The Origins of the Korean War

Second Edition

Peter Lowe

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9780582251472
• eBook ISBN: 9781317890928
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: History

The impressive Second Edition of this standard study incorporates important new evidence on the origins of the war from Chinese and Russian archives. It reveals that Stalin encouraged the attack on South Korea, but also confirms that the original initiative came from North Korea. Peter Lowe has also written an extended conclusion with a discussion of the Koreas in the late 1990s, and the challenges involved in securing their reunification.

CHAPTER ONE
Korea, the Japanese Empire, and the Pacific War

History and character of Korea

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 focused world attention on a remote peninsula in East Asia, which had never previously been the centre of a crisis of such dimensions as to threaten the possibility of a world war. To elderly people with long memories Korea connoted a localised crisis at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries resulting from the decline of the Ch'ing dynasty in China, the landward expansion of the Russian empire, and the beginning of the Japanese colonial empire in the Far East. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894—95 occurred because of thejapanese desire to establish a presence in the kingdom of Korea and the Chinese attempt to thwart this ambition. The close geographical proximity between thejapanese home islands and Korea resulted in Japanese determination to assert herself in Korea so as to ensure the more effective defence of Japan herself; in addition, it was hoped to exploit Korea economically.¹ The Russo-Japanese War of 1904—5 occurred because the partially concealed rivalry of a decade before was now overt. Japan did not want war against Tsarist Russia but was determined to fight unless positive assurances were forthcoming that Russia would cease to meddle in Korean affairs. Russia blundered into a conflict that was to have such serious consequences for the future of the Tsarist state and for an Asian challenge to occidental dominance.² However, the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, while significant struggles and in the case of the latter conflict involving savage warfare in Manchuria anticipating the kind of warfare to be seen in Europe between 1914 and 1918, did not constitute a confrontation between two superpowers set against a background of vitriolic suspicion and rivalry, as happened in 1950.

1. For an account of Japanese aims in external policy after the Meiji restoration of 1868, see Ian Nish, Japan's Foreign Policy, 1869-1942 (London, 1977), chs 1 and 2.

2. For a thorough assessment of the events leading to the conflict of 1904—5, see Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London, 1985).

What was the nature of Korean society and how had Korea been affected by the experience of having been ruled as an integral part of the Japanese colonial empire for almost half a century before the defeat of Japan in 1945? Korea is an ancient country with a very lengthy period of having been governed as a unified area (from AD 668 to 1945). The Yi dynasty presided over Korean affairs from 1392 to 1910 but the dynasty was in decline from the seventeenth century onwards; and Yi ascendancy was distinguished by a combination of exploitation, corruption and brutality in which endemic factionalism predominated. As Gregory Henderson has observed, there were close parallels between the political strategies and tactics during the Yi dynasty and the political developments in both north and south Korea after 1945.³ In geographical terms Korea extends from the long frontier with Manchuria along the Yalu and Tumen rivers to the short border area with Russian territory in the north-east. The southernmost part of Korea was a mere 90 miles (145 km) fromjapan; Korea resembled Japan in having a large number of islands but only one is politically significant - Cheju-do, to the south-west of the peninsula.⁴ Korea extends for approximately 600 miles (965 km) from the north-east to the south-west and is about 150 miles (2,409 km) wide, although narrowing in the northern part of the peninsula to less than 100 miles (160 km). The population of Korea averaged around eight million during the Yi era but increased rapidly in the twentieth century, growing from approximately ten million in 1900 to about thirty million in 1949. In economic terms, in the twentieth century industry was concentrated in the north and the south was principally concerned with agriculture, particularly rice. The arbitrary division of Korea at the 38th parallel in 1945 was absurd economically, creating two areas which could not function efficiently in terms of what they possessed. The Korean language was comprehensible throughout the country with major differences only in Cheju island.⁵

3. See Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass., 1968) for an extremely stimulating, wide-ranging examination of Korean society over many centuries.

4. For a discussion of Korean geography and of the economy, see A. J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York, 1944) pp. 8ff.

5. Henderson, Korea, p. 16.

Korean government was dominated by court circles and the greater landowners until the demise of the Yi dynasty. Chinese cultural influence was important and was most clearly seen in the impact of Confucianism. China regarded Korea as a vassal state of.the Ch'mg empire and Chinese policy was implemented through her representative in Peking. Between 1882 and 1894 China was represented by an ambitious, astute officer, Yuan Shih—k'ai, who worked to postpone the rise of Japanese authority in Korea.⁶ However, the swift rout of China in 1894—95 was followed by a period of tense rivalry between Russia andjapan culminating in the war of 1904—5. Japanese authority over Korea was confirmed by the settlement of the conflict in 1905 but Japan did not immediately annex Korea; instead the Korean monarchy was retained and ajapanese resident-general was appointed in Seoul. Prince Ito Hirobumi, a distinguished genro (elder statesman) and a former Prime Minister, was the first resident-general. Ito was subtle, shrewd and slightly more liberally inclined than the other genro. In 1909 Ito was assassinated at Harbin in Manchuria by a Korean nationalist. An act designed to register Korean antagonism to the consolidation of Japanese dominance in Korea undertaken by Ito ironically led to the imposition of full Japanese rule in 1910. Korean independence was thus liquidated and Korea was rendered an integral part of the Japanese empire.

6. On Yuan's actions in Korea, see Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shik-k'ai, 1859—1916 (London, 1961), pp. 21-45.

Impact of Japanese imperialism

The character of the Japanese colonial empire has not as yet been investigated with the thoroughness revealed in the analyses of the British, French and Dutch colonial territories. An important contribution to an assessment ofjapanese policy is contained in a collection of papers edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie.⁷ Japanese colonial possessions comprised Taiwan (Formosa), acquired in 1895; the Kwantung Leased Territory of southern Manchuria, secured in 1905; Korea, annexed in 1910; and Micronesia (the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas excluding Guam), the former German island territories in the western Pacific, obtained as League of Nations 'C' mandates in 1919 after the earlier Japanese capture of the islands from Germany in 1914. Korea was the most important of the colonial possessions for strategic and economic reasons. Japanese rule was competent and effective yet harsh. Japan wished to eliminate the vestiges of Korean autonomy and to establish Japanese military control in the interests of extending the security of Japan herself. The Korean monarchy was terminated and the Japanese administration was headed by a governor-general, subject to the somewhat remote control of Tokyo. The office of governor-general was recognised to be a major one carrying much prestige and authority; the incumbent enjoyed substantial initiative in the formulation of policy. The early governors-general were military men, distinguished by their narrow, intolerant attitude to their subjects. Field Marshal Terauchi Masatake, the first governor-general, believed that rebellious manifestations, of which there were many between 1908 and 1910, should be suppressed ruthlessly: he was alleged to have said, 'I will whip you with scorpions', and this conformed with his approach.⁸ The calibre of Japanese colonial officials was competent in the main and was explicable through the transfer of bureaucrats from Japanese ministries to the colonies.⁹ They worked diligently and enthusiastically but tended to be aloof from the local inhabitants. Japanese rule in Korea was always controlled by the military: each governor-general was a general or an admiral. The Japanese interpreted their responsibilities seriously but, as in other colonial empires, stressed the obligations of the people rather than their rights.¹⁰ There was no sympathy with the national aspirations of the inhabitants; Japanese administrators were determined to eradicate nationalism and to inculcate loyalty to the Japanese emperor in accordance with the state Shintoism fostered in Japan after the Meiji restoration. This objective could be reached through blatantiy coercive methods or by those less obviously repressive. The first decade of annexation (1910-20) witnessed the most rigorous phase in which draconian punishments were enforced for resistance to Japan. Discontent simmered and then exploded in the nationalist protests against Japanese rule in 1919. These were put down ferociously but were followed by the application of a more enlightened policy. This coincided with the formation of the Hara government in Tokyo and the development of the so-called liberal era in Japan before the ascendancy of the military from 1931 onwards. An attempt was made in the 1920s and 1930s to pursue Japanese aims more skilfully and to enlist the cooperation of the Korean people. Collaboration was accomplished with certain segments of society, notably with landowners and the wealthy elite, but in total Japan did not succeed in reconciling the most articulate in Korea to the continuance of the Japanese presence. Administratively Korea was dealt with by the Colonial Ministry until 1942 when the Home Ministry assumed responsibility.¹¹ After some uncertainty as to whether the Meiji constitution applied to Japan's colonial possessions, it was decided that it did apply to Korea and Taiwan.¹² Almost all Japanese believed that colonial rule in Korea should be extended for a very lengthy period, if not permanently. Yanaihara Tadao was one of the few who courageously advocated home rule for Korea and even, if necessary, independence.¹³

7. R. H. Myers and M. R. Peattie (eds), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895—1945 (Guildford, 1984).

8. Peattie, 'Introduction', in Myers and...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Series Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Maps
• Editor's Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• 1. Korea, the Japanese Empire, and the Pacific War
• 2. The Establishment of Two Koreas
• 3. The Approach of Confrontation in Korea
• 4. General MacArthur and the Recovery of Japan
• 5. The Demise of the Kuomintang and the Triumph of Chinese Communism
• 6. The Cold War in Europe
• 7. The Outbreak of the Korean War
• 8. Rollback and Chinese Intervention in Korea
• Conclusion
• Appendix
• Select Bibliography
• Maps
• Index