The International Politics of Eurasia

Volume 4: The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia

S. Frederick Starr, Karen Dawisha

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781563243585
• eBook ISBN: 9781317456162
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

First Published in 2015. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an Informa company.

III
The Southern Newly Independent States

9
The Sociopolitical Environment Conditioning the Foreign Policy of the Central Asian States

Kemal H. Karpat

DOI: 10.4324/9781315699547-9

Introduction: General Considerations

The purpose of this study is to deal with the broad historical, political, cultural, territorial, and national factors that condition the foreign policy of the Turkic states of Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Tajikistan, due to its unsettled situation, will be given less attention, although much of what follows applies to that state, too. It should be noted from the beginning that independence came for all the ex-Soviet republics, and especially the Turkic states, suddenly and rather unexpectedly, without the usual period of preparation that permits the formation of proper public and national opinion, leadership cadres, communication networks, and so forth, free from the influence and mentality of the old dominating center. Thus, during the first two years of independence the Central Asian states formulated their foreign policies in close relation to internal developments in Russia, all the while attempting to gain recognition from as many foreign states as possible in order to distance themselves from Russia. Consequently, this study will devote considerable attention to those events in the Russian Federation that affected the course of political life in Central Asia. The foreign policy of the Turkic states is part and parcel of their emergence as national states, and the two are viewed as such in this study. In fact, the foreign policy of the new nations in Central Asia is part of the founding process, much the way the foreign policy of Ataturk in 1920–23 was part of the founding of the Republic of Turkey. The founders of the national states have considerable freedom to decide their future foreign policies, but also a high degree of limitation imposed by Russia, due to their past association with the Soviet Union, which continues in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the transformation of the union republics into independent territorial nation-states have raised a series of basic conceptual, philosophical, and practical issues, both for the Russian Federation and the new states. The first and paramount issue was the redefinition of nationhood, national identity, territorial borders, and national interest according to the new realities. Paradoxical as it may appear, history places the Central Asian states in a better position than Russia as far as some of these points are concerned. Throughout the socialist period Moscow and the Russian Federation—although largely led by ethnic Russians—acted as the ideological and administrative seat of a supposedly classless society composed of a great variety of ethnic groups. These groups, of course, were denied the freedom to express their national political consciousness. The nationality policy applied to the Muslim republics aimed primarily at fragmenting the universal Islamic community, the ummet, an imaginary, ideal concept rather than a reality. The Soviet regime feared its neighbors, the old spokesmen for this ummet: primarily Iran, and, somewhat less, Turkey. The latter abolished the caliphate in 1924 and abandoned the pretension of commanding the Muslims’ political allegiance. However, the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey did not eliminate overnight the Islamic traditions and cultural outlook of the Central Asians, acquired over centuries, or their habit of regarding Istanbul as their national Islamic center, second only to Mecca and Medina. For Central Asians and other Muslims of Russia, the hajj to Mecca without a stop in Istanbul was considered incomplete. ¹ At various dates, mainly from 1924 to 1936, Central Asia was divided into a variety of administrative-territorial units in order to break down the ummet’s territorial unity by identifying each ethnolinguistic group with a territory.

The Soviet nationality policy, as is well known, emphasized ethnicity as the foundation of political identity and made the vernacular the distinguishing element of nationality of the major ethnic groups. This policy was in essence an almost ideal blueprint for speeding up nation formation in Central Asia and Azerbaijan (the nationality policy there brought together the various old Azeri khanates, such as Shirvan, Kuba, and Shusha). Meanwhile, the supposedly supranationality policy of the Soviets greatly expanded the usage of the Russian language and generalized many elements of the Russian political-communist culture, while the leaders refused to call the Soviet Union a Russian state. The Soviet policy resembled the Ottoman efforts in the nineteenth century to create an Ottoman nation out of diverse ethnic groups. This Ottoman policy strengthened the national identity of the members of various ethnic groups while holding back and neutralizing the national identity of the ethnic Turks. Hence Turkish nationalism did not acquire its distinct marks until the twentieth century, while Russian “nationalism” emerged in the nineteenth century as a means to assimilate the tsar’s non-Russian subjects. One might further note numerous striking parallels in the nationality problems, changes in the political regimes, and economic policies of the Ottoman and Russian empires and the Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union. (All this could be made the subject of an illuminating historical study.)

The basic problem for Russia today is to become a true nation with an identity and culture of its own. The Russian state must decide whether it wants to achieve economic, spiritual, and cultural self-fulfillment first for the Russians as a people, or continue to view its “Russian-ness” as intrinsically bound to the domination of other ethnic and national groups. This domination prevented the emergence of a Russian identity independent of the domination of others. The state became in fact the vehicle to indoctrinate the Russians with messianic dreams and use them as the docile tools of an expansionist state. If Russia desires honestly to become an authentic Russian nation-state without the psychological need to dominate other nations, this attitude can profoundly affect the internal and external policies of the Central Asian states. The issue deserves more scrutiny than we can give it here. Suffice it to say that the search by the Russians for “superpower” status implies the restoration of the old structure. The fall of many world empires—Ottoman, Habsburg, British, French—since 1918 has left lasting wounds, but nowhere do the imperial memories appear as deeply rooted in the popular psyche as in Russia.

The situation in the former Soviet Union must be placed in the proper perspective in order to better appraise the situation of the Central Asian states. The entire history of Russia has been made and unmade by the state, that is, a power group, not by the nation or society. The case is proven by events in 1991. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 was preceded by the collapse of the center, that is, the Soviet state, which was embodied in the Communist Party and its numerous policy-making bodies, much in the way that the end of the monarchical state had brought about the end of the tsarist regime in 1917. The collapse of the communist state compelled the Russians to realize overnight that they were an inchoate nation, an amorphous body of people without a distinct political identity deriving from a true national state of their own. ² The absence of a true governing Russian nation in a multiethnic structure is typical of the traditional type of empires of which the Soviet Union was the last surviving prototype, despite claims to the contrary. Of course, the Soviet government farther complicated the situation by actually adopting the European colonialist formula of the metropolis-colony dichotomy in its military and economic relations with the periphery, while striving to Russify and “denationalize” the Muslims through the policy of atheism, which could undermine Islam as a source of national identity more than the weakening of Orthodoxy undermined the Russians’ sense of national identity. While Russian colonists poured into every economically promising crevice of the vast Soviet territory, they remained distinguished from Central Asians and Muslims in general by their dominant political-economic status and their language and Orthodox faith. The Russians acted as the dominant social class, but also as the supporting human basis of the state rather than as the representatives of a Russian nation. The issue was aggravated further by the fact that the non-Russian Europeans were considered also “Russians,” although ethnically and linguistically they never considered themselves as such. Thus, in the ultimate analysis, “Russian-ness” in Central Asia was determined by one’s association with the “center-state,” which in turn conferred status. In practice, the real difference between the “outsiders” and the indigenous population was determined by religion. Indeed, no Muslim Tatar, Chechen, Turk, or Persian, for example, however high his education, achievement, or position, could ever qualify as a “Russian” or “European” unless he converted to Christianity and became fully Russified in manners and spirit. These are known issues, but they need to be reviewed to understand better the meaning of the political transformation of Central Asia and the current psychological-legal position of the Russians in the area. The Russians, in short, are viewed as the tools of an oppressive alien state rather than the bona fide members of a normal nation, and they are treated as such.

The disintegration of the Soviet center, that is, the party-state, left largely intact and capable of reorganizing and reactivating themselves the very institutions that helped the center govern the periphery. Among these institutions of the center, the armed forces, the Ministry of the Interior, and the KGB occupy the first rank. It is these bodies that are now striving to re-create the old center, both by using the CIS as their tool and by casting themselves as defenders of the “civil” rights of the Russians living in the old Soviet republics. These two issues increasingly occupy a central place in the foreign relations of the old republics with Russia.

The CIS, about which there will be further discussion, is the potential vehicle capable of transforming the old extensive imperial center-periphery relationship into a new selective, harmonious economic and military relationship between the Russian Federation and the old republics. But the CIS can also be easily used by Moscow to dominate the ex-republics by assuring for itself the utmost benefits and fewest liabilities. At the moment the power instruments of the old communist state, that is, the army and the KGB in Russia, are in the process of developing a new relationship with the old Central Asian and Caucasian periphery. It should not be forgotten that the ex-Soviet army, although reduced in size, remains a formidable force, and it, the KGB, and the relevant ministries are indoctrinated with a heavy dose of nationalism, which, for lack of a truly persuasive and binding Soviet nationalism, had to borrow its symbols, heroes, and spirit from the Russian messianic nationalism used by the tsarist regime throughout its expansionist existence. Nationalism in Russia today emanates from the military, the KGB, and various civilian groups. The current weakness of the “national” political institutions of the Russian Federation, such as the parliament and constitution, the slow progress of privatization and the market economy, and public apathy have induced the leaders, including Boris Yeltsin and his prime minister, to court the power instruments of the old Soviet state, especially the armed forces. In this context one can point out that Yeltsin’s brutal elimination of the old parliament in October 1993—amidst applause from the West—and the election of a new one in which the conservative-nationalist forces have the numerical superiority have greatly increased the influence of the army and other irredentist forces. The outcome of this struggle cannot be predicted with accuracy, although one can venture some views. The USSR was brought down primarily because of the economic weight and political oppression of the state organs, especially the army, operating through the Communist Party. A restoration of the old state by the instruments of the state can only bring to power and give additional privileges and authority to the military, the KGB, and other antidemocratic forces. The restoration of the old order can only hasten its fall in a much more dramatic and, socially speaking, costly manner than the fall of the USSR. The Soviet regime sought to save the tsarist empire with internal reforms. There is no other regime to save what is left of the communist empire but democracy, if it can be implemented at all.

The Vestiges of the Soviet Union

The foreign policy of the Central Asian states is conditioned simultaneously by the challenges and developments taking place in the Russian Federation (including efforts to re-create the old union) and the ethnic, cultural, economic, and historical forces within their own territories unleashed by independence and national statehood. The CIS forms the main axis of the foreign policy of the Central Asian states. Consequently, Central Asian foreign relations are conditioned by a set of circumstances that have no parallel in world history, except probably to a limited measure in France’s relations with its former colonies in Central and West Africa. The restoration of the Russian Foreign Ministry to its previous policy-making status is an omen of things to come. The Foreign Ministry in both the tsarist and Soviet eras has played a major and generally successful role in projecting abroad selected images about the intentions and policies of the state. Its leading personnel have always been selected from among the exceptionally well-educated and sophisticated Russians and Russified non-Slavs whose psychological understanding of the West, including the United States, was repeatedly proven by their adroit ability to manipulate the Western press and the public. No Russian foreign policy could be carried out without the input of the Foreign Ministry. Consequently, the Foreign Ministry has been called to carry out the new foreign policy of the Russian Federation, whose objectives were defined in part in circles of the armed forces. The former republics became the central target of the “near abroad” policy, indicating that they were still regarded as part of the “internal” empire rather than truly independent nation-states. The rapid transformation of the Russian Foreign Ministry (including Andrei Kozyrev) from an institution promoting a Western-type democracy, respect for the independence of other nations, the market economy, and close relations with the West (it is the most Westernized segment of the Russian bureaucracy) into an advocate of a nationalist policy toward the near abroad, including Central Asia, is worthy of some discussion. As the USSR began to disintegrate, Yeltsin issued a decree on 18 December 1991 making the Soviet Foreign Ministry and all its assets an institution of the Russian Federation; one week later he placed Deputy Prime Minister Gennadii Burbulis in charge. Andrei Kozyrev, who had been in office since November 1990 and who was Yeltsin’s protégé, kept his place, evincing a truly intriguing ability to survive, given the harsh criticism leveled at him. ³ At this early stage it seemed that Russia was ready to accept and conduct regular relations with the new nations, as indicated by the creation of a new department to oversee relations with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (created late in 1991). Meanwhile, the Russian Foreign Ministry decided to upgrade its information services. This move was undertaken primarily to answer state critics who had severely censured Kozyrev and even asked for his resignation because they saw Russia’s foreign policy as too accommodating to the West and ready to accept as a fait accompli the new political configuration of the former Soviet Union. In fact, early in 1992 Kozyrev made a tour of the CIS nations and established diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Moldova. Both Yeltsin and Kozyrev opposed the creation of a special ministry to deal with the CIS countries, as proposed by the state counselor Sergei Stankevich, an advocate of an active near abroad policy. The Security Council of the Russian Federation, headed by Iurii Skokov, also had endorsed the idea of a special ministry to deal with the near abroad (Skokov would be dismissed eventually). Skokov asked for Kozyrev’s resignation, while the latter accused the proponent...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Table Of Contents
• The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia
• IRussia
• IIThe Western Newly Independent States
• IIIThe Southern Newly Independent States
• Index