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Chapter 1
Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action
John Clark
Recent years have seen a strong and accelerating trend towards working more actively across national frontiers within many segments of civil society. This shift is particularly evident amongst civil society organizations (CSOs), who seek to influence policies and practices of governments and international organizations.
The trend is due partly to need and partly to opportunity. Policies are increasingly forged at supranational levels, either within inter-governmental bodies ā such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank ā or in regional blocs, such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) or the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Moreover, transnational corporations (TNCs) have become increasingly able to dictate policy and shape our world. Hence the pre-eminence of the nation state as the locus of policy-making has lessened. To influence policy it is now necessary, rather than merely prudent, to act at those international levels and coordinate advocacy across relevant countries. Modern information and communications technology (ICT), cheap telecommunications and air travel and the increased prominence of English as the lingua franca of international communications provide the opportunities for transnational civil society action.
Policy-influencing CSOs comprise development and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), environment and other pressure groups, trade unions, consumersā organizations, faith-based and inter-faith groups and certain professional associations. As with the private sector, each segment has seen the emergence of āmarket leadersā, and these are generally CSOs that are either better placed for, or have more energetically pursued, transnational networking. These CSOs not only achieve greater credibility amongst policy-makers, but also apparently gain advantage over their competitors amongst potential supporters. If we view civil society as a market-place of interests, ideas and ideologies, then it is a fast-globalizing market and ā as with other markets ā transnational pioneers reap the rewards.
Though there is evidence of decreasing associational activity amongst the US public (Putnam, 2000), much of the world has witnessed an āassociational revolutionā over the past 20 years (Salamon, 1994), and a vibrant civil society has emerged in many developing and transition countries where local political realities previously denied this. Although still highly heterogeneous, there is now more global uniformity in the distribution and composition of CSOs, though not yet in their membership, resources and impact. This also drives the move towards international networking.
This shift beyond a national focus to a transnational focus necessitates major changes in the structure and governance of CSOs and is influencing both their mandates and cultures. This chapter provides a review of these issues as they affect a range of transnational civil society actors. It is based on interviews with key stakeholders in major and illustrative CSOs and networks,1 a review of their internal literature, conclusions of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) seminar and the case studies in following chapters. It looks, firstly, at the various organizational arrangements that are used for transnational networking; secondly, it summarizes the key governance challenges ā issues of representation, legitimacy, accountability, leadership, decision-making and use of name; thirdly, it surveys changes in focus, mandate and culture as CSOs increasingly work transnationally; fourthly, it asks how this trend impacts questions of membership and partnership, including the more regular tensions surfacing in NorthāSouth partnerships. Finally, it offers some general conclusions, which were also highlighted by the LSE seminar.
Various commentators have described how wide arrays of policy-oriented CSOs are increasingly seeking to operate in transnational alliances with counterparts or like-minded civic groups in other countries (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Florini, 2000; Clark, 1999). This entails major challenges for CSOs. Amongst diverse CSO networks,2 a remarkably similar spectrum of problems is encountered and a new literature is beginning to address such issues (see Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001, on development NGOs).
There are interesting parallels with the private sector. Many CSOs (such as consumersā associations or development NGOs) are evolving from hierarchic or unitary structures, where the identity of the CSO at national level is paramount, towards network modes in which topic specialists from different countries collaborate in opportunistic alliances with counterparts in other countries. The literature on civil society and conventional organizational theory regarding NGO management and behaviour offers little insight into these matters, though this is starting to change (Anheier et al, 2001; Anheier and Themudo, 2002).3
The internet has enabled citizens to network with one another internationally without the need for CSO intermediaries (at least those who can afford the technology). As a result, a variety of web-mediated advocacy and protest cells (āvirtual CSOsā) have arisen ā we nickname these ādot causesā ā ranging from the Nobel prize-winning International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to a smorgasbord of protest groups (see Chapter 6).
Another feature of CSO dynamics in todayās fast-changing world is the growing tendency to work with non-traditional partners in other segments of civil society. NGOs, trade unions, faith groups, professional associations, think tanks and social movements increasingly cooperate with one another. Oxfam International (2000), for example, is committed to working with others and learning from the achievements of other movements to foster the notion of āglobal citizenshipā and global economic and social justice. Similarly, trade unions (TUs) increasingly collaborate with human rights, environment and other NGOs in campaigns targeting multinational companies or global industry umbrellas. Until recently, they had tended to disdain NGO partnerships. And religious organizations increasingly seek collaboration with those of other faiths.
Unions comprise the CSO category for which working transnationally is most need-driven, since globalization is radically changing their environment (see Chapter 3). The Millennium Review of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), underway at present, seeks to modernize and internationalize the union movement ā in particular, by overhauling the international architecture of trade union networks and federations. Due to be completed by 2004, it seeks to identify TU priorities, structures and strategies to āincrease the strength of the trade union movement as an international campaigning and negotiating forceā, and to influence the structures and policies of inter-governmental organizations (ICFTU, 2000 and 2001).
A relatively new and increasingly powerful force is that of transnational networks led by Southern or transition-country organizations such as Social Watch, Third World Network and the recent campaign (led by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) of South Africa) to press for cheaper generic drugs for poor countries (Chapter 4).4 Some Southern or transition-country organization leaders, however, are frustrated that progress is slow because Northern CSOs are reluctant to hand over the reins (Chiriboga, 2001).
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
Transnational networking necessitates structures that facilitate CSOs in different countries working together; there are many organizational forms that can be chosen for this. They are influenced by the legal traditions of the country where the CSO or network is registered and by national laws applying to members or branches. The spread of ācivil lawā practices (such as US models for non-profit organizations across Central and Eastern Europe) and the promotion by donors of more enabling laws governing civil society is, however, leading to greater uniformity. Three broad forms define the spectrum, each of which can be subdivided:
ā¢ International CSOs: single, coherent organizations; major decisions are reached globally by international boards; policies are implemented by global secretariats or head offices; there is a global hierarchy of staff accountability. Within this form there is considerable variation, depending upon the degree of autonomy vested in the national branches or sections. It includes:
ā Unitary structures: the equivalent of TNCs, these are CSOs with global decision-making processes (albeit with some devolution). Examples include the Catholic Church, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Plan International.
ā Centralized associations: these provide greater national autonomy; but major decisions are made by global headquarters, which also control the use of name and standards. Examples include Greenpeace and CARE.
ā Federations: global boards (representing the member CSOs) make global decisions in a framework of subsidiarity (considerable autonomy at the national level). They are serviced by strong global secretariats, accountable to the boards. Examples include Amnesty International (AI), CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation) and Consumers International (CI).
ā¢ CSO networks: these are collaborative arrangements formed for broad partnership amongst like-minded organizations or cooperation on specific activities. They may have international boards and secretariats; but most power and implementation capacity remains with the CSO members. They comprise:
ā Confederations: network members are fully independent but agree a set of common ground rules and work together on specific activities where there is mutual advantage. Examples include the World Council of Churches, the ICFTU, Oxfam International (OI), Friends of the Earth International (FOE-I) and international inter-faith networks (such as the United Religions Initiative).
ā Informal networks: CSOs come together around a common cause to seek cooperation but with little agreed governance arrangements, leadership or membership requirements. Examples include the ICBL and the Jubilee 2000 movement for developing-world debt relief.
ā¢ Social movements: these comprise amorphous and fluid groupings of activists, CSOs and supporters in which the bonds are common grievances or convictions, and shared goals for societal and policy change (rather than structure). They connect people with causes through developing communities of interest around shared conditions and include:
ā Rooted movements: these are webs of citizens formed at the national level to attack mutually experienced grievances. International exchange and networking with counterparts in other countries can be powerful for sharing ideas and boosting morale; but mobilization and analysis is primarily at the national level. Examples include feminist, agrarian reform, gay rights and civil rights movements.
ā Transnational movements: where the policy changes sought are largely determined by international governmental or corporate actors, movements become more transnational in character, although the boundary of this is not clear cut. Working internationally is not just for sharing ideas and building solidarity but also for forging collective energy and a globally coherent strategy around shared social change goals. Examples include the human rights movement, the climate change movement and the modern protest movement relating to globalization.
Each form has different ways of making decisions, handling leadership, communicating internally, responding to governance challenges, and developing external partnerships. These are summarized in Table 1.1. This chapter mostly deals with the first two forms, which involve conscious efforts to work transnationally. Social movements may exist in multiple countries, but they donāt use defined governance procedures or structures to promote their aims (these are discussed more in Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Two key variables influencing transnational citizen action are the degree of decentralization, exemplified by the above organizational forms, and the degree to which decision-making lies with volunteers and CSO members (via elected committees of representatives) or with professional staff in international secretariats. Do CSOs help citizens to achieve a voice for themselves or do they speak for citizens? The former are more evidently representative and democratic; the latter usually have swifter, clearer decision-making and may appear more professional. There are other variables (such as whether a network is truly global or just operates in a few countries; or whether the transnational activities represent a large or small part of their membersā activities); but these are less relevant to our topic.
Table 1.1 Characteristics of different transnational civil society forms
Figure 1.1 (borrowed from a framework suggested by Amnesty International, 2000) uses these two principal variables to present a taxonomy of transnational civil society in four quadrants:
1 strongly member-controlled; decisions taken largely locally (such as trade unions or international peasantsā movements) (bottom left);
2 strongly member-controlled, but major decisions largely reached internationally (such as Amnesty International or some of the new protest groups) (top left);
3 secretariat-driven (volunteers less powerful); decisions largely reached globally (such as Greenpeace or Third World Network) (top right); and
4 secretariat-driven; decisions taken largely at local levels (such as most faith-based organizations and consumersā associations) (bottom right).
Figure 1.1 The organizational forms of selected CSOs and CSO networks
The figure is schematic and approximate, and is intended to illustrate a useful CSO taxonomy rather than comment on the work of any organization.
Though all CSOs face the same organizational choices as they work in more transnational and network modes, some general patterns emerge. Policy-oriented NGOs have generally been fastest to adapt to these new approaches. They have expanded the clout, resources and professionalism of their international secretariats (although these may be decentralized) to become more effective global negotiators, researchers and campaigners. Such NGOs operate in the issues, and the public are urged to support them in this task. Trade union networks tend to emphasize the provision of professional support to member unions at the national level, including information exchange and basic coordination between their members; ultimately, therefore, they see their role as supporting their rank and file members, not the other way around. Faith-based networks can be very strong when uniting a religion globally (the Catholic Church is an obvious example), but multi-faith networks are generally weak. Faiths tend to be naturally hierarchical (at least at the national level) and more competitive with respect to rivals than other types of CSO. Hence, although there are clear issues uniting faiths, they tend to find it easier to collaborate with secular CSOs than with other faiths. We now explore these organizational choices by looking at specific examples.
NGOs working transnationally
Policy-oriented NGOs can be thought of as products of advanced democracy that are generally not hampered by democracy. The majority do not have mass memberships who take major decisions. Many (such as Oxfam) depend heavily on public subscription; but the public are supporters, not members. Some, such as Greenpeace and Consumersā Association (UK) have āmembersā but delegate few powers to them regarding policies, programmes or selection of chief executives. Other NGOs may be influential but have little or no public base (such as the New Economics Foundation, numerous think tanks and Focus on the Global South). Only a few, such as Amnesty International, are membership organizations in the sense that members control the NGO.
There is, therefore, a paradox. NGOs have recently emerged within well-established democracies (North and South; East and West) as influential voices in their special fields, and they are increasingly seen as plugging the deficiencies in orthodox democracy created by globalization (Clark, 2003). They contribute to democracy, but most influential NGOs are not, in themselves, democratic. This is not to say that they donāt enjoy the enthusiastic support of their subscribers and the wider public; however, they feel no obligation to sound out those publics regarding the policies they advocate or to be accountable to them for their campaign efforts. Hence, they can swiftly adapt their messages and activities to accord with new realities or to seize new opportunities. They also exercise great flexibility in forming alliances and refining their positions. They greatly influence democratic processes, therefore, but are not themselves hampered by cumbersome democratic deliberations.
Perhaps due to their subject matter, environmental groups have often been fastest to change to the opportunities of working transnationally. Friends of the Earth (FOE) provides a good example of a global network. FOE International (FOE-I) started 30 years ago as a network of fou...
