PART I
Theories of Motivation
CHAPTER 1
Expectancy Theories
| Expectancy Theory as a Predominantly Conscious Set of Constructs |
| Evidence for a Conscious Process |
| The Rationality of Implications for Practice |
| A New Vroom |
| Constructs Introduced by Expectancy Theory Variants beyond Vroom |
| Ways in Which Unconscious considerations Might Influence Vroom's Constructs |
| Conscious Valence and Emotions |
| Unconscious Emotions |
| Brain Mechanisms Involved |
| The State of Knowledge vis-ĂĄ-vis Valence |
| The Placebo Effect |
| Controversy |
| Medical Theory and the Placebo Response |
| Conclusions |
Among the various expectancy theories, the one set forth by Vroom (1964) stands out on a number of grounds. It is rated in terms of validity at the five-star level (the highest) (see Miner 2005, Chapter 7). In the same source its importance rating is reported as 5.96, based on the judgments of organizational behavior specialists, and it is the only one among the expectancy theories that appears to have achieved institutional status (Miner 2006b). Meta-analyses have yielded consistent support (Miner 2005, 2007), as have extensive nonquantitative reviews. All in all the evidence for the validity of some version of expectancy theory, particularly the Vroom version, is quite impressive; to an only slightly lesser extent this support extends to the porter and Lawler (1968) version as well.
Expectancy Theory as a Predominantly Conscious Set of Constructs
Vroom's theory and its various derivatives or variants are primarily a rational or conscious construction. There is no guarantee the calculation actually occurs as specified, but the reality provided by heuristics and bounded rationality clearly does achieve a result that closely approximates the theoretical expectations; people may not actually think as expectancy theory specifies, but they follow a process that yields essentially the same kind of validity.
Evidence for a Conscious Process
The idea of expectancy assumes that people think and express their motives in ways that take the probability of occurrence of an event into account; they have expectations with regard to the likelihood that things will happen, and they use these likelihood assumptions to reach conclusions with regard to what they should and will do. Thus various formulae are posited that require mathematical calculations, as for instance the following:
Motivation = Effort-to-performance expectancy Ă the sum of all operating factors (performance-to-outcome expectancies Ă their valences).
In writing regarding the theory more recently, Vroom (2005) has the following to say in this regard:
I would make changes if I were to revise it today. . . . First and foremost I would certainly eliminate the mathematization and formalization of the theory. I was probably unduly influenced by the mathematical zeitgeist at Penn at the time. Unfortunately I believe that my mathematical formulation contributed to many ill-advised attempts to test the theory using measures lacking the ratio/scale properties necessary (254).
It is noteworthy that unconscious processes characteristically make little use of mathematical calculations (see Hassin 2005) in such a manner, thus once again reinforcing the highly rational nature of Vroom's expectancy theory as currently written.
The measurement procedures used in testing the theory also point to its preoccupation with conscious processes. Without exception, these have been of a self-report nature. In whatever form expectancy theory has taken, the constituent variables have been measured by questionnaires that are constituted of entirely conscious self-reports; no uses of projective techniques or other procedures that tap unconscious motives have been reported. Insofar as comprehensive personality indexes have been utilized, they continue to rely on self-report approachesâas for instance the "big five" traits (Judge and Ilies 2002).
The Rationality of Implications for Practice
In reviewing the implications of expectancy theory for practice, I conclude that the domain of the theory is limited to structured, rational, and conscious thought processes (Miner 2007, 77). In such a theory-friendly organization people are recognized and rewarded relative to the excellence of their performance, merit salary increases are an accurate reflection of relative performance, and the promotion system operates to help the best person to get to the top. Given the rational emphasis of the theory, individuals with an internal locus of controlâthose who believe that events in their lives are subject to their own influenceâemerge as having particularly high motivation. The idea of selecting people to be congruent with an expectancy theory context receives strong support from research (Miller and Grush 1988).
Much of the work on the practical applications of expectancy theory has been provided not by Vroom, but by Edward Lawler; it is he who has given this work much of its rational thrust. Writing recently in this area (Worley and Lawler 2006), he has emphasized paying the person rather than the job, reinforcing a culture that values growth and personal development, and utilizing performance-based information systems. "Bonus systems can be particularly effective motivators during periods of change by establishing a clear line of sight between results and rewards" (20). Not all of what is said in this regard derives from expectancy theory, but much of it does, and thus continues the emphasis on rationality and conscious processes in the practical domain.
A New Vroom
Although Vroom has not to date, as of 2010, revised his version of expectancy theory, he has given hints as to the direction such a revision might take. In this connection he has the following to say:
A new expectancy theory would have to acknowledge a "cognitive revolution" which has taken place in the field of psychology during the past several decades. I first became aware of an information-processing perspective to cognition through discussion with Herb Simon on my move to carnegie in the 1960s. . . . To use Simonâs language, [people] "satisficed," rather than optimized, searching until an alternative reaching a level of aspiration was found. Furthermore, they evaluated alternatives sequentially and at a relatively slow speed with no suggestion of the exhaustive multiplication over all outcomes built into my propositions. . . .
The development of prospect theory (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982) also exposed limitations of expectancy theory even in the realm of choice behavior. Human choices are led astray from subjective rationality by a number of identifiable heuristics and biases, including the manner in which the alternatives have been framed (Vroom 2005, 255).
A new Vroom would clearly tackle the realm of the unconscious, to which this book devotes itself, or at the very least he would attempt to deal with such issues. To his credit Vroom recognizes the need for work of this kind to redress the changes that have occurred over the past twenty-five years; yet he does not actually move to face the challenges that scientific change now presents.
Constructs Introduced by Expectancy Theory Variants beyond Vroom
Certain constructs have found their way into expectancy theory through routes other than those provided by Vroom. Historically one such construct preceded Vroom, and probably influenced him to some extent. This is the goal construct as introduced by Georgopoulos, Mahoney, and Jones (1957), a formulation that has been shown to have the capability to bring unconscious motivation into the human repertoire (Miner 2008). Unfortunately, however, this potential was not immediately recognized: In the particular study that involved goals they were measured via a self-report questionnaire that tapped into conscious processes only, thus leaving unconscious goal setting entirely outside of the theoretical loop.
A second construct that moves beyond Vroom, and at the same time brings in the possibility of unconscious motivation, is the introduction of role perceptions into the theoretical mix. Constructs of this kind are inherent in the formulations of Porter and Lawler (1968) and in the version of expectancy theory set forth by Graen (1969). In both instances, roles, and perceptions of them, are central to the theoretical formulations. Unconscious motivation comes in by virtue of the fact that roles which establish job behavior (and motivation) can be a product of social constructions regarding how individuals should act in a particular position even without being aware of the role prescriptions acting on them (Miner 2008). Unfortunately once again the theorists used self-reports in testing their views, and thus by relying entirely on conscious measures negated any possible unconscious factors that might have been involved and unearthed.
We will return to the matter of how goals and roles may manifest themselves at the unconscious level as we take up these matters in much greater detail in subsequent chapters.
Ways in Which Unconscious Considerations Might Influence Vroomâs Constructs
On page 101 of Miner (2005a), Figure 7.2 presents the basic expectancy theory model. The variables considered all involve some perceived probability (or expectancy) to be used in the calculations, with the exception of approach-avoidance valence. This leaves only valence as a possible source of unconscious factorsâeither motives or emotions. Vroom (2005) indicates that he originally borrowed his ideas of valence, and force as well, from Lewin, but in this instance they became attached to outcomes specifically.
Conscious Valence and Emotions
Both Lewin and Vroom were concerned with a valence that was of emotional origin and that yielded either a positive or a negative thrust. As used, valence was a broad-brush construct that served to summarize the directionality of a process but did little to specify the actual nature of what was involved. This kind of approach-avoidance distinction has been found in a wide range of areas. Early work with the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) focused on the need for affiliation and explored how motivation of this kind either served to attract people to one another or brought about an avoidance response (sociophilia vs. sociophobia).
The neurobiological evidence provides a possible reason for the consistent emergence of the approach-avoidance distinction in motivation. . . . [This] distinction has a long and prolific history; it emerges in several theories of motivation and goal processes; and physiological evidence supports the existence of neuroanatomical correlates for it. The two systems are functionally independent of one another and thus are correlated with different environmental stimuli and may operate through different processes (Gable and Strachman 2008, 564â565).
For many years identification of the emotions involved in approach-avoidance valence was achieved by asking people to describe their feelings. Thus the existence of emotion was dependent on conscious processes (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, and Gross 2007); unconscious emotion was not a contributor to scientific knowledge regarding how emotions and valence operate. Research evidence, obtained largely from this type of consciously driven study, yielded a conclusion that a negativity bias predominated, and this bias emerged as early as the second half of the first year of life (Vaish, Grossmann, and Woodward 2008):
Negative stimuli are hypothesized to carry greater informational value than positive stimuli and thus to require greater attention and cognitive processing. . . . Adults spend more time looking at negative than positive stimuli, perceive negative stimuli to be more complex than positive ones, and form more complex cognitive representations of negative than of positive stimuli. . . . When making judgments, people consistently weight the negative aspects of an event or stimulus more heavily than the positive aspects (Kahneman and Tversky 1984, 383).
The negativity bias is thought to serve the evolutionarily adaptive purpose of helping us safely explore the environment while appropriately avoiding harmful situations (395).
Unconscious Emotions
More recent studies have shown clearly that unconscious emotions of a kind powerful enough to alter behavior without reaching the level of awareness, even when conscious processes are directed to feelings, do exist (see Winkielman and Berridge 2004). Thus valence can be a result of unconscious emotions (Ruys and Stapel 2008; Ferguson, Hassin, and Bargh 2008). Some event or stimulus, in most cases external, triggers an emotion; that emotion in turn automatically yields a complex set of changes in the brain and body that constitutes an emotional response (Barrett, Ochsner, and Gross 2007). ...