1
Introduction
What is another person like? Surely this is one of the most important questions that faces us throughout our lives. We may not actually express it as a question to ourselves, yet every day we are making judgements about other people. There are lots of people we encounter quite briefly and at a distance: politicians, celebrities, sports personalities and all the other people we learn about online. At times we think we know them quite well by following them on social media, seeing images of them regularly on television or hearing about them on the radio. Sometimes we actually meet them face to face. How often do they turn out as expected? Other people we meet personally: friends, family, colleagues and neighbours. Despite knowing a lot about them, there are occasions when they donât do as we expect, and sometimes we choose to revise our opinion about them: we might decide that someone who we thought was friend is no longer a friend. Occasionally friends tell us that we âhave got them all wrongâ and that we are misunderstanding them. Clearly, in our everyday lives the way we perceive other people is very important. It might lead to enduring friendships and exciting jobs, but it can also result in prejudice and discrimination. So trying to find out how we make sense of each other is an important topic for psychology. This book examines topics in cognitive and social psychology to explore how we do it. This area of work is often referred to as social cognition, and the first half of the book explores relevant research in perception, social categorization, social inference, motivation and cognition. The book also includes research in social and cultural psychology to give a broader picture of interpersonal perception and, in the second half, examines the socio-cultural aspects of the perception of other people: social influence and social norms, folk psychology, culture, narrative and discourse analysis, dipping occasionally into philosophy, sociology and a little bit of history as well. The combination of the topics in the book demonstrates that both cognition and culture are crucial to the understanding of the perception of people. Each chapter focuses on a different important research area in the subject.
The next chapter, Chapter 2, deals with the fundamentals of perception and provides examples of the models that the researchers have produced for how we recognize people and objects. Much of the research in the study of visual perception has sought to work out, stage by stage, how we make sense of the information before our eyes: extracting an object from the background and then deciding what it is. The ability to identify something involves recognition, and so memory is crucial for perception; therefore we can ask: how does knowledge and expectation influence what we see? For example, clothes hanging in a darkened bedroom may be mistaken for a person in a quick glance. In seeking to understand how we perceive another person (and anything else), researchers have attempted to identify the cognitive processes involved in detection to recognition. In doing so they have built computer models, computational systems, that attempt to mimic the human brain in the way it solves the perceptual âproblemâ of recognizing things. One outcome of this is that, if this modelling becomes sophisticated enough, then in theory we could model human perception in a robot. However, other researchers have questioned whether human perception really can really be conceptualized as a disembodied human brain, processing information from its distant senses, like a computer processing information from a camera. In this alternative view, âperception is livingâ: we perceive through action. We are human beings, animals of a particular shape and size, who have evolved over millennia, and perception is just as much about our bodies, and the way we move, as it is about the brain. We do not perceive the world âout thereâ but we perceive âin the worldâ. It might be perfectly possible to build a robot with certain perceptual abilities, but its perception might never be the same as a personâs. This debate revolves around the question of how to characterize human psychology: are we clever computational problem-solvers or clever evolved animals?
We do not perceive other people simply as âa personâ but identify them as members of particular categories: boys, girls, men, women, relatives, friends, enemies, doctors, teachers, northerners, southerners, French, Japanese, Europeans, Asians, foreigners. Once the category is selected we can access all our information (knowledge, beliefs and expectations) about the category, which we can apply to the member we have just identified. Identifying someone as a (medical) âdoctorâ then evokes the assumption that they are more likely to be able to help in a medical emergency compared to other categories of people (such as bank clerks or lawyers). This gives rise to additional questions about categories and expectations: is a teacherâs perception of a child being noisy in the classroom influenced by the categorization of the child as a âboyâ and that being noisy, in the teacherâs expectation, is what boys do? The categorization of people is viewed as fundamental to social cognition, and is examined in Chapter 3. It is argued that we simply cannot make sense of a person, or interact with them, until we have categorized them. It would be impossible to understand people, and to know how to interact with them, if we were unable to tell friends from strangers or the boss from the janitor. Yet how do we decide which category to put them in? And what does it mean when we have categorized someone as a librarian, a criminal or a friend? Also, what are the âknownâ characteristics that we attribute to the person? What expectations do we have about a person once we have made this categorical judgement about them? How does this categorization affect our later judgements of that person, and our memory of them? The models of how this information is represented mentally (in memory) are examined: are they schemas, prototypes, exemplars? Similarly, what expectations do others have about us from the way we dress, act and present ourselves? What impressions do we make on others, and what information leads to which categorical judgements? Furthermore, how does categorization affect the way we engage with others and the way they engage with us?
Chapter 4 explores how we think about people, that is, how we make social inferences about them. Does this involve a careful reasoning process that rationally seeks to work out what people are like, or do we produce a rapid snap judgement? Are we like Sherlock Holmes, thoughtfully and correctly working out the personâs state of mind, lifestyle, occupation and so forth? Or are we more like Dr Watson or Inspector Lestrade from the Conan Doyle stories: prone to error, with a tendency to jump to conclusions? Chapter 4 considers both the rationality of human thought and the need for rapid decision-making in the context of making judgements about people. Over the last forty years researchers have argued that we develop certain well-learnt responses to people and events which become automatic over time, to the extent that at times we are ârunning on autopilotâ and that our perception of people can occur by unconscious processes which we are not aware of; and so may subtly influence our behaviour in ways we do not realize. Yet, it is argued, we also have the capacity for careful, reasoned thought, so Chapter 4 considers what is, therefore, the best way to model the human mind and its decision-making during person perception. When do we use careful reasoning and when do we use âmental short-cutsâ when perceiving other people? Do we seek to capture a personâs diverse qualities in a judgement of them, or simply to apply a stereotype?
In everyday life we perceive (and interact with) other people for a purpose. We are motivated by a particular goal, such as deciding who to vote for in an election, whether to continue a budding friendship or what to say to the boss about the project we are working on. Sherlock Holmes makes judgements of people to help his investigation (or occasionally to show off to Dr Watson). We think about people for a purpose, often with a particular goal or outcome in mind. Chapter 5 looks at the relationship between our motivations and how we think about people, examining the ways in which motivation influences person perception. At times in perceiving people we simply need or want to make a decision about them as quickly as possible, yet at other times it is important to try and judge them accurately. Motivation can also influence the way we might choose to present ourselves and others (which may not involve seeking to be accurate). When someone asks us how we got on in an examination, do we answer as accurately as we can, or do we try to present ourselves in a positive light? What do we say when someone we donât like does much better than we do in the same examination? When we engage with other people we are in a social relationship, and in many situations we wish to âlook goodâ in front of others and to âfeel goodâ in ourselves. The decisions and explanations we produce about people and events may have more to do with maintaining our self-esteem than making accurate judgements about other people (and ourselves). Sometimes we might act on intuition: we know we like someone but we cannot explain why. We shall also be examining the idea of mindlessness and mindfulness. Do we drift through life mindlessly engaging with the world, or do we stop and consider mindfully what to do? Thus, the way we think about people, may be influenced by the motivation to think about them (or not to think about them) in the first place.
Despite the belief that we choose what we do, much of our behaviour and that of other people is expected and follows a pattern shared by other members of our society according to social norms. This topic is considered in Chapter 6. How we dress and how we act in a range of circumstances is guided by the social norms of our culture. We do not need to work out why someone has done something if it fits with our everyday expectations: if it follows a social norm, such as dressing smartly for a job interview and casually for a picnic. Indeed, there are many instances where people simply go along with the expected behaviour, possibly without even thinking about it. However, what happens when things go wrong, such as going along with others when it leads to inaccurate judgements and dangerous or harmful behaviour? What happens when there is no social norm and the unexpected occurs: how do we act when there is an accident or a crime? Expectation helps to define an event but it also provides information to help us perform the roles we carry out in life. When we go to university we become a âstudentâ, when we have a baby we become a âparentâ, when we get a job we acquire an occupational role and job title. In each of these roles we have expectations of in-role behaviour (the things students, parents and employees are expected to do). In this chapter we will consider the way we judge others carrying out roles and the way we carry out the roles we inhabit ourselves. One way of examining this behaviour is to consider the person as an actor taking on a role, as they would in a play or a film, and examining how convincing they are in performing this role.
It can be argued that the reason we are able to interact with other people successfully is that we have empathy: most of the time we are able infer what they are seeking to achieve by the behaviour they perform. We can normally work out their intentions. The idea of folk psychology has been proposed to explain how we are able to engage with other people in our everyday lives. Often we do not need to make sense of someoneâs behaviour, as it is simply âcommon senseâ. We donât even need to think about it. Yet if we travel to another country or culture, we may find that our common sense is not the same as theirs. From how to shop and how to eat, to beliefs about the most intimate aspects of human life â it can all be very different between cultures. Indeed, we may only be aware of the expectations we hold when we find that they are not met. In one culture certain behaviour is perfectly acceptable, but in another it may be frowned upon, including simple things such as blowing oneâs nose or forming a queue. Even holding particular beliefs that are rooted in one culture may be unacceptable in another. Chapter 7 explores the relationship between culture and common sense, examining how different beliefs and conventions are communicated and shared within a culture, suggesting that the perception of people relies very much on the way we âthink in cultureâ. It has been argued that what we take to be the ânaturalâ or âproperâ way to view the world and the people in it is not an objective âtruthâ (although we may think it is), but a way of representing the world and the people we meet that is inextricably intertwined with culture. In this chapter we examine how the theory of social representations offers an explanation of how, within a culture, common sense ideas are formed, circulated and transformed.
Much of what we know about people, and what they know about us, comes from the stories we tell each other, whether it is across a coffee with a friend in a cafĂ© or through social media, a newspaper or the television. We are surrounded by stories. As members of a particular culture, our identity as a community depends on the stories we draw on to describe the past. In any city across the world there will be statues of famous people reminding citizens of their heroic past. Art and literature often features famous characters from history, and their stories are told and retold. Indeed, these descriptions of events may be unrelated to the actual historical evidence. On a personal level family stories are told from grandparents and parents to children. In describing our own lives to friends and acquaintances, we present the account in terms of a particular story. Chapter 8 examines the importance of narrative in the way we make sense of ourselves and other people. In a written autobiography or biography, certain key events are selected and put together in a storyline, which the reader interprets. We can ask whether these accounts are accurate or truthful. Yet it may be more important to tell a story that gives meaning to our lives. Indeed, we might question whether an accurate, true or definitive account of anyoneâs life is possible. From this position some of the concepts that we have accepted in earlier chapters can be reconsidered. It is argued that certain âcommon senseâ categories that we take for granted are not ânaturalâ categories but are ones that we created in our culture and which we tell stories about. They become so familiar that often we do not realize that these are not fixed categories but are our own constructions. Rather than arguing that the categories reflect genuine differences between people, we can explore how the people in these categories are talked about and feature in stories. We can even ask why it is necessary to construct hypothetical mental structures (such as schemas, discussed in the earlier chapters) when we can explore the subtleties of meaning in the way people, talk, write and discuss themselves and others.
Finally, the question of stereotypes is examined in Chapter 9. If stereotypes are inaccurate judgements of people, then why are they used so frequently? This seems to be particularly worrying because stereotypes have been associated with prejudice and discrimination in society. Indeed, what is a stereotype? The work on stereotyping highlights the different aspects of person perception considered in the book so far. From a cognitive perspective, stereotyping is a result of the way the human cognitive system works in the perception of social groups and their members, and stereotypes can function as mental short-cuts in thinking and decision-making. Yet stereotypes are not idiosyncratic beliefs but shared views of people belonging to particular social groups. Alternative perspectives have been proposed: that stereotypes are particular ideas circulating in a culture, are formed and maintained as a result of the ideology of the culture, and are responsive to the dynamics of that culture. Finally, it has been suggested that the particular construct of âstereotypeâ may not have an explanatory value â in fact, it may get in the way of explaining the way discrimination and prejudice are expressed (particularly in language). It might be more informative to explore the language of prejudice and how it is used rhetorically in everyday discourse to maintain discrimination in a society.
2
Seeing things â and people
Perception is giving meaning to sensation. Sensation arises from the activity of our sense organs: our eyes detecting light, sound waves registering in our ears, our nose detecting odours, our skin detecting pressure, the sensation of taste on the tongue, even the detection of our bodily position in space (proprioception). As I look out of my window, the light from the sun reflects off of various objects and enters my eyes, the wavelength and intensity determining the colour and brightness. Yet I perceive a street scene. It is sunny, but in this early morning at the beginning of spring it is still a little chilly. The daffodils and primroses appear to be waiting for the warmth of the day before opening fully. Cars are passing along the road. An elderly man with a stick walks slowly past. I recognize him as my neighbour. Heâs probably going to the nearby shop. In the other direction a group of teenagers in school uniform hurry along the road in the direction of the bus stop, where I know the bus will take them to school. A man and a woman stride past. They are both wearing suits and carrying briefcases. I guess they are going to the nearby train station and are on their way to work. A woman is walking a dog.
In barely a few moments I have perceived all these things. The sensations have been translated into a meaningful understanding of the scene. Yet it is a combination of the information available to my human senses (such as the image of the elderly man in my eyes) and my knowledge and experience (that he is my neighbour) that result in the complex process of perception. At a basic level I see his head as being part of his body â I donât see them as separate âentitiesâ â but I do know that his walking stick is not part of him. Perception involves separating an object from its background and then identifying what it is. Certain animals have camouflage to hide them from predators and prey, which makes it particularly hard to distinguish them from the background. In a snowy landscape a number of creatures, such as the polar bear, the artic fox and the ptarmigan, are white and when static may be almost invisible in their surroundings. It is not always easy to separate such a creature from its background until it starts to move. In the same way soldiers will wear camouflage uniforms to disguise themselves in the jungle or the desert to make them difficult to pick out in the landscape. Having detected an object we seek to identify it â which usually means being able to name it. In identifying it we are able to draw on our knowledge and memory of such a thing. Normally perception appears to be very fast, but this should not disguise the fact that it involves complicated brain processing and includes not only the information available to our senses, but also factors such as our position in space, our innate human capacities and our learnt experiences and memory.
People seem to be particularly good at perceiving other people. Even very young babies only a few hours old have a preference for looking at a face rather than a jumble of features (Fantz, 1961). This may be a very basic perceptual preference for human-like (even more crudely ape-like) faces. Di Giorgio et al. (2011) have shown that whilst the baby has a preference for human-like faces, it is not exclusively or narrowly human and does include other primates as well (rhesus macaques in their study). Also the face is highly expressive and can communicate emotion. Since the work of Charles Darwin (1872), it has been argued that certain emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise and disgust) are universal in the way they expressed facially (Ekman and Friesen, 1975). Despite possible differences due to cultural factors, Matsumoto et al. (2008) argue that the universality of the expression of these emotions (plus âcontemptâ) have been shown to occur in many studies across cultures and using a variety of methods. As Matsumoto and Hwang (2013, p. 41) note: âBecause facial expressions of emotion are part of our evolutionary history and are a biologically innate ability, we all have the ability to read themâ. We can also perceive a person with very little information. Johansson (1973) showed that we are very good at detecting characteristic human movement. He attached small lights to the ankles, knees, hips, wrists, elbows and shoulders of an assistant wearing tight-fitting, dark clothes. The assistant was video recorded moving about a darkened room, with only these ten tiny points of light visible. The recordings were shown to a large number of observers who immediately identified it as a person moving around and correctly identified the direction and form of movement. Even with only the five lights on the an...