1
Outlining a conceptual space
An introduction
In his essay Life and the Dialogue, RenĂ© Spitz (1963) made a crucial observation regarding the infantâs response to its confusion between a living human being and a lifeless surrogate. According to Spitz, this phenomenon, which appears during the second half of the first year of life, marks the infantâs new capability to differentiate between a living and an inanimate object. To elucidate this problem, Spitz referred to the excitement and uncanny feeling one experiences visiting a wax museum, where one of the visitors may comically pose as a wax figure and then unexpectedly turns out to be a living human being. To clarify the concept of the object in psychoanalysis, Spitz connected this state of confusion with a subtle non-verbal dialogue between the infant and its mother, where the infantâs inner movements elicit a living response and vice versa. Spitz sees human life in general unfolding as a dialogue of this kind, leading to new stages of psychic integration.
In fortunate circumstances, when all is well with the childâs early development, the dialogue may proceed smoothly, originally on the level of bodily responses, and later on the level of preconscious meanings capable of becoming conscious after been linked to words, the infantâs mother tongue conveying vital meanings. However, even in an ideal case, a child will become exposed to drive-instinctual dangers threatening his or her psychic coherence from within; in a less fortunate case, this may prove to be fateful. AndrĂ© Greenâs (1986) essay The Dead Mother offers a profound exposition of this failure, taking the motherâs depression as its starting point. In this context, Green also considered Sigmund Freudâs early childhood, when at two years old his younger brother Julius died, causing his mother to face the greatest conceivable loss. This misfortune was also reflected in Freudâs later dualistic drive theory where the fundamental dichotomy between life and death constituted a crucial problem, coupled with the magnitude of labour Freud put into solving it (Caropreso and Simanke, 2008).
On the metapsychological starting points
The first key to my metapsychological thinking is the notion of the primal representative matrix. This refers to the resource of primary narcissism that an individual has inherently been endowed with, leaning upon vital bodily functions carrying vital meanings and contributing to the sense of being alive (Salonen, 1979). As these meanings are interwoven with subsequent psychic development, this matrix comes to vitalise and constitute both the experiential world as well as the psychic functioning from within, without itself becoming conscious as such. A radical decathexis of this matrix, on the other hand, may have fateful consequences to an individualâs psychic and somatic survival, e.g., in psychotic states and life-threatening psychosomatic conditions. Most clearly this becomes visible in schizophrenic disorders, which are the clinical starting point of my metapsychological studies.
The notion of a primal representative matrix offers the possibility of clarifying some conceptual difficulties between different psychoanalytic schools, not least the discussion about Freudâs dualistic drive theory. Also, Bionâs notion of ÎČ-elements becomes more understandable when thinking about the drive-economic collapse of this matrix, resulting in a rudimentary ego being exposed to the dismantled drive phenomena devoid of psychic representation. Through a living dialogue between the infant and its mother, these drive elements receive preconscious meanings, enabling them to become integrated into the foundations of the childâs emerging mind, i.e. Bionâs α-function.
My second key concept is Freudâs notion of primary identification, which in Mourning and Melancholia (1917) was still treated as an oral-incorporative phenomenon. Five years later, Freud (1923) connected primary identification to object-finding before ordinary object ties, which indicates a major transformation in his theoretical thinking: a structural conceptualization of psychic functioning. The reason I adopt Freudâs latter conception as my starting point was the observation that even severely disturbed psychotic patients may momentarily recover after recognising the lost primary object in the transference. This startling phenomenon helped me to understand the pivotal importance of primary identification for the capacity of metaphorical thinking. This capability cannot be derived in the first place from the oral-incorporative sphere of psychic experience. Its origins lie in the psychosensory area: the infant first finding the object and, simultaneously, himself as a metaphor of the latter (Laplanche, 1976; Gaddini, 1992). This metaphorical configuration will then constitute an inner frame of reference for the psychic representation of elementary drive phenomena. Only after inventing his structural model was Freud able to integrate the realm of psychic representations and drive-instinctual processes into a functional whole.
In confronting an unexpected fatality, the course of time and the sense of inner movement feels interrupted. Even the subliminal background noise of psychic processes falls silent. In dealing with the problem of temporality in Freudâs thinking, AndrĂ© Green (2008) made an essential remark related to this phenomenon, namely, the sense of movement characterising psychic processes. At this point, we can return to Spitzâs notion of life proceeding as a dialogue. I have visualised this process as a dynamic movement, progressing like an ascending spiral in space and time, attaining new stages of psychic integration in the course of individual life. In unfortunate cases this dialogue may take a negative turn. The negative therapeutic reaction then manifests itself as a descending spiral movement, resulting in disintegration and escalating destruction.
I am inclined to think that an individualâs urge for psychic survival, which Eugenio Gaddini (1982) associated with the infantâs first self-configuration, represents an affectomotor response to the threat of annihilation, containing a potential for aggression. In fortunate cases, this potential will be bound in terms of drive-instinctual dangers to the psychic organisation, first in the sphere of maternal intimacy and later as an integral part of the Oedipus complex, the solution of which finally results in a new kind of psychic autonomy. If this process fails, we are confronted with unbounded aggression and escalating destruction devoid of psychic representation.
The instinctual drives pursue two paths to attain their aim, the first being a direct discharge as actions outside the sphere of psychic representation, and the second as part of evolving psychic organisation to ensure sexual satisfaction on the genital level of psychic integration. The dilemma between these two options reflects an individualâs fundamental ambivalence, the integration of which constitutes a crucial point of my metapsychological studies.
Winnicottâs contribution
The transference in psychoanalysis with severely traumatised patients often evokes an anachronistic battlefield with such intensity that the setting itself may run the risk of losing its metaphorical significance. What is at stake is an early psychic trauma that has not been integrated as a part of an individual life history; it continues endlessly, possibly resulting in destructive consequences and a depletion of the analysandâs psychic resources.
Donald Winnicott (1971) guides us further in understanding this topic, linking an individualâs psychic survival to the motherâs survival of the infantâs unbound aggression, the failure of which may result in destructive consequences for the childâs future development. In effect, Winnicott derives destructive drive phenomena in general from this failure, as well as including the analystâs failure to survive the analysandâs aggression in the transference:
The essential feature is the analystâs survival and the intactness of the psychoanalytic technique. Imagine how traumatic can be the actual death of the analyst when this kind of work is in the process, although even the actual death of the analyst is not as bad as the development in the analyst of a change of attitude towards retaliation. These are risks that simply must be taken by the patient. Usually the analyst lives through these phases of movement in the transference, and after each phase there comes reward in terms of love, reinforced by the fact of the backcloth of unconscious destruction.
(p. 92)
Winnicott proceeds:
It will be seen that, although destruction is the word I am using, this actual destruction belongs to the objectâs failure to survive. Without this failure, destruction remains potential. The word âdestructionâ is needed, not because of the babyâs impulse to destroy, but because of the objectâs liability not to survive, which also means to suffer the change in quality, in attitude.
(p. 93)
Although Winnicott was perhaps overlooking the accidental misfortunes inevitable in life (Green, 2010) being nobodyâs fault, his idea of the motherâs survival of the infantâs aggression is of great importance for our understanding of the childâs capacity to deal with destructive drive phenomena later in life. In fact, the motherâs survival ensures a resource of healthy aggression at the infantâs future disposal, which otherwise would be discharged freely with destructive consequences.
Winnicottâs (1975) second notion of primary unintegration offers an additional perspective for our discussion. This state of mind differs from psychic disintegration, which signifies a disruptive development. The stage of primary unintegration is characterised by an incoherent state of mind among the multitude of perceptual elements, akin to a dreaming state. During this phase, the mother is perceived as an incoherent human shape reflecting the infantâs variable affective tones and colours, which become polarised according to its vital needs. The motherâs care-taking presence holds all this together, representing an âenvironmental provisionâ for the child. The motherâs failure leaves the infantâs rudimentary ego at the mercy of strange psychic elements, which signifies a desolate cosmic experience. Against this background, we can better understand the foundation of an individualâs psychic existence, and its vulnerabilities, both of which constitute the subject matter of my metapsychological interest in radical psychic trauma.
Winnicottâs (1975) third notion of primary maternal preoccupation focuses on a particular change in the motherâs personality during the last weeks of pregnancy and continuing for the first weeks after the infantâs birth. Although resembling a pathological withdrawal and sensitivity, the primary maternal preoccupation is a normal behaviour pattern, complementary to the infantâs stage of primary unintegration. What is at stake is the motherâs devotion to the childâs physical and psychical needs evolving in this special atmosphere:
There comes into existence an ego-relatedness between mother and baby, from which the mother recovers, and out of which the infant may eventually build the idea of a person in the mother. From this angle, the recognition of the mother as a person [italics mine] comes in a positive way, normally, and not out of the experience of the mother as the symbol of frustration. The motherâs failure to adapt in the earliest phase does not produce anything but an annihilation of the infantâs self.
⊠In the language of these considerations, the early building up of the ego is therefore silent. The first ego organisation comes from the experience of threats of annihilation which do not lead to annihilation and from which, repeatedly, there is recovery. Out of such experiences confidence in recovery begins to be something which leads to an ego and to an ego capacity for coping with frustration.
(pp. 303â304)
Winnicottâs discussion of the infantâs early recognition of its mother as a person refers to primary identification as a mode of object finding. It signifies the emergence of a metaphorical space, corresponding to Winnicottâs potential space, shared by the infant and its mother. Inside this space, the infant recognises himself as a child of this particular mother, and the mother recognises herself as the mother of this particular child. In short, primary identification does not signify fusion or sameness but likeness in the metaphorical sense. Moreover, it creates an inner frame of reference for the psychic representation of elementary drive phenomena as well as concomitant affect states evolving in the infantâs mind.
Jan Abramâs (2013, p. 311) recent research on Winnicottâs archival notes yields an essential observation regarding primary identification. At the end of his life, Winnicott concluded that the imago of the father as a presence in the motherâs mind, i.e., the fact of parental intercourse, constitutes an integrative force. In becoming transmitted and internalised as a whole object, it leads to an ego capacity without which there would not be such a thing as survival of the object, in Winnicottâs theory, according to Abrams.
Winnicottâs view is consonant with Freudâs (1923) concept of primary identification relating object finding before ordinary object ties to the father, also suggesting that both parents may be involved. Moreover, Freud associated the emergence of the ego-ideal with primary identification. With Freudâs concept as my starting point and based on Gaddiniâs (1992) and Greenâs (1986) contributions, I concluded that the capacity of psychic representation depends on primary identification creating a metaphorical frame for the psychic representation of elementary drive phenomena (Salonen, 1989).
Bionâs contribution
Thomas Ogdenâs Creative Readings: Essays on Seminal Analytic Works (2012) has clarified my understanding not only of Winnicottâs work but especially of Bionâs contribution to psychoanalytic thinking. From these starting points, I am going to summarise my view as follows:
According to Bion (1959, 1962), threatening drive elements evacuated from the sphere of solid psychic functioning continue their dismantled existence in exclusion. Through projective identification, however, there opens an opportunity for their integration through the motherâs reverie. This notion of Bionâs refers to the motherâs dreamlike thinking which is receptive both to her infantâs projections as well as her own preconscious responses at the metaphorical level, this signifying a transformation of the psychic processes from the level of ÎČ-elements to the sphere of α-function. Thus, the motherâs concern for her infant also includes her preconscious dreaming contributing to her childâs future capability to think.
Bionâs notion provides a key not only to the emergence of the capability for thinking in general, but especially to the analystâs thinking, transposing the psychoanalytic process from the elementary to the metaphorical level of psychic functioning:
If the infant feels it is dying it can arouse fears that it is dying in the mother. A well-balanced mother can accept these and respond therapeutically: that is to say in a manner that makes the infant feel it is receiving its frightened personality back again, but in a form that it can tolerate â the fears are manageable by the infant personality. If the mother cannot tolerate these projections the infant is reduced to continue projective identification carried out with increasing force and frequency. The increased force seems to denude the projection of its penumbra of meaning. Reintrojection is affected with similar force and frequency. Deducing the patientâs feelings from his behaviour in the consulting room and using the deductions to form a model, the infant of my model does not behave in a way that I ordinarily expect of an adult who is thinking. It behaves as if it felt that an internal object has been built up that has the characteristics of a greedy vagina-like âbreastâ that strips of its goodness all that the infant receives or gives, leaving only degenerate objects. This internal object starves its host of all understanding that is made available. In the analysis, such a patient seems unable to gain from his environment and therefore from his analyst. The consequences for the development of a capacity for thinking are s...