Revitalizing Political Psychology

The Legacy of Harold D. Lasswell

William Ascher, Barbara Hirschfelder-Ascher

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781317433941
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The goal of this book is to recapture the diminished roles of affect, psychological needs, and the psychodynamic mechanisms that are crucial for understanding political behavior by explaining and extending the contributions of Harold D. Lasswell, the dominant figure in political psychology in the mid-twentieth-century. Although Lasswell was best known for applying psychodynamic theories to politics, this book also demonstrates how his framework accommodated for cognitive processes and social interactions ranging from communications to policy-making. The authors use Lasswell's contributions and the debates over his ideas as a springboard for examining current policy, political, and leadership issues.

Revitalizing Political Psychology presents and extends four aspects of Lasswell's contributions to the field: the psychodynamic mechanisms drawn from psychoanalytic theory, the use of symbol associations to understand political propaganda, the analysis of "democratic character" for both the public and the elites, and the structure of belief systems. In so doing, the authors link personality and political communication theory to democratic practice. The authors also critique leadership studies using Lasswell's concerns over the risks to democratic accountability and the current preoccupation with strengthening the roles of charismatic and transformational leaders.

Intended for researchers, practitioners, and students in the areas of political and historical psychology, political strategy, and political communication, the book's emphasis on psychodynamics also appeals to psychoanalysts and the material on leadership appeals to professionals in management and industrial/organizational psychology.

Chapter 1

Introduction

THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Political psychology is in need of revitalization to recapture its capacity to incorporate the emotional and psychodynamic roots of political behavior. To be sure, the field has made considerable strides over the past quarter century. First, as an interdisciplinary field that strives to understand the psychological bases of political behavior, it has strengthened its commitment to linking theory to issues of normative importance by focusing on such issues as citizenship responsibility, democratic commitment, interethnic tolerance, and willingness to engage in peaceful conflict resolution.¹ This commitment transcends the misguided “value-free” approach of some earlier research agendas.

Second, great theoretical progress has been made in accounting for how people process information and reconcile new information with preexisting perspectives (Alsolabehere & Iyengar, 1993; Ferejohn & Kuklinski, 1990; Lau & Sears, 1986; Ottati, 2002; Ottati & Wyer, 1993; Torney-Purta, 1989; Wyer & Ottati, 1993). Theories of “political cognition” have sharpened our understanding of how people cope with incomplete and inconsistent information about politics and policies. In the subfield of political socialization, which focuses on the development of political attitudes and predispositions among children and young adults, theories of cognitive and moral development have enriched our understanding of how political orientations change as individuals’ cognitive and ethical capacities mature (Cook, 1985, 1989; Torney-Purta, 1989, 2000). “Political communication” has been analyzed far more systematically today than in previous eras. The theory of heuristics, developed by cognitive psychologists, helped to anticipate the simplifications that people use to understand complex politics and policies when confronted with uncertainty and limited analytic capacity (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).

The study of political cognition has been undertaken through careful surveys, “laboratory” simulations, content analysis of political communications, and other empirical approaches. Except for the rare longitudinal study,² these tests, by their very nature, predominantly focus on current attitudes and only those antecedents that have currently measurable manifestations. As an essential element to understanding how life conditions affect political behavior, contemporary research strongly emphasizes identifying individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics and linking them to beliefs and predispositions to action. Many of these studies meet the standard scientific conventions of explicit measurement, replicability, and statistical analysis.

Yet these accomplishments have come at a cost. A sound political psychology must be more than just a normative commitment and an understanding of political cognition. In order to link the full range of economic, sociological, and political conditions to political predispositions, a framework must be able to account for the impact of long-standing, deeply seated predispositions. In many circumstances, determining how individuals perceive the political situation is only part of the challenge; it is often far more difficult to determine why they have particularly strong affects in relation to the relevant actors and objects. Consider the often surprisingly positive reactions to clearly power-hungry, hyperaggressive leaders with questionable ethics and weak commitment to accountability. Consider also the acute animosity and associated stereotypes targeted toward ethnic groups with whom an individual has had little actual contact. To some degree these beliefs may be “learned,” but often other forces must be at play to account for the intensity of these beliefs. These forces are distinct from the cognitive processing that is currently emphasized in theory and research, even if the cognitive processing is involved in shaping the resultant beliefs and predispositions. Richard Wyer and Victor Ottati noted:

Although there have been many advances in our understanding of the cognitive aspects of political judgment, certain important considerations have been neglected. In particular, social judgments and decisions are often greatly influenced by affective reactions that are elicited by the people or objects being judged or by the information presented about them. The importance of taking these reactions into account is supported by evidence indicating that cognitive and affective process mechanisms are interrelated, with one often influencing the other. … However, the role of these affective mechanisms in political decision-making has rarely been investigated. … (1993, p. 296)

However, Wyer and Ottati’s recommended research agenda is confined to survey-based correlations and “innovative experimental approaches,” with no mention of approaches to distinguish the impact of affects originating from long-standing psychological needs, let alone to account for such affects (Wyer & Ottati, 1993). A decade later, George Marcus (2003) noted that the deficiency in accounting for the emotional or affective component of political belief systems persists. Even if theories of cognitive processing begin to account for the results of particular affects (assuming that the affects can be identified), they cannot fully account for the origins of affects. Therefore, they cannot identify which affects may have peculiar properties (e.g., rigidity or emotional exaggeration) due to connections with psychological needs quite apart from the immediate issue at hand.

This state of affairs came about because contemporary political psychology has largely eschewed efforts to model the internal dynamics that connect psychological needs to political predispositions.³ Psychodynamic functional theories⁴ focus on how internal psychological needs develop and shape attitudes, predispositions, and overt behavior. Some (although not all) of these needs are remote from the current and prior circumstances directly related to the political issue at hand. For example, an individual may hate a particular politician because of mental associations with hated teachers or relatives. Psychodynamic functional theory is indispensable for accounting for the drives and affects that both underlie these perspectives and explain why some predispositions are resistant to accommodation. How do these drives arise and get channeled in particular ways? How do personal histories generate the wide variations in political perspectives, apart from the typical considerations of economic and social standing or political experience? Psychodynamic functional theories presume that the impact of these earlier events or conditions is embodied in deeply seated psychological needs that become engaged in the current situation. Psychodynamic functional theory is necessary to understand why the same external stimuli, whether concrete events and conditions or political symbols, trigger different associations and, hence, different reactions from different individuals.

The functionality of psychodynamic theories does not necessarily mean that the attitudes or predispositions are beneficial or functional overall for either the individual or the polity. Psychodynamic functional theories are often employed to understand behavior that may relieve immediate psychological distress but is destructive to the individual and others in the larger sense. For example, blaming others may relieve a painful sense of guilt, but in the long run it may shape hostile attitudes that damage both the individual and the target of blame.⁵

Without psychodynamic functional theory, the models of sociopolitical linkages deteriorate into stimulus-response hypotheses that particular conditions produce particular responses in obvious, commonsense ways. If both stimulus and response are easily measurable, the weight of some relationships can be assessed through straightforward research designs. Yet, without psychodynamic functional theory we cannot fathom the idiosyncrasies of the political misfit, the abrupt shifts in political mood, the political manifestations of personal insecurities, the allure of political symbols that have no personal resonance to external observers, or the clinging to self-destructive beliefs and practices that have no apparent instrumentality. These require understanding the internal, preexisting psychological pressures impinging on specific individuals or segments of the population.

The Scope of Psychodynamic Functional Theory

Let us clarify the scope of psychodynamic functional theories that are in such short supply in contemporary political psychology. These theories encompass the processes that shape affects, meanings, associations, levels of attention, or predispositions in the service of drives or needs that are at some remove from the political situation at hand (Katz, 1960; Lane, 1959; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956). Following is a partial list of possible mechanisms:⁶

• Affect flows from one object to another, not because of the straightforward generalization from one like thing to another but rather because they are associated by overlapping symbol labels, serve some emotional function, or both. The function may be to fulfill a drive or to relieve anxiety. For example, a key component of Adolf Hitler’s propaganda was to invoke the emotionally compelling symbol of “moral purity” and connect it to the Nazi agenda to preserve the supposed “purity of the racial stock.”⁷

• Predispositions or beliefs may reduce internal conflicts. We are angry with A, but this uncomfortable anger is redirected to B; we had an urge to do X, which somehow threatens our self-image, and thus block out this urge or even develop a strong sentiment condemning X. Hence, the repertoire of possible psychodynamic functional processes encompasses, but is not confined to, the classical set of ego-defense mechanisms proposed by Anna Freud (1936/1966): compensation, displacement, emotional insulation, fantasy, identification, intellectualization, introjection, projection, rationalization, reaction formation, regression, repression, sublimation, and undoing.

• Holding particular attitudes may express values with which the individual wishes to be associated, to enhance either seif-respect or standing among others (Katz, 1960). In some of these cases, the resulting attitude may be inconsistent with other political attitudes. For example, individuals who want to express their tough-mindedness may develop bellicose attitudes toward particular “antagonists” that cannot be explained on the basis of generalization, learning, or interests.

We use the term dynamic in a broader sense than its usage in Freudian theory. In psychoanalytic theory, dynamic (as opposed to static) relationships pertain to the “conflict of opposing mental forces” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 126). We can use the term psychodynamic functional theory to denote the broader conception of predispositions at the service of internal drives as well as of the management of internal difficulties such as anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, and so on.

Many psychodynamic functional theories invoke the unconscious. The unconscious can refer to the mental material outside of awareness or consciousness at a given moment. Alternatively, the unconscious as a system or set of dynamics can mean the processes (e.g., repression) that prevent material from coming into the individual’s awareness at the conscious level. Therefore, the individual cannot act on this material with conscious deliberation, or report its existence to a researcher (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973). Freud’s evolving conceptions of the unconscious and those of various offshoots of psychoanalytic theory do not preclude that formerly unconscious material can come into consciousness—that is the essence of psychoanalytic treatment—but they presume that without special intervention, unconscious material exists in many or even all individuals.

WHY HAS PSYCHODYNAMIC FUNCTIONAL THEORY BEEN NEGLECTED?

We have asserted that psychodynamic functional theory is lacking in contemporary political psychology, but we have yet to explain why it is absent. Nor have we addressed the question of whether its absence is a necessary cost for achieving some other goal.

The Positivist Underpinnings of Contemporary Political Psychology

The neglect of psychodynamic functional theories by many political scientists and psychologists reflects the fact that exploring such theories does not fit within the still rather dominant paradigm of positivist research. The positivist dream is to discover true and certain general Law theory,⁸ approached through definitive empirical testing according to the conventional conception of the “scientific method.” The goal is to discover the correct general theory through empirically based hypothesis testing that disconfirms alternative, false theories (hence it is often labeled falsificationism).⁹ Parsimony is regarded as a great virtue; the continuing existence of contending theories and hypotheses is a sign of the incompleteness of the scientific project. Definitive hypothesis testing is so important that contemporary positivism has no tolerance for constructs that cannot be confirmed through direct observation. Equally importantly, the relationships that can be tested are limited in complexity and time frame. It would be a Herculean task to find definitive, confirmable, statistical evidence of a theory that links life history events to basic character qualities, these qualities to political predispositions, these predispositions to beliefs that emerge in particular political circumstances, and finally these beliefs to political actions under specific external political conditions.¹⁰

The commitment of mainstream political psychology to the positivist project is deep and pervasive. The most telling reflection of the restricted positivist mindset of much of contemporary political psychology is Richard Merelman’s (1989) assessment of the state of political socialization.

He emphasized both critical tests and general law theories in no uncertain terms:

Interest in political socialization among political scientists might reemerge more rapidly if proponents of these hotly debated paradigms recognize that research in political socialization offers them crucial tests of their theories. … It would be more satisfying to use political socialization research to help establish a single political theory, or at least to settle upon a single psychological theory of political socialization itself. We all feel the lure of parsimony. (p. 37; emphasis added)

Stanley Moore echoed this sentiment in the very title of his 1989 article, “The Need for a Unified Theory of Political Learning” Moreover, any perusal of Political Psychology, the flagship journal of the International Society for Political Psychology, would clearly reveal the predominance of research attempting to find and confirm the correct theory. The archetypical article begins with a description of a political issue and the related political behavior, cites two or more theories that have been invoked to explain the behavior, and then presents empirical findings to support one of the theories. Typically, this exercise links observable and current traits with observable and current beliefs and predispositions.

It should now be clear why psychodynamic functional theories are at a severe disadvantage in the eyes of researchers who hold to this positivist outlook. If theories must be definitively tested, those featuring nonobservable constructs representing internal psychodynamics do not qualify. Psychodynamic functional theories are complicated, and generally invoke mechanisms that cannot be proven through cut-and-dried empirical research. In particular, theories invoking the operation of unconscious processes and the impact of repressed material are inaccessible to the standard paradigm of the subject reporting to the researcher. When clever ways of eliciting possible effects of unconscious material are implemented, the skeptical reaction is that the materials emerge only because they are not truly unconscious, as demonstrated by their emergence.¹¹ Surveys, simulations, and other laboratory experiments cannot tap into the long-term development of basic psychological predispositions, nor can complex theories be easily tested by correlations of the variables accessible through these approaches. From a positivist perspective, psychodynamic functional theories are at a severe disadvantage.

The Disrepute of Psychoanalytic Theory

This problem is exacerbated by the disfavor of psychoanalytic theory and its offshoots in most contemporary circles of psychologists.¹² The well-known critique of psychoanalytic theory as untestable and unfalsifiable, especially because of the central role played by unconscious dynamics, is one prominent reason for its rejection (Erwin, 1996; Grünbaum, 1984) but so too is the doctrinaire stance of the most prominent variants of psychoanalytic theory. Insofar as each Freudian, Adlerian, Kleinian, Lacanian, Jungian, or other psychoanalytic offshoot claims to be the true and certain theory, outsiders are likely to be skeptical of all of them. The pragmatist view that each approach should be valued for its insights, whether or not it is fully valid, is a dramatically different perspective.

The Pragmatist Alternative: Back to the Future

Sacrificing the insights of psychodynamic functional theory is unnecessary if we acknowledge the validity of the pragmatist approach to the development and application of theory. Today, we typically label the apparently new waves of philosophy of science with such terms as postpositivist or postmodern, inasmuch as their development followed the flourishing of the positivist applications of the past half-century. However, pragmatism already exhibited the insights shared with postpositivism that are crucial for justifying the status of psychodynamic functional theory: the recognition that ultimate certainty is unattainable and concepts are constructed and temporally bound, skepticism toward universalistic generalizations, and continued preoccupation with the ways in which seemingly straight-forward language can mislead.

Let us compare contemporary positivism with the pragmatist approach that animated the remarkable developments in political psychology from the 1930s through the 1960s. This pragmatism also calls for empirical research, but the conception of developing, applying, and appraising empirically based theory differs greatly from that of contemporary political psychology. For the pragmatists, sets of propositions—or hypothesis schemas—are developed by learning inductively from experience. For Will...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Chapter 1 Introduction
• Chapter 2 The Displacement Hypothesis
• Chapter 3 Symbols, Personality, and Appeals: Lasswell’s Contribution to the Political Psychology of Propaganda
• Chapter 4 Democratic Character
• Chapter 5 Political Psychology and the Risks of Leadership
• Chapter 6 Political Climate, Mood, and Crisis
• Chapter 7 Integrating Lasswell’s Contributions: Brief Applications
• Chapter 8 Conclusion: The Role of the Political Psychiatrist
• Endnotes
• References
• Author Index
• Subject Index