Critical Approaches to Science and Philosophy

Mario Bunge

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138521568
• eBook ISBN: 9781351313063
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Modern Philosophy

This collection of essays, written on four continents by scientists, philosophers and humanists, was initially presented to Karl R. Popper on his sixtieth birthday as a token of critical admiration and in recognition of his work. But the volume also stands on its own as a remarkable series of statements utilizing Popper's critical vision in the study of philosophy proper, logic, mathematics, science as method and theory, and finally to the study of society and history. What is remarkable is that Popper worked in all of these areas, not in a cursory or discursive way, but with the utmost clarity and rigor.

. The core position of this volume and its contributors is that the progress of knowledge is not a linear accumulation of definitive acquisitions but a zigzagging process in which counterexamples and unfavorable evidence ruin generalizations and prompt the invention of more comprehensive and sometimes deeper generalizations, to be criticized in their turn. A critical approach to problems, procedures, and results in every field of inquiry is therefore a necessary condition for the continuance of progress.

The title of this volume then is, in a sense, an homage to Popper's critical rationalism and critical empiricism. The essays are a tribute to his unceasing and uncompromising quest, not for final certainty, but for closer truth and increased clarity. Among the contributors are outstanding figures in philosophy and the exact sciences in their own right, including Herbert Feigl, R. M. Hare, J.O. Wisdom, Nicholas Rescher, David Bohm, Paul K. Feyerabend, F. A. Hayek, and Adolf Grunbaum. Social science contributions include Hans Albert on social science and moral philosophy, W. B. Gallie, on the critical philosophy of history, Pieter Geyl on The Open Society and its Enemies, and George H. Nadel on the philosophy of History.

I

THE CRITICAL APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER 1

Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality

BY WILLIAM W. BARTLEY III

I

THE THREE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS of philosophy are the problem of knowledge, the problem of rationality, and the problem of reconciling knowledge and rationality.¹

This essay will be concerned primarily with the second problem, to which it will present a solution. I will assume as correct most of the epochmaking contributions Karl Popper has made to the first problem, that of knowledge and its growth, which has been one of his principal philosophical interests. And I will use many of his remarks which bear more or less directly on the other problems. Thus the essay is in part an application of his philosophical thought; but it is also an attempt to interpret and generalize it, and to test and illustrate its power by extending it to further fundamental problems.²

The third problem, that of conflict between knowledge and rationality, typically arises when it is found that according to one’s theory of rationality, knowledge is impossible; or that according to one’s theory of knowledge, rationality is impossible. This conflict is usually occasioned by the existence of another conflict within the theory of rationality itself, a conflict that appears when it is discovered that according to one’s theory of rationality, rationality is impossible. The problem of resolving the latter conflict I take to be the problem of rationality or of the limits of rationality.

My attempt to solve this problem will proceed in the following manner. First, in Section II, I shall indicate the kind of limitation of rationality I have in mind, specify the most important philosophical positions this limitation engenders, and summarize the claim and argument on which these positions rest. Then in Sections III and IV, I shall explain briefly why it is important to refute these positions by solving the problem, and shall outline my strategy for dealing with it. I shall proceed to consider, in Sections V-VII, the historical background behind the construction of theories of rationality, and will discuss critically two influential but unsuccessful specimen theories of rationality. In Sections VIII-X, as an historical hypothesis, I shall specify several important but unrecorded philosophical dogmas I believe are responsible for the perennial failure of theories of rationality. Finally in Sections XI and XII, I shall present an alternative theory of rationality which, freed of these dogmas, is able successfully to solve the problem of rationality and its limits.

II

There are, in the history of philosophy, a number of different senses in which rationality has been viewed as limited. On the one hand, some philosophers have maintained, as did Kant in some of his moods, that there are certain factual limitations connected with the nature of thought, or with the psychological and biological structure of the human mind. Or the limits of human reason may be thought to coincide with the limits of sense experience; or it may be argued that they coincide with the limits of science, which cannot provide answers to all questions that may be posed to it. Other philosophers have stressed certain physical conditions in nature, largely independent of man’s psyche and its limitations, which make scientific investigation exceedingly difficult if not impossible in certain areas. The existence of radiation chaos,³ or the velocity of light, might be cited as limiting our research somewhat in certain parts of the universe.

Still other limitations are said to be connected with our historical existence and with the impossibility of predicting the historical future because—among other reasons—we cannot predict the future growth of human knowledge.⁴ This limitation Popper himself has particularly stressed : we learn by refuting our present theories, by deriving predictions from them and trying to falsify those predictions; but we cannot derive or predict a refutation of these theories from these theories (provided they are consistent). Related limitations appear in physics and economics due to the existence of indeterminacy and “feedback.” Yet another limitation is connected with the necessarily selective character of description. Then there are the practical limitations of rationality such as those explored by Freud—due to human weakness, physical frailty, humanity.

In what follows, I shall not be at all concerned with any of these limitations. Rather, I shall deal with a so-called logical limitation of rationality, which is sufficient, without aid from other limitations,⁵ to perpetuate the aforementioned conflict between rationality and the theory of rationality.

The logical problem of rationality can be considered as that of defeating the two main philosophical positions that have grown from the claim that rationality is logically limited : skepticism and fideism. Paradoxically, although both positions are, I believe, inimical to philosophy, both are sheltered by similar philosophical arguments. To defeat these self-appointed guardians of the boundaries of reason it is necessary (1) to deal with a philosophical claim both make and (2) to refute the argument on which both rest their claim.

The claim is that from a rational point of view, the choice between competing beliefs and positions and ways of life, whether scientific, mathematical, moral, religious, metaphysical, political, or other, is arbitrary. In short, it is claimed to be demonstrable by rational argument that it is logically impossible to act and decide on rational grounds when it comes to such choices—even though the making of such choices in a nonarbitrary way can be considered to be the main task of rationality.

The core of the argument used by skeptics and fideists to back their claim consists in a simple analysis of what is commonly regarded as the rational way to defend ideas.⁶ The argument based on this analysis might be called the argument about the limits of rationality, the tu quoque or boomerang argument,⁷ the dilemma of ultimate commitment, the problem of ultimate presuppositions, or any number of other names. The argument is a commentary on the fact that any view may be challenged with such questions as “How do you know?” “Give me a reason,” or even “Prove it!” When such challenges are accepted by the citation of further reasons which entail those under challenge, these may be questioned in turn. And so on forever. Yet if the burden of proof or rational justification can be perpetually shifted back to a higher-order premise or reason, the belief originally questioned is never effectively defended. In order to justify the original conclusion, it appears that one must eventually stop at something not open to question, for which one need not provide reasons when demanded. Usually, but not necessarily, the role of halting point of rational discussion is played by such things as standards, criteria, ends, or goals which one accepts irrationally in order to avoid infinite regress. But if to defend a position rationally is to give good reasons in justification of it, it would appear that this stopping point is not rationally defensible. If men conclude their rational justifying at different points, moreover, “ultimate relativism” arises; for some way of choosing rationally among competing ultimate stopping points by appeal to a common standard is excluded in principle by the way the problem is set. Even if all men did subjectively stop at the same place, the problem would remain of determining rationally whether this universal subjective stopping point led to objectively true statements about the world.

Skepticism and fideism, then, share both the claim and the powerful argument which underlies it. They differ in their opposed practical attitudes toward the claim. Whereas the skeptic suspends his judgment about competing positions, or so he says, the fideist makes an irrational commitment to one or another of them, or to some authority or tradition claiming to possess the competence or the right to make such decisions for him. The claim and the argument are, however, far more basic features of the two positions than are the different concluding attitudes they choose: a position that cannot escape skepticism cannot refute fideism.

III

Philosophical incapacity to answer the fideistic and skeptical claim and argument has some serious consequences. In the first place, the argument, if correct, implies that it is pointless from a rational point of view for men to argue rationally about their extremely different “ultimate presuppositions” or commitments. T. S. Eliot, who found a way to become a fideist Christian when he had learnt why his teacher Bertrand Russell could not refute skepticism, embraced such an implication in After Strange Gods, in which he wrote:

I am not arguing or reasoning or engaging in controversy with those whose views are radically opposed to such as mine. In our time, controversy seems to me, on really fundamental matters, to be futile …. It requires common assumptions.

So it would seem that the limits of rational argument within any ultimate philosophical position are defined by reference to that object or belief in respect to which commitment is made or imposed, in regard to which argument is brought to a close. And if, since the limitation is a logical one, all men share it, if no one can escape irrational commitment, then no one can be criticized rationally for having made such a commitment, no matter how idiosyncratic. Bertrand Russell chose to commit himself to the so-called scientific principle of induction, and T. S. Eliot chose Anglo-Catholicism; and that is all there is to it, so it is often argued.

This means that any irrationalist has a rational excuse for irrationalism and a secure refuge from any criticism of this irrational commitment. The irrationalist can reply “tu quoque” to any critic, and remind him that people whose own rationality is similarly limited should not berate others for admitting to and acting on the limitation.

On the other hand, it should be noted that however useful his rational excuse for irrationalism may seem, the irrationalist pays a high price for using it. The strength and survival of the tu quoque argument does indeed make rational criticism of irrationalist commitment boomerang. But the tu quoque argument itself also has a boomerang effect on those who use it. I have discussed this point at some length elsewhere, with examples, and wish only to suggest the character of this backfire here by quoting a brief passage from my discussion:⁸

To the extent that anyone employing [the tu quoque] strengthens his own position by insuring that it is parallel to his opponent’s, to that extent he increases the invulnerability of the opponent to criticism. For the opponent, if criticized, may also use the tu quoque. Those who gain a refuge of safety for themselves through appeal to the limits of rationality thereby provide a similar refuge for all others whose commitments differ from theirs. Thus, the many criticisms which [irrationalists] have leveled at rationalism and liberalism become as pointless as those the liberals have directed at [irrationalism]. Ultimately, the use of the tu quoque makes nonsense of the idea of the historical development and change of ideas in the face of criticism. … In sum, the belief that rationality is ultimately limited, by providing an excuse for irrational commitment, enables … any … irrationalist to make an irrational commitment without losing intellectual integrity. But at the same time, anyone who makes use of this excuse may not, in integrity, criticize the holder of a different commitment. One gains the right to be irrational at the expense of losing the right to criticize. One gains immunity from criticism for one’s own commitment by making any criticism of commitments impossible.⁹

IV

If the cost of his excuse makes it hard for the irrationalist to live comfortably with it, this does not reduce the argumentative effectiveness of the excuse on his opponent. Is the rational excuse for irrationalism really flawless from a rational point of view? Or can the excuse be defeated with rational arguments?

Before attempting to answer these questions, I would like to make the task more manageable; and without distorting any issues or minimizing any difficulties. At the same time I want to focus the skeptico-fideistic argument as sharply as possible in a single example by considering some specific tradition, philosophical viewpoint, or way of life of our culture to see whether irrational commitment is really required of its adherents. Some necessary care in the choice of a tradition to be examined will, I think, satisfy both these desires. The tradition I propose to study briefly is the rationalist tradition itself. ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Introduction to the Transaction Edition
• Preface
• Biographical Notes On The Contributors
• Part I The Critical Approach to Philosophy
• Part II The Critical Approach to Logic and Mathematics
• Part III The Critical Approach to Science
• Part IV The Critical Approach to Society and History
• Writings of Karl R. Popper