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Motivation and its Control
Introduction and Overview
EDDIE HARMON-JONES
AND
JOSEPH P. FORGAS
Introduction
Motivation is what makes the world go round. As even a cursory visit to any bookshop will confirm, there is an insatiable need for motivational books, motivational gurus are in high demand everywhere, and motivational theories are eagerly sought both by organizations and individuals. Our own daily experience confirms the importance of motivation in everyday life. Ability is important, but more often than not it is motivation that makes our students succeed, and it is lack of motivation that condemns them to failure. Motivation can also lead to negative consequences, as occurs when an individualās desire causes over-eating, an over-indulgence in drugs, or sexual misadventures. Questions concerning the nature of human motivationāwhere does it come from, why do some people have it in spades, and others lack it, and how can it be managed and controlledāhave long fascinated philosophers and writers. As Maslow (1954) noted, motivation pervades our lives; it is ā⦠constant, never ending, fluctuating, and complex, and ⦠it is an almost universal characteristic of practically every organismic state of affairsā (p. 69).
However, motivation also needs to be controlled and managed to be effective. In other words, there is a complex and interdependent relationship between the psychological mechanisms of motivation and the mechanisms of self-control. Motivation and the control of motivational urges underlie most behaviors, particularly social behaviors. The consideration of the subtle dance between motivational impulses and self-control dates back at least to Freud (1920, 1923) and remains of growing interest to psychology researchers and practitioners alike. The objective of this book is to review and integrate some of the most recent developments in research and theories on social motivation and its control and management.
These chapters will examine a variety of exciting questions such as: What is the relationship between motivation and self-control? What is the role of affective and cognitive processes in linking the two? How do conscious and unconscious motivational processes interact in producing social behaviors? What role do physiological processes play in controlling motivation? How does imagining an event influence motivated strategies? How can we control aggressive impulses? How do affective states regulate motivation? How does motivation impact perception and attention? What are the social, cultural, and interpersonal effects of motivational control?
In order to discuss these issues, we divided this volume into four parts. The first part considers some of the basic issues and theories about the genesis and control of human motivation (chapters by Higgins; Bargh & Huang; Carver, Johnson & Joorman; Macrae, Christian & Miles; and Koole et al.). In part two, the interaction between affective states and motivational mechanisms is considered (chapters by Inzlicht & Legault; Schmeichel & Tang; Most; Forgas; and Denson). The third part of the book focuses on the management of approach and avoidance processes, perhaps the basic dichotomy in motivational research (chapters by Harmon-Jones, Price, & Harmon-Jones; Elliot et al.; Scholer; and Balcetis & Cole). Finally, in the fourth part of the book we consider the interpersonal, social and cultural implications of recent research on motivation and its control (chapters by Maner & Leo; Napier; Kitayama, Tompson, & Chua; Halberstadt & Jong; and Zadro, Godwin, & Gonsalkorale). We will begin, however, with a brief theoretical and historical review of ideas about motivation and self-control in psychology.
Motivation and Self-Control
The scientific study of both motivation and self-control has received growing attention in recent years with several books (e.g., Elliot, 2008; Higgins & Kruglanski, 2000; Vohs & Baumeister, 2011) and special issues of leading journals devoted to each of these topics (e.g., in Emotion Review, Motivation and Emotion). However, these contributions have typically considered motivation and self-control separately even though these psychological processes intimately influence each other. For example, although much research has suggested that exercising self-control depletes oneās resources and leads to future failures at self-control (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007), more recent work has revealed that exercising self-control can also increase oneās approach motivation or desire for rewards (Schmeichel, Harmon-Jones, & Harmon-Jones, 2010).
Rather than viewing humans as analogous to computers, psychologists who study motivation conceive of persons as active, hot, embodied agents with needs, desires, and fears. We may use the metaphor of the automobile to illustrate this view, a system driven by the complex interaction of fuel, air, electricity, spark plugs, timing belts, coolants, oil, grease, and other materials and mechanics that move various parts of the engine to ultimately set the automobile in motion. Like automobiles, humans move, and motivation can be thought of as the motor and fuel that impel action. However, automobiles also must be equipped with devices that ensure that they slow down, stop and even reverse when required. Similarly, the humanās motivational engine is equipped with various regulatory processes that ensure it slows down, stops and retreats when needed. Exploring how basic motivational forces are managed, controlled, and adjusted in the service of adaptive behavior is the main focus of this volume.
Historical Background
The term motivation first appeared in psychological jargon in the early 1880s. Prior to that date, the more amorphous concept of the āwillā was used by philosophers and social theorists when discussing the antecedents of effortful, directed human behavior. Early functionalist philosophers used the term motivation to describe voluntary actionābehaviors that show direction (Bindra & Stewart, 1966). However, by the early twentieth century motivation became increasingly linked to instinct explanations, reducing interest in the psychology of conscious deliberations. Theorists such as Darwin (1872), Freud (1920) and McDougall (1908) all considered instincts, or innate and unconscious motivational forces, as the prime movers of all directed behavior.
The beginning of behaviorism had a negative influence on the study of motivation. Early behavioristsā doctrinaire refusal to consider internal psychological processes eliminated motivation as a construct of serious concern. When motivation was considered at all, it was in terms of the rise and fall in the intensity of fundamental drive states, such as hunger or thirst, usually investigated in animals other than humans. In these very restrictive terms, motivation could be readily manipulated by subjecting animals to various degrees of deprivation to produce motivational changes, but such studies bore little relevance to understanding the complex motivational processes of humans, as there was simply no room for intentional goal pursuit in this simple-minded stimulus-response (S-R) framework. However, the basic dichotomy between conscious and unconscious motivation survived. Even S-R explanations were deeply influenced by ideas such as Thorndikeās concept of habit (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000), analogous to an unconscious social motive. As the inadequacy of S-R explanations of motivation became clear, neo-behaviorists like Hull (1943), Miller (1959), Spence (1956), and Tolman (1932) realized that any sensible account of human social behavior required a consideration of the complex motivated nature of action. These neo-behaviorists infused psychological theorizing with many advances in understanding motivation.
Other theorists always took a more cognitive approach to purposive behavior, also conceiving of conscious, directed volition as a key motivational force (James, 1890/1950). In the light of contemporary debates about the nature and epistemological status of rational, directed human action (Wegner & Gilbert, 2001), it is interesting that social psychologists have always maintained an interest in both unconscious and conscious motivational forces. Influential thinkers like Heider (1958), Lewin (1951), and Festinger (1957) all developed theories of social behavior that had clear motivational components. Their contributions represent an enduring influence on contemporary thinking about motivation and self-control. As historians of our field note, it is largely thanks to them that even in the darkest days of orthodox behaviorism, cognition and motivation remained meaningful topics in social psychology, sparing the discipline from some of the more damaging consequences of the behaviorist orthodoxy that afflicted other fields (Allport, 1968).
By the 1970s and 80s behaviorism was on the wane, and ācoldā social cognition became the dominant approach to the study of social behavior and judgment. Many social cognitive theorists initially tried to explain away motivational accounts of behavior in terms of cognitive, information processing mechanisms (see Forgas, 1981, 1983 for an early critique of such social cognitive approaches). For researchers like Bem (1967), Nisbett and Ross (1980), and others, what were previously considered motivational explanations of judgments and behavior became re-conceptualized as cognitive errors due to faulty information processing. Many examples of social behavior, such as attitude change, self-serving biases, achievement motivations and the like were increasingly explained in terms of cold information-processing mechanisms (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Trope, 1975). During this time, the study of social motivation was once again relegated to a secondary role in explanations of social behavior. Fortunately, by the 1990s, there was renewed interest in motivation and the use of biological methods to study motivational processes. Several chapters in this volume illustrate the benefits of taking a neuroscience approach for understanding human motivation (e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., this volume; Kitayama et al., this volume; Maner, this volume).
Motivational Mechanisms
Motivation is defined by standard dictionaries as the desire to do, or as interest or drive. Psychologists define motivation as the process that arouses, sustains, and regulates behavior. Motivation is a mechanism that directs and energizes action (Young, 1961). With this definition, social psychologists often regard action or behavior as including both the processing of information as well as overt, more molar behavior (Pittman, 1998). It is also important to note that while motivation directs and energizes the organism, it may not always result in overt molar behavior. For example, one might be motivated to attack the boss after receiving a demeaning comment but such impulses rarely result in actual behavior (see also Denson, this volume).
Motivation involves basic psychophysiological processes, and research of the last decade has made important discoveries regarding the effects of biological variables that influence motivation and self-control (see chapters in the current volume by Carver et al.; Denson; Harmon-Jones et al.; Inzlicht & Legault). Motivation also prepares the organism for action and bodily experiences in turn can influence motivation (Harmon-Jones et al., this volume). Motivation can even influence basic perceptual processes (Balcetis & Cole; Maner & Leo; Most, this volume), judgments of value (Higgins, this volume), and social attitudes (Kitayama et al.; and Napier, this volume).
As we have seen, motivations can range from basic, unconscious, automatic impulses to deliberate, conscious, controlled goal pursuit. Motivations can also be in conflict with one another, as when one is oriented toward fleeing a threat versus aggressively approaching it. Regulatory processes often resolve such conflicts. Motivation can also be characterized by its intensity and direction. Motivational intensity can range from zero, as when one responds to a stimulus that is not associated with any rewards or punishments, to extremely high, as when one responds to a stimulus that signals the possibility of sudden and imminent death.
Motivational direction depends on whether the organism is approaching rewards or positive stimuli (attraction toward them) or avoiding punishments or negative stimuli (repulsion from them; Konorski, 1967; Lewin, 1951; Schneirla, 1959; see also chapters in Part III of this volume). However, there are occasions when organisms show evidence of approach motivation without a stimulus (see review by Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones & Price, 2013). An example of this is when an individual may be approach motivated because of a temperament or mood (see also Forgas, 2013; also, Forgas, this volume). Moreover, there are also occasions when negative stimuli are the cause of approach motivation (see review by Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones & Price, 2013). For example, anger may evoke approach motivation (e.g., aggressive behaviors) toward the source that evoked the anger (see also Denson, this volume). In cases of road rage, the motivation to pursue and verbally attack the driver is a clear case of approach rather than avoidance motivation.
Motivational Domains
In addition to the broad motivational characteristics of intensity and direction, motivations can also be classified in terms of specific domains, directed toward achieving distinct āgoalsā or end states. Early theories of motivation influenced by Darwinās (1859, 1872) evolutionary ideas in the late 1800s and early 1900s (James, 1890; McDougall, 1908) explored the nature and functions of motivations primarily associated with the domains of sexual reproduction and care for offspring (e.g., Maner & Leo, this volume; Panksepp, 1998). In these evolutionary models affect and motivation are integrally linked. Affective states may influence motivation and regulation by providing signals of how to respond to different situations, an idea that continues to stimulate interesting research (Bless & Fiedler, 2006). Some positive affective states may signal that the environment is safe and consequen...