Chapter 1
Embodied technique and practice
The tendency in practice theory is to characterize a practice like swimming or cooking as an âamalgam of elements,â as âcomplexesâ or âbundlesâ of meanings, competences, and material objects ⌠In contrast, I propose to do away with âpractice-as-entityââa phrase with no comprehensible meaning since it is neither abstract nor specificâand recognize instead that concrete moments of practice are structured by knowledge in the form of technique. The immediately allows us to distinguish between a given practice of swimming, bounded in time and space, and the technique of swimming which is not merely a repeated pattern or set of rules but an area of practical and technical knowledge. Conceiving of the relationship between technique and practice in this way solves several problems in practice theory. It also opens the door to an epistemological understanding of practice that can inform our thinking about power, agency, society, and material reality.
(Spatz 2015: 40â44)
Beyond biology and sociality, what makes some bodies move, look, sound, behave, or mean something different from other bodies or, more importantly, the same as other bodies? Why should it matter that race, gender, sex, class, sexuality, and geography variously influence what our bodies do from the smallest unconscious gesture to the largest spectacular event? And how does all this body talk specifically and profoundly affect the very foundation of those everyday improvisational moments of our lives as well as those intensely crafted collaborations of staged performances? These questions invoke an important insight offered in the resonating question, most recently illuminated in the work of Ben Spatz: âWhat can a body do?â Those things our bodies can do, that is, walking, talking, eating, swimming, reading, dancing, telling jokes, making love, playing the piano, public protest, family dinners, brain surgery, meditation, acting, building rockets, sweeping the floor, Yoga, praying, and so on, and the way we do all these thingsâincluding how we learn to do them through repetition and inheritance as well as social and environmental relationsâare all doable through trans-historical techniques that ultimately give form, content, and context to examples of specific practice (Hamera 2007; Jones 2015; Martin 1998; Mauss 1973, 2006; Spatz 2015). What our bodies can do, through the infinite manifestations of practice that are constituted by unwavering technique, is made possible through the âtransmission of embodied knowledgeâ (Hamera 2007; Martin 1998; Spatz 2015). It is the passing on and circulation of embodied knowledge that produce the techniques that lead to the practices inherent in the ordinary and extraordinary realities of life.
This section is organized in two parts. The first part begins with brief working definitions of technique and practice followed by three vignettes to serve as examples of how technique and practice are manifest in social life. The second part is a discussion of how conceptualizations of technique and practice affect performance and communication.
Technique
Technique is material. It is a doing. It is embodied knowledge. It is transmitted and it is always already relational. Technique is not possible without others. Technique is more than representation, signification, and symbol because it encompasses a corporeal effort (conscious or unconscious) of things repeatedly learned and done over time and space. As bodies negotiate, circulate, and interact with other bodies they simultaneously learn what Kenneth Burke calls âequipment for livingâ in the form of transmitted techniques that are then reproduced and recirculated. Because technique is learned and layered by histories and inheritances, if we turn to the embodiments of the oppressed and marginalized, we move beyond discourses of disempowerment and enter the epistemological depth of subaltern knowledge. There is a âcommon curriculumâ across social lives that sustain and (re)produce themselves (Spatz 2015). Spatz provides a âworking definitionâ of technique:
Embodied techniques exceed the narrow notion of being a mindless procedure, automated action, or skilled method. Judith Hamera describes technique as ârelational infrastructureâ as it âoffers templates for socialityâ (2007: 19). Hamera goes on to explain, âTechnique translates individual bodies into a common âmother tongueâ to be shared and redeployed by its participants: a discursive matrix, a vocabulary and a grammar, to hold sociality together across difference and perpetuate it over time.â She further adds, âAt its most basic level, technique births new templates for sociality by rendering bodies readable, and by organizing the relationships in which these can occurâ (19). The conceptualization of technique as ârelational infrastructureâ and as âtransmitted knowledgeâ is particularly useful as we explore the intersections of performance, ethnography, and communication (Hamera 2007).
Practice
Practice is a unique moment of action structured by knowledge in the forms of technique. The distinctions between technique and practice are illustrated here in a jump rope game. The jump rope game of double Dutch is centuries old and spans the world. It requires two long ropes turning rhythmically in opposite directions where one or more players jump simultaneously in the center of the two ropes while the rope-turners keep the rope moving, sometimes at higher and higher speeds. Knowing how to turn two ropes in opposite, synchronized, speed and directions while counting, keeping score, and chanting a double Dutch tune to beats and steps of the jumpers is a learned technique.1 How to jump and turn is not unique to one moment in time; there are world-wide d...