Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self

Constantine Sedikides, Marilynn B. Brewer, Constantine Sedikides, Marilynn B. Brewer

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780863776878
• eBook ISBN: 9781317710264
• Topic: Psicologia
• Subtopic: Storia e teoria della psicologia

This edited volume addresses key issues relating to the concept of self, an increasingly researched area of social psychology. The self-concept consists of three fundamental self-representations: the individual self, the relational self, and the collective self. That is, people seek to achieve self-definition and self-interpretation (i.e. identity) in three fundamental ways: in terms of their personal traits, in terms of dyadic relationships, and in terms of group membership. Contributions from leading international researchers examine the interrelations among three self-representations. A concluding commentary identifies running themes, synthesizes the extant literature, and points to future research directions.

1
Individual Self, Relational Self, and Collective Self

Partners, Opponents, or Strangers?

CONSTANTINE SEDIKIDES
MARILYNN B. BREWER

 

 

This volume is based on the premise that the self-concept consists of three fundamental self-representations: the individual self, the relational self, and the collective self. Stated otherwise, persons seek to achieve self-definition and self-interpretation (i.e., identity) in three fundamental ways: (a) in terms of their unique traits, (b) in terms of dyadic relationships, and (c) in terms of group membership (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).

The individual self is achieved by differentiating from others (i.e., the individual self contains those aspects of the self-concept that differentiate the person from other persons as a unique constellation of traits and characteristics that distinguishes the individual within his or her social context). This form of self-representation relies on interpersonal comparison processes and is associated with the motive of protecting or enhancing the person psychologically (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; see also Markus, 1977; Sedikides, 1993).

The relational self is achieved by assimilating with significant others (i.e., the relational self contains those aspects of the self-concept that are shared with relationship partners and define the person’s role or position within significant relationships). The relational self is based on personalized bonds of attachment. Such bonds include parent-child relationships, friendships, and romantic relationships as well as specific role relationships such as teacher-student or clinician-client. This form of self-representation relies on the process of reflected appraisal and is associated with the motive of protecting or enhancing the significant other and maintaining the relationship itself (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; see also Hazan & Shaver, 1994; Reis & Shaver, 1988).

The collective self is achieved by inclusion in large social groups and contrasting the group to which one belongs (i.e., the in-group) with relevant out-groups. That is, the collective self contains those aspects of the self-concept that differentiate in-group members from members of relevant out-groups. The collective self is based on impersonal bonds to others derived from common (and oftentimes symbolic) identification with a group. These bonds do not require close personal relationships among group members. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wethereil (1987) defined succinctly the collective self as a “shift towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of self as a unique person” (p. 50). The collective self relies on intergroup comparison processes and is associated with the motive of protecting or enhancing the in-group (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).

We assume that these three self-representations coexist within the same individual. We also assume that all three self-representations are social (Simon, 1997). There is considerably less agreement, however, about the nature of the interrelations among the three self-representations. Are the individual, the relational, and the collective self close partners, bitter opponents, or indifferent acquaintances? This is the fundamental question that the contributors to this edited volume were asked to address in their respective chapters.

The overall emphasis of the volume is on exploring and delineating the possible interactive relations among the three self-representations. This objective was approached from several angles. One approach involves focusing on one self-representation as primary (i.e., arguing for the structural, functional, affective, motivational, or behavioral predominance of one type of self as a basis for self-definition) and then discussing how this self-representation gives rise to or underlies the other two. A second way to explore the interplay among the three self-representations is to argue that the three self-representations are equally important or primary as separate aspects of the self. This approach involves specifying the determinants of activation of each self as well as the circumstances under which one self takes precedence over another in guiding self-definition. From this perspective, the three self-representations can be conceived as complementary, adversarial (mutually exclusive), or functionally independent.

A third approach to the issue of interaction among the self representations is some type of synthesis in which the various self-representations are integrated into a single model of the self-concept.

The contents of this volume make use of all three approaches to the question of the interrelationships among the individual, relational, and collective selves. The chapters in part I explore the three self-representations from the vantage point of the individual self. Sedikides and Gaertner argue that the individual self is primary on two grounds: emotional and motiva-tional. Klein argues for the memorial primacy of the individual self based on laboratory and clinical evidence, whereas Higgins and May advocate the regulatory primacy of the individual self. By contrast, the contributors to part II view the interrelations of the three self-representations from the vantage of the relational or collective self. Tice and Baumeister muster evidence for the importance of the interpersonal self and the need to belong, whereas Hogg catalogs the sovereignty of the collective self in everyday life. Aron and McLaughlin-Volpe, as well as Smith, Coates, and Murphy, specify psychological processes by which the relational and collective self become primary or subsume the individual self.

Part III adopts an interactional perspective based on the premise that the three self-representations are equally important in the achievement of self-definition. Four chapters specify the contextual conditions (e.g., numerical or social status of the group; Onorato & Turner; Spears; Simon & Kampmeier) and the psychological conditions (i.e., cognitive, motivational, or affective states; Brewer & Roccas; Simon & Kampmeier) that determine complementary, adversarial, or interactive relations among the three types of selves.

The final section of the volume, part IV, presents several different inte-grative models. Four chapters (by Caporael; Triandis & Trafimow; Kashima, Kashima, & Aldridge; Deaux & Perkins) offer conceptual models on how the three self-representations can function as a unified psychological system. Finally, a commentary by Prentice identifies running themes, synthesizes the literature, and points to future research directions.

The multiplicity of self-representations recently has become an important issue in social and personality psychology. Relevant journal articles appear on a monthly basis, and symposia dedicated to the topic abound at international conferences. While multiple perspectives on the self proliferate, it is relatively rare that theorists from different perspectives are asked to confront competing views of the nature of the social self and to consider the implications of their own position for a more unified theory of the structure and function of the self-concept. Contributors to this volume were asked to do just that, and we believe they each have taken on the task admirably. The result, we hope, has been to push the envelope of theory development a bit further by clarifying competing positions and suggesting some bases for reconciliation. No “final answers” are proposed or implied, but the collective effort should advance theory and stimulate new research in this vital area at the interface of personality and social psychology.

REFERENCES

Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this “we”? Levels of collective identity and self representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 83–93.

Hazan, C., & Shaver, P. R. (1994). Attachment as an organizational framework for research on close relationships. Psychological Inquiry, 5, 1–22.

Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63–78.

Reis, H. T., & Shaver, P. (1988). Intimacy as an interpersonal process. In S. Duck (Ed.), Handbook of personal relationships: Theory, research, and interventions (1st ed., pp. 367–389). Chichester, England: Wiley.

Sedikides, C. (1993). Assessment, enhancement, and verification determinants of the self-evaluation process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 317–338.

Simon, B. (1997). Self and group in modern society: Ten theses on the individual self and the collective self. In R. Spears, P. J. Oakes, N. Ellemers, & S. A. Haslam (Eds.), The social psychology of stereotyping and group life (pp. 318–335). Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M., Oakes, P., Reicher, S., & Wethereil, M. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Part I
THE INDIVIDUAL SELF AS BASIS FOR SELF-DEFINITION

2
A Homecoming to the Individual Self

Emotional and Motivational Primacy

CONSTANTINE SEDIKIDES
LOWELL GAERTNER

This edited volume pays tribute to the multidimensionality of the self, and rightfully so. In light of the rise of compelling research on the relational, collective, and contextual self, the traditional way of equating the self with the individual self does not seem to hold up anymore.

Nevertheless, as much as the authors of this volume are friendly to revisionism and change, there is something to be said about being tradi-tional—not for the sake of comfort and validation, but rather as a means of revisiting and reexamining time-honored constructs with an eye toward eventual integration. Apparently, the current authors can be revisionists, traditionalists, and idealists—all at the same time!

Why, then, should we host a homecoming to the individual self? Let us clarify from the outset that our intention is not to offer a diatribe in exalting the virtues of the individual self. Rather, our intent is to provide a rationale, a justification better yet, for why the individual self deserves to be at the cornerstone of social psychological approaches to the self.

We will begin by justifying the central place of the individual self based on recent empirical evidence generated in our laboratory and in laborato-ries of several colleagues. Our justification will continue with a more gen-eral discussion of issues pertaining to the individual self. We will conclude with an attempt at synthesis.

THESES THAT WE DO NOT ADVOCATE

Before we begin, however, we would like to articulate the theses that we definitely do not advocate. Our proposal is not a restatement of self-interest theory; that is, we do not equate the individual self with material self-interest, a notion derived from the homo-economicus model of human behavior (Miller, 1999). Furthermore, we do not equate the individual self with egocentrism, selfishness, arrogance, and disregard for others, although the individual self can give rise to such phenomena (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998). More generally, we do not argue that having an individual self is necessarily an asset; in fact, it is because of the individual self that such uncomfortable, if not painful, states as guilt, shame, embarrassment, existential anxiety, loneli-ness, and alienation are experienced (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1997; Rosenberg, 1988; Tangney, Burggraf, & Wagner, 1995). Last but not least, we do not advocate that the individual self is asocial or that it exists in a social or cultural vacuum. Indeed, we wholeheartedly accept the notion that humans are fundamentally social (Kashima, Kashima, & Aldridge, chap. 15, this volume; Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998; Stryker & Statham, 1985).

The issue, then, is about balance and relative importance. It is about experiencing the individual self and what this experience means to humans. It is about the degree to which the individual self is subjectively valued, and about the ways in which a threat to this type of self—oftentimes felt as a treasured possession—is handled psychologically.

Of course, our aim is not to review the voluminous literature on protec-tion of the individual self. Instead, we will engage in comparative contrasts that are rather scarce in our field. The main comparative contrast is between two self-representations, the individual self and the collective self (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Trafimow, Silverman, Fan, & Law, 1997; Trafimow & Smith, 1998; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991).

The questions that we ask are: Is the individual self valued and thus protected more forcefully than the collective self? Or, is it that the indi-vidual self and collective self are equally valued and hence protected psy-chologically, with contextual changes determining momentary shifts toward protecting one self more forcefully than another? Is the individual self emotionally and motivationally primary?

Granted, primacy can be a slippery construct, especially when it comes to operationalization and measurement. In our research, we adopted the following well-established principle in assessing emotional and motivational primacy: Threatening feedback will be experienced more negatively and will be reacted to more intensely when the feedback pertains to the more primary self (K. W. Campbell & Sedikides, 1999).

EMOTIONAL PRIMACY OF THE INDIVIDUAL SELF

Does unfavorable feedback hurt more when it is directed to the individual as opposed to the collective self? Do participants feel worse when they are told bad news about the individual self rather than the collective self? Alternatively, do participants feel equally bad regardless of whether the threat is targeted at the individual self or the collective self?

The Ebb and Flow of the Berkeley Personality Inventory

We addressed the above questions empirically (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999, Experiment 1). We operationalized the collective self in terms of “University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) women.” We rendered cognitively accessible both the individual self and the collective self by repeatedly priming participants with their simultaneous status as unique individuals and members of the group, UNC-CH women. We mentioned to participants that the experiment was conducted by the Department of Psychology, allegedly on behalf of the Office of Student Affairs (OSA). Each participant would need to take a computerized version of the Berkeley Personality Inventory (BPI), which was described as a reliable and valid instrument.

We had established, through pilot testing, that our population considered “moody” to be the most negative group-typical trait. In the first part of the BPI, female undergraduates complete...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• About the Editors
• Contributors
• 1 Individual Self, Relational Self, and Collective Self
• Part I The Individual Self as Basis for Self-Definition
• Part II The Relational and Collective Selves as Bases for Self-Definition
• Part III Interactional Perspectives on the Individual, Relational, and Collective Self
• Part IV Integrative Models
• Index