Self-Concept

John Hattie

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9780898596298
• eBook ISBN: 9781317767770
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Social Psychology
• Index: Psychology

The aim of this book is to discuss the notions of self-concept, self-esteem, and related terms from an educational and psychological perspective. Specifically, this book is concerned with developing a model of self-concept -- and corollaries to this model -- that assesses the dimensionality of self-concept, reviews tests of self-concept, discusses the relationship between self- concept and other variables (particularly achievement), describes the development of self-concept, and evaluates programs to enhance self-concept. Throughout this volume, emphasis is placed on ordering the many studies using recent methodological advances such as meta-analysis and the analysis of covariance structures. After detailing a conceptual model of self-concept, the book offers various experimental and statistical discussions of the model. Unlike many other models, the claim is not that this model is the correct one but that it may serve as a useful "coathanger" until a better one is devised.

1 The Bases of a Theory

Human beings have always been interested in the interpretation of themselves. The concept of self is of major interest to philosophers, religious thinkers, politicians and, more recently in the history of thought, psychologists. Some consider that the interest about the self is the fundamental human need. For example, Fromm (1947) regarded the self as the “inner nature” or “essential nature” of man, and Harrè (1983b) considered self-esteem as the deepest human motive.

In the 1970s there was a resurgence of interest in “changing one's personality—remaking, remodeling, evaluating, and polishing one's very self—and observing, studying, and doting on it. (Me!)” (Wolfe, 1976, p. 143). Tom Wolfe called this period the “me decade.” Etzioni (1983) claimed that this consuming preoccupation with self may be quite compatible with the age of abundance but is self-defeating, socially destructive, and unethical. He regarded these trends as the kernels of our downfall. The dominant theme of the 1970s and 1980s, claimed Etzioni, has been the hot pursuit of a nonexistent and nonattainable status, a life of individuals dedicated to their own needs and self-fulfillment. He cited opinion polls (Yankelovich, 1981) estimating that 17 percent of Americans are committed to, and another 63% embrace to varying degrees, a philosophy of self-fulfillment. Etzioni argued that this interest with self is the cause of a variety of present problems including the sharp rise and expansion of government influence, the deterioration of American institutions such as schools and families, and the decline in the quality of life. Gruen (1988), however, argued that contemporary society impedes the development of the self.

A computer search of Psychological Abstracts, which lists major English-language journals in education and psychology revealed 10,910 articles written about the self-concept or self-esteem since 1974. This is approximately 2.5% of all articles cited in the abstracts (and the rate has been reasonably constant over the past 17 years). The concept of self is of major interest to psychologists and educators.

Yet the empirical literature is confusing. For example, in a survey of relationships between self-concept and achievement, Hansford and Hattie, (1982c) reported a range of correlations from −.77 to +.96. Many authors outlined wonderful procedures for enhancing self-concept but provided very little supporting evidence. Some articles were methodologically sound but others could be used in experimental design classes as exemplars of idiocy. A major problem relates to the experimental designs. Typically, many studies have taken a test of self-concept (usually one invented solely for a particular study), applied it in some specific setting, found significant correlations or differences between means (with significance at the .05 or .001—** or ***— level), and then added the study to the literature with little or no attempt at integration with other studies. Science does not progress this way, and little is gained from inducing meaning and theories from observations. Rather, science proceeds from formulating a theory and then assessing the adequacy of that theory to bring order and meaning to sets of observations. Thus, research on self-concept must begin with a theory or a model that will begin to provide order and aid in explaining observations. Once a theory is outlined, it can be probed rather than proven. This probing may lead to refutation or to modifications and refinements of the theory.

THE BASES OF A THEORY

Among the most influential writings in the philosophy of science have been those of Karl Popper (1962, 1968). His writings and lectures have greatly influenced thinking about theories in psychology and on the notions of the self. His main argument has been that science progresses not by collecting facts into a unified and hopefully generalizable theory (i.e., by induction) but by proposing a theory from which we assess the falsifiability of its conjectures (i.e., by deduction).

Popper begins by pointing to a logical asymmetry between verification and falsification. When I observe the color of swans on my pond (here in Australia) I could conclude that “All swans are black.” No number of observations of black swans on my pond would allow me to derive a universal statement that all swans are black. One single observation of a white swan would refute this conjecture. The logic of the situation is simple. If one white swan is observed then it cannot be the case that all swans are black. Thus empirical generalizations, though not verifiable, are falsifiable. Similarly, theories of self-concept are not provable, but they can be tested by systematic attempts to refute or probe them.

Methodologically, however, we could doubt our observation: we may be myopic, we may believe that we are having a joke played on us by observing a painted bird, or we may want to call the white bird something else. So we could reject all falsifying experiences. If conclusive falsification is not then attainable we are not proceeding scientifically; no advances can be made. Verification in the absence of falsifiability is not a reliable guide to the achievements of science (cf. Hanson, 1971). Unlike our human experiences, science cannot evade refutation. This does not mean theories should be abandoned lightly, nor that we discard contrary evidence, give disturbing facts an obscure name, modify observations to conform to the theory, or fail to report disturbing facts (see Maier, 1960). Our methodology should be rigorous as indeed it can be in psychology. But methodology devoid of theory is useless. We must begin with a theory, a set of conjectures, and use our methodology to attempt to refute the theory, or at least to clarify the theory in terms of its explanatory power.

The interest with the pursuit of knowledge is to get closer to the truth, even though we may never know if we have reached our goal. To illustrate this point, Popper liked to quote from the pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes:

The gods did not reveal, from the beginning,
All things to us, but in the course of time
Through seeking we may learn and know things better.
But as for certain truth, no man has known it,
Nor shall he know it, neither of the gods
Nor yet of all the things of which I speak.
For even if by chance he were to utter
The final truth, he would himself not know it:
For all is but a woven web of guesses.

The claim that we begin from observations is absurd, as absurd as believing that everyone viewing a hill will have a similar view. People perceive a hill depending on a perspective. A skier sees the hill from a different perspective than does a landscape architect, an artist, a mountaineer, a real estate agent, a conservationalist, a hiker, an army demolition expert, and so on. The hill does not change; only the perception of it changes. There is no immaculate perception (Nietzche, 1911). Similarly when a gaggle of psychologists review the literature on self-concept there may be many perspectives, none of which are necessarily wrong. Consequently, in order to understand interpretations, it is necessary to specify and make clear our perspectives. In the following chapters, a perspective of self-concept is elaborated. This theory aids in explaining and bringing order to various data sets and to the literature.

WHAT IS NOT WANTED

The aim, however, is not to prescribe a definition of self-concept. Meehl (1978) claimed that the remarkable evidence of a cultural lag in intellectual life is that one can still find quite a few psychologists who are hooked on the dire necessity of strictly operational definitions: “I cannot name a single logician or a philosopher (or historian) of science who today defends strict operationism in the sense that psychologists claim to believe in it” (p. 815). A physicist could not define electricity or magnetism and would think it absurd and meaningless to try to do so. Rather the physicist could tell you how electricity reacts with other attributes, how it can be used, and the value of knowing some properties of electricity. Thus it is difficult to fathom why psychologists and educators get themselves tied in unravellable knots by trying to operationally define terms such as self-concept (or intelligence or creativity).

Therefore, there is little use for nominal definitions that prescribe the meaning of expressions. Looking up a word in the dictionary and seeing how it has been used may be a useful start, but it is only a start. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989, OED), for example, has 14 columns defining “self” and an additional 40 columns that have self- as a prefix. Self is used as a pronoun, an adjective, and as a subject. The meanings include: (a) to indicate emphatically that the reference is to the person mentioned and not, or not merely, to some other; (b) the word may be rendered own; (c) as a reflexive or an emphatic person pronoun; (d) that which a person is really and intrinsically, the ego, or a permanent subject of successive and varying stages of consciousness; and (e) an assemblage of characteristics and dispositions which may be conceived as constituting one of various conflicting personalities within a human being. There are also references to self as a color, an unblended whisky, a portion of an instrument, a trimming, and a bow. Storr (1988) cited a thesis by Abbs (1986) who claimed that it was not until 1674 that the word “self” took on its more contemporary meaning of conscious individuation rather than unconscious fusion with the world and lists a number of derivatives which entered the language about the same time: self-sufficient (1598), self-knowledge (1613), selfish (1640), selfhood (1649), self-deception (1677), and self-conscious (1687). Until the 1985 Supplement, there is no entry in the OED for self-concept but this does not mean that there is no such term. It was not in the OED because it had not been coined by the time the dictionary was completed in 1928 (J. A. Simpson, senior editor, personal communication).

It is pointless to merely present a list of definitions without comment or explanation. This can be seen in the rather barren list of definitions of “self” prepared by Calkins (1910) for the American Psychological Association. These included: (a) a conscious individual, characterized by persistence and change; (b) a mind regarded as consciously distinguishing itself from what it is not; (c) a conscious individual in union with an organized body; (d) the individual regarded as a progressively organized system of mental functions and processes; (e) the subject of consciousness (or experiences) accompanying any complex of mental processes attentively experienced; and (f) a special complex or integration of content in which the body as object of consciousness is fundamental. (See English & English, 1958, for a more recent list.) In the same way we could also investigate the meaning of concept. “Concept” has been used as an idea (Plato), a particular object housed in a person's mind (Berkeley), properties of things, functions of a term, the ability to use a word, a way of mentioning a word, or a set of verbal skills.

Dictionary definitions provide the history of a word. These definitions are neither rules, nor a priori, nor indicators of what we can and cannot properly say. A dictionary only records a word's history.

Hanson (1958, 1971) pointed out that theories must be “more than” or different from that which the theory accounts for. A theory must not only be an explanation or a reduction. A 5-inch model of a Spitfire airplane is less faithful to the original than a 15-inch metal covered, flying model. Both are less faithful than a half-size reproduction possessing every structural component within the actual Spitfire. Eliminating the half-size feature makes the model faithful to the original in every way. The result, however, would not be a model: it would be a reproduction of a Spitfire. Operational definitions can suffer the same reductionist fate. “Reproducing perplexities exactly is not the same as highlighting their structure” (Hanson, 1971, p. 81). The aim of models and theories is to provide an “awareness of structure” absent from the original configuration with a complex of phenomena.

Further, we do not want what Carnap (1950) referred to as explications. These aim at giving expressions, whose meanings in conversational language or even in scientific discourse are more or less vague, a new and precisely determined meaning so as to render them more suitable for clear and rigorous discourse. Such legislative linguistics have been severely criticized (cf. Mundle, 1970, pp. 16ff). We wish to avoid false assertions about what we do say, or do not and cannot say, in the interests of some psychological theory. We do not want to impose meanings on our language tools for our own convenience, nor do we want to invent new tools merely to serve a particular usage that could be idiosyncratic. The aim is not to become language police or psychological Fowlers.

WHAT IS WANTED

An alternative and more desirable strategy is to use open concepts (see Meehl, 1977, 1978; Pap, 1953, 1958). The psychologists who use open concepts develop a system of convergent reduction sentences. These sentences check with each other. A reduction sentence offers no complete definition for the term it introduces. It only partially, or conditionally, determines the meaning of terms such as self-concept. A reduction sentence sets down meanings that may not exhaust all logical situations or possibilities, because the meaning may be unspecified for many conceivable cases. Convergent reduction sentences are a series in that they are not inconsistent with each other and may relate to differing fields of possible experimentation within the same open concept. The consistency in a system of convergent reduction sentences leads to the identity of open concepts. Thus, in general, a set of reduction sentences determines the meaning of a term only partially as there is the possibility that there are applications beyond the field of interest already investigated. The desire is to leave concepts “open” for applications in new contexts.

There is no one reduction sentence that describes self-concept. There are a set of sentences that describe self-concept, that are not inconsistent with each other and refer to a variety of situations. These reduction sentences are akin to what Wittgenstein (1953) termed conceptual cartography, where the aim is to determine the boundaries of words.

A possible procedure to be used in outlining an open concept is the nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). This network designates a system of lawlike relations between theoretical entities and between these theoretical entities and their observable indicators. The nomological network was introduced with respect to construct validation, and Cronbach and Meehl claimed that “unless the network makes contact with observations, and exhibits explicit, public steps of inference, construct validation cannot be claimed” (p. 290). Subsequently, researchers using the nomological network have made a distinction between within- and between-construct validation. The within- portion relates to the interrelationship between the various facets of the construct, whereas the between- portion refers to the interrelationships between the construct and other constructs. That is, a nomological network refers to the meaning and explanation of a construct as well as establishing the boundary conditions.

To illustrate his explanation and, particularly, to make the point that a network need not be an operational definition, Meehl quoted from Hempel (1952):

A scientific theory might therefore be likened to a complex spatial network: Its terms are represented by the knots, while the threads connecting the latter correspond, in part, to the definitions and, in part, to the fundamental and derivative hypotheses included in the theory. The whole system floats, as it were, above the plane of observation and is anchored to it by rules of interpretation. These might be viewed as strings which are not part of the network but link certain points of the latter with specific places in the plane of observation. By virtue of those interpretive connections, the network can function as a scientific theory. From certain observational data, we may ascend, via an interpretive string, to some point in the theoretical network, thence proceed, via definitions and hypotheses, to other points, from which another interpretive string permits a descent to the plane of observations, (p. 36)

In a not too dissimilar metaphor, Wittgenstein (1953) argued that a concept involves a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing as when spinning a thread, we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.

There are many many studies about self-concept and many threads appear to dangle freely with little attempt to clarify the network. What seems necessary is an attempt to describe a network and thus provide an integrated perspective from which to tie interpretive strings back to the observational data.

A COMMENT ON EVIDENCE

One of the implications of following the deductive model of presenting a framework and then assessing the network of relationships, is that the usual social science rules of evidence do not readily apply. It is of questionable value to set up null hypotheses, collect some data from a representative sample, and then use some statistics to assess this null hypothesis. There are various types of evidence. Rychlak (1968) differentiated between procedural and validational evidence. Procedural evidence involves the belief in a theoretical proposition on the basis of its intelligibility, its consistency with common sense knowledge, or its implicit self-evidence. “Scientists are like lovers—they see reminders...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Chapter 1. The bases of a theory
• Chapter 2. A historical perspective
• Chapter 3. A theory of self-concept
• Chapter 4. The dimensionality of self-concept
• Chapter 5. Corollaries of the facet model
• Chapter 6. Development of self-concept
• Chapter 7. Measures of self-concept
• Chapter 8. Correlates of self-concept
• Chapter 9. Self-concept and achievement
• Chapter 10. Enhancing self-concept
• Chapter 11. Concluding comments
• References
• Author Index
• Subject Index