CHAPTER 1
A Moral Outlook
I
This is damn foolishnessāit cannot be that the forty-ninth variety of bagel is more important than your schoolsā¦and you ought to ask yourselves why you act as if it wereā¦
āRobert Solow, Nobel Laureate (quoted in Cassidy, 1998), commenting on Kenneth Galbraithās (1969) Affluent Society
In America, it is illegal neither to create the forty-ninth variety of bagel nor to receive an education that is substandard compared to the best that others receive. But it is unfair, unjust, and unkind.
II
Advantage: āa factor or circumstance that gives superiority to its possessor or that puts him [her]ā¦in a favorable or improved position.ā
āWebsterās Third New International Dictionary (1966)
Advantage surrounds me. I write from Stanford, California, a privileged ācompanyā town that is redolent of physical, financial, and cultural well-being. I live down the street from Stanford University and Silicon Valley. The fabled Mediterranean climate brings year-round pleasure. The less advantaged live elsewhere.
By virtue of memory and contrast, my friend Cohn from Long Beach, California, often pulls me back to our ghetto on Chicagoās West Side. It still is a ghetto today but for kids much less likely to eventually live favored lives elsewhere. The ghosts of my parents pull me back to Jane Addamsā Hull House, which kept them off the street as children, and where I went for recreation each Saturday morning with my mother.
After seven, ten, maybe more false-start titles, I find Permissible Advantage to be the most fitting designation for this book about Edgewood Academy, an elite school, containing Grades 6 through 12, whose promise of outstanding educational opportunities and outstanding futures is eminently realizable. Edgewood Academy provides an educational experience and cachet that merits designation as privileged. The outcome of a privileged education is advantage, a relativistic term that indicates that Academy graduates have enhanced life opportunities compared to most students in the country.1 Is it right that they do?
I find it interesting to think about advantage gained in biological terms, by which organisms seek advantage for their progeny in the selection of their mates. Similarly, Academy parents seek advantages for their children in their choice of schooling, which may represent a continuation of advantage seeking on the part of the parents and the initiation of advantage seeking on the part of their children. The lesson learned (or reinforced, as the case may be) is that choice of schooling is instrumental for keeping an already desirable status quo but also for changing an undesirable one.
I wanted to study a school where it was the norm that its students attended college, indeed, where it was a perverse act not to do so. Of necessity, this meant studying a school that served students with high educational and career aspirations. By good chance, I was introduced to and received permission to conduct research at Edgewood Academy,2 a nonpublic school in New Mexico.
One does not drive by the schoolās otherwise residential neighborhood, located near the northeastern edge of the city, without taking note of the striking nonresidential structures that rise above their surroundings. The Academy could easily be mistaken for a small liberal arts college, with its spread of brick academic and administrative buildings, well-tended lawns and gardens,
array of playing fields, and imposing large library. The campus is bounded by a tall, black metal fence that encloses and separates the school from its surroundings. In this high desert region of New Mexico, a state known more for its beauty than its affluence, Edgewood Academy is both a physical and an educational oasis. It has its cultural origins in and connections to the opportunities and prospects of the larger world beyond its immediate location. A school is known by what it is designed to lead to, by what, in fact, it makes possible afterward for those whom it serves. A school is known by the nature and reach of advantage that its experience affords its students, and the Academy experience affords far-reaching advantages.
III
Over the years, professional and lay media have dealt with a variety of issues and forms of nonpublic schools. Twenty-five years ago, the proliferation of new Christian schools brought joy to many parents who saw the āhumanistā public school as anathema to their doctrine, and despair to public school educators who saw a shrinking enrollment and corresponding decline in state revenues. On a smaller scale, African American and Hispanic Americans, also disappointed with public education, opened schools that would do educational justice to their cultural interests and needs. Further, interest in nonpublic (most often Catholic) schools aroseāon grounds that were neither doctrinal nor culturalāfrom their possibly superior contribution to the academic achievement of urban students who otherwise did poorly in public schools.
This study of Edgewood Academy focuses on one type of nonpublic schoolāthe elite school, known also by its primary function as a college preparatory school. My book differs from Arthur Powellās (1996) fine study that explores āthe education that privileged schools provide and not privilege itselfā (p. 6). The latter is more my focus. It also differs from Peter Cookson and Caroline Persellās (1985) work that concludes by wondering if the āprep experienceā has become so outmoded that we should look, rather, āto those who are less shackled by conventional ways of doing things,ā to those who are less āprisoners of their classā (p. 207). Perhaps because it is not a boarding school, and because it is a relatively new school located in the more egalitarian southwest, Edgewood Academyās students show no sign of shackling or being class prisoners.
Clearly, there is a host of conceivable focal points in the study of elite schools. Many of them already have been incorporated in existing literature:
⢠Legal issues (Devins, 1989)
⢠a rationale for their existence (Heely, 1951)
⢠pedagogical lessons (Powell, 1996)
⢠the economic advantages of their students (Bills, 1988; Collins, 1979; and Kingston, 1981)
⢠reproduction of elites (Cookson & Persell, 1985; Maxwell & Maxwell, 1995)
⢠enhanced access to elite higher education (Cookson & Persell, 1985)
⢠identity formation (Proweller, 1998)
⢠historical analysis (McLachlan, 1970)
⢠comparative academic achievement (Haertel, James, & Levin, 1987)
⢠tuition tax credits and governance structures (James & Levin, 1988)
⢠minority student attendance (Doyle, 1981)
⢠moral traditions (Hays, 1994).
There is more; this list is suggestive of the topics and literature available to illuminate the working of elite nonpublic schools.
IV
Morris Dickstein (1996) wrote that Congressās ādiminished sympathy for societyās losersā can be traced to several factors, ābut some of it arises from a willed ignorance of how the other half lives. Because we all lead insular livesā¦the poor remain part of a distant underclass and take on no individual realityā (p. 19). Dickstein is right about our so-called losers, but his point extends equally to our so-called winners, who enjoy a corresponding oversight. Anthropologist Laura Nader (1969) reminded us of the disproportionate focus of researchers on the poor and the powerless, as did Lois Weis and Michele Fine (1991), who stress that we should not forget those institutions embodying historical powerāthe private secondary school. This oversight tends to preclude us from asking who the winners are and what they are walking away with.
Privilege and advantage operate as my controlling concepts, the filtering terms that shaped what I saw and what I care to write about. Zygmunt Baumanās (1995) point about our moral responsibilities leads to an admonition that only the most depraved would deny. Of course, we have moral responsibilities, a cost-free concession. Moving beyond this concession is where everything becomes moot and where our accord gets lost, then abandoned, in the deep morass of Who gets how much? Who decides? and What next?
All school decisions are moral in nature because in one way or another, sooner or later, they relate to the well-being (e.g., political, economic, cognitive, emotional, social) of students, parents, community, and society. Of procedural importance are questions such as: Who, in fact, makes the judgmentsā pedagogical, curricular, organizational, and interpersonalāthat determine what the nature of the school will be, and who does not? Who are the beneficiaries of these decisions? Whose good do they ignore or slight or undermine? And do they take account of the short-, middle-, and long-term needs and aspirations of students?
Of substantive importance is the outcome of decisions made about what schools elect to teach; what form teaching takes; what ideological orientation is given to what is taught; and what resources are provided for the efficacy of what is taught. āEducation,ā as Chris Clark (1991) observed, āis a profoundly moral businessā (p. 431; see also Dewey, 1909; Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993; Tom, 1984).
I am attracted to the perspective provided by moral choice because of our conventional concern as a society for what is moral, albeit a concern that is much more often associated with religion than with education, more often with the Girl Scouts than with the glee club. Behavior considered moral, outcomes considered moralāas a people, we take these matters to be salient and essential, perhaps inevitably so (Kagan, 1998). If only for the sake of appearances, we learn that we should not demean what others take to be moral. By focusing on moral choices, I underscore that while on the face of it, schools are about algebra and accounting, basketball and drama, field trips and competitions, they are, as well, most fully, inevitably, and irrevocably about what is moral. As such, what schools do and what happens in school must never be taken lightly, for all this goes to the heart of our lives.
Furthermore, the mere existence of particular types of schoolsādoctrinally suffused Christian schools, ethnically centered schools, or academically oriented, elite prep schoolsāindicate moral choices that some American subgroup has made and, moreover, that American society has made about legally acceptable ways to educate American children.
Some moral choices that affect schools originate in the action of state legislatures and state departments of education, some in the financial and regulatory stipulations that emerge from federal government action. Day-to-day, however, a schoolās moral choices originate in and are enacted by the ongoing action of its local clientele and community. In fact, as an embedded institution (Peshkin, 1995), schools are subject to an enormous number and type of agenciesāe.g., interest groups, think tanks, professional organizationsād...