Citizenship and Citizenship Education in a Changing World

Orit Ichilov, Orit Ichilov

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781317827566
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Éducation
• Subtopic: Éducation générale

Political, economic, technological and cultural changes have taken place all over the globe, changes which have transformed the meanings of citizenship and citizenship education. This volume represents an effort to analyze the implications of these changes.

1

PATTERNS OF CITIZENSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD

ORIT ICHILOV

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the processes which may transform the configurations and meanings of the ideological, cultural, political, and social components of ‘citizenship’. The contents and patterns of citizenship education will, no doubt, have to be readjusted, in order to adequately prepare the younger generation to assume their role as citizens. One reason why this is a difficult task is that a mainstream theory of democracy is nonexistent today, and has been replaced by rather fragmented and isolated endeavors. The lack of a comprehensive theory of democracy further erodes the foundations of democracy because it becomes impossible to have reasons for existing institutions, and because democracies are not viable unless their citizens understand them (Sartori, 1987).

Citizenship is a complex and multidimensional concept. It consists of legal, cultural, social, and political elements, and provides citizens with defined rights and obligations, a sense of identity, and social bonds. The classical definition of citizenship rests on the assertion that citizenship involves a balance or fusion between rights and obligations. More recent definitions stress the affinity and identity dimensions of citizenship. According to Heater (1990), for example, citizenship is one among many identities of an individual, which ‘helps to tame the divisive passions of other identities’ (p. 184). It does so by conveying to each individual citizen a society’s collective memory; cultural togetherness and nationality and the collaborative sense of purpose in fraternity. These elements bind people together with a common identity of citizenship. Marshall (1977, 1981) differentiates among three dimensions of citizenship: civil, political and social, and emphasizes the social aspect. The civil element of citizenship is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom, and the institution most directly associated with it is the rule of law and a system of courts. The political component consists of the right to participate in the exercise of political power. Political rights are associated with parliamentary institutions. Social rights represent the right to the prevailing standard of life and the social heritage of society. Included are entitlements such as unemployment benefits and provisions for health care and education. Citizenship in the social sense is based on an individual obligation to contribute taxation to a state system of provision, and to a method of redistribution of resources to those fellow citizens who are unable to provide for their own needs. All these forms of citizenship, in Marshall’s view, have been institutionalized in the welfare state. The existence of a welfare state is, therefore, a requisite of modern democracy and democratic citizenship. From an economic vantage point, citizenship controls access to the scarce resources of society and hence this allocative function could also become the basis of a profound conflict in modern societies over citizenship membership criteria (Turner, 1990, 1997).

Potent social, political, and economic forces seem to be eroding the traditional foundations which are needed to form a social bond and to transform a random collection of consumers, or an aggregation of political, ethnic, and economic interests into citizens striving for the common good. In this chapter, some of these forces will be discussed.

CHANGING PATTERNS OF CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship and Nationalism

‘Citizenship’ as an expression of the political relations between the individual and the state is closely related to the concepts of nationalism and the nation-state (Janowitz, 1983). Nationalism, which is founded on ethnicity, religion, ideology and territory, has been viewed as a binding force, which provides people with collective and self-identities (Greenfeld, 1993; White, 1985; Kashti, 1994; Kelly and Ronan, 1987). Nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a ‘people’, which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty. The idea of the ‘nation’ becomes the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity (Greenfeld, 1992).

The decline of nationalism as a result of economic and political globalization processes was predicted by Marx as early as 1848, during the time called ‘the spring of nations’, when nationalism was at its peak. Marx claimed that the speedy and imminent demise of nationalism was made inevitable by the globalization of the economy implied in the spread of capitalism (Greenfeld, 1993). The anticipation of the collapse of nationalism, often for reasons similar to those mentioned by Marx, remained a popular theme, and is gaining new popularity in the 1990s. For example, Brzezinski (1970) maintained that in the post-industrial world nationalism is ceasing to be the compelling force that determines social change. The emergence of newer and larger frameworks, such as the European Community, indicates that the autarkic ideas of the industrial age have lost their appeal. An inevitable consequence, he predicted, would be a rising global consciousness, with citizenship identity accentuating global awareness instead of nationalism. Hobsbawm (1990) maintains that the history of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries will be written as the history of a world which can no longer be contained within the limits of ‘nations’ and ‘nation-states’ as these used to be defined, either politically, or economically, or culturally, or even linguistically. Such units will be absorbed or dislocated by a new supernational structuring of the globe. Nations and nationalism will be present only in subordinate and minor roles.

Rifkin (1995) estimates that the shift from an economy based on material, energy, and labor to one grounded on information and communication further reduces the importance of the nation-state as a critical player in guaranteeing the fortunes of the marketplace. He considers global corporations to represent quasi-political institutions that exercise great power over people and places, by reason of control over information and communication. The use of military force, a primary function of the modern nation-state, he argues, is no longer needed to seize vital raw materials in a high-tech global economy. Standing armies cannot stop or slow down the ‘invasion’ of information and communication across national frontiers.

However, believed to be a spent force only a few years ago, nationalism has taken on rather a new life. Greenfeld (1993) argues that economic globalization is entirely consistent with nationalism, and does not erode its strength. People will never agree to be deprived of the dignity which they acquire through nationality unless alternative guarantees of dignity are offered. Marxism appealed to Jews, among other things, because it promised to deliver them from their nationality, which in those European countries where Marxism had an appeal, such as Germany and Russia, was associated with unbearable indignity (Greenfeld, 1993). The European Community (EC) is another case in point. So long as European unity was limited to economics, the idea aroused no protest and little sentiment in general. The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in December 1991, declaring EC control over virtually all policy areas, seemed to assault the distinctive national sovereignties and prestige of the member states. As a result, a substantial proportion of Western Europeans do not want unification, however interdependent their economies (Greenfeld, 1993; Hoffman, 1993; Mann, 1993; Brubaker, 1992a). The unification of Europe, it seems, may well rekindle national sentiments and old resentments instead of extinguishing them.

Janowitz (1983) examined the congruence and validity of concepts such as patriotism, nationalism and citizenship, which represent attachment and obligations to a country and a political community, in the face of a changing world. For him, citizenship consists of civil rights and obligations. However, he assigns special significance to obligations on the part of citizens – i.e., the contributions and sacrifices a citizen makes to keep the political system effective – for the viability of democracy. Citizens must be motivated to perform their duties willingly. In this respect, he considers citizenship to be closely linked with patriotism and nationalism because the latter provide an incentive to fulfill civic obligations. Janowitz defines patriotism as ‘a primordial attachment to a territory and a society – a deeply felt and primitive sentiment of belonging; a sense of identification similar to religious, racial, or ethnic identifications. It has been historically associated with the ethos of modern national societies’ (p.8). As nationalism and patriotism become battered notions, allegedly related to xenophobia or militarism, Janowitz offered the term ‘civic consciousness’ instead. It pertains to the positive and meaningful attachments a person develops to the nation-state, and involves elements of reason and self-criticism as well as personal commitment.

Some scholars advocate new and more universal concepts of citizenship. Soysal (1994), for example, supports one whose organizing and legitimating principles are based on universal personhood rather than national belonging. The institutionalization of rights through the UN charter of human rights can be regarded as a central aspect of this trend of globalization (Robertson, 1990). Citizenship defines bounded populations with a specific set of rights and duties, and excludes others on the grounds of nationality. ‘Postnational’ citizenship confers upon every person the right and duty of participating in the authority structures and public life of a polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that community (Derrida, 1986).

These issues concerning citizenship patterns are not merely of a theoretical nature. The institutional growth of the European Community, for example, has raised important concerns about citizen status, not only for minorities, but also for all forms of transient and migrant labor. Issues associated with state membership for aboriginal communities, stateless peoples, and refugees have brought to the fore the implications of human rights in relation to citizenship. Turner (1993) suggests that human rights complement rather than replace citizenship rights. But, as politics become more global, human rights will have an expanded role in the normative regulation of politics.

Janowitz (1983) disputes the idea that a world allegiance needs to be substituted for national patriotism, and does not expect national citizenship to dissolve. He cautions that new communalism, such as the outbursts of ethnic/racial nationalism in the US in the 1960s and 1970s, and the desire of certain groups to become ‘hyphenated Americans’ (e.g., Mexican-Americans, Black-Americans, etc.), can only erode the foundations of civil obligation. Similarly, economic ideology – left, liberal, or right – is also incapable of supplying elites and democratic publics with the rationale for the values upon which democracies are founded. Civic consciousness is irreplaceable for collective problem solving in a democratic society, which rests on voluntarism, motivated by a sense of moral responsibility for the collective well-being. Furthermore, civic consciousness, Janowitz argues, is not only compatible with but required for both national and international responsibilities and obligations. The idea of citizenship, which is founded on the twin pillars of civil rights and obligations, is therefore necessary to support the dynamics of democratic political institutions.

It seems that the nation-state is not in any general decline anywhere else. The breakdown (in many instances violently) of multinational states into nation-states (for example, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) is evident. Given the destruction of much of civil society in the former Soviet Bloc, nationalism is the most plausible and most easily available candidate for filling the resulting void (Gellner, 1993; Brubaker, 1992b; Duffy, Sullivan and Polakiewicz, 1993). Similar trends seem to characterize the Arab world. Kramer (1993), who describes and analyzes the fragmentation of the ‘Arab Nation’, argues that at present many Arabs openly doubt whether there is a collective Arab mission. Islamic activists prefer to think of themselves first and foremost as Muslims. Others prefer to be known as Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians, Moroccans – citizens of over 20 independent states, each with its own flag and own interests.

Hobsbawm (1990), however, argues that the current wave of ethnic unrest does not represent the rebirth of nationalism. This unrest can be viewed as a response to the overwhelmingly non-national and non-nationalistic principles of state formation in the greater part of the twentieth-century world. He argues that multi-ethnic and multi-communal states are the norm, rather than the monolithic ‘nation-state’. He also estimates that the role of national economies has been undermined by shifts in the international division of labor, whose basic units are transnational or multinational enterprises of all sizes, and by the development of international centers and networks of economic transaction which are generally outside the control of state governments.

In conclusion, it appears that nation-states in Europe and other continents seem to be diversifying, and developing rather than dying (Mann, 1993). There is a growing general concern with how a nation’s citizenship and identities should be defined, preserved, or reinvented. The preoccupation is not solely related to economic growth, but to issues of culture, such as citizenship and education.

Nationalism and Democratic Citizenship

Is nationalism compatible with citizenship within modern democracies? Hobsbawm (1990) claims that while nineteenth-century nationalist movements were typically unificatory and emancipatory, late twentieth-century movements are essentially divisive, claiming ethnic, linguistic or religious uniqueness, and rejecting modern modes of political organization, both national and supernational. Thus, they are no longer associated with modernity and progress, unlike nineteenth-century nationalist movements, and are inappropriate within a democracy. Others, however, make distinctions among various forms of nationalism, showing that some may coexist in harmony with democracy. Barber (1995) considers all the extremist political forms which he terms ‘Jihad’ – referring to the fierce politics of religious, tribal and other zealots – a threat to democracy. Greenfeld (1992) differentiates between four types of nationalism along two axes: individualistic-libertarian vs collective-authoritarian, and civic vs ethnic nationalism. She argues that different forms of nationalism are grounded in different values, which in turn give rise to different patterns of social behavior, culture, identity and political institutions. The individualistic-libertarian type of nationalism, she claims, overlaps with the basic tenets of democracy: it locates sovereignty within the people, and it is because these individuals exercise sovereignty that they are members of a nation. Collective-authoritarian nationalism, on the other hand, implies the uniqueness of the people, as it is their very distinctness that makes people a nation. Unlike the former notion of nationality, this one is collectivist rather than individualist. Greenfeld (1992) also classifies nationalism according to the criteria of membership in the national collective which may be either ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’. ‘Civic’ implies that nationality is in principle open and voluntaristic, and can be acquired. ‘Ethnic’ implies that nationality is a generic characteristic which has nothing to do with individual will. She, therefore, asserts that certain types of nationality are more compatible with the ideas of liberal democracy than others.

The compatibility of nationalism and democracy greatly depends on the strength of civil society – an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state. Civil society is conceived as the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold the state officially accountable (Diamond, 1994; Keane, 1988; Pratte, 1988; Waltzer, 1991). By containing the power of governments, and by profoundly legitimating democracy among citizens, civil society plays a significant role in building and consolidating...