Extending Intelligence

Enhancement and New Constructs

Patrick C. Kyllonen, Richard D. Roberts, Lazar Stankov

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• Print ISBN: 9780805845044
• eBook ISBN: 9781317433828
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

This volume presents research from a variety of perspectives on the enhancement of human intelligence. It is organized around five themes – enhancement via instruction; enhancement via development (over the life cycle); enhancement over time; enhancement via new constructs; and new directions in enhancement.

Three key issues are addressed:

• First, although most of the scientific research on intelligence has concerned what it is, this volume attends to the consequential societal and economic issue concerns of whether it can be increased, and how.
• Second, intellectual enhancement is particularly important when targeted to minorities and the poor, groups that have typically performed relatively less well on intelligence and achievement measures. This volume reflects the education community's ongoing interest in understanding, and attempting to close, achievement or test score gaps.
• Third, most of the attention to examining intellectual enhancement, and in accounting for and closing the test-score gap, has focused on general cognitive ability. In line with the current emphasis on considering intelligence from a wider perspective, this volume includes constructs such as emotional and practical intelligence in definitions of intellectual functioning.

Extending Intelligence: Enhancement and New Constructs is an essential volume for researchers, students, and professionals in the fields of educational psychology, intelligence, educational measurement and assessment, and critical thinking.

V

ENHANCEMENT VIA NEW CONSTRUCTS

13

g, g’s, or Jeez: Which Is the Best Model for Developing Abilities, Competencies, and Expertise?

Robert J. Sternberg

Tufts University

There are three kinds of views of intelligence that compete for attention in today’s world of intelligence. I refer to these three kinds of theories as g, g’s, and jeez.

The first kind of view, dating back to Spearman (1904), is the theory of g, or general ability (Jensen, 1998; Spearman, 1927), according to which, for whatever other abilities there may be, general ability—an ability that is believed to pervade performance on any intellectual task (hence, its name)—is critical for success of various kinds.

A second kind of view, with antecedents dating back to Thurstone (1938), argues that general ability is not, in fact, central to an understanding of human intelligence. Thurstone believed that there are multiple (correlated) primary mental abilities. General ability is, at best, a secondary phenomenon. Gardner (1983, 1999) has argued for distinct multiple intelligences, each of which is relatively distinct from the others. Sternberg (1997, 1999b; Sternberg et al., 2000) has argued that there are three aspects of intelligence—analytical, creative, and practical—that are relatively distinct. Analytical and practical abilities tend each to yield a general factor, but the two general factors are relatively distinct from one another psychometrically. Creative abilities appear to be more domain specific (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995).

The third kind of view is based on no theory at all. It involves empirical work with no anchored theoretical basis. Much of the intelligence testing that has been done in the United States and elsewhere has been of this kind—unanchored in psychological theory. A great deal of research also is atheoretical, producing empirical findings in the absence of any theory that would help one interpret what the results mean. Work of this kind is perhaps more prevalent in the study of intelligence than in the study of almost any other psychological phenomenon.

My goal in this chapter is to argue that one of these kinds of views—g’s—is particularly useful for the development of instructional programs to develop intellectual, academic, and other skills. It may be that the other views could also yield useful programs. But I believe the data supporting one theory of g’s, the triarchic theory of successful intelligence (Sternberg, 1997, 1999b), are at least worthy of serious consideration.

Although our data are consistent with the theory of g’s, they are not inconsistent with a certain version of the theory of g, as originally proposed by Spearman (1904), the theory of g. We believe that so-called general ability is applicable to a very wide range of tasks and situations. But its applicability is not equally strong in all situations. Its applicability is greater in academic tasks, for example, than in some kinds of practical tasks. In practical tasks, there also appears to be a g factor, but one distinct from psychometric g. Thus, the question becomes one of whether one takes a stronger or a weaker version of g as viable. I believe the weaker version is upheld, according to which g is quite general although perhaps not entirely general, and according to which its relevance varies across tasks and task domains. I do not believe a stronger version is upheld, according to which g pervades all tasks, and perhaps, pervades them equally strongly.

THE THEORY

According to the proposed theory of human intelligence and its development (Sternberg, 1980b, 1984, 1985, 1990, 1997, 1999b), a common set of processes underlies all aspects of intelligence. These processes are hypothesized to be universal. For example, although the solutions to problems that are considered intelligent in one culture may be different from the solutions considered to be intelligent in another culture, the need to define problems and translate strategies to solve these problems exists in any culture.

Metacomponents, or executive processes, plan what to do, monitor things as they are being done, and evaluate things after they are done. Examples of metacomponents are recognizing the existence of a problem, defining the nature of the problem, deciding on a strategy for solving the problem, monitoring the solution of the problem, and evaluating the solution after the problem is solved.

Performance components execute the instructions of the metacomponents. For example, inference is used to decide how two stimuli are related and application is used to apply what one has inferred (Sternberg, 1977). Other examples of performance components are comparison of stimuli, justification of a given response as adequate although not ideal, and actually making the response.

Knowledge-acquisition components are used to learn how to solve problems or simply to acquire declarative knowledge in the first place (Sternberg, 1985). Selective encoding is used to decide what information is relevant in the context of one’s learning. Selective comparison is used to bring old information to bear on new problems. And selective combination is used to put together the selectively encoded and compared information into a single and sometimes insightful solution to a problem.

Although the same processes are used for all three aspects of intelligence universally, these processes are applied to different kinds of tasks and situations depending on whether a given problem requires analytical thinking, creative thinking, practical thinking, or a combination of these kinds of thinking. In particular, analytical thinking is invoked when components are applied to fairly familiar kinds of problems abstracted from everyday life. Creative thinking is invoked when the components are applied to relatively novel kinds of tasks or situations. Practical thinking is invoked when the components are applied to experience to adapt to, to shape, and to select environments.

More details regarding the theory can be found in Sternberg (1985, 1997). Because the theory of successful intelligence comprises three subtheories—a componential subtheory dealing with the components of intelligence, an experiential subtheory dealing with the importance of coping with relative novelty and of automatization of information processing, and a contextual subtheory dealing with processes of adaptation, shaping, and selection—the theory has been referred to from time to time as triarchic.

Consider instructional studies that have been done on the basis of the triarchic theory. The review of these studies will be divided into four parts: studies aimed at (a) analytical skills, (b) creative skills, and (c) practical skills, and studies aimed at (d) all three kinds of skills.

INSTRUCTIONAL STUDIES

This section of the chapter—the main section—is organized as follows.

First I describe studies aimed at improving intellectual skills. The initial studies were motivated by the componential subtheory of the triarchic theory. I describe, successively, studies aimed at instruction directed at analytical intelligence using metacomponents, performance components, and knowledge components. Then I describe a study motivated by the experiential subtheory, focusing on an important aspect of creative intelligence, namely, insight. Next I describe a study motivated by the contextual subtheory, one focusing on teaching practical intelligence.

Second I describe three instructional studies aimed at improving academic skills and knowledge. These studies compare teaching of subject matter triarchically to teaching of subject matter in alternative ways. The first study, focusing on science (psychology) instruction at the upper secondary level, was aimed at exploring aptitude-treatment interactions between students’ ability patterns and the ways subject matter is taught. The second study, focusing on teaching of social studies at the elementary level and science (psychology) at the middleschool level, was aimed at exploring main effects in terms of efficacy of alternative instructional treatments. The third study, focusing on teaching of reading skills across the high school curriculum, also was aimed at exploring main effects in terms of efficacy of alternative instructional treatments.

DEVELOPING ANALYTICAL ABILITIES

Metacomponents

The goal of this study was to evaluate dynamic assessment as a means for understanding, developing, and assessing intellectual skills. The study involved metacomponential interventions.

PARTICIPANTS

A total of 358 experimental-group children, 161 boys and 197 girls, participated in the study. The children were spread throughout four grades (2–5) in 10 schools, even though their age was limited to 11 through 13 years of age. In terms of grade levels, 4.5% were in second grade, 37.7% were in third grade, 31.8% were in fourth grade, and 26.0% were in fifth grade. The reason for this spread in grades relative to ages was primarily that children first enrolled in formal schooling at different ages.

To verify whether the expected changes in performance were due to the impact of test-specific intervention rather than an outcome of repeated test administration (i.e., a practice effect), we recruited a sample of children to whom the intervention was not administered. The sample included 100 children—40 boys and 60 girls—spread out through grades 2 to 5 (11 through 13 years of age). In terms of grade levels, 5.0% were in second grade, 30.0% were in third grade, 35.0% were in fourth grade, and 30% were in fifth grade. The children were recruited from five of the 10 schools from which the experimental sample’s participants were drawn. No control sample’s participants were included in the experimental sample (and, in fact, the control sample data were collected after the completion of the experimental study).

Tasks

Three tasks were administered dynamically: Syllogisms, Sorting, and Twenty Questions. Each task measured analytical skills of various kinds. Examiners were always instructed to ensure that the children understood what they were being asked to do. At the very start, if a child did not understand a task, the task was further clarified until he or she did understand it. After each pretest, the examiner would indicate to the child that he or she did very well, but that he or she had made some mistakes. The examiner explained that the examiner would now show the child how to solve the problems to help the child solve them correctly.

Syllogisms. Thirty-four linear syllogisms were used—17 three-term series problems and 17 four-term series problems. Six of each appeared in the pretest, five of each in the intervention, and five of each in the posttest. An example of a three-term series problem would be “Alan is taller than Ken. Dan is taller than Alan. Who is the tallest, Alan, Ken, or Dan?” An example of a four-term series problem would be “Bill is smaller than Joe. Joe is smaller than Peter. Peter is smaller than Tom. Who is the smallest, Joe, Peter, or Tom?” Items could be about names of people, or about other things, such as lengths of roads, sizes of balls, sounds of school bells, and so forth. The posttest was similar to the pretest. The statements were read aloud to the children. In the intervention, the tester worked with drawings prepared in advance. The child was shown how visual representations of items in a vertical or horizontal line (spatial mental representations) could facilitate problem solution. Children were shown how the same representations that were drawn on a sheet of paper could be visualized mentally.

Scoring of items was for number correct at pretest, intervention, and posttest.

Sorting. The pretest for the Sorting task used the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1993). Each card contained from one to four identical figures of a single color printed on white cardstock. There were four kinds of figures: stars, crosses, triangles, and circles. There were also four colors in which the figures could appear: red, yellow, blue, and green. Each card, then, could be categorized in terms of number of figures, form, and color.

Children were shown four target stimulus cards. The target cards contained one red triangle, two green stars, three yellow crosses, or four blue circles. The four stimulus cards were placed in front of the child in a row. The children also were given a single pack of 64 cards varying in the attributes described. The task was to sort the cards in the pack into the four piles. Children were not told any rules for sorting nor were they informed in advance that the rule for sorting would change over the course of sorting the 64 cards.

Whether a given card was sorted correctly depended on a rule that was not disclosed to the child. The rule could be that correct sorting was by form, number, or color. If a child placed a card from the pack under a target stimulus card that matched in the “correct” attribute, the child was told that he or she was correct. Otherwise, the child was told that he or she was incorrect. The child then sorted the next card. After a child did six correct sortings, the rule was changed.

The intervention for the sorting task involved foam figures of four colors (yellow, green, black, and blue) and four sizes (large, medium, small, and very small), four shapes (octagon, square, triangle, and rectangle), and four possible numbers of figures (1, 2, 3, and 4). Children were explicitly asked questions about attributes and about finding attributes in common between sets of figures. They were shown how to compare relative attributes and how to sort on the basis of the various attributes.

The posttest for the sorting task involved sorting of threaded beads rather than cards. The beads were of four shapes, four colors, and four combinations (number of beads per thread). The procedure with the beads was comparable to that with the cards.

Scoring of the pretest and posttest was for number of perseverative errors and the number of categories produced. Scoring of the intervention was for number of hints required for the child to reach criterion performance.

Twenty Questions. In the pretest for the Twenty Questions task, the participant was told that the examiner was thinking of an object. The child was then given up to 20 questions to figure out what the object might be. All questions asked by the child had to be answerable either by “yes” or “no.” Objects were geometric designs from six rows of figures that varied in shape, size, and color. The shape could be a rectangle, square, or circle. The size could be large, medium, small, or very small. The color could be black or white. There were a total of 24 (3 × 4 × 2) different objects to choose from.

The intervention consisted of showing the children how to ask those questions that maximally narrowed the search space. For example, they learned that asking whether the figure is “black” would enable them to eliminate all black or white objects, depending on the examiner’s response. Or they learned that asking whether the figure was a rectangle could create an included and an excluded set of eight and 16 objects, with the identities of the included or excluded objects dependi...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Foreword
• Acknowledgments
• List of Contributors
• I General Background
• II Enhancement Via Instruction
• III Enhancement Via Development
• IV Enhancement Over Time
• V Enhancement Via New Constructs
• VI New Directions in Enhancement
• VII Conclusions
• Author Index
• Subject Index