Britain in the Twentieth Century

Charles More

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9781138144866
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317867760
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

In a century of rapid social change, the British people have experienced two world wars, the growth of the welfare state and the loss of Empire.

Charles More looks at these and other issues in a comprehensive study of Britains political, economic and social history throughout the twentieth century. This accessible new book also engages with topical questions such as the impact of the Labour party and the role of patriotism in British identity.

Chapter 1
Britain in 1900

Monarch and Empire

On 22 January 1901 Queen Victoria died at the age of 81, having reigned for over 63 years. The personification of the nineteenth century lived until the beginning of the twentieth. Although her name is immortalised in the adjective Victorian, her importance to Britain lay not in the real power she wielded, which was limited, but in her position as a focus of loyalty and as a constitutional monarch.

Britain has good claims to be the first real constitutional monarchy. In its modern form, this means that the monarch is ultimately subordinate to an elected body, the House of Commons. This subordination had been more or less accepted by the time Victoria came to the throne, and over the next 60 years much of the monarch’s remaining real authority was eroded. The government was established by its ability to command a majority in the House of Commons. The Crown retained some real power in its ability to ask one party leader or another to attempt to form a government, but the occasions for using this power were infrequent, because party discipline was tight. So it was usually obvious which party would command a Commons majority and which party leader would become Prime Minister. Once in office, the Crown by convention accepted its government’s policies, even if the monarch did not like them. The Crown retained the right to ‘be consulted … to encourage … [and] to warn’, in Walter Bagehot’s phrase.¹ Bagehot was a journalist, but his dictum came to be seen as official doctrine.

The monarch’s elevation above politics had important consequences. Politics had become increasingly polarised between the two major parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. By remaining aloof from all this, the monarch avoided criticism from either side and was increasingly seen as a benevolent mother (or when Victoria was succeeded by her son Edward VII, father) of the nation. Victoria herself in later years had increasingly favoured the Conservatives, but Gladstone, the Liberal leader, had loyally kept silent and the monarchy was perceived as officially neutral. Positive feelings about the monarchy were buttressed by the spread of popular newspapers and magazines which carried, mainly respectful, news of the royal family. Always a focus of loyalty to many, by 1900 the monarchy probably commanded more widespread support than at any time since the late sixteenth century.

To many Britons in 1900, sentimental loyalty to the monarch was strengthened by her position as ruler of the British Empire. In 1900 the Empire was at war. Small-scale wars, mainly punitive expeditions against unsubdued native peoples in Africa or the Indian frontier, were not unusual. The Boer war, which had broken out in South Africa in 1899, was a much bigger affair. It was an attempt to subdue the independent Boer republics of inland South Africa, and the Boers, farmers of Dutch origin, had initially scored considerable successes. It was to take three years to finish Boer resistance, although by 1900 Britain had gained the upper hand.

In spite of the Boer war, the British Empire in 1900 was at or near its peak. It covered one-fifth of the habitable land surface of the globe. Like the Crown, it was a focus of loyalty for many Britons. Its protection provided one of the rationales for the British navy, by far the largest in the world. It provided jobs for the sons of middle-class professionals, although as it was staffed remarkably economically the jobs were not that numerous. And it had a considerable economic significance for Britain. However, its vast size and spread can lead to an overestimation of its importance. It had many limits.

The Empire was extremely diverse. Most important, in terms of their impact on popular consciousness and on Britain’s own economy, were two very different entities. One was India. Victoria had been declared Empress of India by Benjamin Disraeli, the Conservative Prime Minister, in 1877 and the title seemed to add an additional lustre to Britain’s possession of this part of the Empire. Hugely populous – it had almost 300 million inhabitants in 1900 – large parts of it were ruled by a small number of British administrators assisted by Indian clerks and police. Other parts were quasi-autonomous states under their historic ruling families. British rule was backed up by two armies, an Indian army – with British officers – and elements of the British army. All this was paid for by India. Apart from largely paying for herself, India was important to Britain economically. It is often assumed that the importance of India, and other parts of the Empire, was in the supply of raw materials to Britain, but this was not the case. Britain bought raw materials from all over the world and enjoyed no special advantages in buying them from the Empire. India did, however, act as a huge market for British manufactures. These were paid for partly by India’s exports to other parts of the world. Thus India helped to buttress Britain’s position as the world’s second largest manufacturing nation.

The second great segment of the Empire comprised the ‘White Dominions’, a term becoming popular for Australia, New Zealand, Canada and tiny Newfoundland, then independent of Canada. From the 1840s onwards, these had been granted effective self-government, and therefore they were not ‘ruled’ by Britain in any real sense. While they were important markets for British goods, their main economic significance to Britain was as destinations for emigrants. Between 1900 and 1914 net British and Irish emigration to these countries totalled almost 1.4 million, and they overtook the USA as the prime destination for such emigration. (Net emigration is after counting those who returned in the period.) While there were people in these countries – Irish emigrants in Australia, the long-established French settlers in Canada – who remained ambivalent about their membership of the British Empire, most of the inhabitants were enthusiastic. Britain herself, as the ‘mother country’, was also a focus of their loyalty, hardly surprising as a large proportion of their population had actually been born there.

The Empire also comprised a mass of miscellaneous smaller colonies, the term usually given to the non-Indian territories which were directly ruled by Britain. (Confusingly, the White Dominions were also often called colonies.) Some of these, such as Nigeria, had only just been welded together as one entity and were governed to a considerable extent by their traditional rulers. Others, such as Ceylon, contained a large British commercial presence in the form of plantation owners or managers – in Ceylon’s case the crop was tea. South Africa itself was more complex in that the Boer farmers had different aspirations to later British settlers, the most influential of whom had substantial mining interests.

While the Empire was a focus of loyalty within Britain, it did not command such widespread support as did the Crown. A substantial portion of the Liberal Party had been publicly opposed to the Boer war. The Conservatives, already in power, had called an election in 1900 and had won a smashing victory, suggesting that voters who favoured the Empire exceeded in numbers those who were lukewarm or against it. But the fact remains that, although there was much patriotic support for the Empire, enthusiasm for it was not universal.

Late nineteenth century imperialism affected Britain’s relations with other countries. British foreign policy at this time is sometimes described as one of ‘splendid isolation’, but the phrase is misleading. Foreign policy was essentially pragmatic. As the world’s largest trading nation it was not in Britain’s interests to be on bad terms with anyone in the long run. However, events sometimes got in the way, and one of these was the rapid expansion of the Empire in the late nineteenth century, which antagonised other nations. In the short term the most important of these were France and Russia, also imperial powers. France and Britain collided in Africa, while Russia’s expansion southwards into Central Asia came up against Britain’s attempts to safeguard India’s northwest frontier. The resulting quarrels led to a period of foreign policy isolation for Britain at the end of the century. The way out of this had major long-term consequences.

Some imperialists had believed that, by constructing a world-wide Empire, Britain could be rendered invulnerable. By 1900 it was apparent that this dream would never become a reality. Strong though the Royal Navy was, as other nations industrialised and built up their own navies it became increasingly unable to police the entire world. Britain had already effectively ceded control of the seas around the Americas to the USA. In the East, Britain saw advantages in friendship with Japan, whose economy and navy were both expanding rapidly. The Japanese alliance of 1902 was the result. It was defensive, with each nation pledging to help the other if it was at war with more than one other nation. If Japan went to war with Russia, which it did two years later, Britain would not get dragged in.

More important was Britain’s changing attitude towards Europe. As late as 1901 Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, had proposed an alliance with Germany against Russia. But Germany was a problem. Its foreign and imperial ambitions had become increasingly grandiose under the reckless and unstable Wilhelm II. Its ambition to develop a large navy, although still unfulfilled, was also a threat. In the circumstances, most British politicians accepted that easing imperial tensions was the safest course of action, and the Entente Cordiale of 1904 with France was the result. It was strongly supported by the cosmopolitan Edward VII, but he was not the prime mover. The entente was in no sense a military alliance, being designed essentially to settle imperial rivalries in Africa. Nor was it intended as a threat to Germany. As before, Britain’s interests lay in world peace, not war.

Prosperity, poverty and the role of the state

Britain’s interests lay in peace because of her supremacy in trade, even though the USA had dethroned Britain as the largest industrial nation. This supremacy was in part because of Britain’s abolition of tariffs on most imports in the mid-nineteenth century, which had encouraged world-wide tariff reductions and a trade boom. Free trade became a cornerstone of Britain’s self-image. It meant cheap imported food, albeit at the expense of British agriculture. In turn, Britain was the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods, while British citizens had built up large holdings of shares and bonds in foreign railways, mines and other assets. Britain’s biggest export products were the goods on which she had built her own industrial revolution: textiles, heavy engineering products such as locomotives, ships and coal. In addition, she was the world’s greatest provider of the services necessary for trade: shipping, insurance and banking. This pattern was replicated in Britain’s economic geography. The wealthiest areas were those where trade or heavy industry was dominant.

Wealthiest of all was London. It was a centre of trade, of much manufacturing (although not heavy industry) and of financial services such as banking and insurance. It was also the place where many of the wealthy chose to live. Outside London, wages were highest in the industrial areas: Lancashire produced coal, machinery and, most of all, cotton textiles; Yorkshire, coal, machinery and wool textiles; South Wales, predominantly coal; the Midlands engaged in engineering, a vast range of other manufacturing activities and coal mining; the North-East, in shipbuilding, engineering and coal mining; and the Scottish Lowlands, in all these activities. The production, use and export of coal was the common denominator (Figs 1.1 and 1.2). The wage levels of the men, and in textiles some women, in these areas made the British working class the best paid in Europe. There was a paradox, however. Working-class health in these areas was poor: no better, and often worse, than in other areas where wages were lower. The best overall measure of this is height, since adult height is a reflection of childhood and adolescent living conditions – that is, a combination of housing conditions, the prevalence of disease, other environmental factors such as air quality and the nutritional value of food intake. While figures for the past are not precise, the average height of working-class men was probably 4 to 5 inches less than the 5 feet 10 inch average of men today. The relatively high wages of many workers were counteracted by overcrowded housing, a poor urban environment and the paucity of medical services for many people.

Of course, as Britain was a relatively advanced society, hospital and medical provision was widespread, although very basic for the really poor since they had to rely on the Poor Law, originally set up as a safety net for the destitute. This function still existed, although it was unpopular since it often meant confinement in workhouses,

Figure 1.1 Coalfields in Britain

Source: More, G., Industrial Age, Longman (1989 and 1997)

Figure 1.2 Great Britain: counties and major towns

Source: More, C., Industrial Age, Longman (1989 and 1997)

usually grim mid-Victorian buildings. But there was no welfare state as we know it today. There was no form of state social insurance for unemployment; no additional benefits for families with young children; no old-age pensions. Such insurance as did exist was provided through individual subscriptions to friendly societies, insurance companies and trade unions. The middle classes and better-off manual workers could afford such subscriptions, but a large proportion of the population only paid them at a minimal level, if at all.

The absence of state social welfare did not mean a complete absence of state intervention. Intervention of various kinds had developed since the mid-nineteenth century, often in response to obvious problems or glaring abuses rather than as a result of major ideological shifts. For many years there had been legal limits on working hours for some groups of workers, many of whom were children. By 1900 the state also provided substantial resources for lower-level, then called elementary, education. It was thought appropriate to intervene on behalf of children, partly because they were not able to help themselves, but also because it was accepted that it was financially difficult for parents to provide them with an adequate education. Similarly, Poor Law medical services had developed, not just for the destitute but for a wider population, because of a similar pragmatic acceptance of their inability to provide for themselves. Both the Poor Law and education were provided through locally based authorities (the churches also provided education), although central government provided much of the money for education. It was generally agreed that such local provision was the correct approach. Local government in larger towns had also become increasingly concerned with the provision of services such as water, gas and electric tramways which had proliferated in the 1890s, as well as the control of building standards and street widths, and the provision of cleansing and sewerage services. Larger towns had their own councils; county councils, covering small towns and rural areas, had only been set up in 1888 and were usually less active.

Municipal action of this kind had developed for two reasons. In the case of gasworks and tramways, because town councils thought they could make money out of them. In the case of building regulations, water and sewerage, because the appalling conditions of mid-Victorian cities had led to a widespread realisation that some collective control over environmental conditions was needed. In modern terms, there was a ‘market failure’ caused by the fact that misuse of the environment did not contain financial penalties; either collective provision was needed or, at the very least, control over private provision. Like the protection of the weak and vulnerable, remedying market failure was seen by most as a limited but necessary exercise. It did not impinge on the duty of the able-bodied population – that is, most people – to look after themselves for most of their needs.

However, there was a growing number of those who believed the state should have a wider role. The Boer war had resulted in a sudden need for more recruits than usual for Britain’s small army. One consequence was a large number of rejections of such recruits for medical reasons. A side effect of the war, therefore, was a heightened debate about ‘national efficiency’. Concern about the subject was not new, as from the 1880s there had been worries about ‘urban deterioration’. The poor physical condition of many town-dwellers had led to a whole quasi-scientific theory: urban children grew up with poor physique which they transmitted to their children in a vicious cycle of decline. The theory was based on a faulty conception of genetics, as acquired characteristics cannot be inherited. However, the poor physique of many of the urban working classes was a reality. Concerns over urban deterioration coalesced with other fears and aspirations to lead some thinkers to much more expansive ideas. Some of these ideas played upon notions of the ‘race’ and its possible deterioration, from poor living conditions or other causes. A discourse of race – that is, a set of beliefs and debates about its importance – was well entrenched in 1900. This incorporated the notion that the British race, or more generally the Anglo-Saxon race, was superior to others – but its superiority might be under threat. (Other countries had similar discourses about themselves.)

Politics and parties

Social welfare was seen as a means of rebuilding superiority by improving working-class conditions, and elements of both political parties were attracted by these ideas. On the Conservative side these included some of the L...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• CONTENTS
• List of boxes
• Timeline
• General elections 1900–1997
• Preface
• Chapter 1 Britain in 1900
• Chapter 2 Liberal high tide: Politics 1900–1914
• Chapter 3 The First World War
• Chapter 4 Changing tides: Politics between the wars
• Chapter 5 The search for peace: Britain and the world 1918–1939
• Chapter 6 Society 1900–1939
• Chapter 7 The Second World War: Battles and strategy
• Chapter 8 The Second World War: Politics and society
• Chapter 9 The years of consensus? Politics 1945–1974
• Chapter 10 Thatcherism and after: Politics 1974–2000
• Chapter 11 Britain and overseas 1945–2000
• Chapter 12 Society 1945–2000
• Afterword
• Appendix UK population and earnings
• Index