results we desired. His fears were certainly not groundless, but the results reported here in part demonstrate considerable success in overcoming these obstacles.

Economic restructuring in Ukraine has served particularly to create new opportunities and avenues for organized crime groups— many of which had already been bubbling just below the surface in the USSR. As noted by one of the Ukrainian contributors here, organized crime and corruption in Ukraine today are simply part of the aftermath of the overwhelming economic, cultural, and political changes that occurred during Ukraine’s transition to being a newly independent state.

For the average Ukrainian, the ramifications of Ukraine’s economic troubles have been devastating. Unofficial estimates have placed the number of unemployed at close to 3.5 million. As a result, many Ukrainians have turned to both licit and illicit “shadow” activities for their sustenance (Foglesong and Solomon 2001).

The symbiosis among government, business, and organized crime effectively guaranteed that crime and corruption had fertile breeding ground. Indeed, the resulting political–criminal nexus remains a major destabilizing factor in Ukraine’s economic and political development and reform efforts.

Why the U.S. Interest in Ukraine?

It was, in part, for exactly the reasons outlined above that during the early 1990s Ukraine became one of the primary recipients of foreign assistance from the United States. A stable and independent Ukraine was determined to be in the U.S. national interest. A country of some 50 million people, with a well-educated population, Ukraine was regarded as a useful buffer with respect to U.S. relations with Russia. In addition, it was home to some 5-6,000 scientists who had worked on weapons of mass destruction—scientists who were now unemployed or underemployed. Concerns about transnational organized crime were, therefore, well founded.

While viewed as an important ally in dealing with post-Cold War problems, because Ukraine’s crime and corruption situation was increasingly seen as an impediment to economic transition and to achieving a more democratic way of life, a better understanding of the nature and magnitude of the problems, and of possible solutions, was deemed critical. Thus it was that in 1998, as part of a larger U.S. law enforcement assistance effort in Ukraine, the idea for a research partnership between criminologists and legal scholars in the two countries was born.

The nine chapters contained herein are the products of this unique partnership between the National Institute of Justice and its counterpart in Ukraine—the Ukrainian Academy of Law Sciences. Freedom Support Act (FSA) funds were provided for the project from the U.S. State Department. These FSA funds had been explicitly intended to support U.S. assistance to the Newly Independent States and to Eastern Europe. Based on mutually agreed upon needs and priorities, the goal of the U.S.-Ukraine research partnership was to advance knowledge related to transnational organized crime and corruption. Thus, on the most practical level, this partnership was seen as assisting Ukraine in combating its own crime problems before they spilled over its borders and ultimately into the United States.

The chapters that follow, taken together, provide a singularly unique look into the current crime situation in Ukraine, and into the potential global threat presented by Ukrainian organized crime. The topics include trafficking in women—who in their desperation for work and a better life are putting themselves in vulnerable situations as they seek employment abroad; the transnational implications of Ukraine’s increasing emergence as a transit country for drug trafficking; and the general problems of organized crime and corruption and the criminal ramifications of a weak economy. The themes of organized crime and corruption are indeed a familiar thread that runs throughout these chapters. Unfortunately, they will likely continue to be impediments to Ukraine’s long-term economic health and development for the foreseeable future.

The Realities of Cross-National Research

In November of 1999, the research team and project administrators from the United States (jet-lagged, cold, and suffering from the inevitable culture shock) met with their Ukrainian counterparts for the first time in Kiev to kick off the project. The sense of the hurdles that lay ahead was palpable. The previously described realities of crime in post-Soviet Ukraine, when coupled with our divergent research approaches and the considerable communication problems that included both language and technology, presented an enormous challenge. This is exemplified in a comment made at the time by a Ukrainian researcher, who, in explaining Ukraine’s increasing problems with computer crime, stated that among those charged with investigating such crime, many had never seen a computer!

Although the endeavor we were about to undertake seemed overwhelming, there was also a visceral excitement at that first meeting. We were all intrigued by the notion of engaging in a wholly new research experiment and were anxious to get started. Looking back now, both the Americans and the Ukrainians would surely conclude that the risks taken were worth the payoffs.

As with any effort of this kind, visionary beginnings sometimes (often) lead to disappointments along the way. This is especially inevitable when one realizes that the challenges and difficulties normally inherent in carrying out research in the United States are going to be multiplied by working within another culture. Many of the hurdles could not have been predicted, and over the course of the project, most of the researchers, most of the time, were amenable to a “learn and adapt as you go” approach. This project demonstrated anew that comparative, cross-national research is not for the purist, nor the faint at heart.

It quickly became apparent that it would be important for program administrators not to try to dictate rigid parameters at the outset. As the joint research teams were being formed, the individual relationships among the American and Ukrainian members of the teams had to evolve on their own, as each member determined his or her individual comfort level and degree of collaboration.

Language was one of the most obvious challenges throughout the life of the project. None of the Americans spoke Ukrainian, although several had a passable knowledge of Russian. Only a few of the Ukrainians spoke any English. Thus, nearly all communication between the researchers required working through Ukrainian interpreters and utilizing written translations. As one U.S. researcher reminisced about his first meeting with his new partners—with a Ukrainian graduate student serving as interpreter— he wondered if he was communicating anything substantive at all to his new colleagues, let alone reaching a consensus on a joint plan for the research. In addition, even when the quality of translation was excellent, many nuances and much of the conversational “jargon” were lost in the differences between English and Ukrainian. For example, the word “policy” when translated into Ukrainian did not seem to mean what Americans thought they were communicating. There were other differences in definition, even more relevant to the research, such as in the different understandings of what is organized crime.

Cultural and social differences dissipated somewhat as the participants became more comfortable with one another and discovered they had much in common. Sometimes, however, cultural differences would catch one or the other sides off-guard, making a good sense of humor an important element for success. This was especially so in face-to-face meetings and social events, when there were occasions where the more patriarchal tendencies in Ukraine met with the more “politically correct” dispositions of the Americans. For example, the regular Ukrainian toasts to all the “beautiful women” were tolerated by some of the female researchers who chalked them up as charming old-fashioned chivalry. On the other hand, a repeatedly stated belief that the real reason trafficking in Ukrainian women was a problem was because it was draining the national gene pool of Ukraine’s better-looking women was a little more difficult for U.S. researchers to swallow!

A pragmatic manifestation of the social and cultural divides between the research sides was in their general orientation and approach to the social sciences. Criminology is not a recognized social science in most countries outside North America and Western Europe, and such is the case in Ukraine. There are no Ukrainian criminologists as such, and, in fact, during the decades of Soviet rule, empirical research, or “reality testing” as it was called, was generally viewed by the state to be more threatening than useful. Party dogma explained crime as being a remnant of the bourgeois capitalistic order, and foreign to the socialist structure. Thus, even as late as the 1960s no one could publish anything to the contrary (Foglesong and Solomon 2001).

This tradition of secrecy played out in different ways with respect to issues of data collection in the post-Soviet period. For example, according to Yuri Voronin, a Russian legal scholar and expert advisor to the NIJ project, in Russia, crime data and police statistics are the products not of a neutral fact-finding process, but instead are viewed as simple record keeping for the benefit of police. The police, Voronin says, typically record only two out of every five reported crimes.

Divergent methodological approaches between the U.S. and Ukrainian teams also materialized with respect to the issue of human subjects. The notion that human subjects involved in research must be protected is still a relatively uncommon idea in Ukraine. Because interviews are frequently used in U.S. research, and because social scientists in the United States must operate under tight rules when conducting research involving human subjects, much attention is paid not only to how interviews are conducted, but also to protecting and insuring their confidentiality. Consequently, some of the U.S. researchers were very troubled about the treatment of interviewees in Ukraine when they realized that not disclosing names was not a traditional requirement among their Ukrainian colleagues.

Other Components of the Partnership

In addition to the collaborative research projects whose reports comprise this volume, there were two other aspects of the larger NIJ/UALS partnership that warrant mention and acknowledgment. Part of the original vision for the cross-cultural endeavor was not only to overcome traditional boundaries between the research disciplines, but also the conceptual boundary between international technical assistance and the unique nature of local crime problems in Ukraine. An evaluation of U.S.-delivered law enforcement training in Ukraine seemed a natural essential, and was thus worked into the project.

In post-Soviet Ukraine, U.S. law enforcement activities and investments were considered to be an important part of the larger U.S. effort to promote Ukraine’s democratic transition. Since 1995, sponsored by the U.S. State Department, agencies from the Departments of Justice and Treasury have expended millions of dollars on professional exchanges and training programs in Ukraine. For example, in 1999 alone, law enforcement training and technical assistance programs in Ukraine cost the United States almost $4 million (Kenney and Reuland 2001). An evaluation of this effort, with all the rigor possible, was strongly desired by the State Department.

Our Ukrainian partners, interestingly, objected to calling the focus of this assessment “law enforcement training.” They preferred the term “experience exchange.” That terminology reflects the initial notions that many Ukrainians held of our international law enforcement training programs. They insisted that the trainer-trainee relationship needed to be both more dynamic and more equal, that the United States alone should not determine the content of training curricula, and, further, that the U.S. effort should recognize that Ukraine had sophisticated law enforcement training and education programs of its own.

A key lesson learned from the assessment was that if U.S. trainers are to be effective, they must have an appreciation for the local legal culture and traditions. And they should determine at the outset upon what existing foundation and framework their reform efforts can and should best be built. While these may seem like commonsense notions, the assessment reinforced the paramount notion that outsiders undertaking reforms should know the indigenous system’s strengths and values. Otherwise, the intended reforms are without teeth, will be considered irrelevant by the intended audience, and will thus not be implemented.

Perhaps the most immediate and tangible contribution of the partnership was the third and final component—a communication platform that established Internet connectivity within the Ukrainian criminal justice community. This was largely a technical assistance and developmental effort to bridge the information and communication barriers inherent not only to this project, but also between Ukraine and the rest of the world. In the span of just three years, web sites and electronic publishing capabilities were developed for the Supreme Court of Ukraine, the Ministry of Interior, the State Security Service of Ukraine (the former KGB), the Interagency Research Center on Combating Organized Crime, and the Ukrainian Academy of Law Sciences. In the short term, this provided the project participants with a communication channel to carry out their research. In the long term, there was increased transparency as well as enhancement of the ability to communicate among Ukrainian government agencies, research institutions, and the public. The most telling example of how this effort made inroads toward government transparency was the establishment of a public website by the State Security Service of Ukraine. Who could have imagined the former Soviet KGB with an English-language website accessible to the outside world?

Reflections

The partnership culminated in two final conferences, one hosted in Ukraine in January 2002, and one in Washington in May 2002. In addition to formal presentations and the sharing of final results, celebrations and informal gatherings took place as well. These were important and meaningful to all the participants, as they realized that the partnerships and even friendships that had grown over ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• 1. Introduction: A U.S.-Ukrainian Research Partnership against Crime
• 2. The Prediction and Control of Organized Crime: A Risk Assessment Instrument for Targeting Law Enforcement Efforts
• 3. Trafficking in Women and Children for Purposes of Sexual Exploitation: The Criminological Aspect
• 4. Ukraine, International Money Laundering, and the Investigation of Organized Crime
• 5. The Transnational Political Criminal Nexus of Trafficking in Women from Ukraine
• 6. Organized Economic Crime and Corruption in Ukraine: The Problem of Countermeasures
• 7. The Growing Importance of Ukraine as a Transit Country for Heroin Trafficking: U.S.-Ukraine Research Partnership
• 8. The Dualism of Business Victimization and Organized Crime
• 9. Organized Crime in Ukraine: Challenge and Response
• 10. A Behavioral Model for Ukrainian Organized Crime Groups
• About the Contributors
• Index