Regional Risk and Security in Japan

Whither the everyday

Glenn D. Hook, Ra Mason, Paul O'Shea

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN:
  9781138823891
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317584858
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Japan's unusual position in the realm of international politics encapsulates a three-fold juxtaposition: both in and out of Asia, both occupied by and a close ally of the United States, and both a key trade partner and a strategic rival of China. Whilst international relations theory offers a number of ways to analyse these relations, this book instead utilizes the concept of risk to provide an innovative perspective on Japan's relations with China, North Korea and the US.

The book elucidates how risk, potential harm and harm are faced disproportionately by certain groups in society. This is demonstrated by providing an empirically rich analysis of the domestic implications of security relations with China, North Korea and the United States through the presence of US troops in Okinawa. Beginning with a theoretical discussion of risk, it goes on to demonstrate how the concept of risk adds value to the study of international relations in three senses. First, the concept helps to break down the boundaries between the international and domestic. Second, the focus on risk and the everyday directs us to ask basic questions about the costs and benefits of a security policy meant to secure the national population. Third, what implications do these two points have for governance? The question is one of governance as Japan's externally oriented security policy produces domestic insecurity shared disproportionately, not equally, as this volume makes clear.

Developing the theory of risk as a tool for understanding international relations, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of Asian politics, Japanese politics, international relations and security studies, as well as to policy makers and practitioners working in the field.

Part I
The ‘China threat’ and Sino-Japanese relations

1 Introduction

This part of the book analyses how China has come to be perceived as a source of a variety of risks to Japan, both external and internal. It examines in particular the development of the ‘China threat’ concept in Japan and how this ‘threat’ has percolated throughout Japanese society because of the construction of food, environmental, territorial and crime risks. This introduction first sets out the context for the subsequent chapters by exploring the broader context of Sino-Japanese relations before turning to the development of the China threat and its implications for Sino-Japanese relations. The following chapters examine the construction and recalibration of the aforementioned risks as well as the potential and actual harm of these risks themselves as well as the response to them.

2 Context

The Sino-Japanese relationship is frequently characterized as involving ‘hot economics’ and ‘cold politics.’ Economically, the two states are in a pattern of interdependence which, although asymmetrical, has created a situation where each economy’s existence depends on the other. Where once China depended on Japan as a key trade partner and supplier of much-needed investment and capital goods, as well as a market for made in Japan goods, the tables have turned recently as China has become the workshop of the world, diversifying and expanding trade across the globe. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has turned to history to provide part of the legitimization for its authoritarian rule through a narrative casting the party as the defenders of China and the victors of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45). Despite effective normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972 (and formal normalization with the signing of the peace treaty in 1978), the CCP has actively encouraged anti-Japanese sentiment, through the patriotic education programmes, and this sentiment has been mobilized by the central government in recent years, most notably in 2005, 2010 and 2012. In each case, events surrounding the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and maritime zone in the East China Sea were either a contributory or primary causal factor. The rise of China as the region’s number one economy and potential leader has further facilitated greater assertiveness in this respect.

The antipathy is mutual: in Japan, sentiment towards China has hardened since the late 1990s over a range of issues, perhaps most clearly as a result of the territorial dispute (Cabinet Office Opinion Polls 2013). China’s phenomenal rate of economic development and growth, coupled with its dramatic increase in military expenditure has, in some quarters, led to the characterization of China as a threat to Japan, as outlined below. This has been reflected in the redeployment of Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops from the north (facing the Soviet Union) of the country in Hokkaido to the southwest (facing China) in Okinawa. The old policy of commercial liberalism, i.e. that promoting trade and prioritizing good relations with China would lead to a kind of liberal peace in East Asia, has been replaced by a much more cautious, sometimes overtly assertive, policy of trade combined with containment (Mochizuki 2007). This shift mirrors the downward trajectory of bilateral relations since the 1990s, particularly following China’s firing of live ammunition into the Straits of Taiwan and launching of missiles near Okinawa’s Yonaguni Island. The heightened tension in the territorial dispute is both a cause and a result of this downturn. The dispute, which has plagued relations in recent years, is charged with historical associations to Japan’s imperial expansion, on the one hand, and the perception of China as an aggressive, assertive state – a risk to Japan – on the other. Thus, managing the Sino-Japanese relationship remains one of the greatest challenges facing Japan, and, unquestionably, the most challenging issue at the heart of the bilateral relationship is the territorial dispute.

Figure 1.0.1 Affinity/no affinity with China

Source: Cabinet Office Opinion Polls (2013)

3 The ‘China threat’ narrative

Realist accounts of China’s rise invariably perceive it as an immediate threat to regional security, and a long-term threat to the United States (US). Since the end of the Cold War one of the ‘first objectives’ of US policy has been, in the words of the highly influential neoconservative thinker and policymaker Paul Wolfowitz, ‘to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival’ (New York Times, 8 March 1992). Neoconservatism may be discredited, but the implicit association of the word ‘threat’ with the word ‘China’ pervades not only the popular but also the academic discourse. This is likely a function of the US-centric nature of much realist scholarship and the theoretical predestination which is an article of faith in much realist literature. The most obvious example of the latter comes in the form of power transition theory, a theory which posits that when a rising power reaches parity with a dominant power, if that rising power is dissatisfied with the system, war is the likely result (Organski 1968). Similarly, offensive realist theory is premised on the twin assumptions that the strongest states always compete for regional hegemony and that the ultimate goal of strong states is to dominate the entire interstate system (Mearsheimer 2001). The result is seen to be that, should China’s rise continue, conflict with its powerful neighbours, and indeed with the US, is inevitable.¹ The theory is said to be underpinned by an objective and value-free science, a ‘tragedy’ which sadly cannot be avoided, in Mearsheimer’s famous rendition (2001).

This kind of inevitability, ‘scientific’ realism, has taken hold in Japan, too. The China threat is well established in domestic discourse, and enjoys varying degrees of support in all the major parties as well as in the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and in parts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Indeed, probably the DPJ’s most popular personality, Maehara Seiji, was one of the first mainstream politicians to publicly announce that he considered China, with its strong economic performance and increased military spending, to be a threat as far back as 2005 (Maehara 2005). Similar statements were made by then foreign minister Asō Tarō later that same year, though even Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō disavowed the notion, insisting that China was not a ‘threat’ to, but rather a ‘chance’ for, Japan (Przystup 2005).² Until taking power the DPJ was considered to be less hawkish than the LDP, but with the decline in influence of Ozawa Ichirō and Hatoyama Yukio, and Maehara’s own ‘rise’ in the political world, the two became bedfellows as far as security policy is concerned. Their closeness is illustrated by the controversial 2010 National Defense Programme Guidelines (NDPG), the first to be published under a non-LDP government, which specified China as a threat, as have all subsequent MOD white papers. The 2010 collision incident involving a Chinese trawler and two JCG patrol vessels in the waters around the Senkaku Islands, in which China flexed its political and economic muscle to force Japan to back down (from a crisis the DPJ itself had instigated), undoubtedly contributed to this perception, as have subsequent events in the dispute. This is further illustrated by prominent right-wing politician Ishihara Shintarō, expressing his worries that, if Japan fails to physically occupy the islands, Japan itself might ‘end up as a second Tibet’ (The Japan Times, 27 November 2012). Similarly, the head of the MOD-affiliated Research Institute for Peace, Nishihara Masashi, calls for a tough stance against Chinese expansionism, and warns that Chinese control of the disputed islands would ‘pose a serious security threat to the region’ (Nishihara 2012). Whilst the veracity of such a statement is questionable,³ it is indicative of how the island issue is now widely perceived in Japan, perhaps best summed up in the old far-right warning that a Chinese occupation of the islands would be the first step in an eventual Chinese invasion of Okinawa and eventually the main islands.

This is not to say that China, demonized by militarist US and Japanese analysts, is a benign state. Numerous authors have identified a strong realist streak in Chinese foreign policymaking (e.g. Johnston 1995; Lynch 2009). Nor is it a simple case of US ideas sailing across the Pacific and dropping anchor in the minds of Japanese politicians and policymakers: anti-Chinese sentiment has a long and sombre history in Japan. Still, the US influence is unmistakeable: China hawks such as Maehara have close ties with US security policymakers and security managers as have members of the present Abe Shinzō administration (Jerdén 2013). Moreover, these policymakers have long deployed Beiatsu (US pressure) on Japan to take a tougher stance towards China. The highly negative US response to Hatoyama’s idea of an East Asian community is indicative of the long-standing US fear that China might pull Japan away from the US and into its own orbit (O’Shea 2014). Whilst such an eventuality seems unlikely with the return to LDP governance, Beiatsu is now focused on pressuring Japan to take stronger measures against the aforementioned China threat to the disputed islands: Kevin Maher, former head of the Office of Japan Affairs in the US State Department, has gone on record as calling for the Japanese government to ‘be decisive and realistic about the threat from China,’ the response to which requires an increase in military spending and the development of military bases on the islands nearest to the Senkakus (Japan Times, 16 December 2012). This kind of pressure often involves the implication that, if Japan does not accede to such demands, US support may not be forthcoming in Japan’s time of need – in this case, Maher stated that spending increases ‘send a very important signal to Washington that Japan is serious about meeting its own defence responsibility under the security alliance with the United States.’

Since 2010 the idea that China represents a threat to Japan, most immediately in the disputed waters and islands of the East China Sea, has gained currency to the extent that it is now conventional wisdom. Japan maintains a strict, non-negotiable ‘no dispute exists’ policy on the dispute; and the debate, such as exists, is on the appropriate level of response to Chinese provocations and the means of defending the islands. However, this threat-based approach focuses solely on defending the islands without addressing broader issues: (1) why are the islands claimed?; (2) why does Japan have outstanding territorial disputes with all of its neighbours?; and (3) what alternative policies might better serve Japan in the long-run? These questions are unasked, as the national interest is taken as read. Shifting the focus from a threat-based to a risk-based approach to Sino-Japanese relations, and specifically to the dispute, suggests alternative interpretations, and does so without ignoring the reality of Chinese territorial ambitions or military assertiveness. Instead of studying the China threat, as is dominant in the IR literature, the approach taken here instead assesses the recalibration of risk produced by the China threat in the areas of food, environmental, territorial and immigration risks.

4 Structure of Part I

This part of the book details how the narrative of China as a threat to Japan has manifested itself, as seen in the perception of China as a source of a wide variety risks. More specifically, it examines how the ‘China threat’ has percolated throughout Japanese society because of the construction of food, environmental, territorial and immigration risks. Whilst the 1990s were generally a time of positive Sino-Japanese relations, as China has grown in economic and military strength so too has the idea of China as a source of risks to Japan. This has led to a recalibration of risks across a wide spectrum of issues including risks associated with food from contaminated Chinese imports (Chapter 1), the environment, as in the case of Chinese transboundary air pollution (Chapter 2), the maritime and territorial dispute in the East China Sea (Chapter 3) and Chinese immigrants in Japan (Chapter 4). Each chapter considers these risks in terms of the actors responsible for their recalibration. These actors vary across the spectrum of risks, as illustrated by the central government promoting the recalibration of the territorial risk, whereas the recalibration of the food risk has been largely in the hands of the market and society (specifically the media). Even where the actors differ, the root causes remain the same: both the recalibration of and response to risk in each chapter are in part a function of the portrayal of China as a threat to Japan, and together the four chapters demonstrate how the risks to the security of the everyday in Japan are linked on multiple levels with the bilateral and the international.

With the recalibration of risk comes the potential for harm, and each chapter highlights potential as well as actual harms that are considered risky to the Japanese state, society or market. For example, the risk of imported Chinese food is based on the potential harm caused by contamination, deliberate or otherwise, of the imported food, despite the relatively low level of harm caused by Chinese food when compared to the actual harm caused by certain Japanese food risks such as raw beef liver. Similarly, there is a widespread perception in Japan that the number of crimes committed per capita by Chinese immigrants compared to Japanese nationals is substantially higher. Here the market, in the form of media outlets, interacts with society to perpetuate and expand this perception by a disproportionate coverage of Chinese immigrant crime. As argued in the introduction of this book, potential harm is only one side of the coin – the response to risk also produces actual harm which affects a range of actors, from the marginal (Chinese immigrants in Japan) to the mainstream (Japanese businesses trading with China).

The first part of this book proceeds as follows:

Chapter 1 on food risks examines how state, society and market actors combined to transform the consumption of Chinese food into a risky activity. The chapter compares the risk construction and recalibration as well as the actual harm caused across a number of food scares in Japan, including contaminated Chinese gyōza, raw beef liver and cesium-tainted beef from Fukushima. It demonstrates how the deterioration in bilateral relations and the narrative of China as a source of risks has exerted a powerful influence in risk recalibration with regard to seemingly unrelated issues, and illustrates how the relationship between risk and harm can be tenuous.

Chapter 2 considers environmental risk, specifically the risks posed by transboundary pollution originating from China and the impact of such pollution on Japan. As with most countries, Japan’s industrial and economic development resulted in large-scale environmental destruction, exemplified by the Minamata disaster most obviously exemplifies. After years of neglect, the Chinese government is beginning to tackle the environmental crises now faced, some of which have had repercussions for Japan, particularly the annual ‘yellow dust’ storms as well as acid rain. Although the Japanese state has for many years supported China’s attempts to tackle these environmental problems, with the growing sense of China as a source of other risks, this support has gradually been phased out. This has taken place at the same time as the media emphasize the environmental risks posed by China.

Chapter 3 details the territorial dispute, elucidating how Japan’s recalibration of risk is intrinsically connected to the China threat, along with China’s own behaviour in the dispute. The construction and recalibration of risk have contributed to an inflexible response in the form of the ‘no dispute exists’ policy. Designed to mitigate the potential harm of losing administration of the islands, the policy has in turn led to actual harm to Japanese business interests in China as well as causing damage to Sino-Japanese relations overall.

Chapter 4 takes up the risks and harms associated with Chinese immigrants in Japan. Although the level of crime by ethnic Chinese is marginally higher than that of Japanese nationals, this fact has been developed as a serious risk by sensationalist media outlets to boost sales and by anti-immigration and anti-China politicians. The recalibration of risk has contributed to existing anti-Chinese sentiment and resulted in harm to Chinese immigrants. It also produces potential harm to Japan as a whole in light of the rapidly aging population and the incompatibility of providing care for the aged without some form of immigration reform.

Notes

1 Indeed Mearsheimer, the father of ‘offensive realism,’ explicitly stated as much in an article entitled ‘The rise of China will not be peaceful at all’ (2005).

2 Chinese officials responded by pointing out that, at the time, Japanese official military spending was almost twice that of Chinese official military spending (Japan Times, 23 December 2005).

3 The islands are tiny and rugged, thus unable to support any serious military base, and are located in the middle of the East China Sea, rather than as part of the wall of islands which control entry to the Pacific Ocean (O’Shea forthcoming).

References

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2013) “Gaikō ni kansuru yoron chōsa, zu 14 chūgoku ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Note on translations, Romanization
• Abbreviations
• Glossary
• Introduction: risk in Japan’s regional relations
• Part I The ‘China threat’ and Sino-Japanese relations
• Part II Deconstructing the framing of North Korea
• Part III Internalizing the US–Japan alliance in Okinawa
• Conclusion: risking the everyday
• Index