Cognitive content and enacted thought
Shakespeare, according to Friedrich Nietzsche, was Michel de Montaigneās ābest readerā, and āfrom his earliest notes on Shakespeareā, as Alan D. Schrift has observed, āNietzsche shows himself to be interested not simply in Shakespeareās evocative power as a dramatist but in his specifically philosophical insights too. ⦠[H]e makes his dramas correspondingly thought-provoking, āfull of ideasāā (Schrift (2000: 46)). This conception of Shakespeare as āfull of ideasā brings the study of the plays and the work of philosophy into the orbit of Shakespeareās relationship with Montaigne. Literature has a place in philosophical understanding and the proposition invites us to think of Montaigneās responsibility for helping Shakespeare become a āthought-provokingā dramatist of ideas and a contributor to intellectual life. From the time that Edward Capell first suggested a Montaignian source for Shakespeare in the second volume of his editorial Notes and Various Readings (1779ā80), studies of a Montaignian background to the plays have mounted in number ā the online āMontaigne Studiesā lists around a dozen discussions dating from the later years of the nineteenth century to the last few decades. Terence Cave, whose critical scholarship on Montaigne is among the most perceptive to date, can in consequence write world-wearily of āthe eternal question of whether and how far Shakespeare was familiar with the Essaisā (Cave (2007: 117)).1 If, however, Shakespeareās familiarity with Montaigne is a question destined to remain unanswered, little will be settled on the matter of āwhether and how farā Montaigne made Shakespeare āfull of ideasā. But equally at issue is whether āideasā per se constitute the philosophical signature of either writer, or if they do not, what philosophical justification, if any, brings them together? As Raimond Gaita has observed, philosophers have always acknowledged that literature can provide food for the thought of philosophers, ābut onlyā, he warns, āwhen what is nourishing to thought ā genuinely cognitive content ā can be abstracted from literary styleā (Gaita (2004: xxxv)).
In this essay I suggest that the perspectives of Shakespeare and Montaigne are fundamentally discontinuous with some of the categories of philosophical disquisition commonly applied to their comparison, and that in order to distinguish the sense of enacted āthoughtā from the ācognitive contentā of philosophy held within the Shakespearean embrace as āideasā, we should place more value on the probings or soundings into the nature of things implicit in the term essai ā in the French sense of ātrialā or āattemptā. Statements having intellectual content abound in both Shakespeare and Montaigne, as do hypotheses for philosophical examination; but we do not always apprehend the philosophical value of Shakespeare and Montaigne in this sense. Montaigneās āthoughtā we construe through a compound of anecdote, self-analysis, reflections on ways of living and dying, classical quotations, stories from the past and the present, autobiographical wanderings and unchecked digressions, complaints about excruciating stones in the kidneys, or extensive disquisition on the reason and unreason of natural religion. The monologue of the Essais presents an extended sequence of thoughts, gestures, and observations unshaped by philosophyās latter-day disciplinary conventions. Their effect, in William D. Hamlinās formulation (marking Montaigneās artistic bond with Shakespeare), is ādramatic in feeling if not in formā (Hamlin (2013: 38)).2 Correspondingly the experience of āthinkingā philosophically inspired in the reader or spectator by powerful Shakespearean drama includes, in Hannah Arendtās characterization of the Socratic mode, āpondering reflection [that] does not produce definitions and is⦠entirely without resultsā (Arendt (1971: 413)). This quality in Shakespeare derives from having statement, action, poetical language, and the psychology of character plumb the abyss of a real not necessarily reasonable world outside the familiarly lived. In neither case is the thought of the writer explicable as a body of doctrine.
Modern philosophers on Shakespeare and Montaigne
If Shakespeare is not the most conspicuous example in literature of a writer committed to intellectual discourse, Montaigneās apparent inescapability as a source of thematic or theoretical content congenial to Shakespeare pervades key studies by professional philosophers. āIt is as ifā, writes A.D. Nuttall of Montaigne in his Shakespeare the Thinker, āthe intense religious experiences of [Shakespeareās] early years were gradually cocooned in a benign Montaignian skepticismā (Nuttall (2007: 18)). In Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare Stanley Cavell likewise implies Shakespeareās links with the same overarching system. He finds āskepticism⦠in various Shakespeare playsā. Of Othello he observes that āthe philosophy or moral seems all but contained in the essay Montaigne entitles āOn Some Verses of Virgilāā, and he cites Montaigne writing in misanthropic mode: āWhat a monstrous animal [is Man] to be a horror to himself, to be burdened by his pleasures, to regard himself as a misfortune!ā From the Shakespeare āall but contained inā Montaigne, Cavell reads a Montaignian Othello on topical-thematic grounds:
The essay concerns the compatibility of sex with marriage, of sex with age; it remarks upon, and upon the relations among, jealousy, chastity, imagination, doubts about virginity; upon the strength of language and the honesty of language; and includes mention of a Turk and of certain instances of necrophilia. One just about runs through the topics of Othello if to this essay one adds Montaigneās early essay āOf the Power of Imagination,ā which contains a Moor and speaks of a king of Egypt who, finding himself impotent with his bride, threatened to kill her, thinking it was some sort of sorcery.
(Cavell (2003: 3, 139))
The ātopics of Othelloā found in Montaigne here arise as categories of philosophical disquisition. Such perspectives are valuable to literary criticism of Shakespeare because they balance developments that emphasize stage rather than page ā the enthusiasm for āStratford Shakespeareā, the creative prestige accorded to directing and design when ascertaining the ultimate experience of Shakespeare, and the place in this experience given to the privileged authority of thespian witness. Against this background the philosopher Colin McGinn can draw attention in Shakespeareās Philosophy to core intellectual and psychological insights available independently of theatrical presentation ā Montaigneās philosophical thinking on (say) the nature of dreams bringing out the underlying theory of Shakespeareās Dream. Many individual arguments, ātopicsā, and āideasā, as Nuttall, Cavell and McGinn have shown, are capable of being read across the space between their respective texts.
This fact may reasonably invite the suggestion that Shakespeare must have known Montaigne, and forms the background to the recent gathering of anglicized passages from the French by Stephen Greenblatt and Peter G. Platt under the rubric of Shakespeareās Montaigne (Greenblatt & Platt 2014). But while the editors of this volume can appeal to a traditionally classical topos to underpin Shakespearean arguments against the fear of death, they maintain that the contemporary translation by John Florio is the Montaigne that Shakespeare actually read. There is the suggestion that reflections from āThat to Philosophize Is to Learn How to Dieā (I.19),3 Montaigneās great essay reasoning in company with the latter part of the third book of Lucretiusās epic poem De rerum natura, came specifically to mind in the famous consolatory address to the condemned Claudio by the Duke in Measure for Measure (performed in 1604):
Be absolute for death: either death or life
Shall thereby be the sweeter. Reason thus with life:
If I do lose thee, I do lose a thing
That none but fools would keep.ā¦
⦠Thy best of rest is sleep.
(III.i. 5ā17)4
The āShakespeareanā passages printed by Greenblatt and Platt support the selection of fully nineteen texts from Florioās translation. But they also express a tension between the scholarly demand for proof that Shakespeare actually cast his eyes on the pages of Montaigne before writing his plays (or some of them) and the broad critical productiveness of speculation about Shakespeare in company with the Essais/Essayes.
Speculation versus proof: the case of Hamlet
The Tragedy of Hamlet, the play perhaps most often invoked by philosophers and literary critics alike to suggest how Montaigne might generate philosophical echoes in Shakespeare, illustrates this tension. Matthew Arnold suggests that Hamlet calls strikingly to mind Montaigneās plasticity of intelligence, his fluid demeanour, and undogmatic humanity:
Shakespeare conceived this play with his mind running on Montaigne, and placed its action and its hero in Montaigneās atmosphere and world. What is this world? It is the world of man viewed as a being ondoyant et divers, balancing and indeterminate, the plaything of cross motives and shifting impulses, swayed by a thousand subtle influences, physiological and pathological.5
āIf there is a single bookā, writes Jonathan Bate, āthat brings us close to the mind of Hamlet, it is Montaigneās Essaysā (Bate (2008: 420)). William M. Hamlin, in Montaigneās English Journey, a comprehensive study of Florioās English reputation and impact, cites approvingly the work of Lars Engle and Peter Mack to endorse an approach whereby, quoting Mack, we āthink about the revealingly different ways the two authors treat the same issueā (Hamlin (2013: 110)), and he gives the example of āconscienceā: āLike the essays of Montaigne, the plays of Shakespeare abound with explorations of human conscience, one of the primary instances being that of Claudius in Hamletā. With respect to Montaigneās āOf Conscienceā, he goes on to note that: āThe play-within-the-play is⦠imagined to function in a manner quite structurally similar to that of judicial torture in Montaigneās accountā (Hamlin (2013: 114ā15)). McGinn, in his turn, writes of āthe philosophical ideas embedded in Shakespeareās textā (McGinn (2006: viii)) ā an insight he illustrates by passages from Montaigne suggestive of moments in Hamlet:
Montaigne has some interesting remarks in this connection⦠In another passage Montaigne could almost be speaking of Hamlet. ⦠I like to think that the work Hamlet is perusing when Polonius confronts him is Montaigneās Essays.
(50ā1, 58)
āCould almost be speaking ofā¦ā; āI like to think thatā¦ā: such formulations register both the explanatory pleasure of the thought that Shakespeare could compose the play with Montaigne in mind and a reluctance to sound categorical, and therefore open to challenge, on the possibility of Shakespeareās access to Montaignian texts. Other philosophical topics on which McGinn links Shakespeare and Montaigne introduce further thematic overlaps: they include cruelty, nothingness, grief, imagination, other minds, and the nature of the self. In this way the drama is nourished by philosophical thought. Certainly Hamlet contains speeches appearing as āembeddedā chunks of quasi-philosophical deliberation: āTo be, or not to beā (III.i. 55).
How far these are the best terms in which to foster philosophical comparisons, I suggest, is open to doubt, while the suggestion that Montaigne is a frequent āsourceā of the plays has proved difficult to establish. The exception is I.31 of the Essais, āDes cannibalesā (āOf the Caniballesā), first identified by Capell (I.30 (Florio (1603), āThe First Bookā, Ch. 30: 258ā9)). Though there are different views on whether Shakespeare was following the original or Florioās translation, Montaigne is here an indisputable, undisputed, source, and his title most likely contributes anagrammatically to the figure of Caliban. The text in question is the address by the old counsellor Gonzalo in The Tempest (possibly written 1610ā11) ā speaking as if with the voice of Montaigne. The passage, adapted as a speech by Shakespeare, defines how the ideal commonwealth might sustain life innocently lived according to the principles of nature:
Iāthā commonwealth I would, by contraries,
Execute all things; for no kind of traffic
Would I admit; no name of magistrate;
Letters should not be known; riches, poverty,
And use of service, none; contract, succession,
Bourn, bound of land, tilth, vineyard, none;
No use of metal, corn, or wine, or oil;
No occupation, all men idle, all;
And women too, but innocent and pure;
No sovereignty ā
(II.i. 148ā57; Capell (1779ā80, 2: 636))
ā an exalted notion immediately undercut by Sebastianās sarcastically deflating remark on Gonzaloās rhapsody of ungoverned perfection:
Yet he would be king onāt.
(II.i. 58)
While other echoes of Montaigne in Shakespeare are by contrast uncertain, many allusions and lines of plot confirm Shakespeareās textual knowledge of Sir Thomas Northās translation of Plutarchās Parallel Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans (first edition 1579, based on the French translation of Jacques Amyot of 1559). A sense of dramatic narrative and rhetorical form (as manifest in the āRomanā plays and particularly Coriolanus) here demonstrates that Shakespeare had indeed read the Plutarchian text. But if we seek empirical evidence of Shakespeare as Nietzscheās ābestā ā or in any sense ā āreaderā of Montaigne, we find that the chronological order of texts and the conditions of Shakespearean publication rule out or make it very difficult to establish the philosophical role of Montaigne.
Thus Florioās Montaigne was published in 1603, and as Gree...