Voluntary Associations

John W. Chapman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138540347
• eBook ISBN: 9781351299787
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

A vast and complicated array of subject matter is subjected to analysis, comment, and speculation by fifteen contributors representing three separate but contiguous disciplines. Their approaches are as various as one would expect. One is concerned with the bonds that hold associations together, and another with the tendency for the private to become public. One sees associations as interferences with democratic political processes, while another is more impressed by their positive values. Still another shows that the way in which they operate in the political process depends not only on the kind of association but also upon the political context within which they operate.

Pennock and Chapman say that the theorist's job is to speculate and to interpret the facts as he sees them. It is also the theorist's job to suggest hypotheses for testing: to point to lines of inquiry that should be pursued. One cannot read the essays in this volume, without having his eyes opened--or opened wider--both to the paucity of information about the political features of voluntary associations and to the wide variety of aspects from which the subject needs to be approached.

The kinds of questions that need to be examined can be grouped in categories. The first focuses on the individual: What kinds of memberships does he have? Even more, what is the effect upon him of membership in each kind of association? The second examines internal composition and workings of organizations. The third focuses on the state as a whole and the effect of organized groups upon it, the political processes of the associational structure of the society, and modes of behavior of these associations.

Organized groups play an intermediate role in the polity. At the same time, the state, and those charged at any particular time with the performance of its functions, must look primarily to new associations within it to secure compliance with its law and for guidance in shaping those laws.

PLURALISM IN PRACTICE

10

THE PUBLIC VALUES OF THE PRIVATE ASSOCIATION

GRANT McCONNELL

For a rather long time now, at least since the end of World War II, we have seen the rise and consolidation in a position of dominance of a body of doctrine which exalts the private association as an essential feature of American democracy, perhaps of any genuine democracy. The orthodoxy of which this particular enthusiasm is a part has come to be labeled pluralism, but in a number of respects it is markedly different from the liberal doctrine across the Atlantic for which this term was originally invented. To speak of this contemporary and native doctrine is difficult in that it lacks the well-elaborated and authoritative texts that distinguished its earlier European namesake. Today, the word “pluralism” has entered popular discourse and is open to a variety of interpretations, each with its own claims to authenticity. Moreover, the private association stands with several other forms of organization, notably, federalism and the small geographical community, in a position of favor under this doctrine. A full analysis necessarily would have to deal with these other forms. Indeed, the critical issue involved is probably the size of the constituent unit, whether formed on a functional, a geographic, or other basis.

In the present context it is not possible to offer either a definition of the general orthodoxy or to examine its foundations in the belief in the value of small constituent units.¹ What I wish to do in this paper, accordingly, is to look at the list of virtues attributed to the private association and then to ask what are the public values that ought reasonably to be expected from it. The answer to this question is, I believe, somewhat divergent from the list of attributed virtues.

What then are the claims which have been made on behalf of the private association? The list is formidable when taken as a whole, although few of the partisans of the private association give each item equal emphasis or, indeed, name all of them. Perhaps the most generalized (and the least explicit) is that private associations are pervasive in the American system and play significant parts in its operation. The evidence in support of this is everywhere to be seen. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the pervasiveness of the private association in our common life is ever stated with sufficient emphasis. Increasingly, however, there seems to be a tendency deriving from the strong mood of national self-congratulation which has been upon us for a number of years to conclude that since this is a highly successful democracy, all its important features are excellent and praiseworthy. Because the private associations of the nation are recognized as important in the system, they are among the objects to be hailed. Perhaps this statement is unfair, but it is difficult otherwise to account for the large number of apologies for virtually all kinds of associations.

Among the more specific parts of the case that is usually made out today for the value of the private association is that it is a major barrier to the rise of totalitarian mass movements. Since the private associations are exceedingly numerous, a conquest of power by any would-be totalitarian movement would be exceedingly difficult, each association having to be surmounted in turn. Moreover, since these associations provide the qualities of life sought by men otherwise inclined to follow mass movements, mass movements do not have the fertile conditions of growth which they need where many private associations exist. This line of argument has been elaborated at considerable length by various authors and, given the still vivid memories of the Nazi and Stalin eras, has been very persuasive. American experience with McCarthyism and other native aberrations have helped to sharpen attentiveness to the discussion.

More positively and much more lyrically, there is the argument that the private association provides fellowship. It is impossible in a few sentences to do justice to either the range of virtues which are implied here or to the eloquence with which the argument is frequently made. The private association thus is held to offer a setting of natural contact between human beings, one in which cooperation, respect, and sometimes even intimacy in place of a separate, empty, and contentious pattern of existence within a large and unstructured world. Within the voluntary association the meaning of work unfolds and life itself is rich. Here are the virtues which once were the daily experience of those living in a simpler, smaller, and more comprehensible pattern of rural life, one in which rationality in human relationships prevails.

Plainly, much more than politics is involved in this vision. It is hardly less than a particular conception of the good life. Yet, politics is involved. The prescription is for a society of small fellowships which shall be beyond the reach of a large, central, and overweening state power. It implies that the virtues sought are to be had by the forms of organization prescribed.

Closely related to the other arguments, but at least in part a different argument is the promise of order and stability offered by an array of associations. In what would otherwise be a condition of rulelessness save what is given by the impersonal, hostile, and commanding laws of the general society, the private associations build norms and patterns of behavior which are those naturally chosen by the members themselves and to which they gladly give obedience, since these are no more than the commands that a man gives himself. Moreover, the associations give form and shape to the relationships among men and, again, do so naturally. In the process society is made orderly and stable.

Next, the existence of many private associations and the retention in their hands of the capacity to make decisions over the matters of their respective concerns divide power. This is one of the fundamental specific guarantees against the tyranny of a centralized state. It lays checks on rulers and ensures that their capacities for evil are small. Moreover, it offers nuclei of resistance whenever one party retains rule in the general society for too long a time.

Whether as another argument or as a restatement of what has been said already, there is the contention that the private association—when of course, it has genuinely vital functions—gives the means of self-government. In the association the individual is able to participate meaningfully in the decisions which affect him. Here his voice may be heard and have effect. Here he is no cipher, but a man engaged in ruling himself. In this small community of which (by definition) he is voluntarily a member the town meeting ideal may be achieved and, consequently, the highest kind of democracy.

As a consequence of all these considerations liberty itself is best served where a multitude of associations exist. Not only is the individual under such conditions unthreatened by mass movements and totalitarianism, he has the positive values of fellowship and meaning in his life without which liberty is a negative and empty thing. Moreover, by this condition he has the opportunity to rule himself and so, again, is free.

To this imposing array of arguments there should be added one that is usually only hinted at—that through the interplay and mutual checking of associations, a balancing and proportioning occurs that yields a natural, if not indeed a beneficent, result. It is natural in that it is free of the conscious choices of rulers, with all the implications of arbitrariness that these imply.

Although the case is long—it could well have been extended to greater length than it has here—it seems generally coherent, with most of its particulars merging into and supporting each other. Moreover, it is a very appealing and attractive doctrine, combining as it does concern for liberty and security with a general implication that the outlines of the political order are right and sound. If it is strongly conservative, it is on the whole reassuring. Despite this manifest charm, however, I believe that the doctrine is a mixture of divergent arguments and that in general tenor it is misleading. Although it is not possible here to explore all the various questions posed by the arguments I have sketched, I do wish to suggest where some serious questions lie.

Probably the first argument, that private associations are barriers to mass movements and totalitarianism, has merit. Although the case is not without some uncertainties, studies of the Nazi experience suggest that the destruction or absorption of the private associations of Germany was an important part of the totalitarian development in the 1930’s. Whether vital private associations will always offer adequate resistance to such pathological mass movements may be open to doubt. Nevertheless, it should be sufficient to say in the favor of private associations that they are barriers to totalitarianism in some degree. The only significant question is whether mass movements that might lead to establishment of a totalitarian regime are in reality a serious danger to the nation. If the answer to this question is affirmative, probably other questions dwindle in importance and any reservations on the worth of the private associations should be suppressed. If, on the other hand, the answer is negative, the remaining questions should be confronted.

Concerning the second argument, that private associations provide fellowship and meaning for life and work, there would seem to be reasons for hoping for such benefits. Again, however, this is in no small part a matter for empirical study. Do the associations in point of fact provide these boons? Perhaps it is superfluous to ask this question in a land that in one summer has seen the Shriners meet in San Francisco, the American Institute of Architects in Denver, the National Housewares Manufacturing Association in Chicago, and the Lions in New York. Busy as the bars may have been in these cities during this time, however, it somehow seems questionable whether the fellowship or the shop talk has quite lived up to the lyricism which has been lavished on the quality of the private association in the abstract. The data on attendance at trade union meetings, on the spontaneity of the meetings of farm organizations, and on the enthusiasm of the memberships of most corporation “families” should at least raise the question to what degree private associations do confer these blessings.

Insofar as the benefit of dividing power is concerned, the issue is quite clear in one respect. The private associations have most certainly divided power that might by one alternative be centralized. On the whole it is quite true that, in the United States at least, affairs relating to barbering are in the hands of barbers, those of plumbing in the hands of plumbers, those of medicine in the hands of doctors, those of steel in the hands of steelmen, and so on. Not even the President of the United States can casually set about a reordering of these affairs; when he attempts it he can look forward to only infrequent and limited success. By the same token, however, power regarding these various affairs can be highly concentrated area by area. This form of concentration of power is rarely looked for, the obsessive fear instead being that of the centralized regime. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the evidence is both plain and abundant that this other form of centralization is common.

The merit of self-government as a quality of private associations is in one sense also self-evident. If the private associations are autonomous and rule themselves, it seems beyond question that they engage in self-government. And in point of fact, they do establish rules which some of them at least term “laws” and enforce with penalties occasionally of some severity through a machinery at least analogous to government as we commonly conceive it. To say only this, however, is insufficient. We do not consider that when we have discovered that a given nation of the world is self-governing we have learned a great deal. The more important question is how that self is governed. Such a question is apropos with the self-government of private associations. Only on an assumption that the myth of unanimity of belief and interest within each association is founded on fact is it justifiable to ignore such a question. In actuality this is never the case. And when the pattern of governance within some of the most important associations is examined, the conclusion emerges that, by the standards of constitutional limitations which prevail within this and most other Western democracies at least, these governments frequently leave much to be desired. If they are to be admired, the standards are rarely made explicit.

Perhaps the most important claim made on behalf of the private association is that it is a bulwark of liberty. As already observed, this has merit to some degree at least when the threat to liberty comes or is feared from a centralized state. As the last question posed suggests, however, liberty may be threatened from other sources. The question which must be asked then is how well is liberty—the liberty of the individual—protected within these associations? There has been a great reluctance to ask this; indeed, it is commonly regarded as a hostile question. The reasons for this outlook are to be found, once more, in the myth of unanimity of interest and belief which is so widely believed, and in the assumption that the private associations are voluntary. The essential part of the latter assumption is that membership, the decision to join or not to join and the decision to remain a member or to depart, is freely open to the individual. If this freedom exists, the issue of liberty within the association is generally unimportant. If this freedom does not exist, however, or if it may be exercised only under serious penalty, the issue of liberty within the association (like the issue of government within the association) deserves serious attention. Although there are important differences among associations, membership in some important associations is not voluntary in the sense indicated and the penalties for withdrawal (as from some trade unions and professional associations) are serious indeed.

If the question about liberty within the private association is legitimate, then, what is the sort of answer to be expected? Certainly the answer can never be as simple as the question itself appears to be. In the first place, there is a multitude of associations and we should expect to find that much diversity exists. Any empirical investigation confirms this expectation. In the second place, the meaning of liberty is susceptible to many interpretations. Certainly the reification of the private association as a hard coherent entity itself obscures the problem of liberty within the association. Such reification, a very common one, attributes distinctly human characteristics to organization and finds moral personality in the collectivity. If this mannerism of thinking is avoided, however, some rather concrete phenomena become visible. The most important of these is that in a substantial number of our most important associations the protections for the liberties of individuals which we esteem in constitutional forms of public government are lacking: a bill of rights, a system of law founded on regularly prescribed procedures, an impartial pattern of justice and a system of checks on leadership power. Although this condition is not everywhere pervasive to the same degree in the private associations, it is sufficiently frequent to suggest that there is a common reason for this recurrent reality. I have argued elsewhere that this lies in the theory of absolute democracy found in the private associations and which in turn is based upon the peculiar traits of these associations, particularly homogeneity.² Whether this is correct or not, however, the facts of too many private associations do not bear out the promise of guarantees for individual liberty in this respect.

To this point, then, the conclusion is that the arguments on which enthusiasm for the private association are based are in substantial part mistaken. The fear of that dire evil, totalitarianism, is too vivid for contemporary reality. The expectations of fellowship to be derived from most real-life associations are much too high. And, most important, individual liberty has often not fared well at the hands of the associations themselves.

It will have been noticed, however, that so far no comment has been made about the claims that private associations contribute to order and stability. On this score, the claims for the private association are, I believe, quite valid. Indeed, they are quite probably understated and underestimated. The private association has been one of the major devices by which men have been organized in modern society and brought under the discipline without which political and social life might have been much more labile and uncertain. In serving this function, the private association has conferred benefits of a fundamental nature, those without some measure of which political society can hardly be expected to continue. They are benefits which in other times and other places have been achieved by other means, through the rigid structuring of classes, by the application of military force, and so on. The private association in our own society does not, indeed, deserve more than a portion of the credit for the order and stability which we enjoy; a respect for law, federalism, and a strong tradition of geographical decentralization have been more important and, of course, we do maintain police forces. Nevertheless, the private association has played a major role in this respect.

The record of contribution is in point of fact very substantial. Although it...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• THE NATURE OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
• HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
• PLURALISM IN PRACTICE
• Epilogue