The term “genocide” was coined in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin (1900–59). Born on June 24, 1900 in the rural village of Bezwodene in eastern Poland (then part of the Russian Empire), his Jewish background, coupled with a natural love of learning, saw him develop an interest in human morality and how it was to be channelled for goodness. A lawyer and legal scholar, Lemkin later became, in turn, a Polish soldier, refugee, and chief architect of what became the international law that made genocide a recognised crime (Bartrop 2012: 186–189).
By 1929, Lemkin had been appointed Deputy Public Prosecutor in Warsaw. In 1933, when an international conference on penal and criminal law met in Madrid in Spain, Lemkin felt that the time was ripe for him to present an idea he had been turning around in his head as a result of learning of the Ottoman Turkish destruction of the Armenians (see Chapter 3): an international law addressing two crimes of “barbarity” and “vandalism.” The former he defined as destroying a national or religious collectivity; the latter as destroying works of culture representative of the genius of such groups. Though he had sent his paper ahead, Lemkin was prevented from attending by the Polish Minister of Justice, who saw Lemkin's work solely as a Jewish issue. Between 1933 and 1939, Lemkin continued to sharpen his thinking about the legal implications and ramifications of such violence against groups.
By early 1941, with war raging in Europe, Lemkin left Poland with the aid of friends, and made his way to the United States. He settled into a teaching position at Duke University, North Carolina, where his contacts had managed to secure an academic appointment for him at the Duke Law School.
One year later, Lemkin submitted to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945) a one-page proposal for an international treaty banning “vandalism and barbarity.” Roosevelt responded affirmatively, but, due to the exigencies of the war itself, such work would have to come later.
At the same time, Lemkin was also working hard on his massive 674-page book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, which would be published in 1944 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. Addressing the issue of Nazi atrocities against Jews, Lemkin devoted the entirety of Chapter 9 to a discussion of what he called “genocide” – a “new term and new conception for destruction of nations” (Lemkin 1944: 79) He coined the term by linking the Greek word genos (tribe, nation) with the Latin suffix-cide (killing). As he saw it, the Nazi assault in Europe was cause for a great deal of serious reflection about the state of humanity in the modern world, and on its future. Accordingly, he wrote, “New conceptions require new terms. By ‘genocide’ we mean the destruction of a nation or ethnic group…. It is intended … to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Lemkin 1944: 79).
After the war, Lemkin became obsessed with seeking recognition of his term from the newly established United Nations, and achieving passage of a bill banning such destruction into international law. He faced considerable difficulties, not the least of which was that he was just one man with a theory, acting in no official capacity, nor representing any agency or government.
After many bureaucratic and legal battles, on December 9, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations, with the support of both its Legal Committee and the Security Council, passed the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The vote was unanimous.
The initial model of the Convention was in large part drafted by Lemkin himself, though considerable redrafting at committee stage saw it changed noticeably from what had originally been envisaged. Article 2 of the final document embodies the definition of genocide, which was contentious both then and now:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
- Killing members of the group;
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
(Totten and Bartrop 2009: 30–33)
A few key points can be made by way of a critique of the Convention and this definitive Article. First, genocide is a criminal act, which the signatories promise to “prevent” and “punish.” Second, for a successful charge of genocide to be brought the notion of intent on the part of the perpetrators must be proven. Third, destruction can be “in whole” or “in part,” though just how many individuals constitute “in part” is not spelled out. Fourth, four possible groups are listed as the only acceptable targets for genocide; thus if other groups of people are persecuted – for example as a result of political affiliation, social origin, cultural background, or sexual preference – these are not included within the UN's definition of genocide. Finally, killing is not the only means to commit genocide as four other activities, in which lives are not necessarily taken, are also considered.
Genocide covers many actions, though the proven intent to destroy is what really matters: if the ultimate aim is the permanent and deliberate elimination of the targeted group from the wider population, then it is genocide.
The UN definition is not all-encompassing. While including acts of destruction that are not lethal to a group, several groups were omitted that arguably should be included. These cover social and political groups; the types of actions that could be included as genocide could be widened; and the meaning of “intent” should be clarifed. The fact is that, owing to a series of compromises involving the major powers of the day, none of these proposed changes made their way into the final form the Convention agreed in 1948. Because the Convention resulted from compromise, and in spite of changing circumstances over more than six decades since it appeared, changing the Convention and its definition will probably be more difficult to achieve than it was to originally secure its passage.
The number of events throughout history that have since 1948 been termed genocide has resulted in confusion regarding what genocide should be; indeed, a full scholarship of genocide has emerged. Invariably, a great deal of genocide theory proceeds from (and all too often gets bogged down by) discussions relating to definitional matters. Where Lemkin's original conception began with the statement that genocide means “the destruction of a nation or ethnic group,” other definitions diverge from this (Totten and Bartrop 2008: 101–102). Other forms of destruction that do not fit comfortably into Article 2 have led to even newer terms being developed: in addition to genocide, ideas such as ethnocide, politicide, democide, omnicide, gendercide, and autogenocide, among many others, have been formulated. While these notions are often useful in creating models to help approach specific issues, it could, however, be argued that the full scope of genocide has yet to be exhausted.
Genocide, first and foremost, is a crime – a crime of the greatest magnitude, and a major problem afflicting the very definition of modern civilisation. Whether or not we would like to admit it, genocide – and the threat of genocide – has become one of the defining features of our time.
Historically, the causes of genocide are difficult to pin down. Only with hindsight is some kind of connection visible between an event and what transpired beforehand. Whether one can ultimately arrive at a common causal denominator for all genocides is doubtful, though some features do stand out. Frequently, genocides take place in times of war. Usually, some sort of ideology is present that demonises a target group and demands its eradication. Elsewhere, times of extreme economic stress can lead to an outbreak of mass violence, while inter-communal violence can take place when there is a radical imbalance of power between those seeking destruction and their intended victims.
These factors, in themselves, do not automatically lead to genocide. Populations have to be conditioned to accept it, often over a lengthy period of time, otherwise a perpetrator regime is seen to be going too far and the population will reject its actions.
The flashpoint, or trigger, will always vary from case to case. Such incidents cannot always be predicted in advance, and, as with all historical events, there are so many variables that it is impossible to foresee how an event will resolve itself before it actually does.
It is in view of this that we need to consider the root cause behind the establishment of international legislation designed to confront genocide. In the enormous death toll of the Great War, the vast majority of those killed were military deaths: our best estimates tell us that, on average, 5,600 soldiers were killed per day, every day, for four and a quarter years. Civilians numbered only 5 per cent of all deaths in combat zones during the Great War (Bartrop 2002: 512–532).
After that conflict, the rate of civilian deaths in wartime increased enormously. By the Second World War, civilians could be calculated at 66 per cent of all war-related deaths; into the 1970s and 1980s, civilian deaths in war headed towards 80 per cent (Bartrop 2002: 512–532). The vast majority of such deaths can be put down to an accumulation of massacres (some pre-determined, some spontaneous) and genocide (by definition deliberate).
The chapters that follow will serve as a short narrative summary of a series of case studies of genocide, and as an introduction to some of the international implications of these case studies. In a work of this length, it is impossible to dissect all the implications of every issue within the field of genocide studies, so this volume can only stand as an elementary overview of the fundamentals of the subject.
The concept of genocide is not an easy one to understand. Because it is locked directly into a legal definition that defines the concept and forms the international legislation that makes it a crime, there is a dissenting view that any definition of genocide should be expanded in order to explain all the horrors and injustices that the world has witnessed. Starting the process that can lead to an understanding of the causes, meanings, and realities of genocide is what this book seeks to do.
Discussion Questions
- Why are definitional matters of such importance for scholars of genocide?
- Is it possible to define the term “genocide” in any way other than legally?
- What are some of the key elements of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, and why are they contentious?
- To what extent is genocide dependent upon the deliberate intent of the perpetrators? Can genocide take place where no such intent is present?
