Global Justice: The Basics

Huw Williams, Carl Death

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781317597599
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Filosofia
• Subtopic: Storia e teoria della filosofia

Global Justice: The Basics is a straightforward and engaging introduction to the theoretical study and practice of global justice. It examines the key political themes and philosophical debates at the heart of the subject, providing a clear outline of the field and exploring:

• the history of its development
• the current state of play
• its ongoing interdisciplinary development.

Using case studies from around the world which illustrate the importance of the debates at the heart of global justice, as well as activist campaigns for global justice, the book examines a wide range of theoretical debates from thinkers worldwide, making it ideal for those seeking a balanced introduction to global justice.

1

FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

IN THIS CHAPTER …

… we trace the beginnings of the modern philosophical debate around questions of distributive justice in the international context. In particular we focus on John Rawls as the seminal figure in much of these debates and look at how he inspired others and presented his own views on these questions. Rawls, it will be explained, has come to represent one strand of thinking – sometimes referred to as communitarianism – that is viewed as a less radical perspective in the debate, as it is tied to the current reality of a world of sovereign nation-states. Before exploring another popular strand, known as cosmopolitanism, in the next chapter, we will discuss another figure often equated with Rawls’ view, namely the English philosopher David Miller.

JOHN RAWLS

There are two key reasons that we begin our account with Rawls. The first of these is because he has become such a dominant figure in the world of political philosophy – most especially in the Anglo-American academy where the global justice debate initially began in earnest. The British philosopher A.N. Whitehead (1979: 39) once famously said of Western Philosophy that it may be considered a footnote to Plato. In many respects one might characterize modern political philosophy – in its mainstream Anglo-American form – as a footnote to Rawls’ theory of social justice. We will attempt to elucidate this influence here.

The second reason we begin with his work is because of the direct role he has played in the global justice debate. In the first instance, Rawls inspired others, such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge (whom we will discuss in the next chapter), to develop ideas that have proved to be extremely important. Moreover, Rawls himself later made a significant intervention that laid out his ‘communitarian’ perspective and helped to define the contours of the debate up to the present day.

COMMUNITARIANS AND COSMOPOLITANS

Attributing the label communitarian to Rawls is not without its difficulties. The term came to prominence in cognate debates around Rawls’ philosophy in political theory, where the term was used to describe his critics – such as Charles Taylor (1992) – who believed Rawls’ liberalism failed to acknowledge the communal roots of the self and our moral and political values. Yet Rawls’ response revealed that he was sensitive to these considerations and saw them as informing his perspective, allowing for the possibility that his own position was that of a ‘communitarian’ articulating and defending the particular emergent liberal political values of western democracies. Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift’s book, Liberals and Communitarians: An Introduction (1996), is considered the go-to text for understanding the development of this debate.

For some it might seem counterintuitive to label Rawls as a communitarian because of the primacy he accords individual rights, and indeed there are some who view his attempts to blunt his critics’ arguments, by emphasizing the embedded nature of the individual within political and social structures, as problematic and inconsistent. Catherine Audard in her work draws out the tension she sees between what she terms the ‘moral individualism’ of his early work and the ‘social holism’ of its later development (2007: 258). However, in the context of international political theory and the global justice debate, the terms take on a slightly different connotation.

As noted in the Introduction, Brown’s use of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism is employed to help negotiate the different perspectives that arise in normative perspectives on world politics, and here communitarianism is associated specifically with the Hegelian idea of the state as an ethical institution that allows the individual to flourish. It therefore takes on an elevated moral significance that may be interpreted as taking precedence over the individual – and this is certainly evident in more extreme forms of communitarian realism that see little place for valuing the individual’s rights in the face of state interests (see Erskine (2002) for discussion of this breed of communitarianism). This is in contrast with the so-called Kantian idea of ‘cosmopolitanism’ where the status of the state is largelysecondary to the inviolability of the individual.

Rawls – and Miller – might therefore be said to be communitarian in the sense that their views on world politics accept the moral position that the state is of fundamental importance and value to the individual, taking precedence over other collectives and levels of government, as a result of which we should be tentative about challenging its authority and remain committed to reforming the state system, rather than undermining it. Rawls’ most revealing quote – where the Hegelian theme of the individual being ‘at home’ in the state is at its most prominent – occurs in the Law of Peoples:

Leaving aside the deep question of whether some forms of culture and ways of life are good in themselves (as I believe they are) it is surely a good for individuals and associations to be attached to their particular culture and to take part in its common public and civic life. In this way belonging to a political society, and being at home in its civic and social world, gains expression and fulfillment. This is no small thing. It argues for preserving significant room for the idea of a people’s self-determination and for some kind of loose or confederative form of a Society of Peoples, provided the divisive hostilities of different cultures can be tamed, as it seems they can be, by a society of well-ordered regimes. A proper patriotism is an attachment to one’s people and country.

(1999: 111–12)

That being said, if we think of Rawls and Miller as ‘communitarians’, we also need to understand they are of a very different hue to communitarian realists, because they also have a deeply cosmopolitan, Kantian strain to their thinking.

Both see moral values extending beyond the state to the global realm, and both take a far more conditional approach to the authority of the state; Rawls, for example, will often cite instances where individual rights will trump the right of the state. Indeed, it will be argued here that unlike other communitarians such as Thomas Nagel (2005) and Richard Miller (2010), both Rawls and Miller believe duties of justice – and not just weaker humanitarian duties – extend beyond the nation-state. For this reason some might choose to describe them as cosmopolitan. In this sense, we see that the concepts of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism are more helpful in drawing out and identifying elements of thinking in individual theorists, as opposed to playing the more cumbersome role of dividing thinkers in two camps.

Rawls himself does not attribute the term communitarian to his own thinking in the global context, although he does explicitly reject the cosmopolitan position (1999: 119–20); he understands the term in a narrower sense as representing thinkers such as Beitz and Pogge in the global justice debate, who advocate for global redistribution on the basis of the individual’s rights. We get a sense, therefore, of why these categories – and categorizing in general – have been problematic in the debate, and why many other terms have been used: Andrew Kuper described Rawls’ position as ‘thin statist’ (2000: 640); Charles Beitz chose ‘social liberalism’ (2000: 677); more recent discussions have seen the descriptors ‘globalist’ and ‘statist’ (Risse, 2012) gaining currency, as well as ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘non-cosmopolitan’ (Brock, 2013). However, as with Brown’s original categories they should all be understood in the terms of their particular context, and the limits of their application recognized.

To understand Rawls’ status, it is important to appreciate the context within which he published his now legendary work, the 500-page tome A Theory of Justice (TJ) ([1971] 2005). One might summarize the story with the old saying, ‘cometh the hour, cometh the man’. As academic wisdom has it, Rawls began to emerge as a political philosopher in the period when his subject most needed him. In short, the academic climate was such in the Anglo-American world that the notion that political ideas and values could be discussed and studied from a moral perspective had lost its currency.

Philosophers known as the ‘logical positivists’ had made it fashionable during the 1930s to believe that unless one was making verifiable statements of empirical fact, then one was talking ‘nonsense’ – whether it be religious, political or moral beliefs. In the same period – and partly as a consequence – it was becoming increasingly fashionable to treat politics as a ‘science’; a realm of study that lent itself to analytical, experimental and theoretical approaches inspired by the natural sciences, rather than philosophical debates about values and principles. No doubt the horrors of World War II made it more difficult to think of politics as a ‘moral’ realm, as many important philosophers became absorbed in the question of asking what had gone wrong with western civilization.

Yet this tendency to extract moral discussions from politics could only last so long, and indeed it was the question of war that partly sparked a revival of interest in this kind of debate. Many Americans in the 1960s became interested in the question of the nature of a just war, in part because many wished to condemn the war in Vietnam, and in part because some wished to defend Israel’s right to defend themselves during the Six-Day War. Just and unjust wars therefore had to be distinguished. It was during this period that Rawls began in earnest to piece together the key elements of his philosophical vision and it came to fruition with the publication of his magnum opus in 1971, which would contribute significantly to restoring political philosophy to its former status.

It is difficult to quantify the significance of his work. To give a sense of his accomplishment, an analogy might be made with the Beatles. The fab four have a legendary position in the pantheon of popular music, because in many senses they came to define it through their legacy. Mainstream pop music since their day can invariably be compared with the music they produced and it is doubtful whether it will ever emerge from their shadow. Moreover, the Beatles, despite projecting a very modern and original sound, created music that was deeply embedded in harmonies and melodies that had their roots in the classical music of major western composers such as Bach, Handel and Beethoven (whom they famously instructed to ‘roll over’).

Rawls of course did not philosophize in a vacuum, and as he notes in the opening pages of TJ, his work is a modern take on a form of political philosophy that had its roots in the western enlightenment tradition, taking inspiration and key motifs from figures such as Locke, Rousseau and most especially Kant. However, the way in which he recreated it for the modern day has left a legacy that shows no sign of slackening, to the extent that for some in the Anglo-American academy political philosophy is essentially Rawlsian philosophy. In many ways, Rawls’ immediate predecessors who inspired him are overlooked in the same way as the Beatles’ forerunners.

The analogy is by no means perfect, of course. In truth, the Beatles’ music had another great influence that had combined with the traditional western harmonies to lay the basis for rock ‘n’ roll, which emerged from African-American musical traditions. They are part of an ongoing tradition of white musicians who have tasted success through appropriating others’ music (this theme of non-western traditions is one we will return to in the context of political philosophy). Another element the analogy cannot capture is the sense in which Rawls was actually responding to, or railing against, an orthodoxy that had come to define those debates that did attempt to engage with moral values in politics – namely utilitarianism. The principle that moral philosophy should cleave to the general principle of ‘maximizing the general happiness’ was something that Rawls wished to challenge fundamentally.

This desire came in part from his belief that the utilitarian standpoint could be misused in such a way as to justify the abuse of the rights and interests of the minority, in the name of the general good. Bearing in mind Rawls’ upbringing during 1920s and 1930s’ America, in a staunchly liberal and politically aware family living in the ethnically diverse Baltimore City, he himself would have been deeply aware of the discriminatory nature of the society he lived in. If his political philosophy is known for anything, above all else it is the priority it gives to the integrity of the individual, and their fundamental equality and liberty. Indeed, it is these aspects of his work that would be at the heart of later debates relating to ideas about world politics.

THE RAWLSIAN LEGACY

So what are the fundamentals of Rawls’ political philosophy that would prove to be so influential, not only on the subject as a whole, but on later debates relating to justice in the global context? The approach that he took was one that sought to emulate the great philosophers of the past, by using a concept known as the social contract. This is an idea that can be traced as far back as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and his famous text, The Leviathan (1651). In a very general sense the idea of the social contract is to articulate and justify the grounds on which we live together as part of a political society. It is true that philosophers such Hobbes, John Locke (1980), Rousseau (2011) and Kant provide very different visions of this social contract, but they all hold in common the idea of individuals coming together to will into existence a political society, where they agree on fundamental terms for living together. In essence, they all use this device to set out what they consider to be the first principles for the state.

It is this idea that inspires Rawls’ vision, but whereas earlier philosophers would generally provide a story of the original contract –a quasi-anthropological account of how it came to be – Rawls is explicit in his argument that he is using it as a strictly hypothetical device. That is to say, Rawls does not want us to imagine actual people coming together to discuss the terms for living together. Rather he wants to present a sort of timeless thought experiment, which can be used as a tool for working out what the most fair and just principles are for a modern democratic society. In this ‘original position’ imaginary individuals are denied knowledge of their own preferences in order to guarantee ‘neutral’ principles as the outcome of their discussion.

THE ORIGINAL POSITION

In Rawls’ ‘original position’ we must imagine individuals behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. These individuals, like us, have a capacity for justice and a conception of the good (a set of values and priorities, such as a religious worldview, for example). They will also know about the basic facts of how their society is ordered so they are not ignorant of its basic structures and institutions. However, they do not know their own beliefs, their status, their wealth, their job, their gender, or even which generation in time they belong to. In essence, they are denied all the knowledge that could allow them to create principles of justice that would favour their own position. From this original position, therefore, neutral, fair and just principles for ordering the society should emerge.

This is not necessarily the most intuitive of ideas to grasp in the first instance, and Rawls suggests one way we might understand his thinking. ‘Perfect procedural justice’ he likens to the familiar scenario where we endeavour to divide a cake fairly. In this situation the obvious answer is to assign the knife to the person who chooses last; they are therefore compelled to ensure a fair division or distribution of the cake, because they do not know which piece they will receive. Given this scenario, as with the choosers in the original position, the rational, self-interested thing to do is to ensure the arrangement you agree to (the division of the cake, or the basic principles of the society) give you the best chance of securing what you want.

The original position is therefore akin to the cake scenario, albeit a more complex version. This is reflected in the different term Rawls uses: ‘pure procedural justice’. The former is perfect in the sense that we can know pretty much exactly what a fair result will look like and we can formulate a procedure to ensure it. In the latter case, however, such as with the distribution of social goods within a highly complex society, we cannot know beforehand what such a result will look like. The best we can do is design a pure procedure that we can be assured will produce a fair result, whatever that result might look like.

The principles which Rawls’ original position produces are well known but not entirely straightforward. They are principles which are framed to regulate the basic structure of the society, meaning its economic, legal, political and social institutions, as it is these which largely dictate how freedoms and resources are distributed, and therefore whether or not a society is just. Rawls identifies only two key principles. The first relates to the basic freedoms and dictates that the society’s basic structure is to be arranged such that we can all be assured of these liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and all those other freedoms we take for granted in a liberal society.

The second is more complex, relating to the distribution of opportunities and resources. The first part secures fair equality of opportunity; fair in the sense that it is more than merely formal equality of opportunity where positions are open to all in theory but in practice only some have a genuine ability to pursue those positions. This ‘fairness’ is to be secured through the second part of the principle, known as ‘the difference principle’, which ensures that all inequalities must be to the benefit of the worst off. Thus, inequality in of itself is not deemed to be problematic, but where increases in inequality lead to those with the lowest expectations being worst off, they are to be prevented. For example, we might imagine a huge increase in wealth for some might, through the taxation system, lead to increased wealth for those who are worse off – but the exponential rise in the wealth of a minority might actually render their relative position weaker, because of a loss of political agency, for example.

Now it is often assumed that the most crucial aspect of Rawls’ theory is the original position. This is understandable given that it provides the context for revealing his principles of justice. However, the focus on this concept and the subsequent rendering of the two principles often disguises the fact that there is an equally important aspect to Rawls’ political philosophy that needs to be grasped to properly appreciate his ideas. This is especially so with respect to his ideas on world politics, as we will see later.

What is often overlooked in brief accounts of Rawls’ work such as this is the method he employs in his philosophy, an approach which for him ultimately justifies the ideas and principles he puts forward and sets them on solid ground. This method aims at what he terms a reflective equilibrium, his claim being that for any moral theory to be valid and well founded, it needs to reach this state. This requires that the key elements, especially the key principles of the theory, are aligned with what he terms our ‘considered judgements’. These judgements we can understand as being our everyday beliefs that we carry with us; not simply our snap judgements or intuitive reactions but rather those values and ideas that orientate our moral lives and that we articulate when we think about important questions in earnest.

Now, it is not simply that we create our moral theory, such as a theory of justice, so that it lines up accordingly with these considered judgements. The idea, rather, is that our theory represents a set of key ideas and concepts that helps us reflect on these everyday ideas, draw out their rationale, challenge them, and ensure that on rational reflection they are suitably well considered and coherent. We are encouraged to go back and forth between the theory and the judgements testing one then the other, so that we may find that eithe...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 From social justice to international justice
• 2 From social justice to global justice
• 3 Beyond cosmopolitan and communitarian?
• 4 The path to global justice
• 5 Global justice in movement and practice
• 6 Challenges from alternative visions of global justice
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index