Distributive Justice

Michael Allingham

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781317813644
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

This book presents a critical appraisal of the main theories of distributive justice. It develops the view that all such theories, or at least all liberal theories, may be seen as expressions of laissez-faire with compensations for factors that they consider to be morally arbitrary.

More precisely, these theories are interpreted as specifying that the outcome of individuals acting independently, without the intervention of any central authority, is just, provided that those who fare ill for reasons that the theories deem to be arbitrary, for example, because they have fewer talents than others, receive compensation from those who fare well. The principal theories discussed are Rawls's justice as fairness, Dworkin's equality of resources, what may loosely be called Steiner-Vallentyne common ownership theories, and Nozick's entitlements theory.

The book considers the extent, if any, to which the theories examined can accommodate both liberty and equality. It concludes that if any such accommodation is possible it will be found in common ownership theories.

1
INTRODUCTION

This book presents a critical appraisal of the main theories of distributive justice, that is, theories that seek to specify what is meant by a just distribution of goods among members of society. It does so in a framework in which all liberal theories of justice are seen as expressions of laissez-faire with compensations for factors that they consider to be morally arbitrary. More specifically, such theories are interpreted as specifying that the outcome of individuals acting independently, without the intervention of any central authority, is just, provided that those who fare ill for reasons that the theories deem to be arbitrary, for example, because they have fewer talents than others, receive compensation from those who fare well.

A simple world

The simple world comprises a number of individuals and three commodities: a natural resource, called land; a consumption good, called food; and individuals' labour. There is a given amount of land, which is held by individuals, but no stock of food: food may be created from land and labour. An individual is characterized by his preferences between food and leisure (leisure being the obverse of labour); by his ability, or productivity in transforming land and labour into food; and by his holding of land.

A distribution is defined by each individual’s consumption of food (or equivalently, his income), his expenditure of labour (or enjoyment of leisure), and his holding of land. An institution under which this may be achieved is a system of taxes and subsidies on income, and reallocation of holdings in land: these may range from pure laissez-faire at one end of the spectrum to 100 per cent taxes on income and complete appropriation of land at the other. A theory of justice specifies which institutions, or, equivalently, which distributions, are considered to be just. (It is assumed, for the time being, that there is a one-to-one correspondence between institutions and distributions.)

Liberal theories of justice consider the process, or outcome, of individuals' free actions to be just except insofar as this depends on factors, in the form of personal characteristics, which are considered to be morally arbitrary. In the present context these factors may be individuals' preferences, their abilities, and their holdings of land. We may, then, categorize such theories according to which of these factors each theory deems to be morally arbitrary.

Equality has various interpretations in this simple world: these correspond to the theories discussed below. Liberty has two aspects: self-ownership, that is, rights to one’s body, one’s labour, and the fruits thereof; and resource-ownership, that is, rights to own external resources and the produce of these. Theories that fail to maintain self-ownership may be divided into those that recognize personal responsibility, in that the extent of the incursions they make are independent of how people exercise these (for example, in being industrious or lazy), and those that do not.

In a liberal context there is (as is justified later) no basis for comparing one individual’s wellbeing with another’s, so that theories of justice which require such comparisons cannot be accommodated. Accordingly, the theories of utilitarianism, which defines a distribution to be just if it maximizes the sum of each individual’s wellbeing, and of equality of welfare, which defines a distribution to be just if each individual has the same level of wellbeing, are not considered.

Four theories of justice are addressed: Rawlsian egalitarianism, or justice as fairness; Dworkinian egalitarianism, or equality of resources; Steiner-Vallentyne libertarianism, or common ownership; and Nozickian libertarianism, or entitlements. These names are used simply as labels: they do not imply sole authorship (particularly so in the case of the third). In each of these theories a just distribution may be interpreted as being that which would result from laissez-faire adjusted for various personal characteristics that are considered to be morally arbitrary. The following specification of the theories sets out, for each theory: its definition of justice; the personal characteristics that it considers to be arbitrary and therefore makes adjustments for; the nature of the institution under which this may be achieved; the justification of any inequalities which it accepts; and the extent to which it is consistent with liberty.

Justice as fairness defines a distribution to be just if it maximizes the food that the individual with the least food receives (this is the maximin outcome in terms of food, which is the sole primary good). It adjusts for preferences, ability, and land holdings. It is achieved by taxes and subsidies on income (that is, on the consumption of food). Inequalities in income, subject to the maximin requirement, are accepted because of the benefit they bring to the individual with the least income; all inequalities in leisure are accepted. Rights to neither self-ownership nor resource-ownership are maintained, and responsibility is not recognized.

Equality of resources defines a distribution to be just if everyone has the same effective resources, that is, if for some given amount of work each person could obtain the same amount of food. It adjusts for ability and land holdings, but not for preferences. It is achieved by taxes and subsidies on income. Inequalities in both food and leisure are accepted because they arise solely from choices made by individuals who have the same options. Rights to neither self-ownership nor resource-ownership are maintained, but responsibility is recognized.

Common ownership theories define a distribution to be just if each person initially has the same amount of land and all transactions between individuals are voluntary. It adjusts for land holdings, but not for preferences or abilities. It is achieved by a reallocation of holdings of land. Inequalities in both food and leisure are accepted because these arise solely from people having different preferences or abilities. Rights to self-ownership are maintained but rights to resource-ownership are not.

An entitlements theory defines a distribution to be just if the distribution of land is historically justified, that is if it arose from the appropriation by individuals of previously unowned land and voluntary transfers between individuals, and all other transactions between individuals are voluntary. It makes no adjustments (other than corrections for any improper acquisitions or transfers) and thus requires no imposed institution to achieve it. All inequalities are accepted. Rights to both self-ownership and resource-ownership are maintained.

As is apparent from these descriptions, the first two theories emphasize outcomes while the second two emphasize institutions. These four theories form a hierarchy, or decreasing progression, in terms of the personal characteristics that they consider to be morally arbitrary, and thus for which adjustments are made. The first theory adjusts for preferences, ability, and land holdings; the second only for ability and land holdings; the third only for land holdings; and the fourth for none of these (other than the corrections noted above). The four theories form a corresponding hierarchy, or increasing progression, in terms of the liberties (self-ownership, with or without personal responsibility, and resource-ownership) that they maintain: the first maintains neither, and does not recognize responsibility; the second maintains neither, but does recognize responsibility; the third maintains self-ownership but not resource-ownership; and the fourth maintains both self-ownership and resource-ownership. These corresponding hierarchies are illustrated schematically in Table 1.1 below.

The world portrayed above and the concepts developed in it are deliberately simple. The remainder of this book develops the four theories of justice which have been described in a more complex world. It demonstrates that they also form a third hierarchy in terms of equality (of outcome), with Rawls’s justice as fairness as the most egalitarian, followed by Dworkin’s equality of resources, then common ownership in the Steiner-Vallentyne vein, and finally Nozick’s entitlements theory as the least egalitarian.

Theory	Arbitrary factors	Liberties maintained
Rawls	Preferences-Ability — Land	—
Dworkin	Ability — Land	Responsibility
Steiner-Vallentyne	Land	Responsibility — Self-ownership
Nozick	—	Responsibility — Self-ownership —
		Resource-ownership

TABLE 1.1 A taxonomy

Background

The 1970s may have been described as ‘the decade that style/taste forgot’,¹ but it was also the decade that witnessed the awakening of political philosophy from its long post-utilitarian slumbers with the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971 and Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia in 1974. As Meadowcroft notes, ‘Rawls’s TJ and Nozick’s ASU provide two of the most important contributions to contemporary debates about justice’² they ‘have framed the contemporary debate about the nature of justice by representing the two fundamental opposing views of what constitutes justice in the distribution of income and wealth’.³

The two views are ‘fundamentally opposing’ in a number of ways. In essence, Rawls emphasizes equality while Nozick emphasizes liberty. Rawls’s justice as fairness approach argues that resources ‘are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution … is to everyone’s advantage’.⁴ In contrast, Nozick’s entitlements approach argues that ‘individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Justice as fairness
• 3 Equality of resources
• 4 Entitlements
• 5 Common ownership
• 6 An assessment
• Bibliography
• Index