Second language acquisition (SLA) research has as its ultimate goal the understanding of what learners know of a second language (L2), how they come to know it, and how they put that knowledge to use. Over the years, the field of SLA has increased in its ways of eliciting data (see Gass & Mackey, 2007 and Mackey & Marsden, 2016, for overviews and examples of elicitation techniques). Traditionally, language production (both spoken and written) has been a main staple for researchers. However, data stemming from language production is limited in what it can tell us about how languages are learned and used. Researchers have turned to different techniques to enhance an understanding of SLA data. One important source of data in the field comes from what learners themselves say about what they know or about how they process their L2, also known as introspective verbal reports.
Verbal reports can be collected from learners either concurrently with language production (think-alouds; Bowles, 2010) or after a language event. This book deals extensively with one specific introspective method, known as stimulated recall. This covers a subset of introspective methods representing a means of eliciting data about the thought processes that take place while a learner is doing a task or an activity. The assumption underlying introspection, in general, is that it is possible to tap into and document a learnerās internal processes in much the same way as one can observe external real-world events. This is predicated on an additional assumption, namely that humans have access at some level to their internal thought processes and can verbalize those processes.
In this chapter we provide background information, including a history of introspection and its place within the fields of philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. We detail the ways that L2 researchers have used stimulated recall (Chapter 2) and, importantly, we provide information on the dos and donāts of conducting, coding, and analyzing stimulated recalls (Chapters 3 and 4). In Chapter 5, we discuss how stimulated recall can be used to mitigate limitations present in other studies where triangulating data through stimulated recall procedures, like the ones described in this book, will provide researchers with important information, but not discernible from the original data alone. In order to provide readers of this book with a balanced view of the information that stimulated recall can provide to researchers, we present the limitations of stimulated recall (Chapter 6). Data collection in L2 research has evolved considerably since the publication of our first edition more than a decade ago. The use of new techniques (e.g., eye-tracking) has greatly enriched our understanding of L2 learning processes. These novel measures also bring up new reasons for including stimulated recall data in designs.
Background
As mentioned earlier, historically, the main source of data for understanding how L2s are learned has come from production data, and, even more specifically, utterances produced by learners. In fact, in the early years of the systematic study of SLA, Selinker (1972) stated that researchers should
focus ⦠analytical attention upon the only observable data to which we can relate theoretical predictions: the utterances which are produced when the learner attempts to say sentences of a TL.
(Selinker, 1972, pp. 213ā14, emphasis in original)
While this view is still maintained by some, it has never been entirely accepted. Corder (1973), for example, argued that forced elicitation data were necessary. In other words, spontaneously produced utterances provide only a part of the picture. If one wants to obtain information about the grammatical knowledge that learners have, one also must have a means to determine which sentences learners think are possible in an L2 (i.e., grammatical) and which are not possible in an L2 (i.e., ungrammatical). To accomplish this, data collection from a source other than language production is often necessary (see additional discussion in Gass, 1997; Gass & Polio, 2014).
In addition to determining actual knowledge of the L2, we also need to understand how that knowledge comes about. Most processes involved in learning are not directly observable. All that is observable is what a learner produces, in writing or in speech. However, there are methodological tools that one can use to understand those processes.
Various methods have been used in the field of L2 research to determine underlying linguistic knowledge, including asking learners to introspect about their knowledge. The focus of this book, stimulated recall, is one such method, which is generally classified under the broader term of introspection. Like many methodological tools, introspection has had a long history and has fallen into disfavor at times along its path. However, it is now being used once again with increased frequency and with increased confidence. In this chapter, we contextualize stimulated recall through an examination of the broader area of introspection, with a focus on verbal reporting. We begin by briefly considering some of the historical context of introspection. We then document the rich background work on stimulated recall as an introspective method.
Introspective Methods
There is a long history of use of reflections on mental processes, originating in the fields of philosophy and psychology. Lyons (1986) traced this history in Western thought to Augustine and possibly even to Aristotle. Such mentalistic reflections are often classified as introspection. As mentioned previously, such methods have been in and out of favor in scholarly circles, in part due to skepticism surrounding the ability one has to accurately access oneās thought processes. Introspection assumes that a person can observe what takes place in consciousness in much the same way as one can observe events in the external world. Lyons cited the definition of introspection in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary as āthe examination or observation of oneās mental processesā (1986, p. 1). This broad definition subsumes a number of different approaches, and, as a definition, has proven to be too general for many scholars, especially those at pains to distance themselves from introspection.
Our present-day nuances of the term introspection are based on the epitome of introspection, what Lyons called the āgolden age of introspectionā (1986, p. 2), covering the timeframe from the sevnteenth century to the early part of the twentieth century. A seminal thinker in the area of introspection is Descartes. A basic premise of his work (e.g., Discourse on Method 1637 [1960]) was the notion of mind as a separate entity: a personās mind is fundamentally separate from a personās body; a personās mind is also fundamentally separate from the minds of others. With this as background, we turn now to a discussion of the potential usefulness of reflection.
The Usefulness of Reflections on Mental Processes
In this section we consider how the use of reflections on mental processes has been conceived. A fundamental question is whether certain types of reflection might be more useful than others. One component of usefulness of any investigative method is how likely that method is to produce ātrueā results. The issue of truth is a complex one, a detailed examination of which is beyond the scope of this book. Nonetheless, two tests can be attempted: falsifiability and r...