1
Introduction
Terrorism is an age-old problem and takes many forms. In Western Europe in the first years of the twenty-first century, for example, the terrorist threat has come primarily from fundamentalist Islamist, or, as they are also called, Islamic fundamentalist groups. We have also seen destruction and violence perpetrated by right-wing extremists. Naturally, such activities need to be countered. And for the response to be effective, it is essential that we understand terrorism and the associated processes of radicalization. This book is an attempt to add to the body of knowledge in that field.
The long history of terrorism has been documented for at least 2000 years. One of the first reliably reported cases dates from the first century BCE, when Jewish attackers used daggers to kill their victims in broad daylight in the heart of Jerusalem, in an effort to spark an uprising against Roman rule (Cronin, 2002/2003). Today we would call that an example of nationalist/separatist terrorism, in accordance with a widely used typology that divides the phenomenon into four categories: (1) left-wing (or social revolutionary), (2) right-wing, (3) nationalist/separatist, and (4) religious (Cronin, 2002/2003; Post, 2005). Post also identifies a fifth type, single-issue terrorism. An example of this type is a radical group that carries out attacks in the name of animal rights (Carson, LaFree & Dugan, 2012). There are undoubtedly hybrid forms as well.
Well known European examples of left-wing terror groups include the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF) in Germany and the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse) in Italy, both most active in the 1970s. The RAF, also known as the Baader-Meinhof Group after its two most prominent members, carried out âacts of resistanceâ against the capitalist West German state, including bank robberies and a number of assassinations of bankers, industrialists and judges. (See Chapter 7 for more information.) Inspired by a similar ideology, the Red Brigades was even more violent: in the first ten years after it was formed in 1970, the group committed some 14,000 acts of terrorism (see Shugart, 2006). This first period culminated in the kidnapping of the Italian prime minister Aldo Moro. They ambushed his car, killing his chauffeur and five policemen. When their terms for exchanging Mr. Moro for ransom and the release of 16 brigade members were not met, the Red Brigade leader Mario Moretti allegedly shot Aldo Moro 11 times, killing him in the backseat of a car (Sundquist, 2010). As for right-wing terrorism, one notable example is the French Secret Armed Organisation (Organ-isation ArmĂ©e SecrĂšte, OAS). Active between 1954 and 1962, it regarded the proposed decolonization of Algeria as a violation of the integrity of the French nation. In its armed struggle, the OAS carried out numerous attacks on representatives of both the French state and the Algerian independence movement, claiming a high number of victims.
That movement, the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN), brings us to nationalist/separatist terrorism, carried out with the aim of achieving independence or greater autonomy for a particular region or population. The FLN at first avoided killing people, instead targeting buildings it regarded as symbols of colonial oppression. But because that campaign made little impact, its attacks steadily increased in brutality to the point where they were causing deaths on a massive scale. After years of guerrilla warfare, Algeria finally gained its independence in 1962 (Shugart, 2006). Other well known organizations in this part of the spectrum include the Basque separatist movement ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom) and the Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA). The former was founded in 1959, committed to the establishment of an independent and socialist Basque state. Between 1968 and 2003, ETA killed more than 300 civilians and more than 400 police officers and soldiers. The IRA sought a united Ireland without links to the United Kingdom and carried out many acts of violence in pursuit of that goal, but in 2005 it called upon its members to end their armed struggle. (See Chapter 8 for more on both groups.)
For an example of religious terrorism, we can look further afield to India, where Hindu extremists (Hindus form the great majority of the population) have targeted Muslims and their mosques and Christians and their churches. But by far the most obvious case, of course, is Islamist terrorism, which reached its nadir â for the time being â with the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001. To its supporters, naturally, that was a high point, and they prefer to talk of a âholy warâ or a âliberation struggleâ rather than terrorism. Box 1.1 illustrates the value-laden character of the terrorism concept.
In this book, we pay considerable attention to religious radicalization and terrorism, in particular their âIslamicâ manifestations, but we also discuss right-wing radicalization and terrorism. This is because these are currently the forms giving greatest cause for concern in the Western world. Left-wing, or social revolutionary, radicalism and terrorism are also covered since they help us to understand whether the different categories can be traced back to similar roots. Nationalist/separatist movements are featured only in passing.
Box 1.1 The Suffragettes, a terrorist organization
At the end of the nineteenth century, a movement for women to have the vote arose in England. Progress in obtaining this goal was, however, very slow; most men in Parliament believed that women could not understand Parliamentâs methods and therefore should not have the right to vote. Due to the slow progress, militancy grew and a different movement that was more prepared to use violence, later known as the Suffragettes, was founded in 1903 by Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughters. That violence started in 1905 when two members of the Suffragettes disturbed a political meeting, which resulted in their arrest and, because they refused to pay a fine, in their imprisonment. More and more extreme violence arose. The Suffragettes burned down churches because the Church of England opposed granting the right to vote to women; they broke windows in Oxford Street, vandalized golf courses, attacked politicians and firebombed their homes. Many Suffragettes went to prison, where they refused to eat. The government responded with the Cat and Mouse Act, which allowed the Suffragettes to go on hunger strikes and let them get increasingly weaker. When they were sufficiently weak, they were released from prison, but they were then too weak to take part in violent actions. Unsurprisingly, the Suffragettes became more extreme, for example, by blowing up part of the house of David Lloyd George â probably Britainâs most famous politician at that time. The Great War, however, ended the violence of the Suffragettes and brought support for the government and its war effort. In 1918, the Representation of the People Act, the start of female suffrage in Great Britain, was passed by Parliament.
This description of the Suffragettes clearly fits what we regard as a terrorist organization. That some may feel reluctant to agree illustrates the value-laden character of the concept of terrorism. Terrorists often are called freedom fighters by people who share their cause.
Source: See The Suffragettes (n.d.).
As the examples already cited make clear, radicalization, terrorism and political violence are not merely facets of one simple, straightforward phenomenon. In fact, they have to be subdivided into many different types, which impedes definition. Plenty of researchers before us have come up against this problem of definition. Smelser (2007), for instance, devotes more than 20 pages of his introductory work to this issue, observing that over a hundred distinctive definitions of the word âterrorismâ appear in the literature. In this book we choose the definition of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is currently the most comprehensive open-source database and includes both domestic and international terrorist attacks. This definition of terrorism is âthe threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidationâ (Carson et al., 2012).
Terrorism does not appear out of nowhere. It is almost always preceded by a process of radicalization â a process that, because of its potentially violent outcome, has attracted a lot of academic attention. While it does not necessarily lead to terrorism, this is a phase in which much can be done to pre-empt that possibility and so is one we address at length. The present book thus pays considerable attention to the stages before individuals or groups decide to opt for illegal force and violence. Polarization of intergroup relations and radicalization will thus be addressed at length. In this context, what we mean by radicalization is the development of a belief in opinions, views and ideas that might well result in a person committing acts of terror (see also TTSRL, 2008). Each of the different forms of terrorism identified earlier has a concomitant form of radicalism. In other words, we can distinguish among left-wing (or social revolutionary), right-wing, nationalist/separatist and religious radicalism.
To properly understand modern-day terrorism, it is helpful to have some impression of the extent and seriousness of the problem. Ben-Zur & Zeidner (2009) report that a total of 19,828 acts of terrorism and political violence were committed throughout the world between 1968 and 2004, resulting in 25,408 deaths and 61,160 injuries. Cronin (2002/2003) adds that, although the number of attacks actually fell during the 1990s, the average number of fatalities per incident increased. To give an example, 1991 saw 102 deaths in 565 acts of terrorism, whereas a total of 741 people were killed in 274 attacks in 1998. Another illustration of the scope of terrorism was presented by Kaplan (2012), who identified jihadi terror plots in the U.S. from terrorism-related indictments that occurred between 2001 and 2011. Kaplan also identified the successful attacks. Using a number of analytical procedures, Kaplan estimated among others mean plot durations. His estimates suggested that, on average, there have been approximately three active jihadi plots in the U.S. at any point since 11 September 2001.
Moreover, the effects can extend far beyond the scene of the incident. People suffer indirectly, through the impact upon others, and can even be traumatized by the media coverage. In the U.S., Dougall, Hayward & Baum (2005) investigated the psychological effects of exposure to media reports about a series of attacks using letters containing anthrax spores. They found that participants who followed the coverage closely from the beginning suffered greater distress, were more likely to harbour thoughts on the subject that they were unable to dispel and displayed stronger avoidance responses. The stress triggered by such events can also result in more unhealthy behaviour and an increased disregard of certain risks. Research into the aftermath of the September 11 attacks (Ben-Zur & Zeidner, 2009) discovered that residents of New York were smoking and drinking more and that alcohol-related problems had increased. Closer involvement, precipitated by the loss of a relative or friend, provoked even stronger reactions, such as serious alcohol abuse. Ben-Zur and Zeidner also mention research in Israel, which revealed a sharp increase in the incidence of fatal road traffic accidents in the wake of terrorist attacks. Morgan, Wisneski & Skitka (2011) reviewed a number of other implications of 9/11, focusing particularly on the social psychological effects. Americans appeared to respond to the attacks with more political intolerance, prejudice and discrimination and with hate crimes directed towards targets that were associated with the attackers. Interestingly, there were also more positive reactions, such as experiencing increased closeness with others, greater intentions to do nice things for friends and family, donating blood, increasing contributions of time and money to charity and flying the American flag. These positive reactions were, however, more fleeting than the negative ones (see also American Psychologist, 2011; Woods, 2011).
The Madrid bombings of 2004 and the London bombings of 2005 not only increased political intolerance and prejudice (see e.g. Echebarria-Echabe & FernĂĄndez-Guede, 2006); they also changed the tides of security policy and societyâs view on terrorism. Interestingly, after the bomb attacks in London in 2005, it was found that British Muslims were more upset than adherents of other faiths (Spilerman & Stecklov, 2009); doubtless, the fear of a backlash against their own community â the perpetrators were Muslims â played an important part in this response. More generally, this same study revealed that fear and concern following the attacks were more prevalent amongst people with no previous exposure to terrorism than those with past experience of it.
In discussing such responses, Spilerman and Stecklov (2009) draw a clear distinction between the chronic type of terrorism that affected Northern Ireland and still exists in Israel and the more incidental form of terrorism that has affected the U.S. and Western Europe. The less extreme sense of fear felt by people with experience of terrorism suggests that they become habituated to it. On the other side of the coin, those subject to chronic terrorism live under constant threat and so try to adapt to the risks. Behaviour that can appear rather pathological in the case of incidental terrorism, such as extreme vigilance and the avoidance of certain places and situations, is logical and sensible in the context of chronic terrorism. According to Spilerman and Stecklov, this results in a kind of new normality in which people are always on their guard and more or less permanently undergoing stress reactions.
The consequences of terrorism are serious, then, but they are not the main focus of this book. We are interested primarily in explanations and theories concerning the causes of radicalism and terrorism. Due in part to the complexity of the issue, however, convincing and comprehensive theories in this field are very thin on the ground (e.g. Bouhana & Wikström, 2008; Silke, 2008; Taylor & Horgan, 2006) Another reason is the difficulty in obtaining reliable and useful data; obviously, a lot of relevant people are hard to reach. Moreover, if they are reached, they are not likely to be keen on participating in research on this issue and may be reluctant to disclose information. Any study of terrorism is further complicated by the forest of possible definitions and the minefield of demarcation problems. For the most part, moreover, terrorist groups are far from homogeneous; in many cases, they are hierarchical in structure, usually with a variety of different individual roles (Victoroff, 2005). They require inspiring leaders but also people capable of compiling a suitable political policy and of devising and preparing attacks and still others to supply the necessary materiel. And then there are the recruiters, who find attackers and persuade them to plant bombs or to carry out suicide missions. This variety of roles makes lumping all âterroristsâ together under one heading an oversimplification. In many ca...