Considering Pragma-Dialectics

Peter Houtlosser, Agnes van Rees, Peter Houtlosser, Agnes van Rees

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781135250546
• Topic: Languages & Linguistics
• Subtopic: Communication Studies
• Index: Languages & Linguistics

Considering Pragma-Dialectics honors the monumental contributions of one of the foremost international figures in current argumentation scholarship: Frans van Eemeren. The volume presents the research efforts of his colleagues and addresses how their work relates to the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation with which van Eemeren's name is so intimately connected. This tribute serves to highlight the varied approaches to the study of argumentation and is destined to inspire researchers to advance scholarship in the field far into the future.

Replete with contributions from highly-esteemed academics in argumentation study, chapters in this volume address such topics as:
*Pragma-dialectic versus epistemic theories of arguing and arguments;
*Pragma-dialectics and self-advocacy in physician-patient interactions;
*The pragma-dialectical analysis of the ad hominem family;
*Rhetoric, dialectic, and the functions of argument; and
*The semantics of reasonableness.

As an exceptional volume and a fitting tribute, this work will be of interest to all argumentation scholars considering the astute insights and scholarly legacy of Frans van Eemeren.

CHAPTER

1

Pragma-Dialectic Versus Epistemic Theories of Arguing and Arguments: Rivals or Partners?

John Biro

University of Florida

Harvey Siegel

University of Miami

In this chapter we advance what we take to be the right way to conceive of the relation between what has come to be known as the theory of argumentation and certain traditional philosophical questions about arguments. According to two of the most prominent authors in the field of argumentation studies, argumentation means the “verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 1).¹ Thus a theory of argumentation is a theory of this activity, and its aim must be, as with any theory of anything, to tell us how best to think about what it is a theory of.

Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical theory is the best-developed and most influential theory of this kind.² According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), “argumentation theorists are interested in the … analysis and the evaluation of argumentative discourse” (p. 2). Central to the pragma-dialectical theory is the idea that argumentative discourse (i.e., argumentation in the activity sense) aims “to resolve a difference of opinion in accordance with critical norms of reasonableness” (p. 53).

The analysis and evaluation of arguments has, of course, always been a central interest of philosophers, in two different ways. One of these is just that that is what philosophers do with particular arguments, both others’ and the ones they themselves devise. At least in the mainstream Western tradition, doing philosophy is doing this and nothing else, and doing anything else is not doing philosophy. The other way in which the analysis and evaluation of arguments is important in philosophy is as something that itself stands in need of analysis and standards of evaluation. Such analysis and the development of such standards is the task of logic, understood in a suitably broad sense, including not just formal logic, deductive and inductive, but parts of epistemology and the philosophy of science, as well. In fact, the task is clearly an epistemological one, if one thinks of an argument, as we believe the tradition just alluded to does, as a route to knowledge or, at least, to reasonable belief. (Other such routes treated in the tradition include perception, memory, introspection, and testimony.) From this perspective, we can think of an argument as epistemically serious if it can serve as a tool for the acquisition of knowledge or reasonable belief. It is for this reason that in previous papers we dubbed the theory of fallacies we advocate, and the broader approach to the study of arguments and argumentation we endorse, an epistemic theory: An argument is fallacious if it masquerades as being able to yield knowledge or reasonable belief but cannot in fact do so.

Our main interest here is the relation between a pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation³ and an epistemic approach to argument (of which an epistemic theory of fallacies is a part). It is our contention that while they can appear to be in conflict, they are in fact complementary, and should be thought of as good companions, rather than rivals. They focus on different things, but these different things are both parts, or aspects, of the complex phenomenon that we (should) want to understand. Another way of putting things is that to understand an activity, one needs to understand the objects—however abstract these may be—with which the activity concerns itself and, conversely, to understand the properties of those objects, one needs to understand the activities in which they play a role and the nature of the role they play. The two are, in fact, inseparable and equally necessary for a proper theoretical understanding of the activity of argumentation, the objects with which that activity concerns itself (i.e., arguments), and of the interrelations between the two.

It is not part of our claim that there cannot be genuine, as opposed to merely apparent, conflict between the two approaches. Indeed, on one interpretation of the pragma-dialectical approach, it and the epistemic approach yield not just a different analysis of what a fallacy is but, not surprisingly, a different extension for ‘fallacy’.⁴ For the former (at least in van Eemeren & Grootendorst’s (2004) version of it), “Every violation of any of the rules of the discussion procedure for conducting a critical discussion … is a fallacy” (p. 175); “fallacies are … moves in an argumentative discourse or text that can be characterized as less than constructive, or even destructive, because they are violations of a well-defined system of rules for the resolution of differences of opinion …” (p. 175). On this view, if I fail to allow my opponent to challenge the thesis (van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s ‘standpoint’) I have advanced, or fail to defend it when challenged—Rule 2 of their rules for a critical discussion (2004, p. 137)—I have committed a fallacy. This seems wrong to us, as does their claim that “(a)ll violations of the rules in a critical discussion are incorrect discussion moves that roughly correspond to the argumentative flaws traditionally known as ‘fallacies’”(p. 22). Shutting up one’s opponent or refusing to argue for one’s claim is not to commit a fallacy: to do that, one has, surely, to be arguing!

However, we will discuss fallacies further here.⁵ Instead, we try next to show that if we unpack van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s notion of a ‘critical discussion’ in a certain way, their theory can be seen as implying the correctness of the epistemic approach. On the other hand, we argue, if we do not unpack that notion (and associated notions such as that of reasonableness) in that way, the theory collapses into a rhetorical one, one in which talk of critical discussion and of reasonableness does no work.⁶

The notion of a critical discussion is central to van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (2004) account of argumentation. On that account, a critical discussion is “an exchange of views in which the parties involved in a difference of opinion systematically try to determine whether the standpoint or standpoints at issue are defensible in the light of critical doubt or objections” (p. 52). Critical discussions aim at resolving differences of opinion, and attempts to resolve such differences in such discussions are understood to take place “in accordance with critical norms of reasonableness” (p. 53). Resolution is achieved only “when the parties involved in the difference have reached agreement on the question of whether the standpoints at issue are acceptable or not” (pp. 57–58). This is only the beginning of an adequate account of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s model of a critical discussion, which they elaborate in considerable detail (pp. 42–68 and passim). But it is enough, we think, to allow us to indicate the two different ways in which it can be interpreted or understood.

The first interpretation centers on agreement and resolution: A dispute is successfully resolved when the parties to it agree on the acceptability or otherwise of the standpoint(s) at issue. On this understanding, a critical discussion’s ending in a resolution (or not) depends on nothing more than the parties’ coming to agreement. The grounds for the agreement are irrelevant, since the parties can agree that a particular standpoint is (or is not) acceptable either for different reasons, for the same reasons differently understood, or for the same reasons understood in the same way but nevertheless misevaluated. Such agreement can, moreover, fail to be based on reasons at all; it may be caused in a myriad of other ways. On this interpretation, van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (2004) account collapses into a rhetorical one; rhetoric—that is, persuasion aiming at agreement—is all there is to dispute resolution, and since dispute resolution is the aim of argumentation, such rhetorical or persuasive effectiveness is all there is to argumentation.

Many of their remarks can be read in this way, that is, as indicating that agreement is sufficient for dispute resolution, and that such resolution is the aim of argumentation: “The model [of a critical discussion] is based on the premise that a difference of opinion is only resolved when the parties involved in the difference have reached agreement on the question of whether the standpoints at issue are acceptable or not. This means that one party has to be convinced by the argumentation of the other party of the admissibility of that party’s standpoint, or that the other party retracts his standpoint because he realizes that his argument cannot stand up to the criticism” (pp. 57–58); “The difference of opinion is resolved when the arguments advanced lead the antagonist to accept the standpoint defended, or when the protagonist retracts his standpoint as a consequence of the critical reactions of the antagonist” (p. 133); “The rules of the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure pertain to the behavior of people who want to resolve their differences of opinion by means of a critical discussion” (p. 135); “The pragma-dialectical rules for a critical discussion … combine to form a discussion procedure that indicates which norms the speech acts performed by either of the parties in a difference of opinion must satisfy in order to contribute to the resolution of the difference of opinion” (p. 187); “We present an ideal model in which the rules for reasonable argumentative discourse are specified as rules for the performance of speech acts in a critical discussion aimed at resolving a dispute … [Participants] must observe all the rules that are instrumental to resolving the dispute … In our approach, committing a fallacy is not automatically considered to be tantamount to unethical conduct: It is wrong in the sense that it frustrates efforts to arrive at the resolution of a dispute. The very fact that they all represent indispensable components of a code of conduct for resolving differences of opinion is the rationale for the 10 discussion rules we present…” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 104–105); “The pragma-dialectical ideal model specifies the rules for reasonable argumentative discourse as rules for the performance of speech acts in a critical discussion aimed at resolving a dispute” (p. 217).

Despite these passages, which suggest that this rhetorical interpretation of their account is the one they favor, in other places van Eemeren and Grootendorst are at pains to distance themselves from it. They insist that their account is ‘pragma-dialectical’ rather than rhetorical, and they criticize merely rhetorical accounts of argumentation and/or dispute-resolution (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 123–132). They also criticize Toulmin’s and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s accounts of argumentation for being excessively rhetorical (pp. 47–48). Despite the many passages in their writings which suggest a rhetorical interpretation of their view, then, let us for the moment set that interpretation aside.

The second interpretation centers on van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s consistent emphasis on the normative dimension of the resolution of a difference of opinion in a critical discussion. Such resolution, they insist, must be ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational,’ and must be achieved “in accordance with critical norms of reasonableness” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 52).⁷ If such reasonableness is understood as we are inclined to understand it, in terms of the degree of warrant or justification afforded the conclusion/standpoint by the considerations advanced in its favor by one or both of the parties, then van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s account is in fact an epistemic one and coincides with our own: good arguments advance knowledge or reasonable belief, and disputes are rationally or reasonably resolved only when they result in such advance.

Is this the interpretation we should, or van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) would, favor? Regrettably, it seems not, because in their discussions of ‘rational,’ ‘critical rationality,’ ‘reasonable,’ and ‘normative’ they seem to construe these crucial notions in a rather different way. True, they insist that normativity is an essential dimension of argumentation, one that a good theory must capture and explain, and they criticize the (in their view) overly rhetorical accounts of Toulmin and Olbrechts-Tyteca for failing to do this: “What this set of theoretical instruments lacks is a normative dimension that does justice to dialectical considerations. A difference of opinion can only be resolved in accordance with a critical philosophy of reasonableness … if a systematic discussion takes place between two parties who reasonably weigh up the arguments for and against the standpoints at issue” (p. 50). We agree that normativity and reasonableness are central to the theoretical understanding of argumentation. But what is a “critical philosophy of reasonableness”? What is it for the parties to “reasonably weigh up the arguments for and against the standpoints at issue”? What counts as a reasonable ‘weighing up’ of those arguments? As noted, if by this they mean something like ‘determining whether the arguments result in gains in knowledge or justified belief,’ then their account is, in the end, epistemic. But the reference to “dialectical considerations” in the first sentence of the just-cited passage suggests that they do not mean this, and indeed they do not: ‘Reasonableness’ is understood by them to be dialectical, to be a matter of admissible moves, rather than of epistemically evaluable content. As they continue the just-cited passage, “This means that the set of theoretical instruments that we need has to contain rules and procedures that indicate which moves are admissible in a critical discussion” (p. 50). And, as they put it a few pages later: “The model [of a critical discussion] provides a series of norms by which it can be determined in what respects an argumentative exchange of ideas diverges from the procedure that is the most conducive to the resolution of a difference of opinion” (p. 59). Here, too, norms and normativity concern not matters of epistemological status, that is, the relations obtaining between propositions/conclusions/standpoints and the reasons offered in their support, but are concerned solely with dialectical and procedural matters and with whether they conduce to the resolution of a difference of opinion. So, on the pragma-dialectical view, my intervention in a critical discussion is ‘reasonable’ just insofar as it conforms to the procedure most conducive to the resolution of a difference of opinion; and my embrace of a standpoint is reasonable just in case it results from a series of exchanges which so conforms.

This reading of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (2004) ‘dialectical’ account of reasonableness is confirmed, and that account further developed, in their highly interesting discussion of these matters in the opening sections of chapter 6, “Rules for a Critical Discussion” (pp. 123–134).⁸ Here they distinguish ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ as follows: “… we shall use the term rational for the use of the faculty of reasoning and the term reasonable for the sound use of the faculty of reasoning” (p. 124). They articulate their preferred, dialectical view of the ‘sound use of the faculty of reasoning’ (i.e., reasonableness) in the following way:

In our view, it is necessary to depart radically from the justificationism of the geometrical and anthropological approaches to reasonableness and to replace these conceptions of reasonableness with a different one. We do so by adopting the view of a critical rationalist who proceeds on the basis of the fundamental fallibility of all human thought. To critical rationalists, the idea of a systematic critical scrutiny of all fields of human thought and activity is the principle that serves as the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• 1 Pragma-Dialectic Versus Epistemic Theories of Arguing and Arguments: Rivals or Partners?
• 2 Pragma-Dialectics and pragma-dialectics
• 3 Pragma-Dialectics and Self-Advocacy in Physician-Patient Interactions
• 4 Evaluating Analogy: Toward a Descriptive Approach to Argumentative Norms
• 5 Reflections on the Hyper Dialectical Definition of Argument
• 6 A Place for Informal Logic Within Pragma-Dialectics
• 7 When Reasons Matter Most: Pragma-Dialectics and the Problem of Informed Consent
• 8 My Interlocutor
• 9 Mill and Pragma-Dialectics
• 10 The Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of the Ad Hominem Fallacy
• 11 Derailments of Argumentation: It Takes Two to Tango
• 12 The Ambiguous Relationship between Pragma-Dialectics and Logic
• 13 Pragma-Dialectic’s Appropriation of Speech Act Theory
• 14 How to Present Fallacious Messages Persuasively: The Case of the “Nigeria Spam Letters”
• 15 Hidden Effects of Presumptive Arguments on Argument Assessment Strategies
• 16 Logic and Games
• 17 Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Functions of Argument
• 18 The Pragma-Dialectic Ideal of Reasonableness and an Education for Critical Thinking and for the Building of a Moral Community
• 19 Gender Aspects Concerning the Concept of “Strategic Maneuvering”
• 20 Pragma-Dialectics and Persuasion Effects Research
• 21 On Casting Doubt: The Dialectical Aspect of Normative Rules in Argumentation
• 22 The Semantics of Reasonableness
• 23 Discourse Linguistics and Argumentation as Open Systems
• 24 The Impact of Argumentation on Artificial Intelligence
• 25 Pragma-Dialectics: A Retrospective
• 26 The Ten Rules of Pragma-Dialectics and Validity in Argumentation
• Author Index
• Subject Index