Metapsychology and the Foundations of Psychoanalysis

Attachment, neuropsychoanalysis and integration

Simon Boag

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781138926769
• eBook ISBN: 9781317404958
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Mental Health in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Metapsychology and the Foundations of Psychoanalysis redresses faults in Freud's original conception to develop a coherent theoretical basis for psychodynamic theory. Simon Boag demonstrates that Freud's much maligned 'metapsychology', once revised, can provide a foundation for evaluating and integrating the plethora of psychodynamic perspectives, by developing a philosophically-informed position that addresses the embodied, interconnected relationship between motivation, cognition and affects.

The book centres upon the major concepts in psychoanalysis, including the notion of unconscious mental processes, wish-fulfilment, fantasy, and repression. Both philosophical considerations and empirical evidence are brought to bear upon these topics, and used to extract the valuable insights from major approaches. As a result, Boag's revised general psychology, which stays true to Freud's intention, addresses psychoanalytic pluralism and shows it is possible to develop a unified account, integrating the insights from attachment theory and object relational approaches and acknowledging the rightful role for neuropsychoanalysis.

Metapsychology and the Foundations of Psychoanalysis will be of interest to psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, philosophers of mind and psychologists, as well as anyone concerned with neuropsychoanalysis or psychoanalysis and attachment theory.

1
THE METAPHYSICS OF METAPSYCHOLOGY

Introduction

A reasonable place to begin addressing the foundations of psychoanalysis might be with a discussion of the ‘basic concepts’ of the theory, as did Freud (1915b), and to then assess whether psychoanalytic theory is logically coherent and consonant with empirical findings. However, these are not, in fact, the true foundations, since Freud embedded psychoanalytic theory within a particular worldview (see Freud, 1933a). If anything, this worldview is the logically prior foundation since the development of psychoanalytic theory is informed by these assumptions, any of which may be more or less implicit or explicit. Thus, while Rapaport and Gill (1959) rightly note that “[a]t some point in the development of every science, the assumptions on which it is built must be clarified” (p. 153), rather than assessing the theory prior to assessing the assumptions, an alternative position is to question one’s assumptions first. In fact, and as hinted at previously, many of the divisions underlying psychoanalytic pluralism are metaphysical in nature, and the logical starting point, then, for clarifying the foundations of psychoanalysis, is not with psychoanalytic theory per se but instead with addressing the metaphysical foundations of psychoanalysis.

However, addressing the metaphysics of psychoanalysis is no small undertaking, and even the term ‘metaphysics’ is open to diverse interpretation (see van Inwagen & Zimmerman, 2008). Most commonly, however, at least in recent writings, Freud’s theory is typically seen as adopting Immanuelle Kant’s philosophical stance (see especially Tauber, 2010). Fulgencio (2005), for instance, writes that “Freudian psychoanalysis was built on the firm ground of the metaphysics of nature of the Kantian kind” (p. 110; cf. Fulgencio, 2007), and from this perspective, “[m]etaphysics concerns ultimate reality” (Talvitie & Ihanus, 2011, p. 1588). For Kant, we do not know the world as it is, but instead via mind-imposed categories, such as space and time, and thus we can never directly access an unknowable, ‘ultimate’ reality lying beyond experience. On the other hand, mind and body are seen as phenomenal aspects of this underlying unknowable reality (das-Ding-an-sich—the thing in itself) and proponents of neuropsychoanalysis explicitly subscribe to this position (e.g. Solms & Turnbull, 2011, p. 137). This viewpoint has major implications for interpreting Freudian theory. For instance, interpreted through a Kantian lens, unconscious processes are viewed in terms of this underlying unknowable reality, rather than referring to ordinary ‘phenomenal’ mental acts (e.g. Solms, 2003). However, viewed as such, it is difficult to see how anyone can have knowledge of an unknowable reality (see Karlsson, 2010), or what clinical relevance such unknowable states might have, and critics of philosophy rightly seize upon this necessarily speculative approach.¹

Instead, an alternative approach to metaphysics, and one more in line with a natural science framework, simply entails enquiry concerning the nature of reality. In contradistinction, then, to the Kantian position, metaphysics here “is not about an unknowable reality behind experience; it is about the reality that is already in and required by experience” (Petocz & Mackay, 2013, p. 217; cf. Hibberd, 2014). On this view, insofar as Freud or anyone else is claiming to be talking about anything that exists, metaphysical considerations are implicated and consequently, any scientific discussion necessarily entails metaphysical considerations concerning the nature of reality. Furthermore, no matter which metaphysical position is adopted, such philosophical considerations are especially critical for psychology generally and psychoanalysis specifically because the relation between mind and body requires critical attention. As Talvitie and Ihanus (2011) observe:

The study of metaphysical issues is often seen as useless speculation … Metaphysics is the key issue when the relevance of neuroscience to psychoanalysis is considered. In this situation it is very important that neuropsychoanalytic studies are explicit in their metaphysical commitments.

(p. 1597)

Holt (1981, 2002) thus recognises that any comprehensive psychoanalytic theory must address metaphysical issues, and the foundational divisions in psychoanalysis, to some degree, reflect different metaphysical stances:

The underlying difficulty, I believe, is metaphysical: the more one tends, consciously or not, toward a dualistic position on the mind-body problem, the more one will feel that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the subjective and objective world, between the realm of external physicochemical fact and that of inner meaning, and thus between science and the humanities.

(Holt, 1981, p. 131)

Accordingly, addressing pluralism in psychoanalysis requires evaluating the supposed metaphysical divisions and whether they hold up to scrutiny or not. By way of example, the supposed tension between general metapsychology and clinical theory (e.g. Fulgencio, 2005, 2007) involves proposing a dualism between the metaphysical categories of universality and particularity. Fulgencio (2007), for instance, attempts to create a dualism between facts and theory: “facts are invariably singular and contingent, while theories and concepts are always universals” (p. 445). However, particular facts cannot be divorced from general theory or concepts, since any so-called singular, particular fact will also refer to types of events of a general (universal) kind—to say otherwise would require that every description be necessarily a novel utterance. Instead, since any situation involves both universals (types of things) and specific instances of those types of things, then any particular clinical description of persons (‘facts’) entails describing universal features of those persons (or what can be described as ‘general theory’). Thus, while clinical descriptions may pertain to a particular individual, these descriptions are not in isolation but necessarily embedded within a broader general ‘metaphysical’ theory, and thus there is not a dualism between clinical theory and descriptions on the one hand and metapsychology on the other.

Consequently, metaphysical enquiry concerns itself with issues such as the relation between mind and brain, causality and freedom, issues which must all be explicitly addressed since they are essential to the whole scientific psychology enterprise. Ignoring such issues simply provides a recipe for confusion and a foundation for apparent but false divisions between theories. As Holt (1981) again observes, metaphysics “takes its revenge on those who ignore it”:

It is of the very nature of the questions metaphysicians tackle that everyone must take some implicit stand on them, and it is dangerous to remain unaware of that fact … Psychoanalysts—of all people—should respond positively to the idea that what you don’t know can hurt you, and that there is a clear gain in expanding our consciousness of matters we aren’t usually aware of.

(Holt, 1981, p. 132, his italics)

Consequently, clarifying the metaphysical foundations of psychoanalysis is directly relevant to addressing Freudian metapsychology since many of the criticisms of metapsychology entail philosophical considerations concerning the nature of mind and brain, and the nature of causality, and thus evaluating whether a metapsychological position is coherent necessitates addressing its metaphysical commitments. Whether such claims are consistently and coherently put forward requires philosophical assessment, and thus, a critical philosophical analytic approach is necessary for both developing a coherent metaphysical position for situating psychoanalytic theory within, as well as providing a critical evaluation tool for assessing the coherency of any proposed psychoanalytic position.

Evaluating metaphysical standpoints

Evaluating the coherency of any given metaphysical standpoint is not, however, a simple matter since it is commonly supposed that such a priori philosophical considerations are not open to empirical evaluation. Talvitie and Ihanus (2011), for instance, while arguing for the critical role of metaphysics in psychoanalysis, nevertheless write, “we cannot avoid asking on what grounds we might know which metaphysical position is more accurate than another … every branch of study must rest on some metaphysical propositions, which cannot be verified empirically” (p. 1598). Similarly, Solms and Turnbull (2002) believe that metaphysical positions are not assessable empirically, and instead one must simply accept the worldview a priori:

Loath as we may be to admit it, the testable hypotheses that scientists can work with are embedded in sets of broader propositions that are themselves untestable. These broader propositions define the world view (Weltanschauung) within which a scientist operates; and world views are not subject to proof.

(Solms & Turnbull, 2002, p. 54)

Nevertheless, it cannot simply be the case that ‘anything goes’, such that any and all world views are on equal footing and one is simply left free to choose whatever metaphysical position that one fancies (cf. Barratt, 2015b). After all, there appear to be empirical facts and achievements that give a scientific Weltanschauung greater credence compared to, say, religious ones, since there appears to be more compelling evidence for the metaphysical thesis of determinism (taken here to be that events arise out of causes) compared to the claim of miraculous intervention.

On the other hand, Talvitie and Ihanus (2011) propose resolving the choice of metaphysical stance by employing Occam’s razor: “we should avoid non-necessary presuppositions and, if there are two models that explain a phenomenon equally well, then we should favour the one that makes fewer metaphysical postulates” (p. 1598). In this context, ‘metaphysical postulates’ refer to assumed-but-unobservable entities, such as ‘the unconscious’ in psychoanalytic theory, which presupposes that theoretical entities are necessarily speculative:

Because the existence of the unconscious part of the mind (or the unconscious) has not been empirically proven (and many think that it is not even worth trying to do so), it should be taken as a metaphysical assumption. The mental unconscious is an unobservable—or we might say that the Freudian unconscious contains several kinds of unobservables: the psychic apparatus, drives, unconscious fantasies, repressed desires and memories.

(Talvitie & Ihanus, 2011, p. 1589, their italics)

Talvitie and Ihanus’s application of Occam’s razor would thus mean accepting a theory postulating fewer theoretical entities compared to other theories (cf. Morgan, 1894, p. 53). Nevertheless, while there might be some heuristic merit to this strategy, this stance is nevertheless problematic because the razor ignores the logical coherency of any given metaphysical supposition. Would we really accept a theory with, say, two incoherent metaphysical suppositions (or theoretical entities) but reject a theory with three coherent ones? Obviously, the issue of logical coherency needs to be the paramount consideration, and while a metaphysical thesis such as determinism might not be empirically demonstrable—no one could ever demonstrate that causality occurs everywhere, and for all time—such theses are nevertheless open to logical scrutiny, and while logic itself might be accused of entailing various metaphysical presuppositions, it is nevertheless the best resource open to us in resolving such matters.

A realist metaphysics

Despite Freud’s apparent deference to Kant, Freud also adopts a realist philosophy underlying his general scientific approach (e.g. Freud, 1933a). Realism here simply means that there is a mind-independent reality, which Freud believes provides a basis for scientific knowledge, since we can both come to know this mind-independent reality and make objective claims about it. A realist philosophical framework thus fits with Freud’s broad commitment to the natural scientific approach involving both empiricism (knowledge through experience) and a commitment to determinism (all events arise out of antecedent conditions and go on to cause other events) (see Freud, 1933a, pp. 170, 182; 1940a[1938], pp. 158–159; 1940b[1938], p. 282). Such a realist metaphysics implicates universally present, mind independent ‘categories’ that are logically necessary for anything to occur, which has practical value since these categories “provide the logical constraints which any theory, model, or general account must meet” (Hibberd, 2014, p. 167), and thus provide a approach for evaluating the logical coherency of theories. Based on the realist philosophy of the Scottish-born Australian philosopher John Anderson (see Anderson, 1962), Hibberd (2014) identifies thirteen “pervasive, logically necessary conditions or features (categories)” (p. 165), which include the spatio-temporal context, identity, difference, existence, relation, generality (or universality), particularity, number, order, quantity, and causality. It is not the place here to enter into whether Hibberd’s list of categories is satisfactory or exhaustive (Anderson, for instance, views space and time as the context for the categories—Anderson, 1962; Baker, 1986; see also Michell, 2011), but for present purposes, the category of relation is particularly pertinent for addressing Freudian theory since it is implicated in evaluating theories, both with respect to description and explanation, as well as logical errors commonly attributed to Freud’s metapsychology, such as reification and circular explanation (as described below).

The world we live in can be seen as consisting of various qualities (or properties) that stand in a variety of relations to one another. Any individual, for example, consists of various properties constituting the individual, and the individual also stands in any infinite amount of relations, whether they be spatial, temporal, familial, or legal (etc.). What relations have in common is that they involve at least two or more distinct terms standing with respect to one another, and any terms standing in relation must have their own intrinsic properties to constitute what stands in the relation. As Mackie (in Anderson, 1962) writes, “a quality is an intrinsic feature of a thing, it belongs to the thing itself, whereas a relation holds between two or more things” (p. 266), and while the terms of the relation must have their own intrinsic properties, they must nevertheless be logically independent from one another, in order to be related. If it were otherwise, we would not be able to speak of what is in relationship. As Maze (1983) writes:

Anything that can stand … in any relation at all, must have at least some intrinsic properties. If that were not the case … then we could not understand what it was that was said to have those relationships. A relation can only hold between two or more terms, and a part of what is involved in seeing those terms as related is being able to see them as distinct, that is, as each having its own intrinsic properties, so that we can say what the terms are that are related. This means that each term of the relation must be able in principle to be described without the need to include any reference to its relation to the other.

(p. 24, his italics; cf. Maze, 1954, p. 231; Michell, 1988, p. 234)

So, for instance, to borrow an example from Bell, Staines and Michell (2001), in the situation where John is different from Mike, both John and Mike must exist and have properties that they differ on. The relation of ‘difference’, however, cannot be reduced to either of the terms (i.e. ‘difference’ cannot be reduced to either John or Mike) since difference is not a property of either term. So, while John and Mike must have their own characteristics that they differ from one another on, the relation of difference is between those properties of John and Mike rather than being a property of either. Taken as such, the relation itself is not some type of third entity, since, as Michell (1988) writes, a relation “is not a kind of stuff that binds the terms. It is just how the terms are with respect to each other” (p. 234, his italics; see also Hibberd, 2014, pp. 168ff). Furthermore, relations need not be simply between two terms and some concepts, such as ‘meaning’ can be viewed as a ternary relation between the signifier, the signified, and a cognising subject (Petocz, 1999; cf. Hibberd, 2014, pp. 173f), and as will be developed later, affective processes can be understood as particular ternary relations as well (see Chapter 2).

The logic of relations and conceptual analysis

Appreciating the logic of relations provides a means of conducting conceptual analysis in two important ways. First, any concept or theoretical term can be assessed for whether it refers to a property or quality of something (including whether it refers to an entity that consists of its own intrinsic properties), or to specific relations between qualities or entities. One means of achieving this is through dissecting what a concept is said to be, and what it is said to do. If a theorist is proposing, for instance, that a certain quality or entity exists, then it should have intrinsic features that can be identified independently of any relation entered into, which would mean describing the property independently of any particular performance or activity (Maze, 1983). On the other hand, certain concepts are relational, although not always clearly so. Concepts such as ‘impulse-control’, ‘risk-taking’, ‘sociability’, ‘adaptability’, ‘cautiousness’ and ‘conformity’ all suggest act...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The metaphysics of metapsychology
• 2 The biological foundations of personality
• 3 Repression and the metapsychology of defence
• 4 The metapsychology of the unconscious
• 5 The metapsychology of the self
• 6 The metapsychology of object relations
• Conclusion
• References
• Index