Development and Structure of the Body Image

Volume 1

S. Fisher

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9780898596847
• eBook ISBN: 9781317767565
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

First published in 1986. First published in 1986. This is volume 1 of two, of Development and Structure of the Body Image. This Volume presents a thorough review and analysis of the body image literature from 1969. The bibliography for all the work described in the two volumes is contained in this second volume.

I Critical Analysis of Research Concerned with Body Perception and Body Attitudes

This section embraces an analysis of the scientific literature concerned with body perception that has appeared since 1969. A review of the earlier literature up to 1958 may be found in Body Image and Personality (Fisher & Cleveland, 1958); and a review of publications from 1958 to 1969 was presented in Body Experience in Fantasy and Behavior (Fisher, 1970).

What does one include in an analysis of studies of body perception? Broad definitions and categories have been applied. Any observations pertinent to the terms body image, body concept, body scheme, body attitudes, and body experience fall within the province of the review. In short, any study qualifies for inclusion if it even remotely deals with how individuals view and assign meaning to their own body. The analyses presented are quite detailed, with sufficient information so that the reader is free to arrive at independent judgments concerning the studies that are evaluated. Greater brevity might be preferred, but, without pertinent details, judgments cannot be truly meaningful. Special effort is devoted to summarizing material, detecting similarities and contradictions, and formulating general principles. It is not the intent of this review to dissect out all the minute defects of the studies considered. Rather, criticisms are directed only at what appear to be major shortcomings.

A word is in order concerning the terms that are employed in referring to body perception phenomena. Some people urge that we should carefully limit the ways in which we use references like body image, body schemata, and body percept. For example, Shontz (1969) would refer to “body image” only when one has in mind “the personal body as a dynamic component of personality” (p. 6). He would confine “body schemata” to the cognitive aspects of body perception. Such distinctions seem to be premature. It is doubtful that any aspect of body experience can be said not to be significantly affected by personality vectors. Thus, even the simplest of judgments about one's body size are probably touched by personal values. With this perspective, terms like body image, body concept, and others are used loosely and occasionally interchangeably at a general level of discourse. However, as the book unfolds, a number of new terms with rather precise technical meanings are spelled out in the context of empirical findings.

1


The Body Stimulus

IDENTIFICATION OF SELF

It is by now well documented that a person becomes uncomfortable when made increasingly aware of his or her somatic self. Such augmented awareness may result from looking in a mirror,¹ hearing a recording of one's voice, or just being exposed to an audience (Fisher, 1970; Holzman, 1964). Heightened response has been detected even when people are unknowingly confronted with their self-representations. For example, if shadow profile pictures are obtained from people without their knowledge, a considerable percentage of the individuals will fail to identify themselves when they later encounter their pictures mixed in with the shadow profiles of others. Interestingly, when they are asked to describe or evaluate their own unidentified profiles, they usually do so in exaggeratedly flattering terms that suggest a self-protective strategy (Huntley, 1940; Reitz & Thetford, 1967; Schnitzer, 1961; Wolff, 1943;). However, they may also at times respond in a markedly self-depreciatory fashion. Fisher (1970) noted:

There is plenty of evidence that when an individual is confronted with his body or some representation of it as a perceptual object he gets stirred up in fairly unique ways. He is surprised, puzzled, autonomically activated, and motivated to take various kinds of defensive strategies. It is even a bit astonishing to learn that he does not have a precise patent against which to compare his mirror image and may have difficulty in deciding precisely how he looks, (p. 14)²

Apparently, as suggested by Holzman, Berger, and Rousey (1967), self-representations contain information that is ordinarily shut out, but that becomes threatening when it cannot be avoided, as in the context of the direct confrontation of one's mirror image or recorded voice.³ There may be expressions and postures that reveal unconscious attitudes that are largely ego alien. Support for such a view comes from studies (e.g., Rogers & Walsh, 1959) demonstrating that, when persons are asked to describe self-representations (e.g., pictures of self) under conditions where they are not aware of the self-reference involved, they exaggerate just those qualities about which they are especially defensive. For example, persons inhibited about being aggressive unknowingly rated their self-representations as more aggressive than those of others (Rogers & Coleman, 1959).

Researchers continue to be curious about how well people can identify their own bodies and about the nature of their reactions when they unknowingly encounter self-representations. Geliert, Girgus and Cohen (1971) probed the ability of male (N = 97) and female (N = 69) children between the ages of 5 and 13 years to recognize their own bodies. Their photographs were taken from the front, back, and side while they wore brief bathing suits. The children were later asked to select their own photographs from a set consisting of their own and those of a number of same-sexed age mates. Selections were made under different conditions: with heads and necks covered and uncovered; with the accompanying pictures of other children varying in their degree of similarity to the self pictures. There was almost perfect accuracy in identifying self when the head was visible in either side or front views. Accuracy for the back view improved with age, from 52% (5–9 years) to 88% (9.5 years). When the head was concealed, accuracy was low but still greater than chance at all age levels. No sex differences in ability to identify self were detected. Interestingly, fat children made significantly more errors in self-recognition than did thin children. By and large, accuracy in self-perception, even among children as young as 5 years of age, was high when adequate cues were provided.

Nash (1969) obtained photographs of seventh- (N = 26) and ninth-grade (N = 20) boys and cut them into strips in such a fashion that 11 different isolated body parts were depicted (e.g., forehead, eyes, chest, legs). Within each grade group, the boys were mutually acquainted. Subjects were asked to pick from each series of pictures of a given body part the one representing self and any others they recognized. In both grade groups, self-recognition was greater than chance, and the older subjects did better than the younger ones. Self-identification was most accurate for the forehead and second best for the mouth. There was also reasonably good recognition of the chest and eyes. However, self-recognition was particularly poor for hand, leg, nose, and ear.

In a second phase of the study, Nash asked 10 psychiatric residents who had had pictures of their heads taken to render a series of judgments similar to those obtained from the children just described. In this judging situation, larger photographs were used and a larger variety of perspectives was employed (e.g., profile views). It was found that self-recognition exceeded chance expectation for almost every part of the head (except hair and ear). Those parts of the face that were most successfully identified for self were also those most often correctly identified for others. The mouth and the eyes were among the most recognizable of the entire head. Self-recognition was greater for a silhouette of one's face than for any other type of facial photograph. Nash doubted that one's degree of familiarity with various parts of one's body could explain differential success in identifying pictures of those parts. He wondered if the explanation was more likely to involve how interested persons were in specific areas of their bodies as a function of their “membership in a stigmatized group, or occupation, or biological changes associated with particular phases of development, or ‘incorporation’ of parental concern about body surface appearance” (p. 338).

Collins, Harper, and Cassel (1976) examined the ability of adolescent boys (N = 55) and girls (N = 94) who averaged 18 years of age to identify their own bodies when facial and clothing cues were eliminated. Subjects were photographed from three different perspectives (front, side, rear) while wearing a standard brief costume and with facial features concealed by a hood. A week later they were asked to pick out their own photographs, which were presented along with six photographs of others of similar height and weight. The identification of one's own body proved to be rather accurate: about 85% correct for front view; 65% for side view; and 76% for rear view. The girls required significantly more time than the boys to render their self-identification judgments. Collins et al. speculated that this might be due to the girls' “greater ego involvement” with their bodies.

Collins (1981) photographed 17 male and 17 female Australian subjects in the nude. Their mean age was 19. One month after the photographs were taken, the subjects were asked to identify front, side, and rear views of themselves from an array of seven photographs grouped according to height and linearity. Judgments were similarly made with reference to individual body parts: head, thorax, abdomen, arms, and legs, as well as the torso and top and bottom half of the body. The front view of the full body was correctly recognized by 94% of the males and 100% of the females. The respective correct identifications for the rear view were 63% and 92%; and for the side view, 81% and 100%, respectively. The males correctly identified 100% of the pictures of the front view of their bottom half, whereas the females had only 92% success. This sex difference was reversed for the front view of the top half of the body: males, 94% and females, 100% success. The difference is noteworthy in view of previous data (Fisher, 1970) indicating that males have relative difficulty in perceiving aniseikonic change in the upper body region and that females display such difficulty in relation to the lower body region. It should be noted, though, that the difference Collins found between males' and females' ability to identify their upper versus lower body regions changed when side or back views were involved; then, females' accuracy was superior for both regions. Women were 100% accurate in identifying their own breasts, whereas men correctly identified their chests in only 88% of their judgments. Males correctly identified their own genitals in 94% of judgments; the comparable percentage for woman was 75. It is interesting that both sexes were more successful in identifying their right arm than their left (viz., 81% versus 50% for males, and 67% versus 58% for females). Overall, the females tended to be more accurate in their identifications than were the males. However, no formal significance test of this difference was provided. Collins determined the speed with which subjects rendered their judgments; and he was particularly impressed with the relative quickness with which the females could correctly identify their breasts and the males their genitals. He speculated about the special prominence of these body parts in the respective female and male sexual identities. As in a previous study (Collins et al., 1976), the females were observed to take significantly longer than males in rendering their body identifications.

Collins and Propert (1983) examined the role of menarcheal status in the ability of Australian girls (N = 175) to identify photographs depicting their body (clad only in briefs and with the head occluded). Each subject was presented with an array of five photographs (one of which was of herself) and asked to indicate which one was her own. There was a steady and significant trend for identification to improve as one proceeded along the continuum from premenarcheal to menarcheal to postmenarcheal stages, but only if the front view of the subject was involved. When subjects judged side and rear view photographs, the postmenarcheal girls were most accurate, but the menarcheal girls were surprisingly less accurate than the premenarcheal girls. Collins and Propert speculated that the body changes linked with adolescence are most quickly and systematically recognized for the front of the body, and less so for other body areas not so easily amenable to inspection. Postmenarcheal girls were able to identify the front view photograph of their body with 84% accuracy, and this matches well the judgmental accuracy found in the earlier Collins et al. (1976) study. Accuracy in postmenarcheal girls was 74% for identifying the side view and 71% for the rear view.

Nolan and Kagan (1980) looked at the ability of 61 boys and 61 girls (ages 2½ through 5½) to recognize photographs of their hands and faces. Subjects viewed each of their photographs in the context of three similar foils and had to identify which was self. Besides the usual full-face pictures, there was also one of the eyes and nose only and another with the eyes blackened out. Ninety-five percent of the children were able to identify correctly their full face photographs⁴ as well as those in which the eyes were blackened out. Pictures of the hands in a palms up position were significantly better identified by the older half than by the younger half of the total sample (45% versus 26% correct). But only the girls showed improvement with age in identifying their faces from which all but the eyes and nose had been omitted. Correct identification rose from 33% for the younger girls to 59% for the older girls. Similarly, only the girls showed improvement with age in identifying pictures of their hands with palms down (44% correct under age 4 to 79% correct over age 4). Nolan and Kagan did not offer an explanation for the fact that the girls showed significant improvement with age, whereas the boys did not.

Solhkhah, Heller, and Aderman (1979) explored the ability of 46 male and 42 female children (ages 11–13) to define correctly their facial proportions when confronted with a mirror that systematically distorted their features. They were given the task of adjusting the mirror so that the distorted images would be “back to normal.” Personality scores from the High School Personality Questionnaire (Cattell & Cattell, 1969) and teachers' ratings were also available for the subjects. A generally high level of accuracy was found in the mirror judgments. However, it should be emphasized that the subjects were first shown an undistorted image of self before being exposed to the distorted versions. This provided an anchor that enhances accuracy. Previous work (Schneiderman, 1956) has shown that, if adults are not provided with such an anchor, they may make considerable errors when attempting to correct distorted mirror images of self. In the Solhkhah et al. study there were no sex differences⁵ in the accuracy of the facial judgments, but the girls tended to overestimate more than the boys. There were scattered findings involving personality measures that did not add up to much. For example, “relaxed” boys made the most distortion errors. Boys who were low in “social interaction” perceived themselves as smaller, whereas “sociable boys” tended to enlarge their facial features. Girls “rated as average in sociability enlarged their facial images, where those extreme in sociability view themselves as small or perhaps more ‘feminine’” (p. 249).

As already mentioned, the special arousal elicited by confrontation with one's self can be detected (e.g., by increased autonomic response) even when the individual is apparently unaware that the confrontation is taking place. A number of studies have continued to document this fact. Gur and Sackeim (1979; Sackeim & Gur, 1978) have done some ingenious work in this area. They sought to demonstrate that an active, defensive process of “self-deception” is involved in misidentification of self in self-confrontation situations. They have used primarily reactions to one's own voice as the basis for their investigation. In one study, they exposed 30 male and 30 female college students, individually, to tape recordings of voices of self and others. Subjects were to indicate in each instance whether the voice was their own or that of a stranger, and furthermore to rate their confidence in their judgments. GSR was simultaneously recorded. Inasmuch as a high level of GSR arousal has been found to typify people exposed to their own voice, even when the voice is incorrectly identified as not self, Gur and Sackeim (1979) assumed that GSR response could be used as a rough index of whether identification of self had, at some level, actually occurred. They relied heavily on this idea to construct a paradigm for demonstrating that motivated deception and contradiction enter into self confrontation responses. Gur and Sackeim considered that (p. 150), “If subjects hold contradictory beliefs when they incorrectly identify voices, then their levels of GSR reactivity should be high when they misidentify voices of self as others (false negative responses) and low when they misidentify voices of others as self (false positive responses). This would indicate that when subjects committed such errors, at some level of processing correct identifications had been made.” The results conformed significantly to this pattern. There was also evidence that those subjects who made errors in identifying self were particularly likely to score high on a “measure of individual differences in tendencies to engage in self deception.”⁶

In another phase of this study, Gur and Sackeim had subjects (30 male, 30 female) judge for a series of recorded voices whether they were hearing themselves or others. Half of the subjects had first had a success experience and half had had failure. It was expected that the failure experience would make self-confrontation more aversive and that success would have the opposite effect. As expected, the subj...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Preface
• I. Critical Analysis of Research Concerned with Body Perception and Body Attitudes