CHAPTER 1
WHAT IS A BUSINESS LEASE?
Under the provisions of Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (the 1954 Act), a tenant who has a business lease will be entitled to a new tenancy provided the landlord does not establish a statutory ground of opposition and the tenant takes certain procedural steps laid down in the 1954 Act. For a business lease to be protected in this way by the 1954 Act, it must comply with the requirements contained in s 23(1) of the 1954 Act. If it does not, then it will not be protected.
1.1 SECTION 23(1)
Section 23(1) of the 1954 Act provides that Part II of the 1954 Act:
⦠applies to any tenancy where the property comprised in the tenancy is or includes premises which are occupied by the tenant and are so occupied for the purposes of a business carried on by him or for those and other purposes.
Section 23 has been amended by the insertion of s 23(1A) and s 23(1B) as follows:
(1A) Occupation or the carrying on of a business ā
(a) by a company in which the tenant has a controlling interest; or
(b) where the tenant is a company, by a person with a controlling interest in the company,
shall be treated for the purposes of this section as equivalent to occupation or, as the case may be, the carrying on of a business by the tenant.
(1B) Accordingly references (however expressed) in this Part of this Act to the business of, or to use, occupation or enjoyment by, the tenant shall be construed as including references to the business of, or to use, occupation or enjoyment by, a company falling within subsection (1A)(a) above or a person falling within subsection (1A)(b) above.
Thus, for the protection of the 1954 Act to apply:
(a) there must be a tenancy of premises;
(b) at least part of the premises must be occupied by the tenant; and
(c) the occupation must be for the tenantās business purposes.
In addition, the tenancy must not be one of those types of tenancies which are excluded from protection (see Chapter 2).
1.2 A TENANCY
The first requirement under s 23(1) of the 1954 Act is that there must be a tenancy before the 1954 Act will apply. āTenancyā is defined in s 69(1) of the 1954 Act as being a:
⦠tenancy created either immediately or derivatively out of the freehold, whether by a lease or underlease, by an agreement for a lease or underlease or by a tenancy agreement or in pursuance of any enactment (including this Act), but does not include a mortgage term or any interest arising in favour of a mortgagor by his attorning tenant to his mortgagee ā¦
This definition includes:
(a) tenancies;
(b) sub-tenancies (see 1.2.3);
(c) tenancies created by the 1954 Act;
(d) tenancies created by any other Act;
(e) agreements for tenancies;
(f) agreements for sub-tenancies; and
(g) tenancies by estoppel (see 1.2.5).
It does not include:
(a) mortgage terms;
(b) licences (see 1.2.1);
(c) tenancies at will (see 1.2.2);
(d) leases of rights of way (Land Reclamation Co Ltd v Basildon District Council [1979] 2 All ER 993, CA);
(e) occupation under a management agreement (see 1.2.4);
(f) leases of chattels (Mirabeau Ltd v Sheckman [1959] EGD 133);
(g) situations where the tenancy has ceased to exist, for example where the tenancy has been terminated by the tenant serving a notice to quit or where it has been forfeited by the landlord (but see 4.1 for the situation where the tenant seeks relief from forfeiture).
1.2.1 Licences
The 1954 Act does not apply to licences and it is therefore important to determine whether an agreement which calls itself a licence does in fact grant the occupier a licence, or whether, instead, it grants the occupier a tenancy. The leading authority on this point is the House of Lordsā decision in Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809, where it was held that there will be a tenancy if the agreement confers exclusive possession for a term at a rent. Whilst this decision related to residential premises, in practice it applies equally to commercial premises (London and Associated Investment Trust plc v Calow [1986] 2 EGLR 80; Dresden Estates Ltd v Collinson (1987) 55 P & CR 47, CA; Venus Investments Ltd v Stocktop Ltd [1996] EGCS 173; National Car Parks Ltd v Trinity Development Co (Banbury) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1686; (2002) 2 P & CR 18, CA; Pankhania v Hackney London Borough Council [2002] EWHC 2441; [2002] NPC 123). It did not matter in Street v Mountford that the agreement called itself a licence and that the occupier had agreed not to have any protection under the Rent Act 1977. The key factor is whether the occupier had been granted exclusive possession.
Lord Hoffmann, in Bruton v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [1999] 3 All ER 481, HL, said (at 485):
The decision of this House in Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809 is authority for the proposition that a āleaseā or ātenancyā is a contractually binding agreement, not referable to any other relationship between the parties, by which one person gives another the right to exclusive occupation of land for a fixed or renewable period or periods of time, usually in return for a periodic payment in money. An agreement having these characteristics creates a relationship of landlord and tenant to which the common law or statute may then attach various incidents. The fact that the parties use language more appropriate to a different kind of agreement, such as a licence, is irrelevant if upon its true construction it has the identifying characteristics of a lease. The meaning of the agreement, for example, as to the extent of the possession which it grants, depend upon the intention of the parties, objectively ascertained by reference to the language and relevant background. The decision of your Lordshipsā House in Westminster City Council v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288 is a good example of the importance of background in deciding whether the agreement grants exclusive possession or not. However, the classification of the agreement as a lease does not depend upon any intention additional to that expressed in the choice of terms. It is simply a question of characterising the terms which the parties have agreed. This is a question of law.
Whilst the presence of rent is not essential to the creation of a tenancy (see Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold [1988] 2 All ER 147, CA; and s 205(1)(xxvii) of the Law of Property Act 1925), in Onyx (UK) Ltd v Beard [1996] EGCS 55 it was held that the absence of a provision for the payment of a rent indicated that the arrangement was not a commercial one and raised the question of whether it might be construed as a licence, rather than as a lease.
It may be possible for an owner of premises to avoid granting an occupier exclusive possession by reserving itself rights in the agreement. The effect of this will depend on the construction of the reservations in all the circumstances of each case and it is clear that to deny exclusive possession the reservations must be extensive. In Dresden Estates Ltd v Collinson, the agreement which was described as a ālicenceā provided that the owner of the property (āthe licensorā) could move the occupier (āthe licenseeā) to any other part of its property. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the occupier was not granted exclusive possession and there was a licence. In Shell-Mex and BP Ltd v Manchester Garage Ltd [1971] 1 All ER 841, CA and Esso Petroleum Ltd v Fumegrange Ltd [1994] 2 EGLR 90, CA, two cases relating to agreements to occupy petrol stations, it was held that exclusive possession had not been granted because the agreements provided that the occupiers w...